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This  thesis  argues  that  higher  education  systems  in  post-­‐‑conflict  states  have  
the   potential   to   contribute   towards  more   effective   post-­‐‑war   reconstruction  
and  recovery.  However,  while  the  role  of  Higher  Education  in  Development  
was   emphasised   in   the   post-­‐‑WWII   era,   the   specific   experience   of   higher  
education   in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   has   escaped   the   attention   of   both  
academics  and  policy-­‐‑makers  engaged  in  reconstruction.  Furthermore,  donor  
policy  attention  has  not  been  placed  upon  utilising   the   resources  of  higher  
education  in  post-­‐‑war  recovery.  The  overall  aim  is  therefore  to  address  this  
gap  in  the  literature  by  providing  global  analysis  of  higher  education  in  post-­‐‑
war   recovery.   Firstly,   a   theoretical   framework   of   the   relationship   between  
higher  education  and  recovery  was  constructed  in  terms  of  the  functions  that  
higher  education  can  perform  in  contributing  to  recovery,  the  features  of  the  
post-­‐‑war   environment   that  hinder  or   enable  higher   education,   and  various  
policy   options   available   to   post-­‐‑conflict   higher   education.   Secondly,   two  
case-­‐‑studies   of   Iraq   and   Libya   were   examined   to   explore   the   relationship  
between   higher   education   and   post-­‐‑war   recovery.   Principally   through  
interviews  with  academics  and  policy-­‐‑makers  from  case-­‐‑study  countries,  the  
thesis  reveals  a  range  of  perspectives  and  voices  on  higher  education  during  
post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   and   transition.   The   thesis   concludes   that   higher  
education   should  be   conceptualised   as   an   important  pillar   of   recovery;   the  
capacity  of  domestic  higher  education  sectors   in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts   is  an  
often  under-­‐‑recognised  and  under-­‐‑utilised  resource  of  considerable  potential  
value   that   can   connect   to   a   wide   range   of   reconstruction   and   recovery  
processes  and  effectively  drive  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery  and  transitions.  Given  
the  under-­‐‑theorised  and  under-­‐‑studied  nature  of  higher  education  and  post-­‐‑
conflict   recovery   the   thesis   operates   in   a   theory-­‐‑building  mode   and   offers  
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This  thesis  analyses  the  role  of  higher  education  (HE)  in  post-­‐‑conflict  reconstruction  
and   recovery   through   two   empirical   case-­‐‑studies   of   Iraq   and   Libya.   The   central  
hypothesis  is  that  HE  is  a  neglected  aspect  of  post-­‐‑war  reconstruction  and  recovery  
that   has   potential   to   act   as   a   key   pillar   of   more   effective   reconstruction   and  
recovery.  The  purpose  of  the  study  is  to  advance  understanding  of  the  relationship  
between  HE  and  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery,  an  area  that  has  received  little  academic  and  
policy  attention.   It   is  posited   that  greater  recognition  of   the  developmental   role  of  
HE  in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts  will  make  a  contribution  towards  better  understanding  
of  the  wider  field  of  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery  and  as  such  more  effective  policies.    
  
  
a) Statement  of  Problem  
  
  
The   role   of   HE   in   post-­‐‑war   recovery   is   a   significantly   understudied   phenomena.  
While   basic   education   in   conflict,   emergencies,   and   reconstruction   emerged   as   a  
field  of  research  and  practice  in  the  past  decade  the  same  cannot  be  said  about  HE  
(Buckland  2005).  This,  despite  the  fact  that  HE  has  since  the  late  1990s  resurfaced  as  
an   important   component   of   global   development   agendas,   driven   in   part   by   the  
importance   attached   to   knowledge   and   innovation   as   growth-­‐‑drivers   (Brennan,  
King  &   Lebeau   2004;   Tilak   2002b).   In   addition,   universities   have   been   held   to   be  
crucial  in  fostering  national  and  civic  identities  (Davis  2005a)  producing  high-­‐‑level  
skills,  enhancing  social  mobility  (Singh  2011),  and  nurturing  critical  thinking  (Bishai  
2008).  While  HE’s   role   in  development  has  been   the   subject  of   a  growing  body  of  
research,   its   role   in  post-­‐‑conflict   societies  has  not  and  remains  confined   to  a   small  
number  of   studies   that  address   some  related  areas.  Furthermore,  no  systematic  or  
theoretical  studies  have  addressed  post-­‐‑conflict  HE.    
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This   thesis   aims   to   redress   the   significant   knowledge   gap   that   exists   in   our  
knowledge   regarding   the   overlapping   spheres   of   HE,   development,   conflict,   and  
post-­‐‑conflict   recovery.   To   achieve   this,   a   global   view   is   provided   through   a  
comprehensive  framework  for  analysing  the  impact  of  conflict  on  HE  and  functions  
of  post-­‐‑conflict  HE.  The  cases  of  Iraq  and  Libya  are  then  investigated  in  some  detail  
to  illustrate  the  global  significance  of  the  field  of  HE  in  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery.  
  
  
b) Research  Questions  
  
The  central  question  addressed  in  the  thesis  is:  
  
RQ1:   Why   should   post-­‐‑conflict   states   place   strategic   emphasis   on   the   higher  
education  sector  in  terms  of  post-­‐‑war  reconstruction  and  recovery  priorities?  
  
The  following  sub-­‐‑questions  will  also  be  answered:  
  
RQ2:  What  is  the  impact  of  conflict  on  higher  education  institutions  and  systems?  
  
RQ3:   What   functions   can   higher   education   perform   in   contributing   towards  
effective  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery?  
  
RQ4:  What  features  of  the  post-­‐‑war  environment  influence  the  relationship  between  
higher  education  and  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery?  
  
RQ5:  What  are  the  opportunities  and  challenges  associated  with  various  options  for  





c) Statement  of  Thesis  
  
The  central  hypothesis  advanced   in   this   thesis   is   that  HE  is  a  neglected  dimension  of  
post-­‐‑conflict  reconstruction  that  can  make  significant  positive  contributions  to  driving  post-­‐‑
war  recovery  processes.  HE  is  theorised  to  have  potential  to  perform  a  wide-­‐‑range  of  
recovery-­‐‑enhancing   functions   in   resolving  conflict,   supplying  graduates  with  vital  
skills   and   knowledge,   offering   expertise   for   managing   reconstruction,   and  
producing  knowledge  about  peacebuilding  and  recovery.  Further,  universities  can  
support  economic  recovery,  nation-­‐‑building,  and  democratisation  processes  that  are  
central  to  most  post-­‐‑conflict  transitions.    
  
A   core  argument   is   that   strategic   investment   in  HE  can   strengthen   core   capacities  
that   are   often   weakened   by   conflict;   for   example,   in   rebuilding   state   institutions  
through   long-­‐‑term   sustainable   capacity   development.   Another   major   area   of  
concern   is   the   place   of   HE   in   theories   of   conflict   causation;   for   example,   in   the  
function   of   HE   in   mediating   unifying   or   divisive   identities   in   conflict-­‐‑affected  
societies.  
  
d) Guiding  Claims  
  
Based   on   the   central   hypothesis   advanced   in   this   thesis   three   guiding   claims   are  
advanced.  The  approach  of  the  thesis  is  rooted  in  an  exploratory  inductive  process  
of   hypothesis   formation   and   theory   building   rather   than   deductive   hypothesis  
testing.  The  following  claims  are  not  intended  as  hypotheses  but  as  an  indication  of  
the   preconceptions   and   predictions   of   the   researcher   at   the   outset   of   the   research  
process.    
Claim  One:  Higher   education   should   be   geared   towards   post-­‐‑war   recovery   at   an  
early   stage   rather   than   be   treated   as   a   stand-­‐‑alone,   long-­‐‑term   concern   to   be  




Claim  Two:  Strategic  investments  in  higher  education  in  post-­‐‑conflict  countries  can  
make  a  major  contribution  to  building  core  national  capacities  critical  to  long-­‐‑term  
post-­‐‑war  reconstruction  and  development  
Claim  Three:  The  role  of  the  state  is  critical   in  mediating  the  relationship  between  
higher   education   and   successful   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   through   ensuring   that   the  




The   empirical   focus   is   two   case-­‐‑studies   of   HE   in   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery;   Iraq   and  
Libya.   A   ‘composite   approach’   (Barakat   et   al   2002)   utilising   predominantly  
qualitative   methods   is   employed   in   the   conduct   of   fieldwork.   Data   collection  
methods  include  elite  interviews,  focus  groups,  and  observation  undertaken  during  
three  field  visits.    
  
In   answering   the   research   questions,   the   research   design   follows   a   ‘most-­‐‑similar’  
case  approach;  utilising  two  cases,   Iraq  and  Libya,   that  share  equivalent  values  on  
many  variables  while  recording  some  differences  on  others.  Both  Iraq  and  Libya  are  
‘most-­‐‑similar’   in   their  oil-­‐‑dependency,   legacies  of  single  person  authoritarian  rule,  
linguistic   and   cultural   Arab   identity,   and   in   their   ex-­‐‑pariah   state   status   which  
entailed  sanctions  and  international  isolation.  
  
Iraq  offers  a  very  important  test  case  for  theory-­‐‑building  in  HE  during  conflict  and  
recovery.  Iraq’s  HE  system,  once  leading  within  the  Middle  East,  suffered  from  the  
combination   of   protracted  wars   and   sanctions   from   1980   culminating   in   the   2003  
invasion  and  post-­‐‑invasion  chaos.  Meanwhile  the  impact  of  conflict  on  HE  in  Libya  
was  relatively  low.  Furthermore,  in  contrast  to  Iraq  where  initial  post-­‐‑war  support  
for   HE   was   very   low,   Libyan   HE   received   relatively   high   priority.   These   factors  
entail   that  Libya   is  a   ‘most-­‐‑likely’   test  case  for   the  thesis   that  HE  can  play  a  major  
role  in  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery.  
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f) Structure  of  the  Thesis  
  
Chapter  One  will  begin  by  problematizing  the  research  area  and  defining  key  terms  
and  concepts.  Following  that,  HE  in  the  developing  world  is  analysed  in  terms  of  its  
evolving   historical   role   and   the   place   of   the   sector   in   development   theory.   The  
chapter   defends   a   developmentalist   position   on   the   role   of   HE   in   development  
drawing   on   the   East   Asian   developmental   states   and   recent   literature   on  
‘developmental  university  systems’  (Brundenius,  Lundvall  &  Sutz  2009).  In  the  next  
section   the   experience   of   HE   in   the   Arab   region   is   analysed   which   provides  
necessary   theoretical   and   contextual   background   informing   the   study.   Lastly,   the  
inter-­‐‑connection  of  issues  surrounding  HE  and  the  ‘Arab  Spring’  are  examined  thus  
illustrating  the  importance  of  the  sector  to  transition  in  the  region.    
Chapter   two   analyses   the  multi-­‐‑faceted   relationship   between  HE   and   conflict.   To  
begin,  HE  and  conventional   conflict   causation   theories  are  analysed;   the   ‘negative  
face’  of  HE  and  conflict.  First  economic-­‐‑based  conflict   theories  of   ‘greed’  and  then  
affective  or   ‘grievance’  based  theories.   It   is  argued  that   this  common  dichotomy  is  
unhelpful   when   it   comes   to   HE   given   the   potential   it   has   to   mediate   conflict   in  
multiple   and   complex   ways.   After   this   the   ‘positive   face’   of   HE   in   conflict   is  
analysed   in   terms   of   the   potential   of   the  HE   sector   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   settings   to  
contribute  towards  processes  of  conflict  mediation,  resolution,  and  transformation.  
Finally,   the   chapter   addresses  Research  Question  Two  by   analysing   the   impact   of  
conflict   on   HE   in   terms   of   capacity,   needs,   and   distortions.   This   provides   a  
framework  that  guides  the  case-­‐‑study  analysis  of  the  impact  of  conflict  on  the  Iraqi  
and  Libyan  HE  systems.      
Chapter   three   analyses   the   relationship   between  HE   and  post-­‐‑conflict   recovery.   It  
builds   the   theoretical   framework   for   analysing   the   two   case-­‐‑studies   utilising   a  
comprehensive  literature  review  on  HE  and  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery.  First,  it  attempts  
to  explain  why  there  has  conventionally  been  low  priority  attached  to  the  HE  sector  
in  reconstruction  strategies  and  the  central  argument  of   the   thesis   that  HE  has   the  
potential   to   in   fact   function   as   a   pillar   of   recovery   is   advanced.   The   chapter   then  
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proceeds  with   three  sections  designed   to  address  Research  Questions  Three,  Four,  
and  Five.  First,  it  is  argued  that  HE  can  perform  a  wide  range  of  functions  in  post-­‐‑
conflict   recovery   including   stabilisation,   physical   and   sectoral   reconstruction,  
statebuilding,   economic   recovery,   nationbuilding,   and   peacebuilding   knowledge  
and  research.  Next,   in  order   to  understand   the  HE-­‐‑recovery   relationship   the  post-­‐‑
war   environment   of   HE   is   analysed   in   terms   of   conjunctural,   educational,  
institutional,   structural,   and   external   features.   Finally,   major   options   for   post-­‐‑
conflict  HE  including  internationalisation  and  private  HE  are  analysed  in  terms  of  
the  opportunities  they  offer  for  driving  the  recovery  of  the  sector  and  the  challenges  
and  trade-­‐‑offs  involved.    
Chapter   four   presents   core   methodological   issues,   choices,   and   approaches.   To  
begin,  the  research  strategy  and  design  are  explained.  The  chapter  then  defends  the  
multiple   case-­‐‑study   method   conducted   utilising   the   qualitative   ‘composite  
approach’;  an  approach  suitable  for  studying  the  complex  relationship  between  HE  
and   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   and   also   for   conducting   field   research   in   volatile   post-­‐‑
conflict   contexts.   The   chapter   also   addresses   philosophical   underpinnings   and  
theoretical   approaches   adopted   by   the   author.   Following   that,   strategic   issues   of  
sampling,   validity,   generalisability,   bias,   and   research   ethics   are   raised   and  
strategies  utilised  to  overcome  problems  or  dilemmas  explained.    
Chapter  five  provides  an  introduction  to  contextual  issues  critical  to  understanding  
the  case  of  Iraq.  To  begin,  the  role  of  Iraqi  HE  in  development  is  analysed  in  terms  
of   its   contribution   to   state   formation,   modernisation,   and   industrialisation   and  
factors   hindering   the   developmental   role   of  HE.   Then   the   impact   of   the   Iran-­‐‑Iraq  
war,  Gulf  war,  and   international   sanctions  on   Iraqi  HE  will  be  charted  where   it   is  
seen   that   this   1980-­‐‑2003   period   witnessed   major   deterioration   in   the   sector.  
Following   that   the   general   post-­‐‑war   context   of   Iraq   is   briefly   described   including  
the   reasons   for   the  2003   invasion  and  major  post-­‐‑war   reconstruction  dynamics.   In  
the  final  section  the  impact  of  the  2003  invasion  and  post-­‐‑invasion  chaos  on  the  Iraqi  
HE  sector  is  analysed.  It  is  found  that  looting,  violence  against  academics,  and  state  
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breakdown  had  a  major   impact  on  HE  capacity,   increased   the  needs  of   the  sector,  
and  distorted  the  post-­‐‑war  environment.    
Chapter  six  presents  the  findings  of  the  empirical  investigation  of  HE  and  post-­‐‑war  
recovery  in  Iraq.  In  the  first  section  post-­‐‑war  reform  and  reconstruction  of  Iraqi  HE  
are  analysed,  which  is  vital  to  understanding  the  constraints  on  the  sector’s  role  in  
recovery.  It  is  found  that  under  the  Coalition  Provisional  Authority  (CPA)  the  sector  
was   a   very   low  priority,   under-­‐‑funded,   and   subject   to   externally-­‐‑devised   reforms  
that   failed   to   take   root.   Furthermore,   under   the   CPA   and   subsequent   Iraqi  
administrations   physical   reconstruction  was   not   sufficiently   addressed.   Following  
this  three  sections  respond  each  to  one  of  Research  Questions  Three,  Four,  and  Five.  
Firstly,   Iraqi  HE’s  contribution  to  recovery  goals   is  evaluated  in  its  contribution  to  
short-­‐‑term  stabilisation  and  physical  reconstruction,  statebuilding,  democratisation,  
economic  recovery,  and  conflict  transformation.  After  that,  the  features  of  the  post-­‐‑
war  environment  that  explain  negative  recovery  outcomes  are  analysed.  It  is  argued  
that  while   the   conventional   focus   on   instability,   insecurity,   and   conflict   identifies  
the   most   important   dynamics   limiting   the   post-­‐‑war   role   of   the   sector   other  
influences  including  governance  and  quality  were  also  significant.  Finally,  debates  
over   major   options   for   HE   to   contribute   to   recovery   are   explored,   in   particular  
private  HE,  decentralisation,  internationalisation,  and  ‘brain  gain’.  
Chapter   seven   contextualises   key   dynamics   of   the   case-­‐‑study   of   Libya.   To   begin,  
Libyan  HE’s  role  in  development  is  analysed  in  terms  of  its  positive  contribution  to  
state   formation,   social   change,   and   economic  development   and   also   the   economic  
and   political   factors   that   limited   the   sector’s   developmental   contribution.   This  
historical   contextualisation   describes   several   path-­‐‑dependent   outcomes   held   to  
constrain   post-­‐‑conflict   HE   policy.   After   this   the   context   of   Libya’s   2011   uprising,  
civil   war,   and   post-­‐‑conflict   transition   is   introduced   outlining   key   recovery  
challenges.   Finally,   to   address   RQ2,   the   impact   of   the   civil   war   on   Libyan  HE   is  
analysed  finding  relatively  low  impact  in  comparison  to  Iraq.    
Chapter  eight  offers  a  case-­‐‑study  of  HE  and  post-­‐‑war  recovery  in  Libya.  To  begin,  
the   post-­‐‑war   reconstruction   of   Libyan   HE   is   analysed   where   it   is   seen   that   this  
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dynamic  is  less  significant  than  the  Iraq  case.  After  this,  three  sections  address  RQs  
Three,  Four,  and  Five.  Firstly,  the  contribution  of  the  HE  sector  to  post-­‐‑war  recovery  
is   analysed   in   terms   of   its   contribution   to   short-­‐‑term   stabilisation,   DDR,   physical  
reconstruction,   economic   recovery,   statebuilding,   transitional   justice   and   conflict  
transformation.   However,   it   is   also   noted   that   research   was   conducted   early   in  
Libya’s   transition   and   that   the   long-­‐‑term   prognosis   is   relatively   positive.   Next,  
various  features  of  the  post-­‐‑war  environment  influencing  HE’s  role  in  recovery  are  
then   addressed   including   instability,   perceived   insecurity,   weak   governance,   the  
‘legitimacy   trap’,   and   low   quality.   Finally,   debates   over  HE   options   are   analysed  
including  private  HE,  decentralisation,  and  internationalisation  where  it  is  seen  that  
participants   in   general   supported   a   vision   for   Libyan   HE   based   around  
internationalisation,  public  provision,  and  university  autonomy.    
Chapter  nine  begins  by  offering  a   comparative  analysis  of   the  case-­‐‑studies  of   Iraq  
and  Libya.   The   findings   of   the   cases   for   each   research   question   are   considered   in  
parallel   to  explain  similarities  and  differences  and  draw  out  comparative  findings.  
This   is   important   in   generating   new   empirical   findings   to   supplement   those  
emerging  from  individual  case-­‐‑study  chapters.    
Chapter   ten   begins   by   stating   the   major   conclusions   of   the   thesis   then   advances  
theoretical   and  methodological   recommendations   and   suggests   areas   upon  which  
future   research   could   usefully   focus.   Finally,   the   chapter’s   most   substantive  
contribution   is  a   framework   for  action   intended   to   inform  reconstruction  planners  
and  actors  on  how  to  best  utilise  HE  resources  for  the  task  of  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery  
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The   purpose   of   this   chapter   is   to   introduce   foundational   and   contextual   issues  
including   definitions,   HE’s   role   in   development,   and   HE   in   the   Arab   region.   To  
begin,   definitional,   conceptual,   and   philosophical   issues   related   to   HE   and   post-­‐‑
conflict   recovery   will   be   addressed.   Next,   the   HE-­‐‑development   relationship   is  
analysed.   This   is   important   for   understanding   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   because   in  
many  respects  post-­‐‑conflict  reconstruction  is  about  development  (Del  Castillo  2008;  
Junne  &  Verkoren  2005;  Barakat  &  Chard  2005).   In  contrast   to  emerging  economic  
orthodoxy  advocating  deregulated  HE  and  foreign  and  private  provision  as  key  to  
HE  in  development,  a  developmentalist  conception  of  HE  as  providing  pubic  goods  
geared   towards   development   will   be   defended.   Following   this,   Arab   HE   will   be  
examined   to   provide   regional   contextualisation   and   an   opportunity   to   illustrate  
through  concrete  examples  the  theoretical  considerations  on  HE  and  development.  
HE  in  the  Arab  Spring  is  discussed  next,  analysing  HE  as  a  factor  in  instability  and  
also  an  opportunity  for  driving  Arab  Spring  transitions.    
  
  
1.1.  Defining  Key  Terms  
  
As   Post-­‐‑conflict   Peacebuilding:   A   Lexicon   (Chetail   2009)   illustrates,   terminology  
surrounding  peacebuilding  and  reconstruction   is  a  contested   terrain.  For  example,  
‘nationbuilding’  can  refer  to  creating  national  identity  in  post-­‐‑war  contexts  and  also  
the   much   wider   practice   of   rebuilding   entire   countries   encompassing   tasks   from  
physical   rehabilitation   to   service-­‐‑provision   (Dobbins   et   al   2007).   Similarly,  
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peacebuilding   has   both   a   narrow   meaning   as   implementation   of   market-­‐‑liberal  
democracy   in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   and   a   wide   meaning   referring   to   long-­‐‑term  
societal   processes   supporting   creation   of   peaceful   societies.   To   avoid   conceptual  
confusion,  some  core  terms  will  now  be  defined.    
Call   and   Cousens   (2008)   define   reconstruction   as   ‘actions   undertaken   by  
international  or  national  actors  to  support  the  economic,  and  to  some  extent  social,  
dimensions   of   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery’.   Similarly,   Del   Castillo   (2008)   views   post-­‐‑
conflict   reconstruction   as   primarily   an   economic   development   task   in   more  
challenging  situations.  These  common  definitions  focus  on  economic  dimensions  of  
recovery;   however,   reconstruction  has   also   been  understood  narrowly   as  physical  
infrastructural  rebuilding.      
Such   a   narrow   definition   of   ‘reconstruction’   is   defended   by   Etzioni   (2004).   He  
criticises  scholars  equating  reconstruction  with  development,  contending  that   ‘it   is  
preferable   to  define   reconstruction  much  more  narrowly,   as   the   restoration  of   the  
condition  of   the  assets  and   infrastructure  of  an  occupied  nation  or   territory   to   the  
same  or   similar   state   in  which   they  were   found  before   the  outbreak  of  hostilities’.  
This  focus  on  restoring  the  status  quo  ante  can  be  criticised  for  prescribing  recreation  
of  structural  conditions  that  were  original  causes  of  conflict.    
Barakat   and   Zyck   (2009)   argue   that   ‘recovery’   includes   a   transformative   and  
regenerative  element  recognising  that  simply  rebuilding  what  is  destroyed  is  often  
insufficient   for   sustainable   post-­‐‑conflict   transition.   Rather,   in   contrast   to  
infrastructure-­‐‑focused   ‘reconstruction’,   post-­‐‑war   recovery   offers   a   more   holistic  
conceptualisation   of   challenges   facing   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts.   This   definition  
encompasses   a   wide   range   of   sectors   and   activities   including   governance,  
education,   women’s   empowerment,   refugee   resettlement,   and   health.   This   thesis  
conceives   of   HE   as   a   vital   task   for   post-­‐‑conflict   societies   better   captured   by   this  
holistic   concept   of   recovery   than   the   narrower   task   of   reconstruction.   This   is   first  
because   on   conventional   understandings   HE   is   conceived   as   a   peripheral   task   to  
reconstruction  while  recovery  encompasses  a  wider  range  of  sectors.  Second,  as  will  
be   argued   later,   many   contributions   HE   can   make   to   post-­‐‑conflict   societies   are  
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indirect,   complex,   and   interact   with   a   wide   range   of   processes   and   sectors;  
therefore,  the  holistic  scope  of  ‘recovery’  best  captures  this  complexity.        
  
1.2.What  is  a  University?  
  
The  primary  concern  of   this   thesis   is  with  universities  and  HE.  OECD  (2002,  p.68)  
defines   ‘higher   education   sector’   as   ‘all   universities,   colleges   of   technology,   and  
other   institutes   of   post-­‐‑secondary   education,   whatever   their   source   of   finance   or  
legal   status’   and   ‘research   institutes,   experimental   stations   and   clinics   operating  
under  the  direct  control  of  or  administered  by  or  associated  with  higher  education  
institutions’   (OECD   2002,   p.68).  Use   of   ‘tertiary   education’   is   often   imprecise   and  
ambiguous.   Broadly,   it   refers   to   all   post-­‐‑secondary   education   institutions   offering  
academic   or   vocational   qualifications.   While   HE   is   the   focus   here   rather   than  
‘tertiary  education’  the  sector  will  be  addressed  where  relevant.    
  
Before  proceeding  it  is  necessary  to  clarify  what  a  university  is.  One  approach  is  to  
provide   a   minimal   definition   by   identifying   necessary   functions.   Teaching   is  
fundamental   to   impart  knowledge  and  skills   to  students.  This   insight   is  consistent  
with   the   definition   of   ‘university’   as   ‘a   college   or   collection   of   colleges   at   which  
people   study   for   a   degree’.1   Alongside   teaching,   research   is   central   to   most  
conceptions  of  HE.  This   is  reflected   in  the  more  expansive  definition;   ‘a  high-­‐‑level  
educational   institution  in  which  students  study  for  degrees  and  academic  research  
is  done’.2  Teaching  and  research  can  be  considered  the  most   fundamental   features  
of  a  university.  
  
While   teaching   and   research   are   fundamental   to   the   ideal-­‐‑type   university,   many  
universities  worldwide  are  not  principally  geared  towards  research.  Even  in  the  US,  
home  of  many  large  research-­‐‑universities,  most  universities  are  primarily  teaching  
institutions.   In  many   developing   countries   the   ideal   of   a   combined   teaching   and  





research   university   is   even   less   common   (Altbach   2009).  Mission   has   increasingly  
been   conceptualised   as   the   third   university   role.   Universities   have   conceived  
‘mission’   in  various  ways,   for  example,  providing  public   service,  enhancing  social  
justice,   addressing   challenges   including   climate   change   or   promoting  
internationalisation  (Scott  2006).    
HE   has   important   economic   and   political   roles   in   most   advanced   nations.   In  
advanced  economies  research  and  innovation  is  considered  a  critical  growth-­‐‑driver  
and   HE   forms   an   integral   role   in   national   knowledge   and   innovation   systems  
(Altbach  &  Salmi  2011;  OECD  2010a).  HEIs  produce  knowledge  through  conducting  
research,   train   skilled   graduates,   and   utilise   their   expertise   in   a   wide   range   of  
commercial   and   non-­‐‑commercial   sectors   (Weisbrod,   Ballou   &   Asch   2008,   p.206).  
Universities   have   been   held   to   be   central   to   forming   modern   nation-­‐‑states   (Reid  
2002),  for  example,  performing  moral  functions  in  fostering  citizenship  and  national  
identity   (Guarasci  &  Cornwell   1997;  Nemec  2006).  HE  has  been  assumed   to  make  
better  citizens  –  reflecting  the  view  that  more  knowledge  leads  to  better  values.  As  
Mamdani  (2008)  states,  ‘higher  education  is  where  we  develop  the  range  of  choices  
which  make  democracy  meaningful  in  different  spheres  of  life’.  
HE  is  also  an   important  mediator  of  social   justice   (Furlong  &  Cartmell  2009).  Two  
dominant  theories  are  the  liberal  position  and  the  elite  re-­‐‑production  theory.  On  the  
former   account,   HE   drives   ‘progressive   social   change’   through  meritocracy,   civic  
values,   and   crucially   an   ‘open   society’   permitting   social   mobility,   equity,   and  
inclusion  (see  Brennan  &  Naidoo  2008).  In  the  latter,  HE  perpetuates  social  injustice  
by   reproducing   powerful   elites,   reinforcing   class   cleavages,   and   legitimising  
capitalist  exploitation  through  ideological  indoctrination  (Gellert  1997;  Soares  2007;  
Tomusk  2000;  Margolis  2001).    
From   this   discussion   it   is   clear   that   a   single   universal   definition   of   the   university  
that   transcends   context   is   hard   to   establish.   Another   approach   is   to   identify  
historical   university   models   and   their   properties.   The   British   model   granted  
universities  greater   freedom  than  most  Continental  universities   (Ruegg  2004,  p.11)  
and  was   primarily   based   on   undergraduate   teaching  with   little   research   (Shils   &  
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Roberts   2004,   p.165).   The   Humboldtian   model   emerged   in   nineteenth-­‐‑century  
Germany   emphasising   unity   of   teaching   and   research   with   high   university  
autonomy   (Ruegg   2004,   p.5).   The   Napoleonic   university   model,   by   contrast,   was  
governed   by   a   centralised   and   highly-­‐‑interventionist   state   with   strict   discipline,  
specialised  colleges,  and  high  conformity  with  official  doctrine  (Ruegg  2004,  p.4).    
These  historical  university  models  illustrate  the  institutional  variety  of  universities.  
It  should  be  qualified  that  models  represent  ideal-­‐‑types  not  uniformly  implemented  
in  all  contexts;   for  example,   the  Humboldtian  model  prioritised  academic  freedom  
while   restrictions   on   university   freedom   were   common   at   times   in   nineteenth-­‐‑
century  Germany   (Ruegg  2004,  p.5).  Transfer  and  adaptation  of   foreign  university  
models   influenced   global   HE   development.   From   the   late   nineteenth-­‐‑century   the  
Humboldtian   model   was   adopted,   remaining   influential   until   post-­‐‑WWII   HE  
reforms.   More   recently,   the   contemporary   American   model,   guided   by   market-­‐‑
driven   competitive   logic  with   selective   public   subsidies   targeted   at   economically-­‐‑
profitable   parts   of   the   system,   has   been   adopted   in  many   countries,   in   particular  
Latin  America  (Rhoades  &  Slaughter  2006,  p.121).  
The   question   of   ‘what   is   a   university?’   can   also   be   addressed   from   a   more  
philosophical   perspective.   Gilbert   Ryle   (1983)   in   The   Concept   of   Mind   proposed   a  
thought  experiment  in  which  a  visitor  was  shown  around  a  university  with  all  of  its  
lecture  halls,  sports   facilities,  dormitories  and  libraries  yet  at   the  end  is   left  asking  
‘but   where   is   the   university?’   Ryle   holds   that   this   illustrates   the   common   human  
fallacy   of   the   category   mistake.   The   term   ‘university’   refers   to   these   constituent  
physical   features   and   is   not   greater   than   the   sum   of   its   parts.   As   Flexner   writes  
(quoted   in   Scott   2006)   universities   are   ‘not   organisms:   they   are   merely  
administrative  aggregations’.    
A  highly-­‐‑contrasting  ontology  is  proposed  by  Karl  Jaspers  (1959).  He  holds  that  the  
university   in   its   ideal   form   is   sustained   by   a   shared   ‘corporative   consciousness’  
between   members   holding   collective   commitment   and   free   and   regular  
communication.  University  unity  was  to  be  achieved  by  a  shared  scientific  method  
and   philosophy   was   to   play   the   integrative   function.   For   Habermas   and   Blazek  
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(1987),   specialisation   of   knowledge   and   other   changes   in   universities   foreclosed  
idealist  accounts  of  corporative  consciousness  sustaining  the  idea  of  the  university.  
However,   they   maintain   that   communication   remains   the   connecting   force  
throughout  the  university  life-­‐‑world.  Further,  Jaspers  (1959,  p.77)  holds  that  for  its  
vitality  universities  depends  on  persons,  not  institutions.    
This   brief   discussion   of   the   university’s   social   ontology   bears   on   conceptions   of  
what   is   at   stake   in   rebuilding   HE   after   conflict:   whether   the   primary   task   is  
rebuilding   infrastructure,   reforming   institutions,   or   revitalising   academic  
communities.  Importantly  for  the  central  argument  of  this  thesis,  HE  recovery  after  
war   should   be   a   holistic   process   viewing   HE   as   more   than   the   sum   of   its   parts.  
Simply   restoring   HE’s   physical   and   administrative   components   to   a   pre-­‐‑conflict  
status   quo   is   insufficient;   rather,   individuals   and   academic   communities   are  
fundamental   to   post-­‐‑conflict   HE   recovery.   Furthermore,   rebuilding   HE   is   an  
essentially   developmental   task   and   for   this   reason   the   chapter   will   now   turn   to  
consider  HE’s  role  in  development  theory  and  practice.  
    
1.3.  Higher  Education  and  Development  
  
Thinking   about  HE   and  development   has   evolved   over   time  while   the   context   of  
development   has   been   transformed   since  most   countries   gained   independence   in  
the  1940s  and  1950s.  In  the  next  section,  an  account  will  be  offered  that  integrates  a  
story   about   how   HE   fared   in   developing   countries   alongside   evolving  
understanding  of  HE  within  development  theory.  Finally,  analysing  Arab  state  HE  
will   illustrate   development   theories   and   provide   contextualisation   for   the   case-­‐‑
studies.    
Before  proceeding,   it  should  be  qualified  that  while  developing  world  universities  
are   generally  weaker   than   universities   in   advanced   economies,   the   importance   of  
universities   as   social   institutions   is   often   very   high   (Altbach   1998).   Another  
important  point  is  that  many  developing  world  universities  do  not  approximate  the  
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Western  ideal-­‐‑type  university.  In  particular,  the  research  function  of  universities  in  
poor   countries   is   frequently   minimal.   Despite   this   variation,   university   models  
worldwide  share  many  similarities,  a  fact  owing  in  part  to  their  transfer  during  the  




Throughout   what   is   contemporarily   labelled   the   ‘developing   world’   pre-­‐‑colonial  
antecedents  of  modern  HE  did  exist,  in  particular,  religious  scholarly  institutions  in  
the   Middle   East   and   Africa   and   a   smaller   number   of   institutions   approximating  
modern   universities   (Lulat   2005;   Cleaveland   2008).   However,   modern   HE   was  
exported   during   colonial   occupation.   Colonial   HE   in   general   was   taught   in   the  
coloniser’s   language   featuring   limited   freedom,   curricula,   and   access   (Teferra   &  
Altbach   2004)   and   supplied   professional   and   administrative   classes   for   ‘native  
administration’.    
Under  direct   rule  colonial  powers  confidently  embarked  on   the  mission  civilisatrice  
in   which   universities   inculcated   elites   with   civilised   values   then   transmitted   to  
colonial  societies.  Loss  of  imperial  confidence  and  threat  of  colonial  nationalism  led  
to  indirect  rule  which  was  much  more  hostile  to  HE  and  administered  by  traditional  
leaders   rather   than   educated   elites   (Mamdani   2008).   However,   students   were  
frequently   crucial   to   emerging   nationalist   movements;   in   India,   Burma,   Vietnam  
and  Indonesia  student  groups  promoted  radical  ideologies,  often  after  contact  with  
Western   education,   raised   political   awareness   and   actively   resisted   colonial   rule  
(Altbach  1987,  p.141-­‐‑6).  
Late   colonial   British   rule   established   universities   in   many   countries   to   manage  
planned   gradual   decolonisation   transitions,   for   example,   the   post-­‐‑1945   Asquith  
Colleges   in   Nigeria,   Sudan,   Ghana   and   elsewhere   (Lulat   2005,   p.227-­‐‑8).   New  
institutions  provided  ‘an  honest  administration,  capable  of  utilizing  modern  science  
and   technology   to  sink  shafts  of  modernity  deep   into   traditional  African  societies’  
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(Hargreaves  1973).  Notwithstanding  these  developments,  HE  was  not  conceived  as  
central   to   development   until   post-­‐‑independence  modernisation,   the   subject   of   the  
next  section.    
  
1.3.2. Modernisation,  Developmentalism,  and  Dependency  
  
Post-­‐‑WWII   understanding   of   HE   in   development   was   heavily   influenced   by  
modernisation   theory:   that   traditional   societies   follow   a   linear   path   of   progress  
towards   the  model   of   advanced   societies   (Leftwich   2000,   p.41).  Development  was  
characterised   by   increased   structural   complexity,   capital   formation,   technological  
upgrading,  planning,  and  foreign  aid.  HE  was  important;  Lipset  (1959)  argued  that  
HE   was   a   necessary   condition   for   democratic   states,   defining   development   as  
‘increased   income,   greater   economic   security,   and   higher   education’.   Further,  
‘modernization   theorists   envisaged   modern   values   being   diffused   through  
education  and  technology  transfer  to  the  ‘elites’  of  the  periphery’  (Leys  1996,  p.111).    
  
Foreign   assistance   to  HE  was   high.  Donors   held   that   new  political   and   economic  
elites   must   be   created   to   manage   countries   with   very   few   graduates;   at  
independence   the   Congo   had   twelve   (Nzongola-­‐‑Ntalaja   2002,   p.173),   Botswana  
approximately   forty   (Siphambe   2000),   and  Tanzania   one   hundred   (Nyerere   1985).  
Advanced   training   was   therefore   crucial   for   effective   self-­‐‑rule.   Many   developing  
nations   viewed   heavy   investment   in   high-­‐‑level   manpower   through   manpower  
forecasting   as   an   ‘engine   of   growth’   for   emulating   development   experiences   of  
advanced  Western  nations  (Pscharopoulos  1984;  Selvaratnam  1988).    
  
At   independence   the   over-­‐‑whelming   majority   of   post-­‐‑colonial   states   moved   to  
establish   national   universities   as   part   of   de-­‐‑colonisation   (Lulat   2005,   p.228).   As  
Mamdani  (2008)  writes  ‘when  they  became  independent,  just  as  sure  as  the  national  
anthem,   the   national   flag,   and   the   national   currency,   a   national   university   too  
became   an   obligatory   sign   of   real   independence’.   HE  was   expected   to   perform   a  
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range  political  development   functions;   forming  nationalist   elites   (Brannelly,  Lewis  
&  Ndaruhutse  2011),  incorporating  masses  into  HE  for  nation-­‐‑building  and  national  
integration   (Jabbra   &   Jabbra   1984),   while   eroding   particularistic   loyalties   such   as  
tribalism   through   meritocratic   public   HE   (Hughes   1994).   However,   politicisation  
also   frustrated   HE’s   developmental   contribution;   Castells   (2009)   argues   that  
political,   elite   formation   and   ideological   functions   of   universities   overwhelmed  
their  educational  and  economic  functions.    
HE   was   conceived   as   a   principal   instrument   for   national   development   and  
universities  were   geared   towards   developmental   goals   (Bown   2002;   Ranger   1981;  
Samoff  &  Carrol   2004;   Banya  &  Elu   2001).  Coleman   (1986)  defines   this  model   the  
‘developmental  university’  in  which  ‘universities  in  Third  World  countries  must  be  
demonstrably   relevant   for   and   totally   committed   to   national   development’.   For  
example,   the   University   of   Dar   es   Salaam   sought   to   make   curricula   relevant   to  
development   needs   and   inculcate   a   socially-­‐‑concerned   attitude   in   students  
(Mamdani  2008).  However,  the  ‘developmental  university’  project  was  criticised  for  
supressing  academic  freedom  and  autonomy  as  HE  was  viewed  instrumentally  by  
states   in   top-­‐‑down   and   limited   projects   of   national   development.   Further,   Court  
(1980)   argues   developmentalism   overburdens   HE   in   developing   societies   facing  
many  challenges,  pressurises  universities’  limited  resources,  and  impedes  provision  
of  ‘good  normal  education’.    
From   another   perspective,   dependency   theory   criticised   HE   in   development.  
Dependency  theory  holds  that  advanced  nation  wealth  is  maintained  by  exploiting  
under-­‐‑developed   nations   through   unequal   global   economic   structures   (Gunder  
Frank  1974;  Leys   1996,  pp.45-­‐‑63).  Applied   to  HE,  power  and   resource   inequalities  
between   advanced   and   developing   nations   perpetuate   ‘Third   World’   academia’s  
dependency   on   Western   knowledge,   culture,   values,   models,   and   resources  
(Chossudovsky  1977;  Altbach  1981;  Arnove  1980;  Gareau  1988).  Dependency  is  held  
to   constrain   Southern   universities’   contribution   to   development   by   limiting   HE’s  
relevance   to   developmental   needs   and   goals   (Selvaratnam   1988).   Colonial   HE  
legacies  and   imported  Western  academic  models,  values,  and  knowledge  are  held  
33	  
	  
to   create   disconnected   elites   and   marginalise   indigenous   culture,   languages,   and  
epistemologies   (Mazrui   1978;   Arnove   1980;   Lulat   2005;   Nyamnjoh   &   Jua   2002).  
Similarly,   Nandy   (2000)   argues   Asian   and   African   universities   facilitated  
expertisation  of  knowledge  defining  Western  academic  culture  as  the  sole  source  of  
legitimate  authority  while  sidelining  indigenous  knowledge.    
This   brief   discussion   of   developmentalism   and   dependency   illuminates   the  
important   tension   between   conceptions   of   the   university   as   a   principal   agent   for  
development  and  long-­‐‑standing  critique  of  universities  as   intellectually-­‐‑dependent  
and   detached   from   social   realities.   Furthermore,   HE’s   important   position   within  
conceptions  of  modernisation  and  developmentalism  supports  the  thesis  that  HE  is  
a   crucial   pillar   of   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   and   development.   However,   the   next  
section  will   address   several   developments   including   structural   adjustment   driven  
austerity   and   rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return   analysis   that  may   be   held   to  weaken   the   basis   of   the  
argument  for  a  developmentalist  approach  to  HE  in  post-­‐‑conflict  societies.        
  
1.3.3. Crisis  and  Austerity  
  
After  initial  optimism  about  post-­‐‑colonial  HE,  by  the  1980s  HE  was  a  sector  in  crisis  
(Salmi  1992;  Atteh  1996).  Salmi  (1992)  describes  uncontrolled  expansion  parallel   to  
falling   public   subsidies,   decreased   academic   standards,   and   mismatch   between  
education  and  market  needs  producing  high  graduate  unemployment.  Atteh  (1996)  
further   adds   student   unrest,   curtailed   academic   freedom,   ‘decaying   facilities   and  
infrastructure’,  and  staff  shortages.    
  
In   response   to   economic   crisis   in   the   developing   world,   many   universities   were  
subjected   to   austerity   and   structural   adjustment.   Simultaneously,  HE  was  widely-­‐‑
perceived   as   sheltered   and   elitist,   failing   in   its   historic   mission   of   leading  
development,  and  irrelevant  to  poor  societies’  needs,  i.e.  ‘Ivory  Towers’  (Lulat  2005,  
p.430).  For  example,  developmentalist  missions  of  African  universities  in  manpower  
and   nation-­‐‑building   by   the   mid-­‐‑1970s   were   either   achieved   or   irrelevant   which,  
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combined  with   economic   crisis,   led   to   the  university   losing   ‘its   importance   in   the  
eyes  of  the  state’  (Zeleza  2003).    
  
Another   factor  was  HE’s   de-­‐‑prioritisation   by   donors;   a   trend   tied   to  World   Bank  
interpretations  of  human   capital   theory   (Lebeau  &  Sall   2011),  which  holds   that   in  
addition   to   tangible   goods   including  machinery,   stock,   or  money,   investments   in  
people   including   health   and   education   are   also   forms   of   capital   (Becker   1964).  
Strong   education   systems   predict   economic   growth   because   skills   transmission   to  
students  through  education  increases  lifetime  workplace  productivity  (Thelen  2004,  
p.8).  The  World  Bank  adopted  human  capital  theory  in  the  1960s,  when  loans  were  
assessed  using  manpower  planning  and  lending  prioritised  vocational  and  technical  
skills  relevant  to  labour  market  needs  such  as  engineering,  neglecting  other  aspects  
of  education  (Heyneman  2003).    
In   the   early   1980s   a   new   approach,   rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return   analysis,   was   favoured   by   the  
World  Bank.   It  provided  cost-­‐‑benefit  assessment  of  educational   investments;   ‘time  
and  money  spent  on  education  builds  human  capital,  hence  one  should  be  able   to  
estimate   the   rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return   on   such   investment,   in   a  way   similar   to   investment   in  
physical   capital’   (Pscharopoulos   &   Patrinos   2004,   p.1).   Social   rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return   is  
measured  through  impact  on  productivity  and  growth  while  private  rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return  
is  measured   through   individual   lifetime   earnings.  At   the   individual-­‐‑level,   private  
rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return   from   investment   in   HE   is   held   to   be   significant   with   lifetime  
premiums   accruing   greater   earnings   (Pscharopoulos   1988).   Contrastingly,   social  
rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return   on   HE   is   low   compared   to   primary   education   because   HE   is  
expensive  to  maintain  with  much  higher  unit-­‐‑cost  per  student.  Pscharopoulos  et  al  
permit  that  social  returns  to  education  can  vary  across  contexts  but  hold  that  social  
returns  are  greater  for  primary  than  HE  is  true  in  all  cases  (Birdsall  1996).      
This  argument  had  enormous  impact  both  in  Bank  lending  and  policies  and  within  
the  economics  of  education  (Bennell  1996).  Public  primary  education  spending  was  
held  to  be  more  socially-­‐‑optimal  than  HE  spending  (TFHES  2000).  In  the  1980s  and  
1990s,  many  developing  countries  experienced  Structural  Adjustment  and  HE  was  a  
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prominent   sector   in   cuts.   Reforms   included   market   deregulation,   state   asset  
privatisation,  reduced  public  expenditure  on  social  sectors,  and  state  ‘downsizing’.  
World   Bank   HE   lending   declined   and   conditionalities   on   recipient   governments  
diverted   funds   from   higher   to   primary   education.   By   the   1990s,   priority   to   basic  
education   was   strengthened   around   the   platform   developed   at   the   1991   Jomtien  
Conference.  
  
Structural   adjustment   altered   the  university’s  position   in   the  developing  world.   It  
has  been  contended  that  rather  than  resolve  the  crisis  in  HE,  austerity  worsened  it  
(Robertson  2008;  Lebeau  &  Sall  2011).  Zeleza  (2003)  states  that  a  transition  occurred  
from   the   ‘development   university’   to   the   ‘market   university’.   Students   were  
expected   to   pay   a   proportion,   if   not   all,   of   study   costs   due   to   long-­‐‑term  personal  
benefits  accrued  through  greater  earnings.  In  many  states  bureaucratic  downsizing  
and  privatisation   of   state   assets   eroded  guarantees   of   public   sector   graduate   jobs.  
Furthermore,   austerity   triggered   social   conflict   over   HE-­‐‑state   relations   and  
resistance  by  students  and  faculty  members  with  protests  resulting  in  deaths,  harsh  
repression,  and  temporary  paralysis  of  HE  (Federici,  Caffentzis  &  Alidou  2000).  A  
practice  of  survivalism  describes  strategies  of  academics  and  students  coping  with  
inadequate  conditions  and  resources.    
  
If   the  overall  picture  of  HE   in   the  developing  world   follows   the  broad  outlines  of  
crisis,  austerity,  and  rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return  logic  then  rationales  for  focusing  on  HE  to  drive  
post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   and   development   are   considerably   weaker.   However,   the  
next   section  will   address   the   emergence   of   knowledge   economy   discourse  which  
had  transformative   impact  on  conceptualisations  of  HE’s  role   in  development  and  






1.3.4. Re-­‐‑Emergence  of  HE  and  Knowledge  Economy    
  
Lebeau   and   Mills   (2008)   identify   a   paradigm   shift   in   understanding   HE   in  
development  from  crisis  to  transformation.  In  contrast  to  negative  roles  imputed  to  
HE   systems   in   developing   countries   during   1980s-­‐‑1990s,   by   the   2000s   HE   was  
increasingly   viewed   as   a   means   to   overcome   developmental   malaise   and   trigger  
growth.  One  major   factor   in   this  shift  was  the  new  knowledge  economy  discourse  
and  eclipse  of  rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return  analysis.    
In  the  late  1990s  and  early  2000s,  World  Bank  publications  began  questioning  rate-­‐‑
of-­‐‑return’s   soundness   as   the   primary   tool   for   determining   the   Bank’s   educational  
stance.   The  Education   Sector  Review   in   1999   argued   for   integrated   approaches   to  
education   at   all   levels,  which   for   Jones   (2007,   p.215)   constitutes   admission   by   the  
Bank   that   it   had   ‘contributed   to   uneven   rather   than   balanced   educational  
development’.  The   influential  World  Bank/UNESCO  report  Peril  or  Promise:  Higher  
Education   in   Developing   Countries   rejected   rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return   analysis.   Its   position   is  
worth  quoting  at  length:  
Educated  people  are  well  positioned  to  be  economic  and  social  entrepreneurs,  having  
a  far-­‐‑reaching  impact  on  economic  and  social  well-­‐‑being  of  their  communities.  They  
are  also  vital  to  creating  an  environment  in  which  economic  development  is  possible.  
Good  governance,  strong  institutions,  and  a  developed  infrastructure  are  all  needed  
if   business   is   to   thrive   –   and   none   of   these   is   possible   without   highly   educated  
people.   Finally,   rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return   analysis   entirely   misses   the   impact   of   university-­‐‑
based  research  on  the  economy  –  a  far-­‐‑reaching  social  benefit  that  is  at  the  heart  of  
any  argument  for  developing  strong  higher  education  systems  (TFHES  2000,  p.39).  
The   report   rejects   narrow   economism   of   conventional   human   capital   approaches.  
Central  to  the  argument  is  that  rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return  analysis  cannot  capture  HE’s  positive  
externalities.   This   is   supported   by   criticisms   that   rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return   analysis   fails   to  
account  for  non-­‐‑private  or  social  benefits  of  education  (Bennell  1996;  Birdsall  1996).  
Other  public  benefits   include  heightened  civic  consciousness,  ability   to  pay  higher  
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taxes  due   to  higher   earnings,   and   social   and   charitable  missions  of  HEIs   (Altbach  
2004,   p.24).   Furthermore,   capabilities   approach   critiques   hold   that   human   capital  
theory   offers   an   unsatisfactory   and   reductionist   conception   of   education   and  
development   that   fails   to   account   for   human   capabilities   (Mehrotra   2005;  Walker  
2010).    
More   generally,   global   structural-­‐‑economic   changes,   in   particular   increasing  
importance   of   technological   dynamism   and   innovation   as   determinants   of  
competitiveness,   made   HE   central   to   growth   and   development   (Hershberg,  
Nabeshima   &   Yusuf   2007).   As   Walker   (2010)   states   ‘the   importance   of   higher  
education   has   thus   predominantly   been   linked   to   its   role   of   enhancing   national  
economic  competitiveness  within  a  global  knowledge-­‐‑driven  economy’.  Alongside  
capital   and   labour,   knowledge   and   education   are   now  widely-­‐‑viewed   as   growth-­‐‑
drivers;   ‘in   the   current   condition   of   the   global   knowledge   economy,   knowledge  
production   and   technological   innovation   become   the   most   important   productive  
forces’  (Castells  2009).    
In  this  context,  the  World  Bank  re-­‐‑modelled  itself  as  a  ‘knowledge  bank’  –  to  enable  
transmission   of   ‘best-­‐‑practice’   from   global   to   national   and   local   levels,   where  
information-­‐‑sharing   is   viewed   as   equal   to   loans,   and   inputs   of   local   or   ‘home-­‐‑
grown’  knowledge  drive  development  (Samoff  &  Stomquist  2001;  Stone  2003).  Since  
the   mid-­‐‑1990s   donors   grew   increasingly   willing   to   fund   HE   in   developing  
economies.   Moreover,   emerging   markets   including   China,   India,   and   Brazil  
invested  large  public  funds  in  HE  and  R&D.      
Brown,  Lauder  and  Ashton  (2011)  argue  that  contrary  to  initial  predictions  that  the  
knowledge  economy  would  provide  high-­‐‑skilled  jobs  only  in  advanced  economies,  
massive  investments  in  HE,  science,  and  technology  and  outsourcing  of  knowledge  
tasks   are   driving   emergence   of   high-­‐‑skill   low-­‐‑pay   labour   markets   in   developing  
countries   including   China   and   India.   Knowledge   economy   discourses   imply   the  
possibility  of  rapid  and  dynamic  change  offering  developing  countries  the  promise  
of   leapfrogging   from   agricultural   exports   to   twenty-­‐‑first   century   technology   and  
growth.  Investment  in  ICT,  HE,  and  innovation  offer  the  prospect  of  entry  of  poor  
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economies   into   high   value-­‐‑added   sectors.   While   knowledge   economy   discourse  
strengthens   rationales   for   post-­‐‑conflict   investment   in   HE   further   support   for   the  
sector’s  potential  comes  from  the  ‘East  Asian  miracle’.    
  
1.3.5. Developmental  States  
  
Another  major   reason   for   increased   attention   to   HE’s   role   in   development   is   the  
remarkable  experience  of  East  Asian  ‘developmental  states’  including  Japan,  South  
Korea,   Taiwan,   and   Singapore.   Investments   in   education   and   training   and   state  
intervention   to   coordinate   tertiary   education   with   economic   needs   are   held   to   in  
part  explain  economic  success.  In  South  Korea  (Doner,  Ritchie  &  Slater  2005;  Sohn  &  
Kenney   2007)   and   Taiwan   (Lin   2004)   HE   played   a   significant   role   in   economic  
transformation,   in   particular   through   directing   students   to   industrially-­‐‑relevant  
disciplines.   Further,   Marginson   (2011)   argues   that   developmental   success   of   East  
Asian   HE   is   explained   by   a   Confucian   model   with   four   main   features;   state  
intervention,   universal   enrolment,   ‘one-­‐‑chance’   competitive   examinations,   and  
substantial  public  research  funding.    
However,  as  Altbach  (2004,  p.19)  argues,  ‘contemporary  economic  development’  in  
these  states  was  not   ‘dependent  on  higher  education’.  Amsden  (1989,  p.238)  holds  
that  education  was  important  but  not  decisive  to  Korea’s  development.  Yet  tertiary  
education  was  important  during  heavy  industrialisation  when  government  focused  
on   S&T   thus  maximising   resources   towards   developmental   ends   (Jeong  &  Armer  
1994).  Once  considerable  catch-­‐‑up  was  achieved  states  invested  more  heavily  in  HE,  
coordinating  with  rapidly  industrialising  economic  sectors.    
Late   developmental   states   from   the   1990s   invested   strategically   in  HE   to   support  
innovation  and  establish  world-­‐‑class  universities  (Rhee  2011;  Lo  2011;  Mukherjee  &  
Wong  2011).  This  sequencing  may  be  held   to  support  arguments   for  development  
sequencing  prioritising  HE   after   initial   investment   in   basic   education   and   labour-­‐‑
intensive   industrialisation.   However,   East   Asian   states   industrialised   earlier   than  
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contemporary   developing   countries.   Since   then,   the   global   economic   context   has  
been   transformed  and  HE   increased   in   relative   importance.   In  support  of   this,   the  
top  five  states  for  increased  tertiary  enrolment  between  the  1990s  and  2000s  include  
four   states,   Ethiopia,   China,   Tanzania,   and   Rwanda,   identified   as   potential  
emerging   developmental   states   (Routley   2012).   Furthermore,   East   Asian  
transformation   falsifies   academic   dependency   theory’s   prediction   that   peripheral  
academic   systems   are   structurally-­‐‑confined   to   peripheries   (Gopinathan  &  Altbach  
2005;  Postiglione  2005).  
East   Asian   universities   performed   important   functions   in   elite   cohesion   and  
bureaucratic   quality;   important   factors   behind   successful   development   (Vu   2007;  
Evans   &   Rauch   1999;   Henderson   et   al   2003).   Japan   (Johnson   1982),   South   Korea  
(Evans   1995)   and   Taiwan   (Wade   1990)   followed   similar   patterns   with   elite  
university   graduates   sitting   highly-­‐‑competitive   university   examinations   for  
prestigious  civil   service   jobs.  Formative  collective  experience   fostered  an   espirit   du  
corps  in  high-­‐‑level  technocrats  strengthening  elite  cohesion  and  enabling  agreement  
on  policy  objectives.    
More  generally,  HE  fosters   ‘developmental  elites’   (Brannelly,  Lewis  &  Ndaruhutse  
2011)   and   ‘developmental   leadership’   because   common   experience   supports  
‘collaborative   work   or   coalitions’   and   enables   understanding   of   collective   action  
problems,   complex   social   and   economic   situations,   and   broad   concepts   such   as  
public   goods   (Leftwich   2009).   Reflecting   on   the   developmental   state   model’s  
applicability,  Fritz  and  Menocal  (2006)  state  that  ‘higher  education  is  likely  to  play  
an  important  role  in  helping  create  a  competitive  and  effective  senior  civil  service’.    
The   above   claims   relating   to   elite   formation   and   bureaucracies   are   relevant   to  
debates  in  chapter  three  over  HE  and  statebuilding.3  Furthermore,  the  discussion  in  
this   section   strengthens   the   developmentalist   position   in   contemporary   political  
economy   debates   over   the   appropriate   mix   of   market   and   state   forces   in   HE  
governance,  the  subject  of  the  next  section.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  See	  section	  3.2.3.	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1.3.6. Marketisation  and  Developmentalism  
  
Re-­‐‑emergence   of   HE   in   developing   countries   was   accompanied   by   growing  
convergence  towards  similar  HE  reforms  globally   (Brennan,  King  &  Lebeau  2004).  
Typical   HE   reforms   and   policies   prescribed   by   IFIs   and   international   agencies  
conform   to  marketised  models   involving   privatisation   of   public   HE   systems   and  
increasing  user-­‐‑fees   in  public  HEIs   (Collins  &  Rhoads  2008;  Oketch  2003;  Munene  
2009).   Public   HE   historically   dominated   most   developing   countries,   except   some  
East   and  South  East  Asian   states   (Umakoshi   2004).  However,  market   reforms  and  
HE’s   inclusion   as   a   tradable   service   under   World   Trade   Organisation   (WTO)  
regulations   removed   barriers   to   entry   on   private   and   foreign   providers   (Altbach  
2001b).  Consequently,  HE  expansion  in  the  1990s  and  2000s  was  widely-­‐‑driven  by  
establishment  of  private  HEIs.  
The   World   Bank   held   Makerere   University   to   be   a   model   of   marketisation,  
describing  its  new  funding  model  marked  by  reduced  public  funding  and  a  private  
entry  scheme  as  a  ‘financial  revolution’  (World  Bank  2010b,  p.64).  However,  critics  
hold  that  Makerere  University’s  marketisation  led  to  declining  academic  standards  
and   eroded   the   university’s   public   good   functions   (Carrol   2007;   Mamdani   2007).  
Similarly,   marketisation   in   Kenyan   HE   is   held   to   have   led   to   declining   quality  
(Wangenge-­‐‑Ouma  2008).  
In  contrast  to  this  orthodox  position,  a  model  of  ‘developmental  university  systems’  
has  been  proposed  as  appropriate  for  the  developing  world  (Brundenius,  Lundvall  
&   Sutz   2009).   HE   is   defended   as   an   important   public   good   and   critical   national  
capacity   for   developing   countries   that   cannot   be   adequately   realised   within   the  
marketised  model   (Naidoo   2011;   Tilak   2008;  Mamdani   2008;   Lebeau  &   Sall   2011).  
Naidoo   (2008,   p.85)   argues   that   powerful   national   governments   and   international  
agencies   offer   developing   countries   the   policy-­‐‑prescription   of   HE   provision   by  
foreign  and  corporate  providers  in  a  global  marketplace  as  the  best  way  out  of  HE  
crisis.   She   contrasts   this  with   the   reality   of   advanced   economies   possessing   large  
public   national   HE   systems.   This   position   is   analogous   to   Chang’s   (2003)  Kicking  
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Away  the  Ladder  argument;  that  rich  countries  used  state-­‐‑interventionist  strategies  to  
become  rich  and  now  proselytise  virtues  of  free  trade  and  open  economies  to  poor  
countries.    
However,   as   Brundenius,   Lundvall,   and   Sutz   (2009,   p.311)   argue,   ‘it   has   become  
almost   trivial   to   assert   that   in   the   knowledge   society   universities   are   important  
institutions’.   Research   into   HE   and   development   has   therefore   examined  
mechanisms  and  processes  through  which  developing  world  universities  contribute  
to   growth   and   development,   for   example,   university-­‐‑industry   linkages,   high-­‐‑tech  
clusters,  and  commercialisation  of  university  research  (Brimble  &  Doner  2007;  Sohn  
&   Kenney   2007;   Yusuf   &   Nabeshima   2007).   There   is   growing   consensus   that   an  
innovation  economy  is  an  appropriate  goal  for  most  developing  countries,  however,  
debate  remains  over  institutions  and  policies  required,  in  particular  the  appropriate  
mix  of  university-­‐‑industry-­‐‑government  relations  (Etzkowitz  &  Leydesdorff  2000).    
A   market-­‐‑liberal   position   holds   that   HE   can   respond   to   market   needs,   produce  
commercially-­‐‑relevant   research   and   train   skilled   graduates.   The   ‘developmental  
university  systems’  model  argues  for  greater  state  action  in  fostering  robust  national  
innovation  systems  in  which  national  research  universities  perform  an  integral  role  
(Brundenius,   Lundvall,   and   Sutz   2009).   University-­‐‑industry   linkages   are  
incentivised,   for   example,   by   publicly   funding   R&D   or   capital   investment   in  
complementarities  such  as  physical  infrastructure  of  hi-­‐‑tec  clusters  (Matthews  &  Hu  
2007).   Cases  where   innovation   systems   are  weak,   for   instance   Latin  America   and  
Thailand,  are  partly  explained  by  weak  bureaucracy  and  political  will   (Arocena  &  
Sutz  2001;  Brimble  &  Doner  2007);  two  factors  present  in  East  Asian  developmental  
states.  
Having  discussed  HE’s  role  in  development  through  a  macro-­‐‑account  of  the  sector’s  
history  and  theory  in  developing  countries  it  can  be  concluded  that  there  is  a  strong  
intellectual   basis   for   viewing   HE   as   a   potentially   major   driver   of   development.  
Furthermore,  this  developmental  argument  will  be  seen  to  support  the  rationale  for  
considering   HE   as   a   crucial   engine   of   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   and   development.  
Before   that,   regional   analysis   of   Arab   state   HE   will   introduce   contextual   issues  
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shaping   the   two   case-­‐‑studies   and   enable   the   generalisations   of   development  
theories   discussed   above   to   be   considered   in   relation   to   a   particular   regional  
context.  
  
1.4.  Higher  Education  in  the  Arab  World    
  
In  this  section  an  analysis  of  ‘Arab  HE’,  in  particular  its  developmental  role,  will  be  
presented.  Iraqi  and  Libyan  HE  should  be  understood  within  the  broader  context  of  
other  Arab   states  with  which   they   share  many   important   similarities   in   language,  
culture,  governance,  and  history.  This  contextualisation  is  crucial  to  understanding  
the  post-­‐‑2011  region-­‐‑wide  transitions  and  conflicts  referred  to  as  the  ‘Arab  Spring’.    
1.4.1. Higher  education  and  Development  
  
To   begin,   it   should   be   noted   that   centres   of   learning   in   the   Islamic   world   have  
played  a  leading  role  in  the  advancement  of  many  fields  of  knowledge,  importantly,  
mathematics,  science,  and  writing  (Hitti  1968,  p.410;  Saliba  2007).  The  University  of  
Zitounah   in  Tunis   (est.   734  C.E.),  Qarawayyin   in  Fes   (est.   859  C.E.)   and  Al  Azhar  
University  in  Egypt  (est.  970  C.E.)  were  all  important  institutions  pre-­‐‑dating  the  first  
established  European  university,   the  University  of  Bologna  (est.  1088  C.E.).  This   is  
not   a   mere   historical   curiosity;   rather   it   is   an   important   aspect   of   intellectual  
heritage   and   a   source   of   pride   for  modern  Arab   nations   informing   contemporary  
discourse  on  revitalising  academia  in  the  region.    
During  the  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  centuries  contemporary  Arab  states  were  
controlled  by  colonial  rulers.  While  pre-­‐‑colonial  education  existed,  universities  were  
largely   an   institutional   import   from   Western   countries.   In   some   states   a   single  
colonial  model  was  relied  upon  to  found  colleges  and  universities,  for  example,  the  
British  model  was  implemented  (although  not  fully)  in  Sudan  (Shils  &  Roberts  2004,  
p.193)   with   French   influence   predominant   in   Algeria,   Morocco,   and   Tunisia.   HE  
emergence   in   other   Arab   states   was   influenced   by   various   models.   Egyptian   HE  
was   influenced  by  both  French  and  British  HE,  and  also   the  American   liberal  arts  
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college   in   establishing   the   American   University   of   Beirut   (Shils   &   Roberts   2004,  
p.192).  Furthermore,  Egypt  was  itself  important  in  early  development  of  Arab  state  
HE,  offering  a  ‘national  university’  model,  faculty  members,  and  branch  campuses  
of  Egyptian  universities  for  export  (Herrera  2006).    
Arab  HE  has  been  held  to  have  driven  political  development  (Jabbra  &  Jabbra  1984).  
National   universities   became   important   institutions   of   newly-­‐‑independent   Arab  
states   (Herrera   2006).   Romani   (2009)   states   that   post-­‐‑colonial   ‘geopolitical   and  
nationalist  dynamics’  gave  ‘higher  education  a  powerful  political  symbolism’.  Arab  
nationalist   states  were   committed   to   expanding  HE  access.   In   the  mid-­‐‑1990s  Arab  
states  spent  on  average  5.5%  of  GDP  on  education,  higher  than  any  other  region  in  
the  developing  world  (Coffman  1996).    
HE  systems  played  a  crucial  role  forming  national  identities  and  achieving  political  
autonomy   (Herrera  2006).   In   Iran,   Iraq,  and  Syria  HE   led   to  political   socialisation,  
enhanced   state   legitimacy,   and   promoted   national   unity.   By   contrast,   Lebanon’s  
confessional  system  and  divided  politics  granted  education  greater  autonomy  from  
political   forces  producing  weaker  social  cohesion  and  political  nationalism  (Jabbra  
&   Jabbra   1984).   HE   triggered   political   development   and   social   change   through  
transition   from   elite   to   mass   enrolment.   Nasser’s   expansion   of   Cairo   University  
widened   enrolment   to   include   poor   and   provincial   students.   Similarly,   Syria  
expanded  HE   after   the   1963   Ba’athist   coup  with   student   enrolment   at   Damascus  
University  doubling  in  five  years,  widening  access  to  rural  and  lower  classes  to  over  
50%  and  41%  respectively  (Hinnebusch  2001,  p.55).  These  examples  underscore  the  
importance  of  widening  access  to  regime  legitimacy.  
Arab   HE   has   been   critiqued   over   its   developmental   contribution.   Academic  
dependency   critiques   hold   that   Arab   universities   replicate   Western   universities,  
disregard  local  knowledge  and  values,  and  maintain  neo-­‐‑colonial  dependency  (see  
Mazawi  2005).  Said  (2003,  p.322)  writes  that  ‘the  Arab  world  today  is  an  intellectual,  
political  and  cultural  satellite  of  the  United  States’.  As  Al-­‐‑Assad  (quoted  in  Mazawi  
2005)   argues,   imported  Western  university  models  produced   a  hybrid   ‘East-­‐‑West’  
academic   model   which   compartmentalised   Islamic   knowledge   in   Western-­‐‑style  
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institutions   thus  preventing   emergence  of   authentic   indigenous   epistemology   and  
perpetuating  intellectual-­‐‑dependency  of  Islamic  societies.  However,  Mazawi  (2005)  
refutes   that   Arab   universities   are   transplanted   institutions   alien   to   local   contexts;  
rather   post-­‐‑colonial   nationalist   movements   transformed   colonial   educational  
legacies   in   a   radical   project   of   expansion   and   nationalisation   entailing   various  
transitions   from   community-­‐‑based   governance,   Islamic,   foreign,   and   private  
provision  of  HE  to  a  state-­‐‑dominated  secular  model.  
HE   expansion   had   several   adverse   consequences.   Rapid   expansion   contributed   to  
declining  academic  standards.  The  failure  of  HE  expansion  and  investment  to  raise  
quality  prompted  Salehi-­‐‑Isfahani  and  Dhillon  (2008)  to  write  that  ‘no  region  in  the  
world  has  invested  more  in  education  with  less  to  show  for  it’.  Common  problems  
include  low  research  capacity,  large  brain  drain,  high  graduate  unemployment,  and  
weak   technical   education   (Romani   2009).   From   the   standpoint   of   human   capital  
theory  Arab  HE  has  in  general  not  been  effective.  Salehi-­‐‑Isfahani  and  Dhillon  (2008)  
report  that  regional  rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return  studies  find  very  low  social  returns  due  to  HE’s  
misalignment  with  economic  needs.  Lord   (2008)   finds   that  educational  outputs  do  
not  align  with  market  needs  leading  to  low  graduate  absorption  and  low  impact  on  
economic  growth.  
This  gap  between  curricula  and  economic  requirements  is  partly  explained  by  HE’s  
public   service   training   function   combined   with   obstacles   to   adapting   to   the   new  
structural  economic  context  in  which  states  no  longer  guarantee  universal  graduate  
employment.  This  dynamic  was  compounded  by  public  sector  retrenchment  during  
structural   adjustment   and   liberalisation   during   the   1980s   and   1990s.   Regionally,  
recent   graduates   prefer   waiting   for   state   jobs   with   life-­‐‑long   employment   than  
private  employment.  Egypt’s  public  sector  employs  six  million  university  graduates  
(Anderson  2012)  with  double  Turkey’s  proportion  of  graduates  in  the  labour  force,  
where   per   capita   income   is   three   times   higher   (Brookings   2012).   In   this   regional  
context   expansion   led   to   over-­‐‑supply   of   graduates   producing   rising   graduate  
unemployment  and  high  youth  grievances.    
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HE  formed  an  element  of  economic  liberalisation  strategies  pursued  regionally  from  
the   late   1980s   as   historically   centralised   and   state-­‐‑run   systems   opened   to   private  
and  foreign  providers.  During  1993-­‐‑2009  two-­‐‑thirds  of  new  universities  in  the  Arab  
Middle   East   were   private   institutions   (Romani   2009).   Jordanian   private   HE  
highlights  some  region-­‐‑wide  problems;  private  HEIs,  user-­‐‑fees  and  parallel  courses  
were  introduced  in  the  early  1990s.  Burke  and  Al-­‐‑Waked  (1997)  state  that  the  ‘basic  
problem’  with  private  HEIs  in  Jordan  is  that  they  ‘were  established  as  a  “quick  fix”  
for   the  mushrooming   access   deficit   in   a   system  without   surplus  money’.   Quality  
remains  low  while  loan-­‐‑schemes  established  in  the  2000s  are  criticised  for  widening  
access   inequalities   as   the   poorest   are   excluded   from   this   financing   option  
(Robertson  2008).  Private  universities  were  established  rapidly  in  countries  with  no  
traditions  of  endowments  or  philanthropy  towards  HE  (Al-­‐‑Lamki  2010).  
The   American   model   of   marketised   and   privatised   HE   has   been   influential   in  
university   reforms   since   the  1980s,   in  particular   in   the  Gulf   (Mazawi  2005,  p.157).  
Over   the   2000s   Gulf   Arab   states   invested   large   funds   in   public   HE   to   produce  
domestic   skills   bases   capable   of   managing   post-­‐‑oil   transitions   and   building  
knowledge  economies.  A  prominent  feature  of  Gulf  HE  is  the  branch  campus  model  
incorporating  leading  foreign  universities  with  the  UAE  and  Qatar  accounting  for  a  
high  proportion  of  branch  campuses  globally  (Miller-­‐‑Idriss  &  Hanauer  2011).      
Domestic   politics   is   a   major   factor   influencing   Arab   HE’s   role   in   development.  
Political   functions   including   student   activism,   organisation,   and   exchanging   ideas  
have   been   limited   by   repression   or   co-­‐‑opting   by   authoritarian   governments.   It   is  
argued   that   severe   restrictions   on   academic   freedom   posed   a   serious   obstacle   to  
HE’s  social  role.  For  example,  the  Arab  Human  Development  Report  (UNDP  2003a)  
portrayed   poor   HE   quality   as   related   primarily   to   low   autonomy   from   political  
factors   and   weak   facilities.   However,   students   and   faculty   have   been   important  
political   actors,   led   collective   action,   and   provided   intellectual   leadership.   For  
example,  Reid  (2002)  shows  how  Cairo  University  was  majorly  affected  by  Egypt’s  
tumultuous   twentieth-­‐‑century   political   trajectory   while   also   actively   shaping  
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domestic  politics.  Many  regional  states  share  this  mutually  constitutive  relationship  
with  politics.  
War  and  conflict  have  powerfully  shaped  HE  in  the  region,  however,  according  to  
Mazawi  (2005,  p.154)   literature  on  Arab  HE  ‘remains  oblivious  of  this  context’.  He  
explains   that   ‘expansion   of   higher   education   across   the  Arab   states   occurred   in   a  
period  ravaged  by  colonialism,  military  conflicts,  coups  d’etat,  civil  wars,  and  human  
populations   displacement’.   Similarly,   the   Arab   Knowledge   Report   (UNDP   2009)  
states:  
Occupation,   wars,   and   internal   conflicts   have   an   overwhelmingly   disruptive  
influence   on   the   knowledge   society.   Not   only   do   they   affect   its   mainstays,   in   the  
form   of   education,   technology,   and   innovation,   they   also,   through   the   economic  
destruction,  disruption  to  development,  suppression  of  freedoms,  and  restrictions  on  
movement,   strike   at   the   heart   of   the   enabling   environments   needed   for   the  
establishment  of  the  knowledge  society.  
These   reflections   highlight   the   necessity   of   explaining   HE’s   role   in   Arab  
development  as  related  to  external  and  political  factors  of  war  and  displacement  in  
addition   to   conventional   focus   on   internal   factors   including   educational  
expenditures   and   enrolment   patterns.   Moreover,   these   insights   connect   with   the  
issues   of   stability,   conflict,   authoritarianism,   freedom,   and   HE   which   were   all  
salient   issues   in   the   ‘Arab   Spring’   and   will   now   be   explored   further   in   the   next  
section.  
1.4.2. Arab  Spring  
  
Popular  uprisings  beginning   in  December   2010   in  Tunisia   and   then  Egypt   ignited  
protest   movements   in   nearly   all   countries   across   the   wider   Middle   East,   in  
particular,   in  Yemen,  Libya,  Bahrain,   and   later  Syria.  While  outcomes  varied  with  
regime  change  in  Egypt  and  Tunisia,  reform  in  Jordan  and  Morocco,  and  civil  war  
in   Libya   and   Syria,   similarities   in   timing   and   goals   of   uprisings   led   to   the   term  
‘Arab   Spring’   to   be   widely-­‐‑applied.   Various   explanations   for   underlying   causes  
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have  been  offered;  per  capita   income,  government  corruption,  suppressed   longing  
for  civil  and  political  rights,  and  high  unemployment  (The  Economist  2011;  Moore  
2013).    
The  term  ‘Arab  Spring’  connotes  a  preceding  phase;  an  ‘Arab  Winter’  during  which  
the   vitality   and   energy   of   Arab   peoples   was   dormant   and   in   metaphorical  
hibernation   due   to   long   rule   under   repressive   regimes.  HE   has   been   theorised   as  
contributing  to  this  stagnant  condition.  Didactic  pedagogies  of  teacher-­‐‑led  learning  
and  rote  memorisation  are  held  to  have  delimited  critical  thinking  and  therefore  re-­‐‑
produced  uncritical  ‘Arab  minds’.  Further,  authoritarian  regimes  have  co-­‐‑opted  and  
controlled  the  Professoriate  and  student  movements,  groups  often  supporting  anti-­‐‑
regime   ideologies,   through   university   appointments,   recruiting   academics   for  
government  positions,  and  suppressing  academic  freedom  (Mazawi  2011).    
University   students   were   notably   proactive   in   social   movements   and   a   leading  
group  in  organising  collective  protests,  in  particular,  in  Yemen,  Tunisia,  and  Egypt.  
This  was  more   remarkable   considering  widespread   perceptions   that   youth   in   the  
region   were   marginalised   from   political   processes   and   widely   considered   to   be  
disengaged   from   political   life   prior   to   2011.   Demands   for   improved   material  
conditions  and  basic   rights  and   freedoms  are  a   core   commonality  of  diverse  Arab  
Spring   protests   (Moore   2013);   what   Brahimi   (2011)   has   described   as   ‘post-­‐‑
ideological’  protest.  In  this  context  students  demanded  educational  rights,  a  greater  
voice  in  HE  governance,  better  quality  education,  less  crowded  campuses,  removal  
of   state   appointed   Presidents   and   Deans,   and   reduced   political   interference   in  
university  affairs  (Altbach  2011;  Anderson  2012).    
The  greatest  single  youth  grievance  across  the  region  is  high  unemployment  and  in  
particular  high  graduate  unemployment   (Kocoglu  &  Flayols   2012;  LaGraffe   2012).  
In  the  previous  section  it  was  seen  that  HE  systems  geared  to  public  employment,  
state   retrenchment,   and   stagnant   economies   led   to   mushrooming   graduate  
unemployment.   In  Tunisia   the  number  of  graduates   and  graduate  unemployment  
rates   increased  by   five   times  during   1994-­‐‑2009  with   almost   one   in   four  university  
graduates   unemployed   a   year   preceding   the  uprising   (Broecke   2012).   In   addition,  
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Jordan,   Morocco,   Palestine,   Egypt   and   Algeria   all   recorded   graduate  
unemployment  levels  of  15%-­‐‑25%.    
Campante   and   Chor   (2012)   hold   that   educational   expansion   combined   with  
economic   stagnation   and   the   increased   political   activism   of   educated   individuals  
created   long-­‐‑term   conditions   ripe   for   uprising   across   the   Middle   East.   Similarly,  
Buckner   (2013)   argues   that   inability  of  graduates   to   find  gainful   employment   and  
growing   inequalities   in   HE   access   resulting   from   increased   particularism   and  
privatisation   delegitimised   Syria’s   post-­‐‑colonial   statebuilding   project,   founded   on  
universal   employment   and   educational   access,   in   the   eyes   of   Syrian   youth   thus  
creating   conditions   favourable   for   uprising.   Similar   dynamics   occurred   in   Libya,  
Egypt   and   Tunisia   where   growing   education-­‐‑economy   mismatch   contributed   to  
state   legitimacy   crises   at   the   heart   of   uprisings   (Noueihed  &  Warren   2012,   p.38).  
Generating   employment   for   regional   youth   is   problematised   by   demographic  
trends   as   55%  of   the   total  population   are  under   24  while   two-­‐‑thirds   are  under   30  
constituting  a  ‘youth  bulge’  (Brookings  2012)  thus  necessitating  3-­‐‑4  million  new  jobs  
annually  to  simply  maintain  existing  unemployment  levels.    
The  Arab  Spring  increased  awareness  of  HE  in  the  region  and  prescriptions  for  how  
the   sector   can   assist   transitional   societies.   There   has   been   renewed   focus   on   the  
common   theme   of   improving   academic   quality   and   producing   market-­‐‑relevant  
skills  and  knowledge  (Hamdan  2011).  Moreover,  HE  has  been  held  to  be  a  fruitful  
sector   for   long-­‐‑term   strategic   investment   to   produce   knowledge   and   innovation  
driven   economies   necessary   to   stimulating   jobs   and   diversifying   away   from   oil-­‐‑
dependence   (Aubert,   Karlsson   &   Utz   2013;   Djeflat   2013).   The   Gulf   state   branch  
campus  model   has   been   proposed   as   appropriate   for   transitional   societies   (Rubin  
2012).  However,  Anderson   (2012)   criticises   this  model   for   failing   to   produce   high  
quality   research,   distorting   regional   HE,   and   insufficient   engagement   with   local  
contextual  conditions.    
HE  has  also  been  viewed  as  supporting  more  pluralistic  societies  with  guarantees  of  
meaningful   rights   and   freedoms.  With   the  direction  of  political   and   constitutional  
reforms   ongoing,   HE   in   some   contexts   became   an   arena   for   contests   between  
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competing  social  forces  and  ideologies  including  secularism,  religious  conservatism,  
liberalism,   and   traditionalism.   In   Tunisia   banning   Islamic   headscarves   for   female  
students   was   a   contentious   political   issue   while   violent   clashes   were   reported  
between   leftist   and   Islamist   students   with   universities   described   as   ‘ideological  
battlegrounds’   (Khlifi   2013).   Furthermore,   some   states   threatened   by  Arab   Spring  
type   protests   have   restricted   academic   freedom,   for   example,   the   increased  
suppression,   surveillance,   and   harassing   of   academics   and   students   in   Bahrain  
(MESA  2011;  Schmidt  2012).  In  this  environment  renewed  debate  has  ensued  on  the  
threats   to   and   importance   of   academic   freedom   in   the   region   (Fanton   2013;   Reisz  
2012).    
Following  the  Arab  Spring  regional  HE  increased  dramatically  as  a  policy  issue  of  
relevance  in  Western  diplomatic  capitals.  HE  was  viewed  by  some  as  a  critical  ‘soft  
power’   resource   for   influencing   newly   empowered   elites   and   future   leaders.   EU  
funding  for  ERASMUS  scholarships  to  the  southern  Mediterranean  was  increased  in  
response   to   the   Arab   Spring   to   assist   in   democratic   transitions,   mutual  
understanding,  and  institution  building  (EU  2011;  O’Malley  2011).    
In   sum,   the   Arab   Spring   brought   attention   to   HE   in   the   region   as   a   structural  
weakness   yet   also   an   immense   potential   for   strategic   investment   and   domestic  
transformation.   Moreover,   this   discussion   raises   questions   over   potential  
destabilising  effects  of  the  sector  which  are  directly  relevant  to  the  next  chapter  on  














This   chapter   investigates   the   relationship   between   HE   and   conflict.   This   is   a  
necessary   step   for  understanding  post-­‐‑conflict  HE  because   recovery   outcomes   are  
shaped   in   part   by   the   nature   of   conflict;   its   main   drivers,   how   it   ended,   and   its  
continuation   in   ‘post-­‐‑conflict’   society.   Furthermore,   conflict-­‐‑sensitive   recovery  
strategy   is   increasingly   viewed   as   important   to   long-­‐‑term   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery  
(Barbolet  et  al  2005;  Barakat  &  Zyck  2009).    
HE  plays  both  negative  and  positive  roles  in  conflict-­‐‑affected  contexts.  Students  can  
be   viewed   as   destabilising;   HE   reproduces   class   or   ethnic   privilege   while  
universities  are  often  an   ideological  battleground.  Alternatively,  higher   learning   is  
thought   to   foster  more  civilised  and  peaceful  populations  bringing  diverse  groups  
together.   Moreover,   university   students   and   faculty   occupy   a   privileged   social  
position   in  many  developing   countries,   offering  public   intellectual   leadership.  For  
these  reasons  HE  has  been  central  to  many  developing  world  political  struggles,  for  
example,  early  1990s  struggles  for  democratisation  in  Africa  (Daddieh  1996;  Balsvik  
1998;   Zeilig   2007).   Understanding   this   social   function   is   important   to   explaining  
HE’s  conflict  potential  which  may  seem  far-­‐‑removed  from  armed  conflict.  
The   HE-­‐‑conflict   relationship   is   an   important   yet   under-­‐‑researched   area.   This  
chapter  provides  an  overview  of   theoretical   literature  on  how  conflict   is  related  to  
HE.   To   begin,   theories   of   conflict   causation   are   analysed   in   relation   to  HE.  Next,  
attention   will   turn   to   HE’s   potential   in   resolving,   mediating,   and   transforming  
conflict.   Finally,   the   chapter  will  describe   conflict’s   impact  on  HE   in   a   framework  




2.1. Higher  Education  and  Conflict  Causation  
  
Bush  and  Saltarelli  (2000)  analyse  education’s  positive  and  negative  contributions  to  
conflict;  the  ‘two  faces’  of  education.  Similarly,  Davies  (2004a,  p.18)  states  ‘there  are  
three  basic  positions:  that  on  balance  education  contributes  to  negative  conflict;  that  
on  balance  it  makes  no  difference;  that  on  balance  it  is  a  force  for  peace..  education  
can   do   all   of   this   simultaneously’.   In   the   following   two   sections,   negative   and  
positive   contributions   of   HE   in   conflict   will   be   analysed;   conflict   causation   and  
conflict  resolution  respectively.    
Various   theories  provide  mono-­‐‑causal  explanations  of  conflict,   for  example,  ethnic  
rivalries,  lootable  resources,  or  human  nature.  Conflict  causation  research  has  been  
categorised   into   two   broad   and   crude   categories   of   ‘greed’   and   ‘grievance’.   The  
grievance  paradigm  refers  to  theories  positing  factors  including  inequality,  political  
repression,   or   ethnicity   as   the  main   conflict-­‐‑drivers   (Horowitz   1985;  Young   2008).  
By   contrast,   the   greed   hypothesis   holds   that   economic   factors   explain   civil   war  
occurrence;   rebellion  always  occurs  where   feasible,   for  example,   through  presence  
of  easily  extractable  resources  (Collier  2000;  Keen  2010,  p.28).    
By   contrast,   there   is   growing   recognition   that   conflict   is   a   complex   phenomenon  
influenced  by  many  factors  and  processes  (Stewart  &  Venugopal  2005).  This  insight  
influences   the   approach   adopted   here;   there   is   no   linear   HE-­‐‑conflict   relationship  
explainable  through  a  singular  theory.  Rather,  multiple  factors  mediate  HE-­‐‑conflict  
interactions  with  cross-­‐‑contextual  variation  in  the  combination  of  mediating  factors.  
Various   conflict   theories   are   analysed   in   relation   to   HE   offering   a   composite  
explanation  drawing  on  insights  from  various  aspects  of  the  field.    
HE  has  not  featured  prominently  as  an  area  of  conflict  research.  Due  to  this  fact  the  
greed  and  grievance  dichotomy,  while  simplistic  and  even  a  limiting  factor  in  a  full  
understanding  of  conflict  (Ballentine  &  Sherman  2003),  will  be  employed  to  present  
two   main   strands   in   theorising   the   HE-­‐‑conflict   relationship.   Following   this,   an  
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account  will  be  offered  that  synthesises  both  economic  and  affective  dimensions  of  
conflict  in  relation  to  HE.    
2.2. Economic  Theories  of  Conflict  
  
Research  has  found  that  large  demographic  ‘youth  bulges’  predict  the  risk  of  armed  
conflict   or   civil   war   (Urdal   2004;   Urdal   2006).   It   is   held   that   under   conditions   of  
poverty,   young  men  are   easily   recruited  by   rebels,  prone   to  political   activity,   and  
constitute  a  general  source  of  instability.  However,  more  recent  research  holds  that  
‘youth  bulges’  can  be  a  conflict  risk  or  opportunity  depending  on  various  mediating  
factors   (Barakat   &   Urdal   2009).   One   factor   is   educational   attainment   in   terms   of  
schooling  level  or  outcome.    
One   position   is   that   armed   conflict   risk   increases   with   large   numbers   of   poorly  
educated  young  men  (Ballentine  &  Sherman  2003).  Opportunity-­‐‑cost  of  rebellion  is  
held  to  entail   that   ‘the   incentive  to  participate   in  violent  conflict   is   lower  for  more  
highly   educated  youths’   (Barakat  &  Urdal   2009;  Collier,  Hoeffler  &  Rohner   2006).  
Three  micro-­‐‑level   studies   found   that   rebel   recruitment   is   easier   in   contexts  of   low  
education   (Barakat   &   Urdal   2009).   Policy   responses   to   the   ‘youth   bulge’   include  
expanding   HE.   It   may   be   argued   that   because   opportunity-­‐‑cost   of   rebellion   is  
greater   for   higher   educational   levels,   tertiary   expansion   is   a   sound   strategy   for  
reducing   rebel   recruitment.   A   similar   argument   is   reviewed   by   Thyne   (2006);  
politically  active  students  play  a  strong  role  in  civil  disobedience  and  therefore  civil  
unrest  although  given  that  they  have  much  to  lose  should  not  be  expected  to  play  a  
strong  role  in  civil  war  causation.  
An  alternative  position,  Urdal  (2006)  finds  that  combination  of  youth  bulge  and  HE  
expansion   increases   risk   of   political   violence   because   educated   unemployment  
constitutes  a  significant  grievance.  Under  conditions  of  economic  stagnation,  where  
unemployment  is  likely  to  be  high,  HE  expansion  may  therefore  bring  risks  (Urdal  
2004).   Further,   in   ‘youth   bulge’   countries   educational   inequalities   better   predict  
conflict   than   income   inequalities   (Urdal   2006).   In   support,  UNESCO   (2011,   p.165)  
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states  that  ‘more  education  is  not  an  automatic  panacea  for  the  threat  posed  by  the  
combination   of   a   youth   bulge   and  mass   unemployment…  when   higher   levels   of  
education   are   not   matched   by   expanded   opportunities,   however,   the   resulting  
frustration  can  have  the  opposite  effect’.  
Goldstone  (2002)  holds  that  a  high  risk  of  political  violence  is   ‘strongly  associated’  
with   ‘an   expanding   population   of   higher-­‐‑educated   youth   facing   limited  
opportunities   to   obtain   elite   political   and   economic   positions’.   However,   the  
argument  that  HE  expansion  leads  to  increased  grievances  and  therefore  conflict  is  
contradicted   by   Ostby   and   Urdal   (2010;   2011)   who   report   that   based   on   three  
studies  of  conflict  and  education  there  is  no  evidence  that  a  rapid  expansion  in  HE  
increases  the  risk  of  political  violence.  Barakat  and  Urdal  (2009)  found  no  evidence  
for   increased  conflict  risk  due  to  rapid  tertiary  enrolment  expansion  in  the  Middle  
East   and  North  Africa.   Rather,   they   argue   that   expansion   of   tertiary   education   is  
likely  to  lead  to  political  unrest  and  instability  but  not  armed  conflict.    
In   sum,   this   debate   in   econometric   literature   remains   ongoing   with   no   firm  
conclusion  about  the  HE-­‐‑conflict  relationship.  Yet  a  cognate  literature  on  causes  or  
correlates  of  terrorism  often  includes  educational  level  and  attainment  as  a  variable  
and   therefore   provides   evidence   on   HE’s   relative   importance   in   the   education-­‐‑
‘terrorism’   relationship.   This   literature   is   relevant   because   it   investigates   many  
similar  mechanisms  and  conditions  analysed  in  the  above-­‐‑described  conflict  and  HE  
literature.    
On  one   side,   it   is  held   that   ‘poverty  breeds   terrorism’;  poor,  hungry  and   illiterate  
individuals   turn   to   terror   organisations   to   vent   grievances   through   violence   and  
accrue   economic   benefits   not   available   elsewhere.   Further,   poorly-­‐‑educated  
individuals  are  expected  to  be  more  susceptible  to  extremist  ideologies.  In  support,  
Azam  and  Thelen  (2008)  find  that  countries  with  greater  secondary  enrolment  levels  
have  reduced  risk  of  terrorist  attacks.  However,  a  contrary  position  finds  no  causal  
connection   between   higher   educational   levels   and   reduced   terrorism   (Krueger   &  
Maleckova   2003;   de  Mesquita   2005;   Berrebi   2007;   Brockhoff,  Krieger  &  Meierrieks  
2010).  Higher  educational  levels  have  also  been  found  to  have  no  causal  impact  on  
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public   support   for   terrorist  attacks   (Haddad  2004;  Mousseau  2011;  Shafiq  &  Sinno  
2010).    
Rather,   in  a   study  of  Muslim  countries  Testas   (2004)   finds   that  higher  educational  
levels   correlate  positively  with   incidence  of   trans-­‐‑national   terrorism.  Additionally,  
micro-­‐‑level  evidence  reports  that  many  terrorists  are  highly  educated  (Berrebi  2007).  
Krueger   and   Maleckova   (2003)   found   that   individual   Hezbollah,   Hamas,   and  
Islamic   Jihad  members  are  as   likely   to  have  high  educational   levels  as  opposed   to  
low   while   Israeli-­‐‑Jewish   terrorists   were   more   likely   to   have   a   high   level   of  
education.   Sageman   (2004)   finds   that   Al   Qaeda   members   are   typically   well-­‐‑
educated.  In  contrast  to  the  poor  and  uneducated  ‘terrorist’  a  new  stereotype  is  an  
individual  in  their  early-­‐‑twenties  often  with  post-­‐‑secondary  education  in  a  technical  
or  engineering  discipline  (Azam  2011).  
At   the   individual-­‐‑level   those   with   higher   educational   levels   may   be   expected   to  
have  a  high  opportunity  cost  in  joining  terrorist  organisations  due  to  risks  it  entails.  
However,   Kavanagh   (2011)   argues   that   terrorists   are   most   likely   to   be   highly-­‐‑
educated   individuals   living   under   poor   economic   conditions.   In   poverty-­‐‑stricken  
economies   there   are   few   market   options   and   low   opportunity   costs   for   highly-­‐‑
educated  individuals  to  join  terrorist  groups.  At  the  organisational-­‐‑level  it  has  been  
held  that  terrorist  organisations  prefer  recruiting  highly-­‐‑educated  individuals  with  
more  ‘human  capital’  because  they  are  more  productive  in  committing  acts  of  terror  
(De  Mesquita  2005;  Benmelech  &  Berrebi  2007)  and  because  investing  in  education  
indicates  personal  commitment  to  a  cause  (Krueger  &  Maleckova  2003).    
The   above   arguments   about   conditions   under  which   highly-­‐‑educated   individuals  
join   terrorist   groups   may   be   applied   to   recruitment   of   armed   militias   and   rebel  
groups  during  civil  conflict.  The  majority  of  the  literature  employs  a  rational-­‐‑choice  
and  econometric  approach  and  the  findings  support  the  ‘greed’  thesis  regarding  HE  
and  conflict.  By  contrast,  the  next  section  will  introduce  theories  that  posit  affective  
factors   as   conflict-­‐‑drivers   and   analyse   their   relation   to   HE   systems   in   conflict-­‐‑
affected  contexts.    
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2.3. ‘Grievance’  Theories  of  Conflict  
  
If   it   is   accepted   that   individual   rational-­‐‑agents’   calculations,   presence   of   lootable  
natural   resources,   criminal   networks,   and   related   factors   are   principal   conflict-­‐‑
drivers  then  the  HE-­‐‑conflict  relationship  will  be  limited  to  the  above  considerations.  
However,  conflict  theories  placing  explanatory  weight  on  affective  factors  including  
identity,   ethnicity,   and   group   inequalities   view   the   HE-­‐‑conflict   relationship   as  
wider  than  the  ‘greed’  position.    
Similarly,   the   ‘New  Wars’   thesis   describes  warfare’s   evolution   from   ‘old  wars’   of  
grand   strategy,   imperial   conquest,   high   politics,   and   ideological   struggle   to  
globalised   cross-­‐‑border   network-­‐‑warfare   involving   myriad   non-­‐‑state   actors   and  
criminal   activity   (Kaldor   2001;  Duffield   2001).  At   first   sight,  HE’s   role  within   this  
phenomena   appears   negligible.  New  wars   are   held   to   be   conducted   primarily   by  
armed  groups  driven  by  economic  motives  such  as  resource  extraction  rather  than  
ideology.   Universities,   by   contrast,   are   seen   as   sites   of   ideology   and   political  
activism.   There   exists   a   gap   between   the   halls   of   academe   and   shadowy   trans-­‐‑
border  networks  of   insurgency  and  organised   crime.  However,   another   feature  of  
new  wars   is  mobilisation  around  ethnic  or  nationalist   ideologies;  an  area   in  which  
HE  is  of  relevance  that  will  now  be  analysed.    
One  position  relating  to  ethnicity  and  conflict  is  the  new  barbarism  hypothesis  that  
emerged  in  the  wake  of  wars  in  the  Balkans,  Sierra  Leone,  and  Rwanda,  explaining  
their  emergence  as  due  to  awakening  of  primordial  ethnic  or  tribal  enmities  (Kaplan  
1994).  Universities  have  been  held  to  be  victims  of  the  New  Barbarism.  For  example,  
Astill   (2004)  writes  of   the  University  of  Sierra  Leone  that   ‘an  army  of  drug-­‐‑addled  
teenage   cannibals   and   rapists   seized   the   university   campus   at   Fourah   Bay,   on   its  
steep   green   peak   above   Sierra   Leone'ʹs   capital,   Freetown’.   In   such   accounts   the  
university  is  conceived  as  a  bastion  of  enlightened  values  and  civility  under  threat  
from  uneducated,  uncivilised,  delinquent  youth.  
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An   alternative   position   holds   that   HE   has   been   a   cause   of   ethnic   conflict.   The  
Manipulative   Elites   theory   of   ethnic   conflict   holds   that   identities   are   constructed  
rather  than  primordial  and  subject  to  mobilisation  by  strategic  ethnic  entrepreneurs  
(Oberschall   2007).   Academics   have   been   held   to   have   constituted   important  
manipulative  elites   in  some  conflicts  by  popularising  exclusive  ethnic   identities  or  
providing   ideological   rationales   for   violence   (Lebeau   2008).   For   example,   Chege  
(1996)   argues   that   genocide   in   Burundi   and  Rwanda  was   aided   by   complicit   and  
proactive   intellectual   elites   including   academics   propagating   racial   anti-­‐‑Tutsi  
propaganda  decisive  in  mobilising  Hutu  violence.  Chege  does  not  support  the  view  
that   ethnic   enmities   were   primordial   properties   of   Rwandan   society;   rather,  
academics  actively  mobilised  for  violence  utilising  ethnic  identity  constructs.  
In   another   example,   Serbian   academia   is   portrayed   as   driving   pre-­‐‑war   ethnic  
mobilisation.  The  1986  memorandum  of  the  Serbian  Academy  for  Sciences  and  Arts  
is   held   to   have   propagated   Serbian   racial   superiority   (Primoratz   1996)   thereby  
catalysing   Serbian   nationalism;   a   decisive   moment   in   conflict-­‐‑escalation   between  
former   Yugoslavia’s   nascent   nation-­‐‑states   (Dimitrijevic   1999,   p.128).   While  
Dragovic-­‐‑Soso   (2004)   argues   that   a  more   balanced   view   is   necessary,   significance  
lies   not   in   factual   accuracy   but   discursive   construction   of   Serbian   academics   as  
prototypical  ethnic  entrepreneurs.    
Beyond   these   theories   in   which   HE   actors’   agency   is   viewed   as   driving   ethnic  
mobilisation,  the  position  of  HE  as  an  important  social  institution  mediating  group  
identity  is  also  a  factor  in  conflict.  A  set  of  explanations  of  conflict  posit  identity  as  a  
central   factor   in   conflict   causation.  Differences  between   ethnic,   religious,   regional,  
tribal,  kinship  or  other  social  groups  are  held  to  be  critical  (Horowitz  1985;  Young  
2008).   On   the   subject   of   HE   and   ethnicity   Crawford   Young   (1981)   writes   that   ‘at  
moments  when  cultural  polarization   is   intense   in  a  nation-­‐‑state,   the  high   levels  of  
political  awareness  which  characterize  university  milieus  are  likely  to  be  reflected  in  
powerful  ethnic  mobilization’.    
After   long   periods   of   conflict   communal   divisions   frequently   become   entrenched  
and   inter-­‐‑group   animosities   are   a   facet   of   daily   life.   In   Cameroon   and   the   Ivory  
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Coast   campuses   reflected   social   conflicts   with   highly-­‐‑divisive   student   politics  
stratified  principally  by  ethnic  or  geographic   identities   (Konings  2002;  Sany  2010).  
Barakat   (1977)   contends   that   student   activism   and   HE’s   fragmentation   along  
confessional  and  sectarian  lines  contributed  to  Lebanese  civil  war  onset  in  1975.  In  
these   cases   conflict   limited   HE’s   ability   to   strengthen   social   cohesion   further  
exacerbating  societal  divisions.  
In   situations   where   group   divisions   and   inequalities   co-­‐‑exist   the   theory   of  
horizontal   inequalities   incorporates   both   ideational   and   economic   factors   and  
arguably   enables   analysis   to   move   past   greed/grievance   binaries.   Stewart   (2008)  
defines  horizontal  inequalities  as  ‘inequalities  among  culturally  determined  groups,  
groups  that  have  salience   for   their  members  and/or  others   in  society;   for  example,  
among   races,   ethnic   groups,   religions,   religious   sects,   regions,   and   so   on’.   Group  
grievances  mediated  by  HE  systems  have  been  held  to  have  contributed  to  conflict.  
HE   is   an   important   positional   good   and   highly   valued   in   many   countries   for  
providing   social   mobility,   enhanced   social   status,   and   employment   opportunities  
(Silva  1978).      
A   primary   grievance   is   ethnic   inequalities   in   HE   through   inequitable   student  
enrolment   or   faculty   membership   which   have   been   held   to   contribute   towards  
conflict.  In  pre-­‐‑genocide  Burundi  HE  access  was  highly  unequal  with  ethnic  Hutus  
historically  marginalised   through  Belgian   colonial  policy   (Ngaruko  &  Nkurunziza  
2000).   The   1990s   protracted   civil   war   is   explained   by   highly-­‐‑stratified   ethnic  
inequalities  (Nkurunziza  2011)  and  Buckland  (2005,  p.10)  holds  that  ‘disparity  at  the  
tertiary  level  was  a  particular  source  of  resentment’.  
The   most   widely-­‐‑cited   case   is   Sri   Lanka.   In   the   1970s   Sri   Lanka’s   government  
initiated   a   positive   discrimination   policy   to   redress   imbalance   of   Tamil   students  
over  Sinhalese  (Sriskandarajah  2005).  This  policy  of  reversing  Tamil  predominance  
in  HE  opportunities  has  been  held   to  be  a   cause  of   conflict;   a  young  unemployed  
and   well-­‐‑educated   minority   had   great   incentive   to   address   grievances   through  
armed  struggle  (Jayaweera  1997,  p.333;  Stewart  2005).    
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Another   important   case   is   Nigeria   where   large   regional   educational   inequalities  
were   a  major  post-­‐‑war  political   issue.   Successive  Nigerian  governments   increased  
federal   support   to  HE   to  achieve  national   integration   (Akpan  1990).  Ukiwo   (2007)  
argues   that   the  state,   to  an  extent,   successfully  reduced  HIs  preventing   large-­‐‑scale  
conflict.   However,   an   unintended   consequence   was   increased   regional   HE  
provision  in  response  to  federal  policy  which  led  to  HE  serving  to  strengthen  anti-­‐‑
national   and   regionalist   identities.   Jinadu   (2006)   explains   that   ‘fractured   or  
differentiated   citizenship’   has   been   reproduced   in   public   universities  which   have  
been  heavily  influenced  by  Nigeria’s  multi-­‐‑cultural  and  diverse  society.    
While   these   cases   support   the   HIs   thesis,   other   divided   countries   experienced  
considerable  HIs   in  HE  without   armed  conflict.  For   example,  HIs  were  present   in  
Malaysian  HE   in   the   1960s  when   the   indigenous   Bumiputera   population   claimed  
exclusion.   After   violent   riots   in   1969   positive   HE   discrimination   favoured  
Bumiputeras  over  Chinese  and  Indian  communities  aiming  to  foster  national  unity  
through  social  mobility   (Lee  1997,  p.173).  While   this  prompted  largely  non-­‐‑violent  
social  conflict,   there  was  no  armed  conflict  remotely  comparable  to  Burundi  or  Sri  
Lanka;  a  difference  explained  by  the  importance  of  institutions  in  mediating  ethnic  
conflict  (Easterly  2001).    
To   conclude,   while   many   societies   can   experience   long-­‐‑standing   HIs   in   HE   and  
other   sectors   without   risk   of   conflict,   in   combination   with   other   conditions,  
inequality   in  access   to  HE  may  exert   influence  on  conflict  dynamics.  Furthermore,  
the  consideration  of  horizontal  inequalities  enables  a  political  economy  perspective  
that   moves   beyond   dichotomous   greed/grievance   frameworks   to   identify   inter-­‐‑
connected  economic  and  affective  bases  of  conflict.  While  the  above  section  focused  
on  HE’s  potential  as  a  cause  of  conflict,  or  the  ‘negative  face’  of  HE,  the  next  section  






2.4.   Higher  Education  in  Conflict  Resolution  and  Transformation    
  
The  positive  face  of  education  in  conflict-­‐‑affected  societies  has  been  classified  as  its  
peacebuilding  role  (Bush  &  Saltarelli  2000).  Basic  education  is  held  to  connect  with  
peacebuilding   in   multiple   ways   including   its   strong   socialisation   and   identity  
formation   role   that   can   foster   positive   social   cohesion   (Novelli   &   Smith   2011),  
teaching   non-­‐‑violent   means   of   resolving   conflict   (Davies   2004),   inclusion   of  
minority  rights,  culture,  and  languages  (Barakat,  Connolly,  Hardman  &  Sundaram  
2012;  Brown  2011),  and  as  a  return  of  normalcy  that  functions  as  a  peace  dividend  
(Buckland   2005;   Kirk   2007).   In   this   section   the   specific   functions   of   HE   in  
contributing  to  peacebuilding  will  be  conceptualised  as  lying  on  a  continuum  from  
the   short-­‐‑term   domain   of   conflict   mediation,   through   conflict   resolution,   to   the  
long-­‐‑term  tasks  of  conflict  transformation  and  reconciliation.      
To   start   with,   conflict   mediation   refers   to   third-­‐‑party   intervention   to   end   a  
particular   conflict   through   communicating  with   the   various  parties   to   the   conflict  
(Lanz,  Wahlisch,  Kirchhoff  &  Siegfried  2008;  Brahimi  &  Ahmed  2008;  Ramsbotham,  
Woodhouse   &   Miall   2008).   HE   features   in   conflict   mediation   activities   primarily  
through  track-­‐‑two  diplomacy;  contacts  outside  of  formal  governmental  and  official  
diplomatic  channels.  For  example,  in  the  1950s  HE  and  scientific  exchange  became  a  
tool   for   increased   U.S.-­‐‑Russian   contact   (Schweitzer   2004).   In   another   example,  
Shoham  (1998)  argues   that   Israeli-­‐‑Palestinian  academic  encounters   functioned  as  a  
form  of  track-­‐‑two  diplomacy  positively  impacting  the  Oslo  peace  process.    
Furthermore,  HE  is  arguably  important  to  developing  a  knowledge  and  skills  base  
to   support   mediation   efforts   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   contexts.   International   conflict  
mediation  has  been  criticised  for  neglecting  local  context  (Brahimi  &  Ahmed  2008),  
local   conflict   resolution   mechanisms   (Mac   Ginty   2008)   and   global   ‘best-­‐‑practice’  
(Crocker   2007).   An   example   of   a   programme   in   this   area,   a   partnership   between  
Eastern  Mennonite  University  and  the  University  of  Hargeisa   in  Somaliland  states  
its  goal  as   ‘employing   traditional  mechanisms  and  best  practices   in  global   conflict  
resolution’   while   strengthening   Somali   research   capacity   in   indigenous   conflict  
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resolution   (HED   n.d.).   Supporting   such   expertise   and   knowledge   on   local   and  
global   mediation   practices   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   countries   would   enable   a   more  
contextually-­‐‑relevant  and  effective  field  of  conflict  mediation.    
Peace   and   conflict   education   has   been   held   to   contribute   to   conflict   resolution   in  
conflict-­‐‑affected  societies  (Harris  2010).  For  example,  Firer  (2008)  argues  that  ‘peace  
education   is   the  basis   for   any   sustainable  non-­‐‑violent   relations  between  parties   in  
dispute’.  Professor  Shaubhgya  Shah  of  Tribhuvan  University  in  Nepal  describes  the  
significance  of  a  Masters  programme   in  Conflict,  Peace  and  Development  Studies,  
collaboratively  run  by  universities  in  Sri  Lanka,  Norway  and  Nepal  (Norling  n.d.).    
When  Nepal  was   in   the  midst   of   an   armed   conflict  with   the  Maoist   rebellion   our  
university   still   didn’t   have   a   program   that  would   allow  Nepalese   to   develop   their  
own  research  capacity,  examine  and  research  the  conflict,  and  offer  solutions  to  the  
policymakers.  We   are   now  hoping   to   offer   very   rational   and   sound   alternatives   to  
how  conflicts  in  this  country  might  be  resolved  
Harris  and  Lewer  (2008)  describe  their  experience  in  establishing  a  diploma  in  peace  
studies  held  in  rebel-­‐‑controlled  Colombo  during  Sri  Lanka’s  civil  war.  A  key  course  
outcome  was  providing  relatively  depoliticised  space  where  students  could  learn  to  
analyse   conflict   in   their   society   differently.   However,   limitations   of   peace   and  
conflict   studies  are   recognised  by  Lebeau   (2008)  who  argues   that  establishment  of  
such  courses   in  African  conflict-­‐‑affected  societies   ‘reflects  an  understanding  of   the  
conflict  that  identifies  individual  attitudes  as  a  key  part  of  the  explanation  for  past  
conflicts’  and  that  while  this  may  explain  some  cases  it  does  not  address  structural  
causes  of  conflict  including  youth  marginalisation.    
HE   also   has   a   theorised   role   in   processes   of   conflict   transformation   and  
reconciliation   in  conflict-­‐‑affected  societies.  Conflict   transformation  may  be  defined  
as  ‘actions  that  seek  to  alter  the  various  characteristics  and  manifestations  of  conflict  
by  addressing  its  root  causes  over  the  long-­‐‑term,  with  the  aim  to  transform  negative  
ways  of  dealing  with  conflict  into  positive,  constructive  ones’  (Austin  2010).  Further  
‘this   concept   of   conflict   transformation   stresses   structural,   behavioural,   and  
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attitudinal  aspects  of  conflict’  (Berghof  n.d).  HE  has  been  held  to  have  the  potential  
to   play   a   crucial   role   in   transforming   the   bases   of   conflict,   for   example,   through  
reducing  deep  rooted  inequalities  or  promoting  non-­‐‑conflictual  identities.    
First,  HE  is  often  a  place  where  students  meet  ‘the  other’  for  the  first  time  in  divided  
conflict-­‐‑affected   societies.4   HE   programmes   have   been   designed   to  maximise   this  
opportunity.   For   example,   in   Lebanon   where   the   majority   of   universities   are  
divided   along   confessional   lines   the   Lebanese  American  University   (Nassar   1998)  
and   the   University   of   Balamand   (Nahas   2008)   have   both   adopted   a   vision   of  
contributing   to   national   reconciliation   through   multi-­‐‑cultural,   multi-­‐‑ethnic  
education.  The  LAU  has  an  orientation  programme  to  ease  students  into  the  ‘shock’  
of  encountering  such  a  varied  array  of  backgrounds  and  to  enhance  recognition  of  
diversity  on  campus.  
One   means   through   which   HE   can   contribute   to   conflict   transformation   and  
reconciliation   is   through   academic   cooperation   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   contexts.   The  
contact  hypothesis  posits  that  contact  with  adversaries  builds  bridging  social  capital  
enabling   relationship   formation,   cooperation,   and   trust   across   dividing   lines   of  
conflict   (Allport   1954;   Amir   1969).   Reflecting   on   a   cooperative   reform   project   in  
Bosnian  schools  of  medicine  Simunovic  et  al  (2008)  propose  that  HE  is  a  ‘favourable  
arena  for  reconciliation’.  They  conclude  that:  
  
Society   rebuilding   can   be   promoted   indirectly,   through   formal   education   and  
professional  engagement,  not  necessarily  by  pressing  “opposing”  sides  to  talk  about  
reconciliation  and  sign  peace  declarations.  
Further,  Hill  (2011)  holds  that  academic  activities  with  a  common  professional  goal  
across  Bosnia’s  divided  HE  system  offered  opportunities  for  developing  trust,  skills,  
and   knowledge   which   fostered   social   cohesion.   Similarly,   deep  mistrust   between  
the   Kosovan-­‐‑Serb   University   of   Mitrovica   and   the   Kosovan-­‐‑Albanian   Pristina  
University  made   contact   between   the   two   institutions   politically   infeasible.  Many  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   See	   chapter	   three	   sections	   3.2.7.	   and	   3.2.8.	   for	   a	   more	   in-­‐depth	   discussion	   of	   HE	   and	   conflict	  
transformation	  specifically	  in	  the	  context	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  societies	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international  organisations  emphasised  reconciliation  and  multi-­‐‑ethnic  programmes  
that  ‘had  begun  to  turn  people  away’  from  various  initiatives  (Heath  2009).  In  2007  
the  university’s  rectors  jointly  attended  a  conference  on  European  HE  in  Dubrovnik  
held  to  offer  a  depoliticised  space  and  common  goal  which  enabled  communication.  
Heath   concludes   that   ‘development   initiatives   that   take   place   on   neutral   grounds  
and   focus   on   common   goals   rather   than   ‘international   community’   reconciliation  
goals  would  be  more  warmly  received’.        
Arab-­‐‑Israeli  academic  cooperation  has  received  significant  attention  and  according  
to   some   cooperation   has   positively   supported   peace   (Scham   2000;   Salem   &  
Kaufman   2007;   Sriharan   et   al   2009).   For   example,   Lindsay   et   al   (2008)   hold   that  
cooperation   between   Al   Quds   University,   Israeli   universities   and   the   Jewish-­‐‑
American  Brandeis  University  enables  ‘meaningful  interactions’  and  ‘moves  toward  
the   core   of   understanding,   acceptance   of   one’s   rival,   and   the   promotion   of   peace  
and   cooperation’.  However,   there   has   also   been   considerable   resistance   to   Israeli-­‐‑
Palestinian  academic  cooperation.  Kaufman  (1993)  asks;   ‘where  does  one  draw  the  
line   between   collaboration   with   the   enemy   and   legitimate   academic   intercourse  
between   occupier   and   occupied?’  while  many  Palestinian   academics   contend   that  
cooperation   legitimises   occupation   (Barghouti   &   Murray   2005).   Baramki   (2010)  
criticises   international   donors,   unaware   of   these   objections,   for   attaching   aid-­‐‑
conditionalities   requiring   Palestinian   universities   to   cooperate   with   Israeli  
universities.  
While  academic  cooperation  may  in  some  places  have  peace-­‐‑promoting  effects,  use  
of   academic   contact   regardless   of   context   can   have   unintended   negative  
consequences.  Academic  links  across  dividing  lines  of  conflict  emerging  organically  
from  locally-­‐‑embedded  agency  of  individuals  and  academic  communities  should  be  
supported   rather   than   externally-­‐‑devised   schemes   grafted   on   to   conflict-­‐‑affected  
contexts.  Despite   this,   political  will  was   found   to   be   a  major   recommendation   for  




At  a  broader  level  HE  is  held  to  have  a  role  in  resolving  inter-­‐‑cultural  conflict.  Inter-­‐‑
cultural   miscommunication   theory   holds   that   conflict   is   caused   by   incompatible  
cultural   communication   styles   and   that   resolving   conflict   requires   clarifying  
knowledge   about   adversaries’   culture   and   weakening   of   negative   stereotypes  
(Fisher  et  al  2000,  p.8).  On  the  negative  side,  closed  HE  systems  may  be  argued  to  be  
a  source  of  cross-­‐‑cultural  misunderstanding.  Contrastingly,  HE  has  been  viewed  as  
an  institutional  arena  in  which  inter-­‐‑cultural  dialogue  and  communication  may  take  
place   (Bergan   &   Restoueix   2009).   Pursuit   of   knowledge,   central   to   the   self-­‐‑
understanding  of   the  university,   is  held   to   combat   the   ignorance  of  other   cultures  
underlying  cross-­‐‑cultural  conflict  (Karamurzov  2010).  For  example,  Zaragoza  (2010,  
p.25)   argues   for   HE’s   importance   to   promoting   a   ‘culture   of   peace   and  
understanding’,  writing  that  ‘peace  is  built  through  education,  culture,  science  and  
communication’.    
  
This   role   of   HE   in   national   dialogue   is   also   reflected   in   the   conception   of   the  
university   as   a   critical   social   agent   capable   of   contributing   to   reconciliation   and  
conflict   transformation   through   promoting   progressive   values   and   ideas   that  
transcend  the  dividing   lines  of  conflict-­‐‑affected  societies.  However,   this  social   role  
may   be   limited   by   violent   reprisals   or   contest   by   other   social   forces   such   as   non-­‐‑
state  armed  groups  or   repressive   states  who  perceive   challenges   to   their   interests,  
identities,  and  power.  As  an  example,  during  the  Liberian  civil  war  the  Doe  regime  
‘regarded   the   intellectual   and   political   ferment   associated   with   the   University   of  
Liberia  as  a  threat’  (Africa  Watch  1991)  and  closed  the  institution.    
  
Another  example  which  illustrates  well  both  this  critical  social  role  and  its  attendant  
risks   is   the   Jesuit-­‐‑run  Central  American  University   (CAU)   in  El  Salvador.  Situated  
in  the  liberation  theology  tradition,  the  institution  taught  that  the  bases  of  injustice  
could  be  overcome  through  social  transformation  and  envisaged  an  important  role  
for   universities   (Beirne   1996).   The   CAU   became   a   leading   advocate   of   national  
reconciliation  during  El  Salvador’s  civil  war.  However,  the  institution  paid  a  heavy  
price  when   in   1989   six   Jesuit   priests  were   assassinated   at   the   José   Simeón   Cañas  
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Central   American   University,   including   the   Rector,   an   influential   figure   and  
proponent   of   peace   talks   (Easterbrook   2003b).   Brown   (1991,   p.144)  writes   that   ‘an  
evident  aim  of  the  right  wing  is  not  merely  the  intimidation  of  individuals  but  also  
the   discrediting   of   the   two   major   independent   universities   as   educational  
institutions’.   The   UES   insisted   on   maintaining   ‘its   autonomous   role   as   critical  
conscience  of  society  with  the  duty  to  contest   inequities  and  injustice’   (Harrington  
2002,  p.100).    
  
Such  a  vision  of  HE   in   conflict   transformation   is   found   in   the  words  of   a   team  of  
African  scholars  reflecting  upon  the  future  role  of  the  university  in  Burundi  in  the  
aftermath   of   mass   atrocities.   They   write   that,   ‘the   university   must   make   the  
individual   the   light   of   the   society.   It   must   train   people   to   transcend   their  
peculiarities  and  differences   to   rise   to   the  universal  values  of   justice,   equality  and  
solidarity’  (Gahama  et  al  1999,  p.100).    
  
It   has   been   seen   in   this   section   that   HE   does   possess   a   ‘positive   face’   (Bush   &  
Saltarelli   2000)   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   societies   in   that   the   sector   has   the   potential   to  
perform  a  wide  range  of  roles  in  conflict  mediation,  reconciliation,  transformation,  
and  promoting  cross-­‐‑cultural  communication.  In  the  next  section  attention  will  turn  
from   the   effect   of   HE   on   conflict   to   conflict’s   impact   upon   HE;   a   crucial   step   in  
analysing  the  field  of  HE  in  post-­‐‑war  reconstruction  and  recovery.    
  
  
2.5. Impact  of  Conflict  on  Higher  Education  
  
This   chapter   has   so   far   reviewed   theoretical   literature   on   HE   and   conflict.   This  
section   has   two   goals;   firstly,   to   contribute   directly   towards   answering   RQ2   and  
secondly,   to   provide   a   framework   for   analysing   conflict’s   impact   on   HE   to   be  
utilised  in  case-­‐‑studies  of  Iraq  and  Libya.  This   is   important  as  a  necessary  step  for  
analysing   post-­‐‑conflict   HE.   Firstly,   understanding   conflict’s   impact   on   HE   is  
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important   in  understanding  the  post-­‐‑war  context   in  which  the  sector  operates  and  
therefore   is   crucial   to  evaluating   reconstruction  and   recovery  outcomes.  Secondly,  
understanding   constraints   that   conflict   can   bring   about   on   capacity,   needs,   and  
distortions  is  important  to  forming  realistic  expectations  about  post-­‐‑conflict  HE.      
It  should  be  qualified  that  HE’s  actual  impact  on  conflict  is  not  the  same  across  all  
contexts.   Rather,   the   categories   analysed   are   typical   features   of   the   post-­‐‑conflict  
environment   that   affect  HE.  Moreover,  HE’s   impact   on   conflict   transformed   over  
time;  pre-­‐‑WWII  warfare  did  not  target  civilian  infrastructure  while  during  total  war  
HE   and   science   were   strongly   mobilised   for   the   war   effort   (Rudy   1991).  
Furthermore,  HE  was   less  affected  by  societal  conflict  during  Cold  War   inter-­‐‑state  
‘proxy  wars’  than  the  post-­‐‑Cold  War  increase  in  intra-­‐‑state  wars  (Kaldor  2001,  p.5)  
often  driven  by  societal  divisions  and  ethnic  mobilisation.    
In  this  section,  conflict’s  impact  on  HE  is  analysed  in  terms  of  capacity,  needs,  and  
distortions.  Specific   impacts   include  physical  damage   to  HEIs,  weakened  resource  
bases,  hostile  research  environments,  and  international  isolation.  To  begin,  the  next  




Capacity-­‐‑building   or   capacity-­‐‑development   is   widely   recognised   as   a   central  
dimension  of  post-­‐‑conflict  reconstruction  and  recovery  processes  (Barakat  &  Chard  
2005;  Brinkerhoff  2005).  Moreover,  Davies  (2009)  argues  that  capacity-­‐‑development  
for  education  systems  is  crucial  to  addressing  the  challenges  of  fragile  post-­‐‑conflict  
states.   In   terms   of   definitions,   capacity   has   both  material   and   human   dimensions  
and  involves  the  capabilities,  resources,  and  conditions  that  enable  the  effectiveness  
of  organisations  or  communities  (Chard  2005,  pp.4-­‐‑5).  Following  this  identification  
of  material,  human  and  organisational  dimensions  of  capacity  this  section  will  now  
analyse  the  impact  of  conflict  on  the  physical,  human,  and  institutional  capacity  of  
HE  systems.    
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2.5.1.1. Physical  Capacity  
  
To  begin,  this  section  will  consider  conflict’s  impact  on  physical  capacity;  a  crucial  
factor   limiting   HE’s   contribution   to   post-­‐‑war   recovery.   Armed   conflict   can   cause  
widespread   and   significant   physical   damage   to   the   infrastructure   and   facilities   of  
HEIs.   Countries  where  HEIs   suffered   significant   physical   damage   during   conflict  
include  El  Salvador  (Harrington  2002,  p.97),  Iraq  (Reddy  2005a),  and  Bosnia  (Dizdar  
&  Kemal  1996,  p.40).    
The  case  of  Afghanistan  illustrates  this  trend;  Afghan  HE  in  2001  was  described  as  
‘in   a   state   of  disrepair’   after  decades   of   conflict   and  occupation   (ADB  2003,   p.13).  
UNESCO  (2002,  p.17)  found  that  at  Kabul  University  ‘about  95%  of  the  classrooms  
have  no  furniture,  there  are  no  office  facilities,  toilets  are  not  working,  laboratories  
and  workshops  are  damaged  and  empty’.  Talab  (2002)  writes  that  after  the  Taliban  
entered  Kabul  in  1996:    
Books  in  Dari  and  Pashtu  were  carried  off;  others  of  other  languages  were  left  on  the  
shelves   or   were   burnt   to   keep   fighters   warm   through   the   winter.   Laboratory  
equipment  was  smashed  and  sold  for  scrap.  Landmines  were  strewn  in  the  campus  
gardens.  Dead  bodies  were  stuffed  down  wells.  
Kabul   University’s   Library   that   once   housed   an   impressive   million-­‐‑volume  
collection  was  depleted  to  20,000  items  by  the  mid-­‐‑1990s  by  the  burning  and  illegal  
sale  of  books  (Hekmatullah  Sadat  2004).  Furthermore,  the  building  was  ‘extensively  
shelled’   leading   the   library  Director   to  describe   it  as   ‘a  mere  path   through  rubble’  
(quoted  in  Knuth  2006,  p.151).    
HEIs   located   at  war’s   frontlines   often   have   their   facilities   converted   into  military  
outposts,   bases,   or   headquarters,   although   the   consequences   are   vastly  
undocumented   (GCPEA   2012,   p.15).   This   dynamic   is   reported   in   many   cases  
including   Afghanistan   (ADB   2003,   p.12;   Hayward   2011;   Recknagel   2001),   South  
Sudan  (Osman  2005,  p.125),  Liberia   (Action  Aid  2011,  p.40),  Sierra  Leone,  Guinea-­‐‑
Bissau,  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo  (DRC),  and  Rwanda  (Lebeau  2008).  In  many  
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poor  countries  university  campuses  are  relatively  well-­‐‑equipped,  easily  adapted  for  
military   purposes,   and   have   therefore   been   exploited   often   leading   to  
infrastructural  damage,  looting,  and  vandalism.    
Another  reason  for  physical  damage  to  HEIs  during  war  is  intentional  targeting  as  a  
strategic   war   aim.   For   example,   the   Islamic   University   in   Gaza,   suspected   of  
assisting  Hamas  in  bomb  production,  was  bombed  in  the  2008  Gaza  war  destroying  
three   colleges   and   damaging   over   75   laboratories   worth   $55.351   million   (UNDP  
2010,  p.26;  PNA  2009).  However,  HEIs   are  often  affected  as   ‘collateral  damage’   in  
attacks   not   targeted   at   educational   institutions.   Buildings   can   be   destroyed   and  
academics   and   students   killed   as   part   of   blanket   bombardment   of   cities   and  
indiscriminate  violence  against  civilians.  For  example,  Iraq’s  invasion  of  Kuwait  in  
August   1990   included   generalised   destruction   of   property,   looting,   and   abuse   of  
civilians   (Stansfield   2007,   p.127).   Universities,   although   not   specifically   targeted,  
were  destroyed  leading  to  the  HE  system’s  collapse  (Altbach  1998).  Beyond  physical  
devastation,  conflict  can  have  far-­‐‑reaching  impacts  on  people  and  for  this  reason  the  
next  section  will  address  human  capacity  of  HE  in  conflict-­‐‑affected  contexts.    
  
2.5.1.2. Human  Capacity  
  
In   this   section   conflict’s   impact   on  HE  human   capacity  will   be   considered;   this   is  
vital   to   understanding   post-­‐‑conflict   HE   recovery   and   accords   with   the   overall  
argument   of   the   thesis   by   informing   a   holistic   perspective   on   recovery   beyond   a  
narrow  infrastructure  focus.    
Maintaining   sufficient   staffing   of  HEIs   can  be  difficult   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   settings  
due   to   a  number  of   factors   including   insecurity,   brain  drain,   financial   constraints,  
and  obstacles  to  training  and  staff  development  (IIEP  2010,  p.277).  Violence  against  
HE  faculty  members  and  students  has  led  to  high  death-­‐‑tolls  in  some  conflicts.  For  
example,  in  Cambodia  from  a  pre-­‐‑Khmer  Rouge  national  total  of  1,009  HE  teaching  
staff   there   were   only   87   survivors,   some   of   whom   emigrated   (Sophoan   1997).   In  
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Rwanda  153   faculty  members  were  murdered  and  a  mere  18.54%  of  pre-­‐‑Genocide  
university   staff   remained   (Obura   2003  p.49).   This   type   of   high   casualty   conflict   is  
very  damaging  to  HE  human  resources.  
During  conflict   there   is   frequently   significant   ‘brain  drain’   from  HE.  For  example,  
during  decades  of   conflict  Afghanistan   lost   20,000  experts   and  academics   through  
death   and   displacement   (Hekmatullah   Sadat   2004;   Tierney   2005;   MoHE-­‐‑A   2009).  
Similar   patterns   include   Bosnia   where   ‘brain   drain’   was   classed   the   most  
devastating  impact  of  war  on  HE  (Dizdar  &  Kemal  1996)  and  Kosovo  (Davies  2004a,  
p.98).  Factors  driving  academic   ‘brain  drain’   in  non-­‐‑conflict   circumstances   include  
economic  insecurity,  greater  opportunities  overseas  and  political  oppression  whilst  
in   conflict   settings   physical   insecurity,   disruption   to   academic   life,   and   wartime  
devaluation  of  academia  also  drive  out-­‐‑migration.  
Eroded  human   capacity   can   have   a   significant   impact   on   quality.  An   indicator   of  
brain  drain  in  Liberia,  at  the  University  of  Liberia  the  percentage  of  faculty  whose  
highest   degree   was   a   doctorate   stood   at   26.6%   in   1982   and   fell   to   5.3%   in   2001  
(Barclay   2002).   Another   example,   a   single   department   at   pre-­‐‑war   University   of  
Liberia   possessed   30   PhDs   and   24   MA-­‐‑holding   staff   falling   to   two   and   four  
respectively   after   war   (Fields   2007).   Similar   trends   are   prevalent   in   Iraq   and  
Afghanistan   where   the   percentage   of   faculty   holding   a   PhD   in   most   universities  
dropped   considerably   due   to   human   capital   flight   after   decades   of   conflict.   This  
impact  of  reduced  human  capacity  on  institutional  quality  connects  to  the  subject  of  
the  following  section,  conflict’s  impact  on  institutional  capacity.    
  
2.5.1.3.   Institutional  Capacity  
  
In   this   section   conflict’s   impact   on   institutional   capacity   of   HE   systems   will   be  
addressed.  This  is  an  important  dimension  yet  one  that  is  often  over-­‐‑looked  in  the  
literature.  Moreover,  the  focus  on  institutional  capacity  augurs  well  with  one  of  the  
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central  arguments  of   the   thesis   in   that  building   robust  and  effective   institutions   is  
central  to  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery.    
  
To  begin,   institutional   capacity  of  HEIs  and  Ministries   is  often  negatively  affected  
by   conflict.   Financial   capacity   is   weakened   as   resources   are   diverted   away   from  
social   service-­‐‑delivery   to   defence.   Reduced   public   investment   occurs   when   HEIs  
must   cope  with   additional   conflict-­‐‑related   challenges.   In   the   war   economy  many  
firms  and  industries  are  disrupted  restricting  opportunities  for  universities  to  gain  
additional   income.   In   private   HEIs   closed   for  more   than   a   year   wages   and   fixed  
expenditures   are   paid   while   not   receiving   non-­‐‑state   revenue   streams.   Protracted  
conflicts   often   precipitate   state   crisis   and   breakdown   in   authority   and   regulatory  
frameworks.   Weak   regulation   encourages   black   market   forged   certificates   and  
unchecked   private   expansion   producing   low-­‐‑quality   ‘diploma   mills’   contributing  
little  to  development.    
  
Evidence   suggests   that   primary   education   is   more   resilient   during   conflict   than  
secondary   and   tertiary   education.   This   is   in   part   due   to   local   capacities   and  
community  coping  strategies  that  enable  schools  to  operate  even  during  destructive  
conflict   (Buckland  2005,  p.25;  Rose  &  Greeley  2006;  Davies  2009,  p.26).   In  contrast,  
HE   systems   require   greater   financial   support,   skilled   labour,   technical   inputs   and  
institutional  capacity  to  function  which  renders  basic  education  coping  mechanisms  
insufficient   to   maintain   more   complex   systems   (Buckland   2005,   p.25;   Rose   &  
Greeley   2006).   Consequently,   in   some   conflict   settings  HE   ceases   to   function   as   a  
system.5   For   example,   in   Afghanistan   ‘during   the   years   of   war,   the   HE   system  
collapsed:  Academic   staff   and   students   left,   teaching   stopped   and  most   buildings  
were   either   damaged   or   destroyed   (MoHE-­‐‑A/IIEP   2004,   p.13).   In   another   case,  
Somalia,   the   entire   education   system,   already   struggling   during   the   late   1980s,  
collapsed   completely  with   the   Siad   Barre   regime’s   collapse   in   1991   (Cassanelli   &  
Abdikadir  2007).    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  It	  should	  be	  qualified	  that	  not	  all	  societies	  have	  HE	  systems;	  rather	  some	  possess	  unconnected	  HEIs	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Conflict  can  reduce  HE  enrolment  through  physical  barriers  to  movement,  student  
mobilisation,   and   closure   of   HEIs.   Lai   and   Thyne   (2007)   find   strong   statistical  
evidence   for   civil   war   incidence   reducing   primary,   secondary   and   tertiary  
enrolment.  Cases  fitting  this  pattern  include  Afghanistan  where  17,370  enrolment  in  
1995  fell  to  7,881  in  2001  and  the  University  of  Pristina  in  Kosovo  where  enrolment  
fell   dramatically   during   1990-­‐‑1999,   increasing   afterwards   (UNDP   2006,   p.46).   In  
conflict-­‐‑affected   contexts   secondary   and   tertiary   enrolments   tend   to   reduce  more  
than  primary  enrolments  (Buckland  2005,  p.18).  Older  students  are  more  likely  to  be  
recruited   as   soldiers   or   combatants   than   younger   pupils   (UNDP   2008,   p.31),   are  
more  politically  active  making  tertiary  institutions  more  likely  targets,  and  require  
greater   resources   to   operate   (Buckland   2005,   p.18).   However,   this   trend   is   not  
universal;  during  long  civil  wars  in  Sudan  and  Mozambique  (Beverwijk  2006,  p.103)  
rapid  HE  enrolment  growth  continued.  
To  recap,  it  has  been  seen  in  this  section  so  far  that  conflict  can  have  a  major  impact  
on   the  physical,  human,  and   institutional  capacity  of  HE   institutions  and  systems.  
The   factors   identified  will   be   investigated   in   the   case-­‐‑studies.  However,   conflict’s  





In   this  section  the  range  of  needs  faced  by  HE  sectors   in  societies  recovering  from  
war  will   be   addressed.   Before   proceeding,   it   should   be   noted   that   the   concept   of  
‘needs’  is  a  social  construction  and  no  essential  or  objective  need  can  be  identified.  
However,   some   needs   are   so   widely-­‐‑considered   to   be   necessary   that   the   level   of  
inter-­‐‑subjective   consensus   enables   uncontroversial   labelling   as   a   basic   need,   for  
example,  security.    
A  significant  criticism  of  most  approaches   to   the  post-­‐‑war   reconstruction  of  HE   is  
the   neglect   of   the   psycho-­‐‑social   dimension.   The   traumatic   experience   of   conflict  
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places   a   heavy   burden   on   individuals   and   communities   and  HEIs  must   therefore  
provide  psycho-­‐‑social  support  to  students  (IIEP  2010,  p.5).  A  study  of  education  in  
Gaza   after   the   Israeli   campaign   of   2008-­‐‑2009   found   significant   psycho-­‐‑social  
problems   including   fear,   anxiety,   increased   drug-­‐‑abuse,   everyday   distress,   and  
hopelessness  impacting  students  and  their  ability  to  learn.  Additionally  there  was  a  
high   prevalence   of   stress   and   great   unmet   demand   for   psycho-­‐‑social   support  
amongst   university   faculty   members   (Kostelny   &   Wessells   2010).   Psycho-­‐‑social  
factors  can  affect  students’  ability  to  learn,  reduce  university  teachers’  productivity,  
and  place  an  additional  strain  on  university  resources.    
  
HE  can  function  as  an  important  means  for  students  and  staff  to  cope  with  conflict.  
First,  campuses  can  offer  security.  As  Baramki  (2010,  p.103)  writes  of  his  students  at  
Birzeit   ‘the  university,  however   turbulent  at   times,  was  often   the  safest  place   they  
knew’.  In  addition,  by  offering  counselling,  student  organisation,  and  faith  services  
HEIs  can  provide   important  moral  and  psychological   support   to  students.  Oweini  
(1998),  himself  a  student   in  Lebanon  during  the  civil  war,  writes  that  on  reflection  
his  university  days  approximate  ‘a  normal  college  experience’  and  contrast  with  the  
widely-­‐‑accepted   narrative   of   traumatised   and   disrupted   college   experience.   Low  
exposure   to   war   trauma   amongst   a   sample   of   AUB   students   is   explained   by   the  
‘high   casualty/low   intensity’   conflict   but   also   because   ‘the   AUB   campus   was   a  
pleasant   environment   with   tight   security,   which   provided   students   with   a   safe  
haven  and  a  semblance  of  order  in  the  midst  of  the  chaos  of  Beirut’.  This  illustrates  
that  HEIs  can  provide  crucial  support  and  services  to  students  and  staff  that  enable  
them  to  cope  under  conditions  of  conflict.      
Simply   re-­‐‑opening  HE   is   the   primary   need   in   countries  where  many  HEIs   closed  
during   intense   fighting   including  Liberia   (Lulat   2005,   p.281),   South   Sudan   (Bishai  
2008)   or   Afghanistan   where   missed   years   of   learning   create   logistical   problems.  
Furthermore,   where   disruption   is   concentrated   in   specific   regions   educational  
imbalances  must  be  redressed.  In  these  situations,  universities  face  the  challenge  of  
providing   education   to   students   with   varying   years   of   education   leading   to  
differentiation  in  the  academic  level  of  students  (IIEP  2010,  p.277).  Similarly,  coping  
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with   registration   after   large   flows   of   displaced   persons   can   create   additional  
logistical   hazards.   This   disrupting   effect   of   conflict   may   also   be   considered   a  
distortion  of  the  HE  environment,  the  subject  of  the  next  section.    
  
2.4.3. Distortions    
  
In   this   section  distortions  of  HE   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   societies  will   be  addressed.   In  
some  conflict-­‐‑affected  contexts   there  may  be   little  observable   impact  of  conflict  on  
HE  in  terms  of  physical  damage  or  casualties.  After  a  tsunami  causing  widespread  
devastation   rebuilding   efforts   can   draw   on   societal   structures   and   capacities   that  
remain   largely   intact.  However,   conflict  distorts   the  context   in  which  HE  operates  
and   leads   to  adaptation  of  HE  systems  often  with  negative  consequences.   Indirect  
losses   include   international   isolation,   a   challenging   research   environment,   and   a  
weakened   resource   base   affecting   quality   as   much   as   the   quantity   of   education.  
Such  distortions  will   be  analysed  now,   enabling  understanding  of   factors   shaping  
post-­‐‑conflict  contexts  in  which  HE  must  operate.      
  
2.4.3.1.Teaching  and  Research  Environment  
  
Conflict-­‐‑affected   contexts  pose  various  obstacles   to   conducting   research  and   some  
HEIs   therefore   shift   to   operating   solely   as   teaching   institutions.   For   example,   in  
Afghanistan  after  decades  of  war  and  occupation  ‘the  research  culture,  at  the  core  of  
the   modern   university,   had   been   largely   destroyed’   (MoHE-­‐‑A   2009).   Academic  
knowledge   is   often  devalued  during  war   thus   hindering   research.   In  Algeria   it   is  
stated  of  domestic  research  that   ‘the  civil  war  seriously  weakened  the  system,  and  
government   interest   for   science’   (Esau   &   Khelfaoui   n.d.).   Research   funding  
frequently  falls  as  it  is  diverted  to  defence  spending  and  civilian  research  capacities  




In   conflict-­‐‑affected   societies   academic   freedom,   which   may   have   very   few  
protections  in  the  pre-­‐‑conflict  period,  is  frequently  eroded  due  to  various  pressures  
including   intimidation,  harassment,  and  violence  against   faculty  members,  closure  
of  institutions,  and  banning  of  subjects  of  inquiry.  Furthermore,  fear  during  conflict  
can  lead  to  self-­‐‑censorship.  As  Lebeau  (2008)  writes  ‘in  almost  all  war-­‐‑torn  societies,  
intellectual   capital   is   one   of   the   casualties   of   the   conflicts’.   Altbach   (2001a)   states  
that   ‘universities   are   very   often   centers   of   political   and   intellectual   dissent,   and  
regimes   are   reluctant   to   allow   institutions   the   freedom   and   autonomy   that   may  
contribute   to   instability’.   In   fragile   conflict-­‐‑affected   states,   this   imperative   to  
maintain  stability  at  academic  freedom’s  expense  is  even  stronger.    
Consequently,   certain   topics   or   areas  may   be   difficult   to   research   during   conflict.  
Furthermore,   conflict   poses   logistical   barriers   to   research,   for   example,   access   to  
certain  areas  may  be  very  difficult.  In  many  developing  countries  a  strong  research  
culture   may   only   be   present   in   several   top   institutions   and   national   research  
universities  are  frequently  located  in  capital  cities.  During  Mozambique’s  civil  war  
the  Eduardo  Mondlane  University  lost  all  capacity  to  conduct  research  outside  the  
capital  Maputo  which  was  spared  from  fighting  (Mario  et  al  2003,  p.9).    
International   isolation   of  HE   systems   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   contexts   is   an   important  
dynamic   that   can   limit   cross-­‐‑border   flows   including   procurement   of   educational  
materials   and   educational   exchange   through   scholarships   and   conference  
attendance.  For  example,  during  the  Bosnian  war  the  cutting-­‐‑off  of  universities  from  
advances  in  academic  fields  and  their  inability  to  import  new  books  or  journals  was  
termed  an  ‘information  blockade’  (Benedek  1997).  Isolation  has  massive  impacts  on  
countries  experiencing  protracted  conflict.  Mahshi  (2003)  notes  that  in  2002  the  most  
recent  English  language  publication  in  Kabul  University  Library  was  the  1987  issue  
of  Time  magazine.  He  writes  that  ‘time  froze  at  universities  and  institutes  of  higher  
learning.  They  were  left  devastated  by  conflict  and  war,  and  isolated  from  the  rest  
of  the  world’.  Such  long-­‐‑term  impacts  are  also  a  feature  of  population  displacement  




2.4.3.2.  Conflict  Dynamics  and  Displacement  
  
Further   distortions   of   HE   that   may   emerge   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   contexts   include  
population  displacement  and  social  polarisation.  Internal  population  shifts  can  lead  
to  some  areas  lacking  HE  demand  while  others  are  highly  over-­‐‑subscribed,  usually  
due   to   large  population  movements   to   large   cities  during   conflict.   In  Afghanistan  
during   the   early   1990s   civil   war   Balkh   University  was   the   only   fully   functioning  
HEI   and   students   therefore   transferred   leading   to   quadrupled   enrolment   in   five  
years   (Massey   1996).   Some   areas   face   the   challenge   of   integrating   Internally  
Displaced   Persons   (IDPs)  many   of  whom   tend   to   be   young.   In   2004   during  Cote  
D’Ivoire’s   crisis   thousands   of   students   fled   Bouake   where   the   university   campus  
was  looted  and  shut.  In  response,  a  temporary  campus  was  opened  in  Abidjan  for  
displaced   students   (Sany   2010).   Moreover,   HEIs   can   be   displaced,   for   example,  
Sudan’s   long   civil  war   led   to  displacement   to  Khartoum  of   campuses   from  South  
Sudan’s  HEIs  with  only  partial  return  since  2006  (Faye  2010,  p.22).  
Additionally,  the  ‘international  mix’  of  HEIs  can  be  affected  negatively  by  conflict.6  
Foreign   students   flee   from   fighting   and   a   country’s   attractiveness   as   a   study  
destination   can   be   tarnished   by   conflict.   For   example,   in   1974-­‐‑75   non-­‐‑Lebanese  
students   in  Lebanese  universities   totalled   57.3%   and   fell   to   approximately   20%   in  
the  year  following  civil  war  (Oweini  1998;  Nahas  2009).  Another  example  is  Kuwait  
where  many   expatriate   academics   left   following   the   Iraqi   invasion.   In   such   cases  
reduction  in  foreign  students  can  decrease  a  vital  source  of  additional  income  while  
displacement  of  foreign  faculty  members  can  create  staffing  shortages.    
In  divided   societies   the  university   system  can   reflect  wider   societal   fractures  with  
group  homogenisation  in  HEIs.  This  may  be  captured  as  the  ‘intra-­‐‑national  mix’7  of  
HE.  It  refers  to  the  degree  to  which  the  composition  of  the  student  body  reflects  the  
national   social   profile.   In   Lebanon   the   intra-­‐‑national  mix   of  HE  was   transformed  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	   ‘International	  mix’	   is	   a	   criterion	   in	   the	   Times	  Higher	   Education	  University	  World	   Rankings	   2010-­‐
2011.	   60%	   of	   the	   score	   is	   international-­‐to-­‐domestic	   staff	   ratio	   and	   40%	   international-­‐to-­‐domestic	  
student	   ratio.	   See	   http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-­‐university-­‐rankings/2010-­‐
2011/analysis-­‐methodology.html#international	  	  
7	  ‘Intra-­‐national	  mix’	  is	  the	  author’s	  concept	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during   the   1975-­‐‑1990   civil   war.   Universities   reflected   conflict-­‐‑induced   population  
movements  by   fragmenting  along   territorialised   space   in   ‘ethnic   enclaves’  or   ‘safe  
havens’,   for   example,   the   splintering   of   the   Lebanese   University,   the   Lebanese  
American   University,   and   Notre   Dame   University   into   various   branch   campuses  
across   Lebanon’s   ethno-­‐‑sectarian   ‘patchwork   quilt’   (Nahas   2009;   Al-­‐‑Khatib   &  
Johnson  2001).  
Another   impact   is   potentially   long-­‐‑lasting   psychological   scars   on   academic  
communities.   As   Urusaro   (2003)   puts   in   in   the   case   of   Rwanda,   ‘the   site   of   the  
genocide  on  the  green  hills  of  the  beautiful  Butare  campus  is  the  final  refuge  of  the  
sons  and  daughters  of  this  country,  who  at  times,  after  having  been  tracked  down  
like  animals,  perished  under  the  strokes  of  their  colleagues,   their  teachers,  or  their  
students’.  After   such   episodes   of   violence   there   is   an   increased   need   for   campus-­‐‑
level   reconciliation   and   transitional   justice   efforts   to   overcome   past   legacies.  
Moreover,  given  the  brutality  of  the  Rwandan  genocide  and  the  long-­‐‑term  relative  
success  of  post-­‐‑Genocide  HE  the  academic  community  may  be  held  to  show  signs  of  
resilience   and   coping   strategies   after   a   traumatic   experience  which   connects  with  
the  subject  of  the  next  section.    
  
2.4.3.3.  Coping  Strategies    
  
Finally,   this   section   must   recognise   the   often   considerable   coping   strategies   and  
resilience   of  HE   communities   during   conflict.   As   Barakat   (2005   p.262)  writes   ‘the  
starting  point  for  assessing  the  capacity  for  recovery  of  any  war-­‐‑torn  society  is  the  
recognition   of   the   resilience   and   impressive   survival   abilities   of   those   who   have  
come   through   the   trauma   and   hardship   of   violent   conflict’.   This   concern   with  
coping  strategies  connects  to  one  of  the  main  arguments  of  the  thesis;  that  existing  
HE   capacities   and   resources   of   conflict-­‐‑affected   societies   should   be   built   upon   in  
recovery  efforts  rather  than  discarded  as  defective  and  built  from  a  ‘blank  slate’.  
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While   attacks   on   education   are   increasingly  well   documented,   the   capacity   of  HE  
communities   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   societies   to   survive   and   adapt   are   not   widely-­‐‑
recorded.   During   conflict   HE   may   cease   to   function   as   a   system,   however,  
individual   and   collective   coping   strategies   are   still   adopted.   For   example,   the  
parallel   education   system   emerged   in   Kosovo   after   ethnic   Albanians   were  
effectively  excluded  from  formal  education  by  Serb  authorities  in  1991  (Nelles  2005).  
Faculty  members   held   classes   in   homes   and   after   years   in   operation   the   system’s  
mere  existence  became  a  powerful  symbol  of  resistance.  Similarly,  during  civil  war  
the   University   of   El   Salvador   was   shut   for   four   years   during   which   time   a  
‘University   in   Exile’   emerged   with   classes   held   in   rented   homes   and   apartments  
(Easterbrook  2003).      
Coping   strategies   and   stories   of   resilience   during   conflict   can   form   powerful  
narratives   of   heroism   that   can   strengthen   corporative   identities   in   HEIs   in   post-­‐‑
conflict   societies.   Benedek   (1997)   wrote   of   Bosnian   HE   that   ‘continuation   of   the  
teaching   process   during   the   war   with   only   minor   interruptions   was   one   of   the  
heroic   features   of   this   period’.   Similarly,   Gazan   students   view   education   as   a  
defence   against   Israeli   aggression   and   ‘in   a   very   difficult   psychosocial   landscape,  
education   remains   a  powerful  potential   source  of   resilience’   (Kostelny  &  Wessells  
2010,   p.31).   Baramki   (2010)   describes   struggles   to   provide   HE   under   occupation  
involving   arrests,   closures,   and   checkpoints   which   gave   purpose   and   fostered  
solidarity   among   HE   communities.   This   testimony   is   supported   by   Bruhn   (2006)  
who   argues   that   Palestinian   universities   enabled   resistance   and   contributed   to  
emerging   national   consciousness.   She   writes   that   ‘the   space   for   collective   self-­‐‑
expression   is   central   to   the   university’s   capacity   to   empower   communities   and  









In   conclusion,   this   chapter   has   investigated   HE   and   conflict   causation,   conflict  
resolution  and  transformation,  and  conflict’s   impact  on  HE.  It  has  been  found  that  
HE   is   theorised   to   contribute   to   conflict   causation   through   interaction   with   both  
economic   and   affective   processes   and   that   neat   dichotomies   between   ‘greed’   and  
‘grievance’  cannot  capture  the  multi-­‐‑functional  role  of  complex  HE  systems.  It  was  
then   seen   that  HE   can   contribute   to  mediation,   resolution,   and   transformation   of  
conflict  although  the  sector’s  capacity  to  do  so  is  limited  by  various  factors.  Lastly,  it  
was   shown   that   conflict   has   both   direct   and   indirect   impacts   on  HE   and   that   the  
sector  tends  to  suffer  more  than  primary  and  secondary  education.  Further,  analysis  
showed  that  conflict  often  weakens  capacity  and  increases  needs  of  HE  sectors;  two  




















This   goal   of   this   chapter   is   to   investigate   HE   in   post-­‐‑war   reconstruction   and  
recovery.  HE  is  typically  not  a  high  priority  in  post-­‐‑conflict  states.  The  experience  of  
post-­‐‑conflict   HE   has   received   little   academic   attention   and   there   have   been   no  
attempts   to   provide   a   comprehensive   framework   for   analysing   the   field.   This  
chapter   aims   to   redress   this   imbalance   by   offering   a   global   view   of   HE   in   post-­‐‑
conflict   recovery   and   reconstruction.   A   central   argument   is   that   HE,   while   often  
neglected   in  post-­‐‑war   interventions,  has   the  potential   to  be  a  key  pillar  capable  of  
driving  more  effective  recovery.    
The   overall   goal   of   the   chapter   is   to   address   the   central   research   question   by  
analysing   key   theoretical   literature   and   providing   a   framework   to   inform  
examination  of  the  two  case-­‐‑studies.  To  recap,  RQ1  is  as  follows:  
RQ1:   Why   should   post-­‐‑conflict   states   place   strategic   emphasis   on   the   higher  
education  sector  in  terms  of  post-­‐‑war  reconstruction  and  recovery  priorities?  
To   begin,   debates   around   HE   and   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   are   analysed   including  
several  common  arguments  against  HE,  in  particular  that  basic  education  should  be  
the   priority   for   post-­‐‑conflict   societies   and   that   HE   investment   is   not   appropriate  
during   reconstruction   because   it   is   a   long-­‐‑term   developmental   sector.   While  
responding  to  and  acknowledging  some  of  these  criticisms,  the  next  section  seeks  to  
demonstrate   the   connection  between  HE  and  a  wide   range  of  processes   central   to  
post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   including   physical   and   sectoral   reconstruction,   conflict  
prevention,   statebuilding,   peacebuilding,   reconciliation,   and   transitional   justice.  
Recognising   that   HE   frequently   is   constrained   in   contributing   to   these   recovery  
processes   the   following   section   analyses   the   conjunctural,   structural,   institutional,  
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educational,   and   external   features   of   the   post-­‐‑war   environment   that   influence   the  
HE-­‐‑recovery   relationship.   Finally,   the   potential   of   options   for   HE   recovery   and  
development   in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   is   explored   including   privatisation   and  
internationalisation.    
  
3.1. The  Neglected  Pillar  of  Recovery  
  
The  goal  of  this  section  is  to  establish  that  HE  in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts  is  an  under-­‐‑
recognised  and  under-­‐‑analysed  sector  with  the  potential  to  drive  recovery;  in  short  
that   HE   is   a   neglected   pillar   of   recovery.   To   begin,   it   can   be   stated   that   HE   is  
commonly   a   very   low   priority   in   conventional   approaches   to   post-­‐‑war  
reconstruction.  Buckland  (2005)  states  that  ‘much  of  the  energy  and  resources  of  the  
international   community   have   been   directed   at   basic   education,   while   education  
authorities  have  been  left  to  their  own  resources  to  deal  with  the  needs  of  the  other  
subsectors’.  Kumar  (1996,  p.20)  further  explains  that:  
  
Bilateral  and  multilateral  donors  have  also  given  economic  and  technical  support  to  
reopen   institutions   of   higher   learning-­‐‑   although   the   amounts   are   modest   and   the  
delivery   slow,  partly  because   the   functioning  of   institutions  of  higher   education   is  
not  universally  perceived  as  a  priority  by  relief  agencies.  
In   support   of   this   trend,   two   cases   of   internationally-­‐‑administered   reconstruction  
received   very   low   donor   or   international   agency   support   for   HE.   The   United  
Nations  Transitional  Administration   in  East  Timor   initially  budgeted  no   funds   for  
HE   in   2000;   funds  were   only   released   after   lobbying   by   the  National  University’s  
rector   (Hill   2000).   In   another   case,   Iraq   received   no  HE   funding   in   the   initial   $18  
billion  allocated  for  reconstruction.  Further  illustration,  Table  1  below  shows  that  in  
only  Lebanon  and  Cote  D’Ivoire  did  HE  receive  more   than  50%  of   total  education  
ODA  flows  in  the  first  three  years  following  conflict.      
80	  
	  
Table   1.   ODA   flows   ($   Millions   –   Constant   2008   prices)   to   selected-­‐‑conflict   affected  
countries   in   the   three   years   after   the   signing   of   a   peace   agreement.   Source:   OECD-­‐‑DAC  
QWERY  Wizard  for  International  Development  Statistics.  
  
  
However,   it   should   be   qualified   that   some   donors,   including   France   and   the  
Netherlands,   allocate   substantial   sums   to   HE   while   the  World   Bank   has   become  
more  willing   to  support   tertiary  education.  A  World  Bank  study  argues   that  post-­‐‑
conflict   settings   in   which   secondary   and   tertiary   education   are   ‘eradicated’  
constitute   an   exceptional   category   in   which   conventional   wisdom   on   the  
developmental  priority  of   basic   education   is  weakened  due   to   the  need   to   restore  
human   capital   (Kreimer   et   al   1998).   A   review   of   World   Bank   education-­‐‑sector  
lending   in   post-­‐‑conflict   countries   found   that   primary   education   received   43%,  
tertiary   12%,   and   secondary   8%   (Buckland   2005,   p.63).   Further,   interest   in   HE   in  
post-­‐‑conflict   states   increased   in   the   late   2000s   with   emerging   international   civil  
society  initiatives  in  the  area.  
Low  priority  attached   to  HE   is  explained  by  various   factors.  Firstly,   consensus  on  
basic  education  as  a  development  priority  emerged  at  approximately  the  same  time  
as   post-­‐‑conflict   peacebuilding   operations   in   the   early   1990s.   In   a   brief   post-­‐‑Cold  
War  window  of   humanitarian   and  developmental   optimism   it  was  predicted   that  












institutions  and  markets  across  the  world  thus  creating  conditions  for  global  peace.  
As  De  Waal  (1997,  p.2)  writes:      
At  the  ‘end  of  history’  following  the  collapse  of  Communism,  the  triumph  of  political  
liberalism   appeared,   briefly,   so   incontestable   that   civil   society   and   economic  
prosperity   seemed   ready,   with   state   repression   removed,   to   spring   naturally   into  
place  
Peacebuilding   missions   focused   on   the   dual   imperatives   of   holding   democratic  
elections  and   implementation  of   liberal  market  reforms.   In   this  narrow  conception  
of   peacebuilding   there   is   very   little   linkage   between   the   central   tasks   of  
peacebuilding  and  HE  systems  in  post-­‐‑conflict  areas.    
The   1990   Education   For   All   conference   in   Jomtien,   Thailand,   represented   a  
coalescing   of   global   donor   and   development   actors   around   a   basic   education  
agenda.   HE   rebuilding   in   this   period   was   impacted   indirectly   through   increased  
attention  to  primary  schooling  and  decreased  tertiary  sector  funding.  For  example,  
Cambodia,   after   the   Paris   Peace   Accords   in   1991  was   not   recipient   of   substantial  
resources   for   reconstructing   HE   (Chamnan   &   Ford   2004,   p.342).   Prioritisation   of  
basic  education  was  enshrined  in  the  Millennium  Development  Goals  (MDGs)  and  
the   goal   of   universal   basic   education.   Furthermore,   Novelli   (2010)   argues   that  
invading  Afghanistan  has  been  retrospectively  justified  by  Western  powers  through  
provision  of  basic  education,  particularly  to  girls.  As  Ghani,  Lockhart  and  Carnhan  
(2005)   argue   ‘the   degree   of   consensus   on   the   importance   of   a   primary   education,  
particularly  for  girls,   is  so  general  that  it  does  not  bear  repetition...   the  importance  
of  secondary  and  tertiary  education  in  post-­‐‑conflict  conditions,  however,  is  not  yet  
adequately  grasped’.    
Education   in   conflict   and   emergencies   emerged   as   a   field   of   policy-­‐‑practice   and  
academic  interest  in  the  late  1990s  and  early  2000s.  During  the  2000s  basic  education  
became  widely-­‐‑recognised   as   the   ‘fourth  pillar’   of   humanitarian   action   (Nicolai  &  
Triplehorn   2003)   and   an   important   post-­‐‑conflict   sector.   A   burgeoning   academic  
literature   followed   this   shift   in   policy   analysing   education,   conflict,   and   recovery  
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from  multiple   perspectives   (Bush  &   Saltarelli   2000;   Buckland   2005;   Davies   2004a;  
Brown  2011).  However,  the  majority  of  the  literature  does  not  address  HE  in  post-­‐‑
conflict   recovery.  Where  HE   is   discussed,   it   is   often   viewed   as   an   expensive   and  
unproductive   sector   in   competition   for   resources   with   basic   and   secondary  
education  (see  for  example  UNESCO  2011,  p.120).  While  mainstream  development  
thinking  was  beginning  to  consider  HE  an  important  sector  the  same  was  not  true  
in  the  fields  of  statebuilding  and  reconstruction.  
It   should   be   qualified   that   the   education   in   emergencies   and   reconstruction  
literature   is   not   silent   on   HE.   Buckland   (2005,   p.32)   argues   that   standardised  
approaches   to   post-­‐‑conflict   education   do   not   sufficiently   focus   on   all   educational  
sub-­‐‑sectors   which   leads   to   the   ‘danger   that   postconflict   reconstruction   will  
introduce  or  exacerbate  imbalances  in  the  system’.  He  suggests  the  need  to  correct  
this   ‘sectoral   imbalance’   through   an   innovative   and   system-­‐‑wide   approach  
including   multilateral   strategies   that   enable   secondary   and   tertiary   sectors   to  
mobilise  critically  needed  resources.    
Furthermore,   the   narrow   peacebuilding   approach   was   transformed   by   the  
emergence   of   statebuilding   in   the   late   1990s   and   2000s.   While   HE   remains  
peripheral   to  much   statebuilding   literature   the   sector   is   considered   important   by  
some   leading   analysts.   HE’s   potential   in   post-­‐‑conflict   statebuilding   and  
reconstruction  is  defended  by  Ghani  and  Lockhart  (2008)  who  argue  that  failure  to  
prioritise   HE   led   to   long-­‐‑term   capacity   deficits   in   Iraq   and   Afghanistan   that  
seriously   frustrated   statebuilding   efforts.   In   Afghanistan   during   the   initial  
reconstruction  period  HE  was  a  very  low  priority.  Reconstruction  was  too  focused  
on   ‘hard’   issues   of   security   while   donor   education   policy   focused   on   basic  
education.   This   position   is   supported   by   Haneef   Atmar,   former   Minister   of  
Education   in   Afghanistan,   who   argues   that   failure   to   systematically   address   HE  
resulted   from   lack   of   vision   for   HE   and   its   de-­‐‑prioritisation.   He   holds   that   HE  
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should  have  been  a  central  part  of  an  integrated  reconstruction  strategy  focused  on  
building  human  capital.8    
Such  a  rationale  was  adopted  in  post-­‐‑genocide  Rwanda  where  donor  priorities  for  
investment  in  basic  education  were  in  tension  with  national  prioritisation  of  HE;  an  
important   component   of   national   development   strategies.   In   the   early   2000s  
Rwanda  spent  33%  of  its  education  budget  on  HE;  a  very  high  figure  for  the  region  
and   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts.   Hayman   (2007)   describes   how   Rwandan   government  
officials   strategically   navigated  donor  demands   and   resisted   external   pressures   to  
focus  on  basic  education  and  a  rural  pro-­‐‑poor  poverty  reduction  strategy.  National  
priorities  were  to  pursue  a  hi-­‐‑tec  growth  strategy  led  by  strong  ICT  and  HE  sectors  
with   the   goal   of   integrating   Rwanda   into   the   global   knowledge   economy   (Uvin  
2010).   Hayman   (2007)   holds   that   the   Government   pledged   to   follow   donor  
preferences  while   in  reality   implementing  their  Vision  2020  (Hayman  2007).  While  
HE   expenditures   were   reduced   over   time   largely   due   to   donor   pressure,   they  
remain  high.  Rwanda  is  held  to  be  a  successful  example  of  long-­‐‑term  post-­‐‑conflict  
reconstruction  and  supports  the  argument  for  conceiving  of  HE  as  a  critical  national  
capacity   and   strategic   investment   as   an   alternative   to   conventional   post-­‐‑conflict  
strategy.    
Another  reason  for  low  prioritisation  relates  to  conceptualisations  of  reconstruction  
and   recovery.   In   chapter   one   it   was   seen   that   narrow   views   of   reconstruction   as  
physical   restoration  of   the   status  quo  contrast  with   conceptualisations  of   recovery  
as  a  holistic  process  encompassing  various  activities.  HE  is  classified  as  unrelated  to  
recovery  in  conceptions  of  post-­‐‑conflict  reconstruction  that  are  limited  to  short-­‐‑term  
stabilisation   and   ‘hard’   issues.   A   wider   yet   still   narrow   conception   of   post-­‐‑war  
reconstruction   would   incorporate   Security   Sector   Reform   (SSR),   Disarmament  
Demobilisation  and  Reintegration   (DDR),  and  macroeconomic  stabilisation.   In   this  
conception   HE   may   still   be   expected   to   be   viewed   as   peripheral   to   recovery.  
Crucially,   when   the   task   facing   post-­‐‑conflict   societies   is   defined   as   a   holistic  
recovery   process   the   utility   of   HE   as   a   multi-­‐‑dimensional   and   multi-­‐‑functional  
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  Personal	  communication,	  York,	  UK	  2012	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institution  with  potential  to  contribute  to  all  recovery  sectors  and  processes  can  be  
recognised.    
A   related   reason   for   low  priority   relates   to   sequencing   of   policies   in   post-­‐‑conflict  
transitions.   Sequencing   of   policies   is   crucial   to   successful   post-­‐‑conflict  
reconstruction  (Timilsina  2006),  and  HE  is  often  viewed  as  a  long-­‐‑term  investment  
inappropriate  for  support   in  the  relief  and  reconstruction  phases.  White  and  Cliffe  
(2000)  explain  that  primary  education  tends  be  categorised  as  a  relief  activity  while  
secondary  and  HE  are  considered  developmental  activities.  They  note  that  the  logic  
guiding   this   distinction   led   the   EU   to   reject   funding   a   scholarship   programme   in  
Somalia.   The   conventional   rationale   behind   short-­‐‑term   priorities   of   relief   and  
reconstruction   holds   that   establishing   security,   stabilising   the   economy,   and   re-­‐‑
establishing  critical  institutions  such  as  courts  should  be  prioritised  above  all  else  in  
the  first  phase  of  reconstruction.  
  
Dobbins  et  al   (2007,  p.152)  The  Beginner’s  Guide  To  Nation-­‐‑Building   is  an   influential  
work  defending   this  position.  They  argue   that   in   immediate  post-­‐‑conflict   contexts  
developing   HE   systems   hinders   effective   service-­‐‑delivery   in   high   priority   areas  
including  health,  basic  education,  and  the  legal  system  (Dobbins  et  al  2007,  p.152).  
They   state   that   ‘at   this   stage,   projects   to   reform   pension   systems,   create   a   stock  
market,  or  develop  higher  education  tend  to  distract  from  rather  than  contribute  to  
the  effective  provision  of  government  services’.  Dobbins  et  al  (2007,  p.148)  continue  
that:  
  
Globally,   there   is   considerable   capacity   in   tertiary   education.   Most   postconflict  
societies   would   be   better   off   concentrating   resources   on   primary   and   secondary  
schools  than  on  state-­‐‑run  universities,  at  least  until  economic  growth  has  created  a  
stronger  tax  and  funding  base.  
  
Further,  they  argue  that  post-­‐‑conflict  countries  should  concentrate  on  primary  and  
secondary   education,   utilising   scholarships   for   study   abroad   and   encouraging  
private   providers   to   meet   post-­‐‑secondary   educational   needs.   In   this   ‘division   of  
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labour’   there   is   no   need   for   state-­‐‑run   universities   and   national  HE   capacity.   This  
position   connects   three   areas   common   to   conventional   approaches   to  post-­‐‑conflict  
HE;  low  priority  to  the  sector,  private  HE,  and  internationalisation.  While  the  ‘hard  
security’   approach   would   rule   out   HE   investment,   this   approach   views   HE   as   a  
long-­‐‑term   developmental   investment   potentially   appropriate   at   a   late   stage   of   a  
post-­‐‑conflict  transition  after  a  reconstruction  phase  prioritising  restoration  of  critical  
infrastructure   including  electricity,   transport,  health  systems,  and  communications  
networks.    
  
The   concept   of   post-­‐‑conflict   transitions   refers   to   the   relief-­‐‑reconstruction-­‐‑
development   continuum   to   describe   the   trajectory   of   recovery   in   post-­‐‑conflict  
societies.   However,   the   reality   of   post-­‐‑conflict   societies   rarely   fits   a   neat   linear  
transition   model.   UNDG/ECHA   (2009)   state   that   transition   processes,   ‘exist  
simultaneously,   at   varying   levels   of   intensity,   susceptibility   to   reversals,   and  
opportunity’.   Multiple   transitions   are   underway   simultaneously,   including   from  
rural  to  urban,  isolated  to  internationalised,  war  to  peace,  or  military  to  civilian.  In  
addition   to   these   often   turbulent   processes,   states   are   frequently   expected   to  
undertake  complex  processes  of  institutional  engineering  including  democratisation  
and  marketisation  within  overall  ‘liberal’  post-­‐‑conflict  transitions.  
A  major  argument  of  this  thesis  is  that  HE  in  post-­‐‑conflict  societies  has  the  potential  
to  act  as  a  critical  national  capacity  that  could  enable  more  effective  transitions  from  
relief  through  reconstruction  into  long-­‐‑term  and  sustained  development.  A  similar  
argument   is   made   by   Zeus   (2009)   who   writes   that   in   the   context   of   protracted  
refugee  situations  HE  can  support  transition  from  relief  to  development.  She  writes  
that   ‘in   the   long-­‐‑run,  higher  education,  while   requiring  significant   financial   jump-­‐‑
start  and  continuing  commitment  by  donors,  could  contribute  to  breaking  out  of  the  
relief-­‐‑cycle   in   offering   a   way   to   development   and   self-­‐‑sustainability’.   While   HE  
conventionally   understood   is   not   a   priority   area   in   post-­‐‑conflict   societies   and   is  
classified  as  a  developmental  rather  than  a  reconstruction  activity  it  is  argued  here  
that   strategic   investment   in   HE   has   potential   to   contribute   to   more   effective  
recovery   at   all   stages   of   post-­‐‑conflict   transitions.   The   following   section   provides  
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numerous  other  examples  and  arguments  supporting  the  view  that  HE  sectors  can  
contribute  positively  to  recovery  during  all  stages  of  transition.    
  
3.2. Core  Functions  of  Higher  Education  in  Post-­‐‑conflict  Recovery  
  
In  the  previous  section  it  was  shown  that  several  influential  positions  do  not  regard  
HE  as  an  important  sector  for  post-­‐‑conflict   investment.   It  should  be  qualified  that,  
as   described   in   chapter   one,   measuring   economic   and   social   impact   of   HE  
‘externalities’,   for   instance   increased   institutional   quality   or   moral   education,   is  
difficult  in  ‘normal’  development  contexts.  In  post-­‐‑conflict  settings  measurement  of  
these  variables  becomes  even  more  problematic.  For  this  reason,  many  studies  can  
miss  the  indirect,  mediated,  and  long-­‐‑term  impacts  of  HE  on  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery.  
This  section  is  designed  to  specifically  address  RQ3,  which  asks:  
RQ3:   What   functions   can   higher   education   perform   in   contributing   towards  
effective  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery?  
To  effectively  address  RQ3  this  section  will  provide  a  review  of  academic  and  ‘grey’  
literature  to  identify  the  theorised  linkages  between  HE  and  post-­‐‑war  recovery.  The  
main   functions  of  HE   in   relation   to  central   ‘tasks’  of  post-­‐‑conflict   recovery  will  be  
analysed   including   physical   and   sectoral   reconstruction,   conflict   prevention,  
humanitarian  relief,   statebuilding,  economic  recovery,  and  conflict   transformation.  
To   begin,   HE’s   role   in   short-­‐‑term   stabilisation   and   conflict   prevention   will   be  
considered.    
  
3.2.1. Conflict  Prevention  and  Stabilisation  
  
Ensuring   security   and   stability   is   widely-­‐‑considered   the   most   foundational   task  
facing  post-­‐‑conflict   societies   and   a  necessary   condition  of   effective   reconstruction.  
As  Caplan  (2005,  p.45)  states,  ‘public  order  and  internal  security  are  the  sine  qua  non  
of   civil   rule’   and   vital   for   reconstruction.   Preventing   outbreaks   of   violence,   civil  
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unrest,  and  armed  conflict  is  crucial  to  maintaining  a  secure  post-­‐‑war  environment.  
Many   ‘post-­‐‑conflict’   countries   run   significant   risk   of   slipping   back   into   armed  
conflict  within   ten  years   (Collier,  Hoeffler  &   Söderbom  2008).  Conflict   prevention  
has   therefore   become   an   increasingly   important   concern   of   reconstruction   and  
peacebuilding  operations  (Ackermann  2003).    
HE   has   a   theorised   positive   impact   on   post-­‐‑war   security   and   stability   through  
conflict   prevention.   Unemployed   young   people   are   increasingly   perceived   as  
sources   of   instability   in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   (Rose  &  Greeley   2006;   Collier   2000;  
Munive   2010).  As   Buckland   (2005,   p.25)   states   ‘slow  progress   in   the   expansion   of  
secondary   and   tertiary   education   tends   to   create   a   backlog   of   frustrated   and  
unemployed   youth   ripe   for   recruitment   into   violence   or   crime’.  HE   expansion   in  
post-­‐‑war   environments   has   therefore   been   held   to   reduce   likelihood   of   conflict  
recidivism  by  providing  educational  opportunities  addressing  grievances  including  
high  youth  unemployment  (Rubin  2009).    
A   study   of   HE   enrolments   in   the   first   five   years   of   peace   in   a   large   set   of   post-­‐‑
conflict  cases  found  that  ‘increased  enrollments  (sic)  in  higher  education  in  the  first  
five   years   after   the   end   of   a   conflict   significantly   decreases   the   likelihood   of   the  
restart   of   a   civil   war’   (Breuning   &   Ishiyama   2010).   The   results   are   explained   by  
increased   opportunity   costs   of   reverting   to   conflict   for   former   rebel   leaders   and  
middle-­‐‑class  potential  rebel  leaders  once  enrolled  in  HE.    
However,   the   option   of   short-­‐‑term   stability   through   HE   expansion   can   entrench  
medium   and   long-­‐‑term   risks.   If   educational   opportunities   are  much   greater   than  
livelihood   opportunities   then   in   the   medium-­‐‑term   raising   expectations   of   newly  
educated   youth   will   lead   to   even   greater   grievances   and   conflict   risk   (Rose   &  
Greeley   2006).   This   point   illustrates   the   centrality   of   job   creation   to   successful  
processes  of  post-­‐‑conflict  stabilisation  and  reconstruction.      
On   the   negative   side,   HEIs   may   be   viewed   as   a   destabilising   force   in   post-­‐‑war  
settings.   Student  political   action   can   trigger   social   conflict  with   sometimes  violent  
consequences   that   risk   conflict-­‐‑escalation.   For   example,   in   Nicaragua   political  
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contest  over  the  university  budget  became  a  highly  charged  national  political  issue  
in  1992   in  the  post-­‐‑Sandinista  period.  On  the  day  of  a  crucial  vote  on  whether  HE  
would   retain   its   6%   budget   allocation   a   leading   morning   newspaper   ran   the  
headline  ‘the  6  per  cent  vote  will  determine  peace  or  crisis’  (Arnove  1995,  p.47).  In  
another  example,  students  in  Cote  D’Ivoire  acted  as  peace  process  spoilers  at  crucial  
moments   after   2003.   FESCI   members   disrupted   identification   sessions   at   which  
primarily   Northern   citizens   are   registered;   an   important   peace   process   condition  
(HRW  2008).    
HE  can  make  a  critical   contribution   to  stabilisation   through  security  sector   reform  
(SSR).   Although   military   universities   are   generally   conceived   as   peripheral   to  
national   university   systems   they   nonetheless   constitute   part   of   a   diversified   HE  
landscape.   In   post-­‐‑conflict   countries   with   weak   militaries   investing   in   military  
education   may   be   argued   to   be   important   for   developing   modern   professional  
armed  forces  and  therefore  ensuring  domestic  security.    
This   rationale  was   employed   in  Afghanistan;   the  National  Military  Academy  was  
established  in  2005  after  a  policy-­‐‑transfer  process  in  which  senior  US  army  officers  
sponsored  Afghanistan’s  Ministry  of  Defence  to  study  the  US  Military  Academy  at  
West  Point  model  (Global  Security  n.d;  NYT  2004).  Cadets  receive  four-­‐‑year  degrees  
focused  on  engineering  and  languages.  Expected  impact  on  reconstruction  is  clear;  
‘the  government  hopes  graduates  will  help  rebuild  roads,  bridges,  and  an  electricity  
grid   ravaged   by   decades   of   war   and   neglect’   (Jones   2008).   In   2010   construction  
began   on   the  Afghan  National   Security  University   to   integrate   advanced   security  
services  and  military   training;   its   $200  million  budget  dwarfing  annual  public  HE  
expenditure.   It   may   be   questioned   whether   the   benefits   of   a   military   university  
outweigh   the   opportunity   cost   of   not   investing   part   of   the   sum   in   Afghanistan’s  
under-­‐‑resourced  public  HEIs.    
Another   potential   contribution   of  HE   is   through  Demobilisation,   Demilitarisation  
and  Reintegration  (DDR);  programmes  for  collecting  weapons,  breaking  up  armed  
groups,   and   integrating   former   combatants   into   society   (Muggah   2009,   p.3).   Very  
little  has  been  written  about  HE’s  role  in  DDR  processes.  In  essence,  expanding  HE  
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opportunities   can   assist   demobilisation   by   incentivising   combatants   to   lay   down  
arms  and  pick  up  books.  A  central  purpose  for  re-­‐‑opening  the  University  of  Liberia  
was   ‘to   make   it   an   instrument   for   ending   the   war   –   since   many   of   the   60,000  
combatants   were   college   students’   that   ‘laid   down   their   arms   to   return   to   their  
studies’  (Seyon  1997).    
  
However,   it   should   be   expected   that   HE   performs   a   very   limited   role   in  
reintegration  processes   in  most  post-­‐‑conflict  countries  due   to   low  gross  enrolment  
ratios   and   low   student   participation   in   conflict.   For   example,   in   a   study   of   ex-­‐‑
combatants  in  Sierra  Leone  it  was  found  that  36%  had  no  schooling  at  all  while  only  
1%   had   received   any   HE   (Solomon   &   Ginifer   2008).   However,   this   trend   is   not  
universal;   some   conflict-­‐‑affected   countries   have   relatively   high   enrolment   and  
significant   participation   of   university-­‐‑age   youth   in   conflict,   for   example   Syria,  
Libya,  and  Iraq.  In  another  case,  when  the  University  of  Liberia  re-­‐‑opened  in  1991  
one-­‐‑quarter  of  enrolled  students  were  former  combatants.    
  
Technical  tertiary  education  should  be  expected  to  have  greater  DDR  benefits  than  
university  education  because  relevant  skills  could  be  transferred  relatively  quickly  
enabling   reintegration   through   employment.   However,   former   combatants’   skills  
have  also  been  viewed  as  having  benefits   for   academic   education.  Delgado   (2008)  
describes   a   politics   course   established   in   Colombia   for   former   rebels,   many   of  
whom   had   taken   up   civil   and   political   positions.   His   findings   suggest   that  
experience  of  fighting  may  be  a  valuable  resource  for  ex-­‐‑combatants  pursuing  their  
studies,   for   example,   in   peace   and   conflict   studies   ex-­‐‑combatants   could   offer  
insights  into  motivations  for  participation  in  conflict.    
  
In  sum,  HE   is  not  widely  viewed  as  an   important  aspect  of  SSR  or  DDR  although  
the  sector  could  play  a   theoretically   important  role  within   long-­‐‑term  programmes.  
By  contrast,  an  area  where  HE  has  a  more  basic  connection  to  post-­‐‑war  recovery  is  





3.2.2. Physical  and  Sectoral  Reconstruction  
  
HE’s  most  fundamental  role  in  post-­‐‑conflict  societies  is  providing  skilled  graduates  
and   expertise   connected   to  physical   and   sectoral   reconstruction.   In   general,  many  
sectoral   reconstruction   processes   operate   with   a   short-­‐‑term   relief   mentality   and  
insufficiently  support   sustainable   local  capacity.  Supporting  domestic  HE  capacity  
in   core   areas   of   reconstruction   including   health,   engineering,   and   basic   education  
early   in   post-­‐‑war   recovery   are   long-­‐‑term   investments   that   enable   sustainable  
capacity  and  human  resources  for  reconstruction.    
As   Del   Castillo   (2008,   p.222)   writes,   post-­‐‑conflict   societies   frequently   ‘lack   basic  
managerial   and   technical   capabilities’   due   to   brain   drain.   Other   factors   affecting  
skills  and  capacities  include  war  casualties,  disrupted  education  systems  (Buckland  
2006),   and   HIV/AIDs   (Anand   2005).   With   insufficient   numbers   of   trained  
professionals   in   areas   including   law,   medicine,   education,   or   health   post-­‐‑war  
recovery  processes   face  significant  barriers.   In  short,   ‘post-­‐‑conflict   countries   face  a  
skills   gap   at   a   time  when   human   capital   is   in   high   demand’   (World   Bank/UNDP  
2005).  For  example,  ten  years  after  Mozambique’s  war  the  country  possessed  seven  
pharmacists   per   16   million   people,   no   certified   accountants,   and   one   doctor   per  
50,000  citizens  (Hopper  2006,  p.56).    
MoHE-­‐‑A/IIEP   (2004,   p.6)   argues   that   ‘there   is   already   a   great   shortage   of   highly-­‐‑
skilled  people  in  Afghanistan.  Unless  higher  education  is  expanded,  it  will  be  even  
greater  in  the  future’.  Similarly,  Barakat  (2008)  argues  that  building  human  capital  
is  crucial  to  sustainable  development  in  Afghanistan  and  that  neglected  HE  should  
be   prioritised   to  meet   demand   for   highly-­‐‑skilled   personnel.  A   contrasting   case   of  
relatively   high   post-­‐‑conflict   human   capital   is   Lebanon   where   HE   in   engineering,  
architecture,   and   related   disciplines   provided   reconstruction-­‐‑relevant   skills,   for  
example,   Hezbollah’s   NGO   Jihad   Al   Bina’a,   following   the   2006   July  War   rapidly  
mobilised   3000-­‐‑4000   volunteer   surveyors,   architects,   and   engineers   to   rebuild  
damaged   and   destroyed   homes   in   a   manner   more   effective   than   state   or   donor  
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interventions   (Barakat   &   Zyck   2008,   p.15).   However,   it   has   been   cautioned   that  
over-­‐‑provision   of   HE   courses   in   security   reform,   peace   studies,   governance,   and  
counselling   in   post-­‐‑conflict   African   states   led   to   short-­‐‑term   employment   of  
graduates  in  aid-­‐‑agencies  while  leading  to  unemployment  and  irrelevant  skills  once  
international  agencies  move  to  the  next  hotspot  several  years  later  (Omeje  quoted  in  
Grove  2013).    
This   consideration   suggests   that   HE’s   greatest   long-­‐‑term   contribution   to  
reconstruction  is  in  providing  advanced  training  and  skills  in  important  disciplines  
and   areas   rather   than   narrow   skill   sets   favoured   by   international   agencies.  
Investment   in   specific   subject   areas   including   medicine,   law,   teacher   training,   or  
economics   may   be   held   to   produce   recovery-­‐‑relevant   skills   in   critical   areas  
including   health,   rule   of   law,   basic   education,   and   the   economy   respectively.   For  
example,   medical   education   should   be   viewed   as   a   major   pillar   of   post-­‐‑conflict  
health  reconstruction.  Leather  et  al  (2006)  state  that  a  major  obstacle  to  post-­‐‑conflict  
health   development   is   ‘a   void   in   teaching   and   training   of   all   cadres   of   health  
workers  dating  back  to   the  preconflict  era’.  As  an  example,  Deolalikar   (1999,  p.36)  
argues   that   medical   education   in   Cambodia   in   the   mid-­‐‑1990s   was   of   such   low  
quality   that   graduates   were   far   short   of   regional   standards   thus   constituting   a  
‘major  bottleneck’  to  health  sector  rebuilding.    
In   all   of   these   advanced   disciplines   investment   in   human   capital   is   a   powerful  
rationale  for  post-­‐‑conflict  HE.  Support  for  the  hypothesis  that  high  skills  or  human  
capital   are   an   important   determinant   of   successful   reconstruction   can   be   drawn  
from   post-­‐‑WWII   West   Germany   and   Japan.   While   both   countries   were   severely  
affected  by  war   their   long-­‐‑term  reconstruction  was   remarkable.  This  may,   in  part,  
be   explained   by   presence   of   large   numbers   of   skilled   workers   able   to   lead  
reconstruction  and  the  ‘institutional  memory’  that  survived  physical  destruction.  As  
Coyne   (2005)   suggests   in   a   comparison   between   post-­‐‑WWII   successes   and  
contemporary  ‘failed  states’;  ‘perhaps  it  is  the  case  that  a  different  set  of  knowledge  
and  skills  existed  in  prewar  Japan  and  Germany  as  compared  to  Haiti  and  Somalia’.  
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In  addition  to  reconstruction-­‐‑relevant  skills,  advanced  education  can  provide  skills  
and  knowledge  for  often  neglected  sectors  important  to  a  holistic  recovery  process.  
For  example,  advanced  training  in  psychiatry,  archaeology,  and  social  work  may  be  
linked  to  sustainable  recovery  in  addressing  psycho-­‐‑social  needs,  cultural  heritage,  
and  the  caring  sectors  respectively.    
Brain  drain  of  highly-­‐‑skilled  individuals  is  a  major  dynamic  affecting  human  capital  
available   for   recovery   tasks.   As   a   response,   domestic   HE   can   contribute   to   re-­‐‑
supplying   depleted   pools   of   human   capital   necessary   for   recovery   by   producing  
skilled  graduates.  However,  HE  can  also  contribute  to  recovery  as  a  pull  factor  in  a  
process   of   ‘brain   gain’.   Diaspora   and   displaced   populations   constitute   valuable  
human   resources   pools   for   recovery,   for   example,   in   promoting   post-­‐‑conflict  
governance   reform   (Brinkerhoff   2008)   or   providing   capital   investment   (Nielsen  &  
Riddle  2010).  Furthermore,  frequent  disruption  of  HE  in  conflict-­‐‑affected  countries  
combined   with   the   tendency   of   emigrants   to   gain   advanced   education   or   skills  
abroad   make   highly-­‐‑skilled   diaspora   an   even   more   valuable   asset   (PGD/OECD  
2010a).      
Investment  in  post-­‐‑conflict  HE  encourages  skilled  diaspora  return  in  several  ways.  
Davies   (2004a,   p.98)   argues   that   following   conflict   ‘whether   academics   return  
depends  at  least  in  part  on  the  future  the  country  holds;  the  brain  drain  is  worse  in  
poor  countries  such  as  Rwanda’.  Another  factor,  Chauvet  and  Collier  (2007)  argue  
that   public   investment   in   post-­‐‑primary   education   is   necessary   in   post-­‐‑conflict  
contexts   because   educational   opportunities   are   a   very   important   attractor   of  
displaced   diaspora   whose   children   are   usually   enrolled   in   the   host   country.   The  
rationale   employed   by  US   reconstruction   planners   for   large   investments   in   1950s  
Korean  HE  was  that  ‘availability  of  advanced  high-­‐‑quality  centers  would  reduce  the  
outflow  of  talented  students  seeking  training  in  foreign  universities’  and  ‘draw  back  
to  Korea  outstanding  scholars  who  had  settled  abroad’  (Dodge  quoted  in  Lee  2004,  
p.155).   From   this   brief  discussion  preventing   ‘brain  drain’   and   stimulating   skilled  
diaspora   return   are   further   contributions   of   HE   to   post-­‐‑war   human   capital  
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requirements.  Moreover,  HE’s   importance   to   building  high-­‐‑level   human   capital   is  




Early   1990s   post-­‐‑conflict   peacebuilding   missions   focused   on   holding   democratic  
elections  and   implementation  of   liberal  market-­‐‑reforms.  During  the   late  1990s  and  
early  2000s  post-­‐‑conflict  peacebuilding  operations  were   transformed  by  new  focus  
on   ‘construction  or  strengthening  of   legitimate  governmental   institutions’   (Paris  &  
Sisk   2009,   p.1).   This   development  was   driven   in   part   by   increased   academic   and  
policy   attention   to   the   state   and   recognition   of   limitations   to   dominant  
peacebuilding   approaches   emphasising   elections   and   market-­‐‑reforms   which  
insufficiently  addressed  wider  institutional  post-­‐‑war  contexts.    
The  statebuilding  literature  places  greater  importance  on  HE  than  the  narrow  liberal  
peacebuilding  literature,  for  example,  Ghani  and  Lockhart  (2008).  In  this  section  the  
HE-­‐‑statebuilding  relationship  will  be  considered  in  terms  of  several  core  aspects  of  
statebuilding;   rule   of   law;   capacity-­‐‑building;   and   legitimacy.  To   begin,   the   role   of  
HE,  legal  education  in  particular,  will  be  examined  in  its  contribution  to  the  rule  of  
law.    
  
3.2.3.1.   Rule  of  Law  
  
Re-­‐‑establishing  rule  of  law  is  a  fundamental  task  of  statebuilding  and  restoring  civil  
administration   (Plunkett   2005).   Legal   education   is   argued   to   be   crucial   to  
establishing  post-­‐‑conflict  rule  of   law  (Waters  2007;  Swenson  &  Sugerman  2011).   In  
many   post-­‐‑conflict   countries   where   legal   institutions   are   often   weak,   efforts   at  
restoring  legal  capacity  are  challenged  by  insufficient  qualified  legal  professionals.  
For   example,   in   May   2006   one-­‐‑third   of   Afghanistan’s   1,415   judges   held   HE  
qualifications   (Lister   2007).   In   2002  Mozambique’s   lawyer-­‐‑to-­‐‑population   ratio  was  
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1:102,222   compared   to   1:400   in   England   and   Wales   and   1:4360   in   South   Africa  
(Baker  &  Scheye  2007).  In  Burundi  before  the  2004  UN  mission  there  were  only  60  
defence   lawyers   present   nationally   and   mostly   concentrated   in   the   capital  
Bujumbura   (Sannerholm   2007).   Investment   in   legal   education   is   therefore   held   to  
redress  this  critical  shortage  of  legal  expertise  to  support  meaningful  legal  reform.    
Stromseth,  Wippman  and  Brooks  (2006,  p.185)  argue  for  a  ‘synergistic’  approach  to  
post-­‐‑conflict   rule   of   law   reform   focused   on   critical   inter-­‐‑related   capacities;   law-­‐‑
making,  law-­‐‑enforcement  and  adjudicatory  capacities  in  addition  to  legal  education  
capacity.  They  hold   that   the   latter   is  often  neglected  with  donors  providing  short-­‐‑
term  training  to  demonstrate  immediate  impact.  Rather,  it  is  contended  that  ‘in  the  
long   term,   effective   indigenous   legal   education   is   critical   to   training   a   new  
generation’  of  legal  professionals.  Similarly,  Sannerholm  (2007)  writes  that  in  post-­‐‑
conflict   states   ‘an   interesting   aspect   of   judicial   reform   is   that   it   rarely   includes   a  
focus  on  legal  education  and  support  to  law  schools’.  He  argues  that  over-­‐‑reliance  
on  continuing  legal   training  rather   than  basic   legal  education  can  solve  short-­‐‑term  
problems  but  is  unsustainable.    
Swenson   and   Sugerman   (2011)   argue   that   Afghan   legal   education   has   been   a  
neglected  dimension  of  rule  of  law  programmes.  They  argue  that  legal  education  is  
essential   to   rule   of   law   because   it   impacts   heavily   on   how   lawyers   work   and  
‘promotes  scholarship  and  practical  expertise’  among  government  officials.  In  many  
post-­‐‑conflict   states   legal   education   requires   significant   curricula   reform   and  
professionalization.   Afghan   legal   education   ‘prepares   graduates   ill-­‐‑suited   to  
address  the  profound  challenges  facing  Afghanistan’s  nascent  constitutional  order’  
(Swenson   &   Sugerman   2011).   As   Stromseth,   Wippman   and   Brooks   (2006,   p.244)  
write   ‘inadequate   university   legal   education   can   be   a   serious   obstacle   to   the  
development  of  a  fair  and  effective  justice  system’.    
Existing   domestic   capacity   in   legal   education   and   related   disciplines   including  
criminology  and   forensics   is  an  often  under-­‐‑utilised  resource   for  post-­‐‑conflict   rule  
of  law  and  justice  reforms.  OHCHR  (2006)  writes  that  ‘the  United  Nations  overlooks  
local  academic  research  and  expertise,  which  could  enrich  all  aspects  of  its  rule-­‐‑of-­‐‑
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law  work’.  They  hold  that  greater  involvement  of  domestic  academic  experts  would  
have   two   major   impacts;   enhanced   contextual   understanding   of   rule   of   law  
interventions   and   increased   sustainability   of   capacity   after   outside   legal   advisors  
leave.    
Legal   education   is   arguably   more   important   when   transition   is   accompanied   by  
radical   legal,   constitutional,   and   institutional   reforms,   for   example,   externally-­‐‑led  
post-­‐‑conflict   transitions   in   East   Timor   and   Afghanistan.   Better   legal   education  
supplies   more   legally-­‐‑trained   professionals   who   can   comprehend   and   address  
complex   changes.  Without   sufficient   legal   expertise   post-­‐‑conflict   states  may   have  
inadequate   human   capacities   for   effective   self-­‐‑representation   in   international  
negotiations   and   other   forums;   an   obstacle   to   ‘local   ownership’.   For   example,  
supporting  indigenous  legal  education  is  important  to  safeguarding  representation  
of  national   interests   in  the  design  and  operation  of  new  institutions  (Waters  2007).  
This  point  connects   to   the  central  argument  of   the  next  section;   that  HE  can  make  
‘ownership’  meaningful  by  supplying  advanced  skills,  knowledge,  and  expertise.    
  
3.2.3.2. Capacity-­‐‑Building  and  Governance  
  
Capacity-­‐‑building  may  be  defined  as   ‘means  by  which  skills,  experience,   technical  
and   management   capacity   are   developed   within   an   organizational   structure’  
(OECD  2002).  Capacity-­‐‑building  has  increasingly  become  a  principal  form  of  post-­‐‑
conflict   donor   assistance.  As  Chard   (2005)   explains,   donor   programming   assumes  
causal   links   between   capacity-­‐‑building,   good   governance,   and   post-­‐‑conflict  
recovery.   Capacity   is   arguably   central   to   recovery,   for   example,   Barakat   (2005,  
p.262)   writes   ‘in   essence   the   post-­‐‑war   reconstruction   task   is   about   restoring   and  
developing   the   capacity   of   a   nation   to   function   and   manage   all   aspects   of   its  
collective  life’.    
HE   and   human   resources   are   important   factors   in   effective   rebuilding   of  
governmental   institutions.  As  Collier   (2009)  states,   ‘a   legacy  of  civil  war   is  usually  
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that  the  civil  service  deteriorates,  partly  because  the  society  loses  skills’.  In  post-­‐‑war  
Mozambique   a   major   obstacle   to   developing   the   parliamentary   system   was   the  
weak  human  resource  base  and   lack  of  staff  or  party  recruits  with  HE  (Ostheimer  
1999;  Manning   2002).  Ghani   and  Lockhart   (2007)   support   the   argument   for  HE   in  
capacity-­‐‑building  efforts  writing  that:  
Good   governance   depends   on   a   credible   path   of   upward   social  mobility   for   young  
people;  this  path  cannot  be  created  without  in-­‐‑country  investment  in  institutions  of  
higher  learning  that  provide  the  leaders  and  managers  that  would  constitute  the  key  
constituency  for  change  and  make  the  state,  market  and  civil  society  function.  
The   above   quote   illustrates   the   link   between   capacity-­‐‑building   supported   by  HE,  
capacity,   governance,   and   recovery   in   post-­‐‑conflict   societies.   Post-­‐‑conflict  
statebuilding   has   been   held   to   frequently   prioritise   central   state   institutions   and  
government   at   the   expense   of   local   governance   to   the   detriment   of   overall  
peacebuilding  outcomes  (Berdal  2009,  p.127).  However,  HE  provision  due  to  donor  
assistance   was   found   to   be   the   most   critical   factor   enabling   effective   local  
governance   in   post-­‐‑war   Bosnia   because   it   overcame   human   resources,   staff  
organisation,  and  low  knowledge  obstacles  (Pickering  2011).    
HE   can   arguably   support   long-­‐‑term   sustainability   of   capacity-­‐‑building.   For  
example,   Ghani   and   Lockhart   (2008,   p.142)   note   how   the   UN   and   World   Bank  
warned   the   Afghan  Government   against   investment   in  HE,   in   favour   of   primary  
education.  They  link  this  failure  to  revitalize  HE  with  continuous  high  spending  on  
technical   assistance   to   compensate   for   ‘low   capacity’,   many   years   into  
reconstruction.  Torabi  and  Delesgues  (2008)  agree,  arguing  that  neglecting  Afghan  
HEIs   post-­‐‑2001   rendered   the   sector   unable   to   produce   sufficient   numbers   of  
competent   professionals   for   a   viable   ‘exit   strategy’   to   enable   transition   beyond  
extreme   dependence   on   expensive   technical   assistance.   Haidari   (2009)   concurs,  
emphasising   the   priority   that   must   be   attached   to   Afghan   secondary   and   HE   to  
redress  massive  capacity-­‐‑deficits  produced  by  initial  reconstruction  strategies.    
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Another  example,  Rugumamu  and  Gbla  (2003)  argue  that  capacity-­‐‑building  in  post-­‐‑
conflict   Uganda   was   unsustainable   due   to   ‘inordinate   dependency   on   foreign  
financing   and   expertise   without   any   imaginative   exit   strategies’.   They   prescribe  
donor   attention   to   HE   to   generate   human   capital   and   ‘strengthen   the   country’s  
ability   to   nurture,   sustain,   update   and   regenerate   capacity   over   time’.   Katorobo  
(2007,  p.62)   agrees   that  Uganda’s  post-­‐‑conflict   reconstruction   suffered   from   skills-­‐‑
shortage   due   to   largescale   ‘brain   drain’   leading   to   high   technical   assistance  
dependence.   However,   he   notes   that   HE   expansion   led   to   oversupply   of   skilled  
graduates,  unemployment,  and  further  brain  drain.    
Post-­‐‑conflict   statebuilding   requires   far-­‐‑reaching   reforms   to   create   and   maintain  
quality   institutions   and   develop   functioning   service-­‐‑delivery   mechanisms.   HE   is  
arguably   important   for   effective   post-­‐‑conflict   reforms.  Chauvet   and  Collier   (2007)  
find   that   societies   with   higher   secondary   enrolment   are   more   likely   to   initiate  
challenging   reforms.   In   their   econometric   test   secondary   education   is   used   as   a  
proxy   for   a   societal   knowledge   on   the   assumption   that   ‘reform   will   be   easier   in  
better   educated   societies’.   Chauvet   and   Collier   (2004)   argue   that   donor   aid   to  
secondary   and   HE   in   fragile   states   is   a   productive   investment   creating  
preconditions  for  reform.  They  hold  that  lack  of  qualified  personnel  in  the  poorest  
countries  is  a  significant  obstacle  to  implementing  ‘radical  adaptations’  necessary  to  
long-­‐‑term   transformation   and   that   therefore   any   programmes   supplying   ‘well-­‐‑
trained  individuals’  should  be  welcomed.    
Weak   ‘local   ownership’   of   post-­‐‑war   reconstruction   and   gaps   between   local   and  
international   priorities   has   been   identified   as   a   major   factor   explaining   the   poor  
record   of   international   post-­‐‑war   interventions   (Brinkerhoff   2005;   Donais   2009).   In  
response,   UN   peacebuilding   operations   increasingly   emphasise   that   ensuring  
‘national  and  local  ownership’  is  critical  to  their  effectiveness  (von  Billerbeck  2010).  
Ownership  can  be  conceptualised  as  local  and  national  actors’  role  in  a  continuum  
from   participating   in,   designing,   implementing,   to   controlling   post-­‐‑war   projects,  
programmes,  and  processes.  However,  as  Chesterman  (2007)  argues,   lip-­‐‑service   to  
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ownership  is  often  more  about  ‘buy-­‐‑in’  or  consent  than  genuine  control  and  should  
be  placed  towards  the  ‘participating  in’  end  of  the  above  continuum.    
HE   investment   is   also   held   to   strengthen   ‘ownership’   of   statebuilding.  As  Ghani,  
Carnahan  and  Lockhart  (2006)  argue  ‘key  to  promoting  good  governance  is  the  local  
ownership  of  a   state-­‐‑building  agenda.  This  cannot  be  promoted  without   investing  
in   the   creation   of   first-­‐‑rate   institutions   of   tertiary   education’.   The   dominant  
approach  to  post-­‐‑conflict  reform  typically  involves  complex  institutional  and  policy  
processes   including   introducing   market   economies,   constitutions,   or   liberal  
democratic   institutions.   To   illustrate,   Sloper   (1999,   p.10)   argues   that   due   to   rapid  
changes  in  Cambodia  during  1993-­‐‑1997  former  cadres  of  the  two  previous  regimes  
were   not   equipped   to   provide   leadership   and   enact   change   while   faced   with  
complex   transitional   issues   and   challenges.   Domestic   universities   have   a  
comparative   advantage   in   supplying   skills   to   manage   complex   transitions   and  
reforms,   defend   national   interests,   and   thereby   promote   authentic   ownership.  
Establishing   specialised   courses   in   critical   disciplines,   for   instance   a   Masters   in  
Public  Administration  (MPA),  could  provide  skills-­‐‑training  and  upgrading  of  civil  
servants  and  redress  reliance  on  external  consultants  and  technical  assistance.    
However,  it  may  be  contended  that  theorised  benefits  of  HE  to  institutional  quality  
will   experience   significant   lag-­‐‑time  because   it   takes   several   years   to  produce  new  
graduates   and   expand   HEIs.  While   this   point   contains   a   partial   truth,   the   above  
discussed  MPA  course’s  impact  could  require  less  than  one  year  between  enrolment  
and   training  of  young  civil   servants.  Another  objection  may  be   that   impact  of  HE  
externalities,   including  enhanced   institutional  quality,   is  very  difficult   to  measure,  
in   particular   in   post-­‐‑conflict   settings.   In   sum,   while   inconclusive,   the   above  
discussion   suggests   that   quality   post-­‐‑conflict   HE   should   be   expected   to   have   a  
positive  impact  on  reform  and  institutional  quality  although  some  effects  are  likely  
to   be   realised   over   the   long-­‐‑term.   Beyond   capacity,   another   major   aspect   of  





3.2.3.3.   State  Legitimacy  
  
Legitimacy  became  a  keyword  in  statebuilding  and  reconstruction  during  the  2000s.  
‘Strengthening  legitimate  institutions  and  governance’  to  move  past  violence  is  the  
WDR   2011’s   main   message   while   lack   or   absence   of   legitimacy   is   defined   as   an  
important   dimension   of   state   fragility   (OECD   2010b)   and   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery  
(Papagianni   2008;   Berdal   2009,   p.95;   Brinkerhoff,  Wetterberg  &  Dunn   2012).  HE’s  
contribution   to   post-­‐‑conflict   legitimacy   has   not   been   discussed   before   although  
there  are  reasons  to  view  the  possibility  as  fruitful.    
  
Legitimacy   can   be   derived   from   various   sources.   Performance-­‐‑based   legitimacy  
may   be   accrued   by   states   through   delivering   goods   and   services.   Post-­‐‑conflict  
provision  of  basic  education  has  the  greatest  potential   for   increasing  performance-­‐‑
related  legitimacy  (Barakat  2009)  although  re-­‐‑opening  HEIs  shut  by  conflict  can  also  
contribute.   Long-­‐‑term   promise   and   delivery   of   HE   expansion   can   form   a   central  
component   of   a   legitimacy-­‐‑enhancing   social   contract.   For   example,   in   post-­‐‑WWII  
Europe   transformation   of  HE   from   small   elite   systems   to  mass   systems   formed   a  
significant   part   of   the   post-­‐‑war   consensus   and   social-­‐‑democratic   legitimacy   (Judt  
2005,  p.393).    
  
In  addition  to  performance,   legitimacy  may  be  drawn  from  symbolic  and  affective  
dimensions.   In  newly-­‐‑independent  nations  recovering  from  war,  universities  are  a  
trapping   of   modern   statehood.   Shils   and   Roberts   (2004,   p.164)   argue   that   post-­‐‑
colonial   ‘universities   became   part   of   the   symbolic   apparatus   of   progressive  
civilization,  of  modernity’.  At  the  domestic-­‐‑level,   the  University  of  Juba,  displaced  
in  Khartoum,   is   a   potent   symbol   of   South   Sudanese   nationhood   and   its   potential  
return   to   Juba   has   been   a   source   of   conflict   since   the   2005   Comprehensive   Peace  
Agreement   (Wallace   2006).   HE   has   been   held   to   confer   a   degree   of   international  
legitimacy,   for   example,   Shillinger   (2005)   cites   the   fact   the   Somaliland   has  
universities  as  a  reason  for  granting  statehood  internationally.    
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After  the  2010  Cote  D’Ivoire  post-­‐‑election  crisis  President  Ouattara  closed  all  HEIs,  
heavily   looted   during   crisis,   for   18   months   while   major   renovation   and  
development  was  completed  at  a  cost  of  $220  million  and  the  power  of  the  student  
militia   FESCI   reduced   (Fatunde   2011a;   AFP   2012).   This   may   be   explained   as  
motivated  by  development   thinking;   the  President   stating   that   ‘as   an  economist,   I  
am   convinced   that   investment   in   universities   brings   the   highest   yield   in  
development’   (Corey-­‐‑Boulet   2012).   However,   this   move   should   be   interpreted   as  
driven   in   part   by   the   need   to   enhance   the   new   President’s   legitimacy   and   is  
supported  by   the   renaming  of  Bouake  University   to  Université  Alasane  Ouattara.  
Furthermore,  the  government  aimed  to  generate  international  legitimacy,  evidenced  
in   the  advertorial   in  BBC  Africa  Magazine  and  global  media  coverage  of   the  story  
(IRIN  2012).  This  example  illustrates  use  of  HE  as  a  means  of  accruing  performance-­‐‑
related,  symbolic,  and  international  legitimacy.    
  
However,  HE’s  role  in  enhancing  state  legitimacy  motivates  one  powerful  critique.  
In   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   large   subsidies   to   unproductive  HE   sectors   are   arguably  
maintained  to  bolster  state  support  amongst  urban  middle-­‐‑class  constituencies  and  
elite   groups.   Rather,   it   is   argued,   re-­‐‑distributing   educational   resources   to   basic  
education   would   support   pro-­‐‑poor   growth,   rural   poverty   reduction   and   conflict-­‐‑
sensitive   development   strategies.   For   example,   Novelli   (2011)   argues   that   Sierra  
Leone’s  prioritisation  of  HE  for  urban  and  elite  groups  over  basic  education  for  the  
rural  and  poor  was  a  core  factor  in  educational  exclusion  and  marginalisation,  a  key  
conflict-­‐‑driver.   He   holds   that   continued   post-­‐‑war   priority   to   HE  was  maintained  
despite   government   statements   backing  basic   education.  Rwanda   fits   this  pattern;  
donors   and   agencies   argued   for   reduced   HE   funding   to   support   more   equitable  
development.  Furthermore,  Braithwaite  et  al  (2010)  hold  that  education  budgets  in  
post-­‐‑conflict  Solomon   Islands  are   ‘badly  skewed   towards   funding   for   the  children  
of  the  elite  to  participate  in  higher  education’.    
  
In   sum,   it   has   been   seen   that  HE   can   in   theory   play   important   roles   in   the  main  
dimensions   of   statebuilding   and   that  while   this   possibility   is   under-­‐‑recognised   in  
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statebuilding  literature  there  are  notable  contributions  that  do  recognise  the  sector’s  
comparative  advantage.  Another  area  where  HE  in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts  represents  
an  under-­‐‑utilised  resource  is  as  a  humanitarian  actor,  which  will  be  addressed  next.    
  
3.2.4. Humanitarian  Assistance  
  
HEIs  have  been  held  to  be  potentially  important  actors  in  contributing  to  post-­‐‑war  
relief   and   recovery   operations.   In   the   post-­‐‑earthquake   rebuilding   of   Haiti,  
universities   were   important   in   organising   relief   efforts.   Community   service  
emerged   at   Quisqueya   University   with   medical   students   running   clinics,  
engineering   students   assisting   in   temporary   camp   construction,   and   education  
students   offering   alternative   education   (Pankratov   2010).   Similarly,   the   American  
University   of   Beirut   Center   for   Civic   Engagement   and   Community   Services  
supported   student   volunteers   in   administering   a   shelter   project   to   support   local  
communities  in  rebuilding  damaged  and  destroyed  houses  after  the  2006  July  War  
and  also  in  constructing  shelters  for  Syrian  refugees  in  2013  (AUB  2013).    
Refugee  HE  is  a  major  area  in  which  the  sector  can  contribute  during  humanitarian  
crises.   Forced  displacement   is   a  major   consequence  of  war   and   some  post-­‐‑conflict  
contexts   struggle   with   refugees   and   internal   displacement   for   many   years,   even  
generations.   Buckland   (2005,   p.67)   writes   that   ‘the   neglect   of   secondary   and  
postsecondary   education   typical   of   postconflict   environments   is   even   more  
pronounced  in  refugee  education’.  Refugees  face  obstacles  to  accessing  HE  in  their  
host   countries   including   expectations   they   pay   international   student   fees,  
requirements  for  special  permission  to  study,  or  denial  of  access  (Morlang  &  Stulte  
2008).   Furthermore,   donors   commonly   reject   tertiary   education   spending   for  
refugees   because   educational   provision   at   lower   levels   is   very   low   and   HE  
expenditures  benefit  small  elite  groups  (Dryden-­‐‑Peterson  2010).    
Dryden-­‐‑Peterson  (2010)   identifies   three  main  reasons  for  providing  HE  to  conflict-­‐‑
affected  refugees;  HE  offers  protection,  refugee  demand  for  HE  is  very  strong,  and  
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HE  supports  reconstruction  through  providing  ‘human  and  social  capital’   that  is  a  
resource  upon   return.   The   latter   reason   supports   the   central   thesis   defended  here  
that  HE  is  a   long-­‐‑term  developmental   investment  crucial   to  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery.  
One   case   fitting   the   theorised   return-­‐‑recovery   link   is   Afghan   refugees,   many   of  
whom  accessed  HE  opportunities  abroad  and  who  constituted  a  valuable  post-­‐‑war  
inflow   of   educated   individuals.   Morlang   and   Stulte   (2008)   argue   that   the   DAFI  
scholarship   Afghan   programme   successfully   facilitated   returns   because   tertiary  
education  provides  the  ‘skills  and  entrepreneurial  willingness  to  return  early’.  Due  
to  shortages  in  qualified  personnel  caused  by  conflict  DAFI  recipients  face  positive  
employment  prospects  upon  return  and  70%  of  scholarship  recipient  returnees  were  
‘employed   in   sectors   relevant   to   the   reconstruction   and   the   development   of   their  
countries’  (UNHCR  2007,  p.6).  
  
However,   return   creates   logistical   problems   for   post-­‐‑conflict   HE   including   high  
diversity   in   the   system,   possible   excess   demand,   accreditation   recognition,   and  
access   blockages   for   refugees   (IIEP   2010,   p.5).   Furthermore,   tertiary   education  
provision   for   Afghan   refugees   suffered   a   lack   of   donor   coordination   rendering  
reinsertion  into  Afghan  HE  much  more  complex  for  administrators  and  served  as  a  
barrier   to   reintegration   (Morlang   &   Stulte   2008).   The   recovery   perspective   on  
refugee   HE   accords   with   the   argument   of   the   next   section;   that   a   long-­‐‑term  
developmental  approach   is  required  to  maximise  HE’s  potential   in  contributing  to  
post-­‐‑conflict  economic  recovery.  
  
  
3.2.5. Economic  Recovery  
  
HE  tends  to  be  perceived  more  as  a  post-­‐‑war  economic  problem  than  opportunity.  
In  poor  countries   facing  numerous  post-­‐‑conflict   challenges  public  HE  expenditure  
may  be  viewed  as  a  barrier  to  investment  in  more  productive  sectors.  Public  tertiary  
education   is  expensive;   in  some  cases  educating  one  university  student  equals   the  
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cost  of  educating  over  fifty  primary  students.  Furthermore,  in  transitional  societies  
with  legacies  of  command-­‐‑economies  HE  sectors  are  seen  as  bloated  and  inefficient.  
Another   factor,  HE   in  many  post-­‐‑conflict   countries  produces  graduates  with  skills  
and   knowledge   irrelevant   to   economic   or   reconstruction   needs.   HE   is   therefore  
often  viewed  as  a  lag  on  economic  performance  rather  than  as  a  potential  recovery-­‐‑
driver.   However,   this   section   will   review   ways   in   which   HE   can   contribute   to  
economic  recovery  in  post-­‐‑conflict  settings.    
Given   the   state’s   centrality   to   creating   conditions   for   economic   development,  
devising   national   development   plans,   and   providing   public   goods   in   most   post-­‐‑
conflict  contexts   (Sisk  2013)  HE  can  contribute   to  economic  recovery  by  providing  
expertise  in  these  areas.  Additionally,  economic  recovery  faces  complex  challenges  
including  entrenched  war-­‐‑economies  and  economic  crises  requiring  responses  that  
demand   expertise   including   macro-­‐‑economic   stabilisation,   regulating   extractive  
industries,   international   negotiations,   and   participation   in   global   governance  
regimes.   Incentivising   return   of   highly-­‐‑skilled   expatriates   in   post-­‐‑conflict   settings  
can   therefore   aid   economic   recovery   (Chauvet   &   Collier   2007;   Sisk   2013).  
Furthermore,   gearing  HE   to   these   challenges   can  provide   expertise,   research,   and  
skilled  graduates  in  relevant  disciplines  that  would  enable  a  long-­‐‑term  sustainable  
approach   to   building   economic   governance   capacity,   generate   employment  
domestically,  and  avoiding  the  legitimacy  dilemma  of  relying  on  ‘outsiders’  to  staff  
key  institutions  indefinitely.    
While  HE  has  a   limited  short-­‐‑term  impact  on  tough  economic  recovery  challenges  
such   as   macro-­‐‑economic   stabilisation   the   sector   has   been   held   to   be   a   potential  
engine   of   post-­‐‑conflict   economic   recovery.   Agriculture   accounts   for   much  
employment   in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   (Ozerdem  &   Roberts   2012)   and   agricultural  
HE  and  extension  activities  are  therefore  argued  to  have  major  potential  in  reducing  
unemployment,  securing  livelihoods,  and  redressing  ‘urban  bias’   in  reconstruction  
(Bertelsen  2009).  For  example,   the  American  University  of  Beirut   (AUB)  Land  and  
People  relief  program  mobile  clinic  offered  ‘agricultural  and  business  development  
advice’  to  local  communities  (GUNI  2005).    
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HE   can   support   economic   transition   and   private-­‐‑sector   development   through  
adapting   business-­‐‑related   courses   to   new   economic   challenges   and  
entrepreneurship   programmes.   For   example,   the   NGO   SPARK   organised  
workshops  and  training  on  entrepreneurship  and  business  start-­‐‑ups  for  university  
students   in   post-­‐‑conflict   countries   including   Kosovo   and   Bosnia.   Furthermore,  
capital   investment   in   university   construction   brings   economic   benefits   including  
jobs  and  local  economic  stimulus.  For  example,  the  proposed  Springvale  university  
campus   in   Belfast  would   have   been   situated   ‘in   acutely   contested   territory   on   an  
interface   between   disadvantaged   rival   ethno-­‐‑nationalist   communities’   (Gaffikin  
2008,   p.277)   bringing   a   peace   dividend   by   creating   significant   local   employment,  
stimulating   urban   regeneration,   and   deepening   Northern   Ireland’s   knowledge  
economy  integration.    
A   central   argument   is   that   HE   can   contribute   towards   economic   recovery   by  
replenishing   depleted   human   capital.   Post-­‐‑conflict   economic   recovery   has   been  
linked   to   HE’s   relevance   to   economic   and   social   needs.   Ghani,   Lockhart,   and  
Carnahan   (2005)   write   that   ‘without   higher   education   geared   towards   producing  
responsible  citizenship  and  marketable  skills  in  the  economy,  neither  administrative  
reform   nor   competitiveness   can   be   realistic   goals’.   However,   post-­‐‑conflict   HE   is  
often   mostly   theoretical   rather   than   practical   and   irrelevant   to   economic  
development,  therefore  limiting  its  economic  impact  and  reducing  its  employment  
generation   potential.   Furthermore,   HE   is   generally   geared   towards   the   formal  
economy   while   in   many   cases   much   post-­‐‑conflict   economic   activity   is   in   the  
informal  economy.    
Technical  and  vocational  education  and  training  (TVET)  has  been  held  to  be  more  
relevant  to  economic  recovery  than  academic  HE.  Chauvet  and  Collier  (2007)  hold  
that   establishing   construction   skills   colleges   after   conflict   is   one   of   only   two  
potentially   justified  public  expenditures  on  post-­‐‑primary  education.  Barakat  (2009)  
holds   that   TVET   is   the   educational   sector   with   the   best   prospects   for   swift  
integration  with  economic  reconstruction  and  livelihood  generation.  He  argues  that  
in  Occupied  Palestine  HE  expanded  quantitatively  driven  by  nationalist  demands  
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with  low  economic  relevance  while  TVET  suffered  due  to  negative  social  attitudes  
towards   vocational   education   despite   the   sector’s   potential   to   contribute   to  
individual  employability  and  collective  economic  recovery.    
These   arguments   support  prioritising   technical   rather   than  HE.  While   recognising  
vocational  education’s  strengths,  a  balanced  approach  would  support  both  technical  
tertiary  education  and  academic  HE.  Rather   than  recommend  a  single  appropriate  
balance   for   economic   recovery   the   response   should   be   context-­‐‑dependent   and  
subject  to  long-­‐‑term  forecasting  and  planning.    
However,   balancing   demand   for   skills   and   supply   of   graduates   in   post-­‐‑conflict  
societies  can  be  difficult.  For  example,  at  Eduardo  Mondlane  University   (UEM)   in  
Mozambique,   there   were   more   than   five   applicants-­‐‑per-­‐‑place   in   economics   and  
management,   computer   science,   and   law,   yet   less   than   one   applicant-­‐‑per-­‐‑place   in  
geology,   chemical   engineering,   chemistry,   and   physics;   fields   more   important   to  
reconstruction   (Mario   et   al   2003,   p.19).   High   institutional   autonomy,  
decentralisation,   and   unregulated   private   expansion   can   produce   contradictions  
including   duplicative   investments   and   over-­‐‑subscribed   courses   with   low   job  
prospects.   State   regulation   is   required   to   align   admissions   with   reconstruction  
needs.  Government  interventions  include  allocating  disciplines  to  students  based  on  
performance   or   offering   financial   incentives   for   enrolment   in   undesirable   but  
socially-­‐‑productive   courses.   However   in   fragile   states   weak   governance   and   low  
forecasting  capacity  are  obstacles  to  alignment.    
Beyond  human  capital,  another  rationale  for  post-­‐‑conflict  HE  is  participation  in  the  
global  knowledge  economy.  Reddy  (2005b)  notes  that  ‘the  move  from  an  industrial  
to   an   information   society’   is   a   challenge   to   universities   ‘especially   in   post-­‐‑conflict  
transitional   societies’.   The   example   of   Rwanda’s   Vision   2020   illustrates   HE’s  
prioritisation   as   central   to   an   economic   recovery  plan   aimed  at   shifting   a   country  
from  devastation  by  conflict   towards  a  knowledge  economy.  HE  was  predicted   to  
provide  knowledge,  advanced  skills,  and  inter-­‐‑sectoral  linkages  enabling  long-­‐‑term  
economic   transformation   to  become   ‘the  Silicon  Valley  of  East  and  Central  Africa’  
(Davis   2012,   p.109).   In   such   bold   long-­‐‑term   visions   for   economic   recovery   HE  
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constitutes   an   important   investment;   however,   while   knowledge   economy  
discourses  increased  HE’s  prominence  within  development  thinking  it  is  viewed  as  
less  appropriate  in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts  due  to  myriad  challenges  and  typical  low  
levels   of   development.  HE’s   transformative   role   is   also   held   to   be   relevant   to  HE  
and  democratization  in  post-­‐‑conflict  settings,  analysed  in  the  next  section.    
  
3.2.6. Democratisation  and  Civil  Society  Development  
  
Since   the   early   1990s   democracy   promotion   and   democratisation   have   become  
central   concerns   of   dominant   international   approaches   to   rebuilding   war-­‐‑torn  
societies   (Kumar   1998,   p.5).   HE   has   been   argued   to   support   processes   of  
democratisation   in   post-­‐‑conflict   states.   University   students   are   often   viewed   as   a  
critical   group   in   the   promotion   of   democracy.   In   the   words   of   the   University   of  
Sarajevo’s   Rector   following   the   Bosnian   war,   ‘our   students   today   belong   to   a  
generation  that  will,  in  due  time,  themselves  be  responsible  for  the  development  of  
the  new  democratic  system  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina’  (Mulabegovic  1999,  p.XI).    
  
A  historical  example  is  the  ‘maximalist’  approach  to  post-­‐‑war  reconstruction  of  HE  
favoured   by   the  Americans   in   Europe   following  WWII.   The  USA   prescribed   that  
universities   in   occupied   areas   have   collaborators   removed,   curricula   revised,   and  
course   content   remodelled   ‘to   give   solid   root   to   the   theory   and   practice   of   a  
democratic  society,  to  serve  as  the  foundations  of  a  ‘new  world  order’  and  to  ensure  
that   society’s   key   value-­‐‑allocating   body   –   the   university   –   would   act   as   a   sure  
bastion   against   any   possible   return   of   totalitarianism   in   the   future’   (Neave   2011,  
p.33).  Germany  was  perceived  by  the  Allies  to  require  ‘re-­‐‑education’  to  steer  away  
from  its  National  Socialist  past  towards  a  democratic  path.  
  
HEIs  have  been  held  to  contribute  to  democratisation  and  building  of  civic  cultures  
directly   through   educational   content.   For   example,   a   British   Council   grant   to   the  
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University   of   Pristina   in   post-­‐‑war   Kosovo   allocated   funds   to   five   departments;  
Political  Science/Public  Administration,  Sociology,  Journalism/Media;  Architecture;  
and  Film  Directing.  The  rationale  was   that  chosen  areas   ‘all  directly   related   to   the  
regeneration  of  Kosovo  society  and  of  democracy’  and  ‘would  directly  assist  in  the  
rebuilding   of   political   and   public   culture   in   Kosovo’   (Davies   2002).   Furthermore,  
Davies   (2004b)   notes   that   the   grant,   although   relatively   small,   was   an   innovative  
form  of   post-­‐‑conflict  HE   aid   offering   an   alternative   to   conventional   infrastructure  
and  technology  assistance.    
  
Another   area   is   the   function   of   campuses   in   developing   countries   as   ‘training  
grounds’  for  democracy  in  which  young  people  learn  skills  of  political  organisation,  
electoral   campaigning,   and   advocacy   (Luescher-­‐‑Mamashela   et   al   2011).   Similarly,  
student   participation   in   university   associational   life   including   student   politics,  
associations,  and  societies  can  offer  the  first  opportunity  to  engage  in  activities  and  
learn   skills   that   constitute   important   experience   for   future   civil   society  
development.    
  
In  addition  to  skills,  student  civic  participation  has  been  held  to  contribute  to  post-­‐‑
conflict  democratisation  and  citizenship  by  affecting  civic  attitudes  and  behaviours.  
For   example,   Pouligny   (2005)   writes   that   post-­‐‑conflict   civil   society   development  
programmes   ‘are   often   seen   to   carry   the   best   hopes   for   a   genuine   democratic  
counterweight   to   existing  power-­‐‑brokers   and   to  hold   the   key   to   the   building  of   a  
‘new’   society’.   Davis   (2005a),   in   recommending   civic   participation   including  
interning,  working  with  youth,  or  care  work  for  Iraqi  students,  advances  a  similar  
argument  stating  that:    
  
Citizenship  and  service   learning  promotes  a  deeper   level  of  civic  understanding  on  
the  part  of  university  students.  Not  only  do  they  improve  their  learning  process,  but  
they  gain  an  appreciation  of  giving  to  the  community…  but  most  important  of  all,  
this  form  of  learning  helps  inculcate  civic  values  in  students.  
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However,   in   contrast   to   this   positive   contribution   of   HE   in   promoting  
democratisation  and  civic  culture  universities  can  function  as  training  grounds  for  
violence,  crime,  and  corruption.  The  most  widely-­‐‑known  case  is  FESCI  in  the  Ivory  
Coast,  formally  a  non-­‐‑partisan  national  student  union,  which  functioned  as  a  militia  
for  former  President  Laurent  Gbagbo  and  controlled  campus  life.  FESCI  was  found  
responsible   for   criminal   ‘mafia-­‐‑like’   activities   including  extortion,  violence  against  
regime  opponents,  and  murder  and  rape  of  students  affiliated  with  Northern-­‐‑based  
groups   (IRIN   2005;   IRIN   2007;   HRW   2008).   Furthermore,   the   group   offered   the  
regime  power   to  mobilise   large  numbers  of  people   at   critical  moments   and  act   as  
spoilers  in  the  peace  process  (HRW  2008).    
  
Paradoxically,   FESCI   has   been   held   to   have   the   crucial   formative   functions  
theorised   above   albeit  with   a   negative   impact   on   conventional   understandings   of  
civil   society   development   and   democratisation.   In   a   Human   Rights  Watch   (2008)  
report   entitled   “The   Best   School”   Student   Violence,   Impunity,   and   the   Crisis   in   Côte  
d’Ivoire  a  former  leader  of  FESCI  states  that:  
  
FESCI  is  the  best  school  for  leaders  there  is.  You  come  out  battle  hardened  and  ready  
to  do  politics.  Ours  is  a  generation  that  had  to  come  to  power  one  day,  so  if  you  see  
members  of  FESCI  rising  up,  our  view  is  that  it  was  inevitable  and  came  later  than  
it  should  have.  The  arrival  of  this  class  will  change  politics.  
  
However,  many   fragile   post-­‐‑conflict   countries   have   a   long   experience   of   students  
providing   strong   political   opposition   and   therefore   constituting   a   source   of   state  
instability.  In  such  situations  student  associational  life  may  be  repressed  or  co-­‐‑opted  
by   the   state.   For   example,   PRESBY   in   Cameroon   has   been   alleged   to   serve   as   a  
student   and   ex-­‐‑student   led   repressive   arm   of   Biya’s   regime   (IRBC   2004).   Intense  
ethno-­‐‑political   violence   between   rival   student   groups   nearly   paralysed   the  
University  of  Yaounde  for  several  years.  A  dilemma,  then,  facing  some  post-­‐‑conflict  
states  is  the  degree  to  which  independent  student  organising  should  be  permitted  to  
balance   the  goals  of   equipping   students  with   skills   in  public   life  with   the  
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maintain   stability.   This   dynamic   of   divisive   identities   affecting   the   student   body  
highlights   a   broad   theme   of   the   next   section;   that   HE   is   a   major   arena   in   which  
conflictual  identities  are  negotiated  in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts.    
  
3.2.7. Identity  and  Conflict  Transformation  
  
HE  plays  an  important  social  role  in  mediating  affective  issues  of  national  and  civic  
identity   in  post-­‐‑conflict  societies.  HEIs  have  been  viewed  as   instrumental   tools   for  
forging   a   unified   national   identity,   arenas   for   promoting   civic   values,   and  
fomenting   grounds   of   ethnic   and   political   polarisation.   In   this   section   various  
positions   in   this  debate  will  be  assessed.  First,  however,   it   is  worth  reflecting  on  a  
historical  example.   In  the  wake  of  Napoleonic  wars  which  ravaged  Europe  during  
1803-­‐‑1812  the  Humboldtian  university  model,  which  greatly  influenced  universities  
globally,   was   implemented   by  Wilhelm   van  Humboldt  with   the   goal   of   unifying  
and  rebuilding  the  defeated  Prussian  nation  (Penington  2010,  p.206).  Johann  Fichte  
‘envisioned  the  emergence  of  a  nation-­‐‑state  with  a  coherent  and  inspiring  national  
educational  system'ʹ  and  proposed  a  ‘total  revamping’  of  universities  and  a  focus  on  
research   (Gonzalez   2011,   p.105).   The   University   of   Berlin   was   established   with  
Prussian  revitalisation  as  its  mission  (Sawyerr  2004).  
This   concern   with   nation   revitalisation   strongly   parallels   modern   post-­‐‑war  
nationbuilding.   Lemay-­‐‑Hébert   (2009)   argues   that   statebuilding   focuses   on  
institutional   strengthening   and   re-­‐‑constituting   typical   Weberian   states,   often  
neglecting   nationbuilding’s   importance,   defined   as   fostering   shared   national  
identity  to  enhance  social  cohesion  in  conflict-­‐‑affected  contexts.  HE  may  be  argued  
to   support  post-­‐‑conflict   nationbuilding,   for   example,   through   conducting   research  
on   and   teaching   students   about   national   history,   languages,   and   foundational  
collective  myths.  For  example,  the  National  University  of  East  Timor  performed  an  
important  role  in  strengthening  national  culture  and  identity  in  post-­‐‑independence  
Timor-­‐‑Leste  with  courses  and  curricula  adapted  to  the  country’s  cultural,  historical,  
linguistic,  and  ecological  context  in  an  education  system  previously  geared  towards  
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Indonesian   national   concerns   (Boughton   2005).   This   rationale   is   defended   by   the  
MoHE-­‐‑A/IIEP  (2004):  
Preservation  of  the  nation’s  legacy,  the  heritage  and  history  that  is  an  integral  part  
of  forging  a  national  identity  as  well  as  the  rich  diversity  in  culture  and  languages,  
also  requires  that  education  play  a  strong  role.  Indeed,  universities  and  colleges  are  
the  most  important  custodians  of  the  past  and  its  achievements.  
Millican   (2008)   argues   that   in   the   context   of   building   citizenship   in   post-­‐‑conflict  
countries  HE  ‘may  be  better  placed  working  through  civil  society  movements  than  
through  promoting   the  badges  of  national   identity’.  This  position   is  motivated  by  
liberal   critiques   that   HE   should   not   be   a   direct   instrument   in   top-­‐‑down   and  
paternalistic  nation-­‐‑building  initiatives.  However,  it  may  be  countered  that  a  realist  
position  on  HE  to  forge  national  identity  and  social  order  in  post-­‐‑conflict  countries  
is  required.  Unlikely  support  for  this  position  comes  from  Hobbes’  Leviathan  where  
he   argues   that   English   universities   contributed   to   disorder   and   Civil   War   by  
encouraging   students   to   question   authority   and   that   lasting   peace   necessitated  
implementation  of  a  national  curriculum  designed  to  produce  order  (Parry  1998).    
An  example  of  a  post-­‐‑conflict  HE  strategy  with  the  goal  of  a  shared  national  identity  
is  Afghanistan  where  the  MoHE  identifies  high  quality  tertiary  education  as  a  ‘key  
condition’  for  national  unity.  The  HE  strategy  states:  
On   the   one   hand,   that   involves   recognising   national   diversity   and   on   the   other  
building   tolerance,   respect   for  differences  and  most   importantly  building  a  united,  
democratic   and   modern   Afghanistan   which   has   the   loyalty   of   all   Afghans,   while  
preserving  the  uniqueness  of  Afghanistan,  its  history  and  culture.  
This   strategy   balances   multi-­‐‑cultural   (respect   for   diversity,   tolerance)   and   civic  
(united   Afghanistan)   models   of   HE   in   fostering   national   integration.   The   multi-­‐‑
cultural   model   holds   that   recognition   of   inter-­‐‑group   difference   is   necessary   for  
building  peace  while  the  civic  model  posits  shared  values  and  beliefs  as  required  to  
ensure   peaceful   coexistence   (Bacevic   2010).   National   HE   policy   interventions   are  
often  necessary  to  translate  such  stated  goals  into  outcomes.  For  example,  in  Nigeria  
111	  
	  
after   the  Biafran  civil  war   the  state  undertook  various   interventions   to  ensure   that  
HE   supported   national   unity   rather   than   discord.   University   Chancellors   were  
selected   from   states   other   than   their   place   of   origin   and   students   placed   on   year-­‐‑
long  graduate  service  programmes  in  a  different  state  (Ukiwo  2007).  
However,  top-­‐‑down  HE  policy  interventions  are  not  the  only  manner  in  which  HE  
can   contribute   to   nation-­‐‑building   and   recovery.   While   it   may   be   expected   that  
building  HE  systems  after  destructive  conflict  is  a  complex  process  requiring  some  
foreign   technical   assistance   and   donor   resources   there   are   several   examples   of  
endogenous  community-­‐‑led  HE  recovery.  For  example,  Palestinian  HE  emerged  in  
a   context   of   protracted   conflict   and   occupation   (Abu   Lughod   2000).   In   another  
example,  universities  developed,  albeit  slowly,  in  Iraqi  Kurdistan  in  the  1990s  when  
the  area  was  largely  isolated  from  both  foreign  contacts  and  the  rest  of  Iraq  (Mojab  
&  Hall  2003).  In  both  cases  HE  was  viewed  as  an  important  factor  driving  emergent  
national  consciousness  and  identity.    
In   1998   Amoud   University   was   established   in   Boroma,   Somaliland   through  
indigenous   initiative;   the   first  post-­‐‑collapse  Somali  university.   $8000  was   received  
from  local  business  leaders,  each  University  Committee  member  donated  $150  and  
diaspora  remittances  from  Gulf  States  provided  further  financial  resources  (Samatar  
2001).  The  university’s  vision  was  promoting  national  over  sectarian  identities  held  
to   have   contributed   to   past   civil   conflicts.   Samatar   (2001)   writes   that   Amoud  
University’s   establishment   holds   ‘symbolic   significance’   in   ‘rehabilitating   trust   in  
public   institutions   and   remaking   social   relations   and   national   identity’.   This  
discussion   of   autonomous   recovery   illustrates   that   bottom-­‐‑up   processes   of  
community-­‐‑led  rebuilding  can  have  strong  impact  on  strengthening  social  cohesion  
and   communal   identity   in   addition   to   effectively   rehabilitating   post-­‐‑conflict   HE  
systems.    
  
However,  rather  than  functioning  as  a  catalyst  of  national  or  civic  identity,  in  many  
post-­‐‑conflict   states   HE   has   been   found   to   reproduce   particularistic   identities,   for  
example,   by   entrenching   ethnic,   religious,   sectarian   or   class   divides.   Giustuzzi  
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(2010)  finds  that  compared  to  the  1960s  and  1970s,  Afghanistan’s  post-­‐‑2001  student  
politics   has   been   ethnicised.   Most   student   organisations   and   associations   serve  
exclusive   ethnic   or   religious   groups   while   there   are   growing   reports   of   campus-­‐‑
based  ethnic   tensions.  This   example   illustrates   that   the  above-­‐‑quoted  positions  on  
HE’s   utilisation   to   promote   national   and   civic   identities   in   Afghanistan   must  
confront  social  forces  moving  in  the  opposite  direction.    
  
Post-­‐‑war  Bosnia’s  HE  landscape  fragmented  along  ethnic  divisions,  for  example  the  
University  of  Mostar  split  into  two,  one  for  Bosniac  and  one  for  Croat  populations  
(Temple  2002).  Sabic-­‐‑El-­‐‑Rayess   (2009)  holds   that   these   ‘educational  micro-­‐‑systems’  
perpetuated   existing   ethnic   divisions   and   ‘retarded   the   solidification   of   Bosnia’s  
national   identity’.   Similarly,   Kosovan   universities   split;   the   University   of   Pristina  
almost  exclusively  for  ethnic  Albanian  and  other  non-­‐‑Serb  Kosovan  groups  with  the  
University  of  Mitrovica  Serb-­‐‑dominated.  In  another  case,  Lebanese  universities  are  
primarily  exclusive  to  particular  groups.  In  all  of  these  cases  HE  may  be  argued  to  
have   played   a   greater   role   in   solidifying   and  deepening   rather   than   transforming  
the  affective  bases  of  conflict.    
  
Contributions   from   the   conflict   transformation   literature   hold   that   HE   can  
transform  conflictual  identities  and  promote  lasting  peace  in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts.  
For   example,   Bishai   (2008)   argues   that   Sudanese   universities   have   potential   to   be  
agents   of   conflict   transformation   through   enabling   critical   thinking   capable   of  
challenging   established   truths   and   fostering   inclusive   identities   that   transcend  
existing   divisions   for   example,   North/South   (Bishai   2008).   In   general,   primary  
education   is   formative  while  HE  has   the  possibility   to  be   transformative.   In  many  
conflict-­‐‑affected   societies   young   people  make   the   transition   from   insular   primary  
and  secondary  education  to  HE  where  many  students  have  their  first  possibility  to  
‘meet   the   other’  whether   based   on   ethnicity,   race,   religion,   gender,   nationality,   or  
political  position.  In  a  discussion  of  student  politics  in  developing  countries  Altbach  
(1987,  p.124)  writes  that:  
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While   student   populations   tend   to   come   from   relatively   privileged   strata   of   the  
population,  they  have  relatively  greater  opportunities  to  interact  with  compeers  from  
different  social  strata.  Traditional  barriers  of  caste,  ethnicity,  tribe  and  religion  seem  
less  important  in  the  meritocratic  atmosphere  of  the  university.  
Bosnia,   Iraq,   and  Lebanon  may  be  held   to  offer   extreme  cases  of   separation  while  
for  most  societies,  post-­‐‑conflict  or  otherwise,  mixing  and  integration  in   large  cities  
that   dominate   HE   provision   is   a   fact   of   life.   For   example,   in   comparison   to  
secondary   schools   Northern   Ireland’s   universities   offer   ‘a   much   more  
heterogeneous   social   context   in   terms   of   religious   and   national   identification’  
(Cassidy   &   Trew   2004).   In   discussing   a   human   rights   course’s   impact   in   post-­‐‑
conflict   Sri   Lanka,   Goldberg   states   that   ‘many   Sri   Lankans   have   never   had   the  
opportunity   to   have   significant   personal   interaction   with   people   from   other  
linguistic   or   religious   backgrounds.   Fear   and   mistrust   are   commonplace’   (Simon  
2012).    
Post-­‐‑conflict   HE   can   also   contribute   towards   conflict   transformation   by   reducing  
group   HE   access   inequalities.   However,   where   enrolment   expansion   does   not  
address   equity  problems   there   is   increased   risk   of   restoring   the   status   quo   ante   by  
recreating   inequalities   that  were  causative  factors   in  original  conflicts   (Breuning  &  
Ishiyama   2010).   Furthermore,   post-­‐‑conflict   trends   toward   private   HE   provision  
reduce   state   capacity   to   address  horizontal   inequalities.  Without  public   control   or  
regulation   expanded  private  HE   sectors   tend   to   serve   the   economically   better-­‐‑off.  
Where   horizontal   inequalities   exist   this   pattern   could   reproduce   inequalities   and  
grievances.      
This  brief  discussion   shows   that   in  post-­‐‑conflict   societies   there   is  no   simple   linear  
HE-­‐‑identity  relationship;  rather  HE  can  play  positive  or  negative  roles.  Moreover,  a  
range  of  views  exist  on  the  issue;  from  a  constructivist  perspective,  that  individual  
identities   are   relatively   malleable   and   open   to   change,   such   possibilities   may   be  
convincing.  However,  realist  views  may  be  sceptical  of  hypothesised  impacts  of  HE  
on   identities   and   conflict.   To   resolve   this   debate,   it   should   be   stated   that  HE   can  
influence   identity   issues   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   societies   but   are   limited   by   structural  
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context.   Another   means   by   which   HE   can   contribute   to   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   is  
through  advancing  transitional  justice  which  will  now  be  addressed.    
  
3.2.8. Transitional  Justice    
  
HE  can  be  affected  by  and  a  participant  in  transitional  justice  issues  in  post-­‐‑conflict  
societies.   In  societies  undergoing  radical   transitions,   for  example,  after  revolutions  
or  wars,  ‘lustration  systems’  may  be  implemented.  Lustration  refers  to  the  removal  
of  circumscribed  parties,   ideologies,  or   individuals.  Universities,   in  particular  high  
ranking  Professors  and  Deans,  are  often  affected  because  of  their  high  social  profile.  
For   example,   in   the   former   Communist   Eastern   European   countries   many  
Professors  viewed  as   too  closely  aligned  with   the  Communist  state  were  removed  
from  their  posts  (Altbach  2001a).    
  
Lustration   in   academia   is   held   to   have   a   positive   impact   in   delegitimising  
discredited  ideologies  and  removing  a  means  for  outlawed  political  movements  to  
mobilise   students   in   a   renewal   of   their   cause.   Further,   it   signals   a   break  with   the  
past   that  may  be  seen  as  psychologically  necessary   for  HE  recovery.  For  example,  
under  Nazi  rule  academic  freedom  was  absent;  therefore  clear  rejection  of  the  Nazi  
past   enabled  universities   to   regain   autonomy.  De-­‐‑Nazification  was   carried   out   by  
the   US   in   West   Germany   to   remove   National   Socialist   Party   members   from  
universities.   A   dilemma   existed   in   how   far   academic   staff   should   be   purged.   In  
Gottingen   University,   for   example,   28%   of   faculty   lost   their   jobs   in   the   first   two  
years   of   de-­‐‑Nazification.   A   similar   process   in   Austria,   if   fully   followed-­‐‑through,  
would   have   removed   two-­‐‑thirds   of   faculty   members,   requiring   closure   of  
universities  (Fleck  1995).  Ericksen  (2000)  argues  that  while  flawed,  this  process  ‘still  
assisted  in  the  German  transition  to  a  post-­‐‑Nazi,  democratic  tradition’  as  academia  
did   not   perpetuate   National   Socialism.   However,   removing   large   numbers   of  




HE  can  also  be   an   important  means   for  overcoming   societal   trauma  after   conflict.  
Academic   fields   related   to   conflict   and   peace   can   enhance   understandings   of   the  
past,  for  example,  the  Centre  for  Conflict  Management  at  the  National  University  of  
Rwanda   was   established   in   response   to   genocide,   to   understand   its   causes,   and  
contribute  to  a  culture  of  peace  and  tolerance  (Urusaro  2003).  However,  Cambodian  
universities  have  been  criticised  for  insufficient  coverage  of  Khmer  Rouge  atrocities  
in  history  courses   thus  producing  secondary  history  teachers   ill-­‐‑equipped  to   teach  
young  generations  about  their  national  past  (Dy  2009).    
  
Furthermore,   academic   understandings,   narratives,   and   interpretations   of   past  
conflicts   can   influence   reproduction   of   conflict   in   the   present.   Hallward   (2010)  
argues   that   Israeli   and   Palestinian   academics   perform   an   important   role   in  
‘constituting’   conflict,   for   example,   by   shaping   students’   worldviews   through  
advancing  particular  interpretations  of  conflict  or  influencing  student  views  of  ‘the  
other’  for  example  through  negative  stereotyping  in  textbooks.  This  negative  role  of  
academic  work  in  perpetuating  conflict  contrasts  with  the  positive  potentials  of  HE  
research   and   knowledge   capacities   to   contribute   towards   reconstruction   and  
peacebuilding,  which  is  the  subject  of  the  next  section.    
  
3.2.9. Post-­‐‑conflict  Research  and  Knowledge  
  
Domestic   HE   in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   can   perform   an   important   function   in  
producing   and   disseminating   knowledge   of   local   context,   conflict,   and   recovery.  
Knowledge   of   reconstruction   and   peacebuilding   is   produced   largely   in   OECD  
donor  organisations,  powerful  international  organisations,  and  Western  universities  
and   think-­‐‑tanks.   This   ensemble   of   organisations   constitutes   a   global   conflict   and  
recovery  knowledge  architecture  which  transmits  and  disseminates  knowledge  and  
information  to  post-­‐‑conflict  countries.  The  World  Bank  places  great  emphasis  on  its  
role  as  a   ‘knowledge  bank’   for  development;   the  World  Development  Report  2011  
116	  
	  
confirms   its   commitment   to   this   role   for   fragile   and   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   (World  
Bank  2011b).    
  
The  dominance  of  global  and  Western  institutions  in  this  system  excludes  Southern,  
indigenous,  or  local  voices  from  debates  on  fragility  and  recovery.  In  support  of  this  
point,   IDRC/CCNY   (2012)   in   addressing   the   global   architecture   of   peacebuilding  
and  statebuilding  knowledge  write  that:    
Historically,  Northern  institutions  have  retained  “ownership”  of  knowledge  in  these  
areas   and   have   often   overwhelmed   Southern   voices.   Decades   of   crises   have  
intensified   this   imbalance,   leaving   many   Southern   institutions   lacking   human,  
social  and  economic  resources.  Cumulatively,   this  has   intensified  the  shortcomings  
of   educational   systems—especially   in   higher   education—in   conflict   affected  
countries   and   diminished   the   role   of   scholars   in   the   shaping   of   public   policy   and  
debate.  
Post-­‐‑conflict  interventions  led  by  donors  and  outside  actors  have  been  criticised  for  
operating   without   an   in-­‐‑depth   understanding   of   local   context   (Barakat   2005).  
Conceptual   frames  applied   to  understanding   local  social  context  are  often  derived  
from   the   understanding   of   external,   usually  Western,   academics   or   analysts.   For  
example,  Da  Costa  (2012),  Finance  Minister  of  East  Timor,  writes  that  in  2002  ‘influx  
of   aid,   donors   and   NGOs,   national   and   international,   was   in   full   swing   as   they  
established  their  compounds,  procedures,  plans,  agendas  and  staff;  and  with  them  
came  a  vast  array  of  observances  and  theoretical  approaches  to  the  development  of  
our  country’.  He  criticises   international  agencies   for   failing  to  build  Timorese  staff  
and   agency   capacities   and   for   sidelining   local   knowledge   and   systems   thus  
producing   cyclical   instability.   In   response,   building   local   capacity   of   research  
institutions,   including  HEIs,   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   and   post-­‐‑conflict   countries  would  
enable   meaningful   local   ownership   and   contextually-­‐‑relevant   knowledge   in  
recovery  processes.    
Denskus   (2009)   criticises   peacebuilding   actors   in   Nepal   for   neglecting   tertiary  
education   with   the   consequence   that   there   is   little   critical   local   research   on  
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peacebuilding   and   development.   He   contends   that   what   local   research   capacity  
exists  is  co-­‐‑opted  into  the  aid-­‐‑industry  as  ‘assistants’  to  foreign  ‘experts’  preventing  
locals  from  finding  a  ‘critical  voice’.  Further,  he  links  low  tertiary  research  capacity  
to   the   inability   to   challenge   hegemonic   peacebuilding   models   stating   that  
‘peacebuilding   is   a   process   that   conforms   to   global   aid   discourses,   but   does   not  
foster  critical,  reflective  research  or  the  establishment  of  local  intellectual  agendas  to  
challenge  the  Western  liberal  peace  model’.    
However,  research  capacity  of  post-­‐‑conflict  countries  on  peacebuilding  and  related  
areas   is   often   very   limited.   In   many   post-­‐‑conflict   countries   such   research   is  
conducted   predominantly   through   non-­‐‑university   research   institutions,   for  
example,  the  Afghanistan  Research  and  Evaluation  Unit  or  the  National  Institute  for  
Research   and   Studies   in   Guinea-­‐‑Bissau.   Furthermore,   Lebeau   (2008)   argues   that  
research  conducted  by  universities  in  post-­‐‑conflict  African  countries  is  ‘very  rarely  
handled   at   departmental   or   faculty-­‐‑level   but   rather   through   individual   contracts  
with  donors,   and   few   research  projects   are   collective  or   contribute   to   institutional  
capacity’.  Serhati  (2011)  argues  that  in  Kosovo  lack  of  relevant  domestic  expertise  in  
HE  is  a  major  obstacle  to  building  capacities  for  evidence-­‐‑based  policy-­‐‑making.    
Yet   it   has   been   argued   that   HEIs,   academics,   and   domestic   researchers   in   post-­‐‑
conflict  societies  can  contribute  towards  recovery  through  research  and  knowledge  
production   in   areas   of   direct   relevance   to   reconstruction,   peacebuilding,   and  
development.   For   example,   Sasa  Madacki   of   the   University   of   Sarajevo   describes  
how   in   post-­‐‑conflict   Bosnia   the   paucity   of   research   conducted   outside   population  
centres   fostered   a   sense   of   denial   about   domestic   violence   (cited   in  UNFPA  2010,  
p.59).   He   criticises   the   overwhelming   predominance   of   foreign   researchers   on  
Bosnian   issues   and   recommends   domestic   research   capacity   in   areas   such   as  
anthropology   capable   of   investigating   neglected   yet   important   facets   of   the   post-­‐‑
conflict  society.    
  
These  examples  support  arguments   for  domestic  HEIs  as  critical  elements  of  post-­‐‑
conflict   peacebuilding   knowledge   capacities.   In   short,   domestic  HEIs   can   provide  
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local   contextual   knowledge   and   understanding   that   constitute   critical   inputs   into  
reconstruction   programmes   and   thereby   enhance   probability   of   success   while  
enabling   meaningful   ownership   of   recovery.   This   recognition   that   post-­‐‑war  
recovery   is   highly   context-­‐‑dependent   and   faces   numerous   obstacles   is   the   basic  
insight   that   the   following   section   explores   further   by   investigating   the   dynamics,  
mechanisms,  and  processes  that  mediate  the  role  of  HE  in  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery.    
  
  
3.3.   Post-­‐‑war  Environment  of  Higher  Education  
  
The  above  section  reviewed  a  wide  range  of  functions  that  HE  sectors  may  perform  
in  post-­‐‑war   recovery  processes.   Faced  with   the   above   tasks  of   recovery,  HE  often  
faces   severe   challenges   in   post-­‐‑conflict   environments   that   impede   reconstruction  
and  limit  the  sector’s  positive  contribution  to  recovery.  Buckland  (2005,  p.63)  notes  
that  secondary  and  tertiary  sectors  tend  to  experience  a  more  gradual  recovery  from  
conflict   than   primary   education.   There   are   many   reasons   for   this   observation,  
including   the   need   for   reconciliation,   hardened   ethnic   divisions,   displacement   of  
academics,  breakdown  in  governmental  authority  or  absence  of  a  long-­‐‑term  vision;  
and   external   factors   including   government-­‐‑donor   relations.   This   finding   informs  
RQ4,  which  will  be  addressed  in  this  section,  and  which  asks:  
  
RQ4:  What  features  of  the  post-­‐‑war  environment  influence  the  relationship  between  
higher  education  and  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery?  
In  this  section  the  main  obstacles  to  HE’s  contribution  to  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery  will  
be   analysed.   These   are   categorised   as   conjunctural,   institutional,   educational,  
structural,   and   contextual   features   of   the   post-­‐‑war   environment.   The   section   is  
designed  to  provide  a  broad  framework  for   the  empirical  analysis  relating   to  RQ4  
during   the  presentation   of   case-­‐‑study   findings   in   the   chapters   on  HE   in   post-­‐‑war  
Iraq  and  Libya.  To  begin,  conjunctural  features  will  be  analysed  because  it  is  found  
that  they  are  highly  significant  in  shaping  the  post-­‐‑war  environment  of  HE.    
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3.3.1. Conjunctural  Features    
  
Conjunctural  features  refer  to  those  emerging  from  a  conjuncture  of  various  factors,  
dynamics,  and   trends.  They  are  viewed  as   less  permanent   than  structural   features  
although  the  capacity  of  individual  agents  to  affect  conjunctural  features  is  expected  
to   be   limited.   To   begin,   security,   widely-­‐‑viewed   as   a   necessary   condition   for  
successful  reconstruction,  will  be  analysed.    
3.3.1.1.   Security    
  
There  is  strong  support  for  the  claim  that  insecurity  is  a  major  obstacle  to  post-­‐‑war  
HE.   High   levels   of   violence,   crime,   murder,   kidnapping,   and   low-­‐‑level   armed  
conflict  mark  many  societies  after  formal  cessation  of  war  (Berdal  2011,  p.53).  Such  
an  environment  has  many  far-­‐‑reaching  effects  on  HE.  It  is  argued  that  attacks  on  HE  
communities   have   ‘ripple   effects   through   the  whole   sector   and   society.   Teachers,  
content   and   modes   of   learning   are   lost.   Quality,   effectiveness   and   availability   of  
education  at  all  levels  diminish’  (Quinn  2010).  Where  violence  affects  HE  long  into  
post-­‐‑conflict  periods  the  impact  of  conflict  is  an  ongoing  process.    
Practical  difficulties   of  delivering  HE   in   insecure   conditions  may  be   immense,   for  
example,  increased  absenteeism  due  to  fighting  or  threat  of  violence,  psychological  
problems  caused  by  fear  leading  to  distractions  from  academic  work,  or  an  increase  
in   security  measures   inside   the  university  altering   the  atmosphere  of  an  academic  
institution   from   one   focussed   on   learning   to   a   defensive   fortress.   Furthermore,  
where   violence   is   directed   at   HEIs   because   they   are   perceived   as   Ivory   Towers  
detached   from   societal   needs   university-­‐‑society   relations   can   further   deteriorate.  
Moreover,  if  outsiders  perceive  a  country  as  insecure  then  existing  programmes  and  
international  cooperation  may  be  cancelled  and  foreign  HE  investment  or  aid  may  






Various   dimensions   of   conflict   shape   HE-­‐‑recovery   interactions.   Firstly   and   most  
directly,   it  was  seen   in   the  previous  chapter   that  conflict’s   impact  on  HE  can  vary  
greatly  between  different  conflict-­‐‑affected  contexts.   It  may  be  expected   that  where  
impact  on  HE  is  high,  for  example  in  Iraq  or  Afghanistan,  the  sector’s  role  in  post-­‐‑
war   recovery   will   be   much   more   constrained   than   where   impact   is   low,   for  
example,  Sri  Lanka.  Where  efforts  of  HE  communities  are  directed  towards  meeting  
basic  educational  needs  the  opportunity  to  address  reconstruction,  reconciliation,  or  
peacebuilding  is  severely  reduced.    
Second,  how  conflict  ends  is  a  major  influence  on  typical  post-­‐‑conflict  environments  
(Berdal   2009,   p.31)   thus   shaping   HE’s   prospects.   Where   a   negotiated   outcome  
resulting   in   an   inclusive   peace-­‐‑agreement   or   political   settlement   occurs   there   is  
greater   likelihood   that  HE   can  prosper.  Conversely,   in   the   absence   of   a   clear   and  
decisive  settlement,  for  example  in  Afghanistan,  HE  prospects  are  often  eroded  by  
protracted   conflict,   instability,   and   state  weakness.   Lastly,   ‘causes’   of   the   original  
conflict   influence   HE’s   post-­‐‑conflict   role.   In   societies   recovering   from   civil   war  
communal,   ethnic,   or   religious   conflicts   and   divisions   remain   highly   salient  
rendering  HE   reconstruction  more   challenging   (Sall,  Lebeau  &  Kassimir   2003).  By  
contrast,   following   inter-­‐‑state  war   or   in   newly-­‐‑independent   states   such   as   Timor-­‐‑
Leste  societal  cleavages  should  be  expected  to  be  significantly  less  of  an  obstacle  to  
HE.  
A   related   point   is   that   HEIs   must   address   campus-­‐‑level   need   for   reconciliation.  
Students   and   faculty   members   represent   many   social   groups   in   conflict-­‐‑affected  
societies  and   in  some  cases  classroom  colleagues   fought  on  opposing  sides  during  
war,   for   example,   in   Libya   and   Liberia.   University   members   may   have   been  
involved   in   committing   atrocities   and   their   positions   in   the   institution   may   be  
threatened.  As   seen   in   chapter   two,   conflict   can  engulf   campuses  distorting  many  
aspects   of   HE.   It   can   therefore   be   expected   that   rebuilding   HE   will   be   more  
problematic  in  deeply-­‐‑divided  societies.    
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3.3.1.3. Stability  and  Fragility  
  
The   stability   and   fragility   of   the   post-­‐‑conflict   environment   in  which  HE   operates  
significantly   influences   the  HE-­‐‑recovery  relationship.  The  concept  of  state   fragility  
became   increasingly   influential   in   development   and   security   policy   during   the  
2000s.  A  fragile  state  may  be  defined  as  one  that  is  ‘failing,  or  at  risk  of  failing,  with  
respect   to  authority,   comprehensive  service  entitlements  or   legitimacy’   (Stewart  &  
Brown  2009).  The  overwhelming  majority  of  conflict-­‐‑affected  countries  are  classified  
as  fragile  states  which  are  held  to  be  conflict-­‐‑prone  while  past  experience  of  conflict  
is  a  state-­‐‑fragility  driver.    
While   it   should   be   qualified   that   nearly   all   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   are   classified   as  
fragile   contexts,   HE   systems   in   contexts   experiencing   a   greater   degree   of   state  
fragility   should   be   expected   to   face   greater   obstacles   and   to   make   a   lower  
contribution   to  post-­‐‑war  recovery.  This   is  because  HE  systems  are  complex  multi-­‐‑
dimensional  institutions  requiring  high  levels  of  administrative  and  resource  inputs  
that  constitute  a  difficult  service-­‐‑delivery  task  (Rose  &  Greeley  2006).  HE  systems  in  
‘fragile’   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   face   myriad   challenges   that   are   very   difficult   to  
respond  to  due  to  typically  very  low  capacity  and  authority  of  key  institutions  and  
agencies  including  Ministries  of  HE.    
Moreover,  general  breakdown  in  state  power  experienced  in  many  conflicts  leads  to  
low  governmental  coordination  and  direction  that  problematizes  HE  governance.  In  
situations  such  as  Afghanistan  or  Somalia  where  conflict  caused  state-­‐‑collapse  this  
dynamic   is   even   more   pronounced.   Restoring   physical,   human   and   resource  
capacities   of   state   institutions   involved   in   HE   governance   is   a   vital   task   in   the  
sector’s  post-­‐‑war  recovery.  Beyond  issues  of  capacity  there  is  also  a  need  to  protect  
substantive   freedoms   of   academic   communities   in   post-­‐‑conflict   settings,   which   is  





3.3.1.4. Academic  Freedom  and  Autonomy  
  
In   many   post-­‐‑conflict   states   restrictions   on   academic   freedom   limit   HE’s   social  
function   and   impact   on   recovery.   Academics   and   students   may   be   subjected   to  
restrictions   on   core   freedoms   including   freedom   of   movement   and   freedom   of  
speech.   Academic   freedoms   including   freedom   to   publish,   criticise   authority,   or  
investigate   controversial   topics   may   be   curtailed   through   formal   policies   or  
informally   through   threats,   violence,   or   harassment.   Academic   freedom   can   be  
threatened   by   illiberal   state   authorities,   (un)civil   society   organisations,   militant  
groups,  or  even  university  students.  Hoole  (2007)  argues  that  academic  freedom  in  
Tamil  controlled  areas  of  Sri  Lanka  was  eroded  through  day-­‐‑to-­‐‑day  interference  by  
the  LTTE  through  control  of  student  organisations.  
Sall   (2001)   argues   that   severe   resource   constraints   are   as   great   an   obstacle   to  
academic  freedom  in  Africa  as  political  repression.  In  discussing  universities’  public  
role  in  Africa,  Sall,  Lebeau  and  Kassimir  (2003)  write  that:  
Academic  freedom  often  comes  under  attack  when  it  is  needed  most.  In  post-­‐‑conflict  
transitions,   the   fear   of   being   seen   as   a   bystander,   as   not   participating   in   the  
reconstruction  process,  or  as  being  unnecessarily  critical  is  very  real  and,  thus,  may  
limit  the  post-­‐‑conflict  reconstruction  of  the  public  sphere.  
This  quote   illustrates   the  dilemma  between  granting   full   autonomy  and  academic  
freedom   to   universities   and   the   need   to   harness   the   sector’s   potential   towards  
national  reconstruction  goals.  Evans’  (1995)  concept  ‘embedded  autonomy’  may  be  
adapted  to  suggest  an  appropriate  state-­‐‑HE  relationship  for  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery;  
that   universities   are   afforded   relative   autonomy   albeit   with   strong   political   will,  
vision,  and  incentives  to  participate  in  recovery.  However,  it  may  be  contended  that  
concern  with  higher-­‐‑order   issues  of  academic   rights  and   freedoms   in  post-­‐‑conflict  
contexts  is  meaningless  unless  the  basic  and  material  needs  of  HE  systems  are  met;  




3.3.1.5. Post-­‐‑war  Recovery  of  HE  
  
HEIs  and   their  personnel   frequently  view   the  end  of   conflict  as  an  opportunity   to  
address   basic   educational   goods,   for   instance   improving   classrooms,   raising  
salaries,  and  procuring  teaching  resources.  This  can  be  conceived  as  the  desire  to  re-­‐‑
start  the  process  of  ‘normal’  academic  development  that  had  been  reversed  by  war.  
The   priority   for   universities   that   have   been   damaged,   looted   or   even   destroyed  
during  armed  conflict  is  often  to  rebuild  the  physical  infrastructure  of  campuses,  for  
example,   in   Kosovo   (Daxner   2010).   Dormitories,   laboratories,   lecture   halls,  
classrooms,   and   offices   may   require   substantial   repair   or   in   some   cases   building  
from  new.  A  common  form  of  assistance  in  early  phases  is  to  refurbish  buildings  for  
immediate  use  through  clearing  any  debris,  painting  and  decorating,  and  providing  
classroom  furniture.    
However,  in  many  post-­‐‑war  contexts  there  is  low  or  no  improvement  in  the  overall  
situation  of  HEIs.  Benedek  (1997)  writes  that  the  situation  of  post-­‐‑Bosnian  war  HE  
was  one  of   ‘rapidly   increasing  numbers  of   students,  but  almost  no  new   literature,  
no   functioning   laboratories,   and   often   no   heating   of   classes.   Dormitories   are   not  
repaired,  there  are  no  state  scholarships,  and  no  advisors  to  address  social  problems  
of  students’.  At  a  wider  level,  failure  of  reconstruction  in  other  sectors  can  seriously  
impede  the  effective   functioning  of  HE.  Weak  public  service  delivery  of  electricity  
and   water   can   constitute   significant   obstacles.   For   example,   students   attending  
lectures   at   Kabul   University   four   years   into   the   reconstruction   phase   in   2005  
withstood  sub-­‐‑zero  temperatures  due  to  lack  of  heating  (Amani  2005).    
Beyond  these  needs  for  physical  and  material  rebuilding  most  HE  systems  in  post-­‐‑
conflict   contexts   also   have   the   need   for   institutional   strengthening,   a   point   that  
connects  to  the  theme  of  the  next  section  on  the  influence  of  institutional  issues  on  





3.3.2. Institutional  Features  
  
In   this   section,   institutional   features   shaping  HE   in  post-­‐‑conflict   recovery  contexts  
will   be   considered.   These   are   state   and   institutional   capacity,   governance,   ‘local  
ownership’   and   vision.   To   begin,   the   important   issue   of   state   and   institutional  
capacity  will  be  addressed.    
3.3.2.1. State  and  Institutional  Capacity  
  
State  and  institutional  capacity  are  key  variables  affecting  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery  yet  
in  many  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts  are  weak.  Pre-­‐‑war  capacity  deficits  are  compounded  
by   factors   including   ‘brain   drain’,   looting,   infrastructural   destruction,   war  
casualties,  state-­‐‑collapse,  and  financial  crisis.  Institutional  strengthening  and  reform  
are   therefore   central   to   donor   approaches   to   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   (Aron   2003;  
Brinkerhoff   2005),   for   example,   the   World   Development   Report   2011   states   that  
‘strengthening   legitimate   institutions   and   governance’   is   its   core  message   (World  
Bank  2011b).    
Institutional   capacity   development   and   reform   of   ministries   and   HEIs   is   also   a  
major   dimension   of   post-­‐‑conflict   HE   rebuilding.   In   some   contexts,   such   as  
Afghanistan,   the   need   for   institution   building   after   war   is   chronic.   Following  
protracted  conflict  and  state-­‐‑collapse   institutional  capacity  can  be  minimal   to  non-­‐‑
existent   with   many   functions   performed   by   foreign   consultants.   In   some   post-­‐‑
conflict  countries  there  have  been  far-­‐‑reaching  reforms  of  national  HE  institutions.  
Mozambique  experienced  dramatic  changes;   ‘since  the  1990s,  after  almost  30  years  
of   devastating   war,   a   new   higher   education   system   has   been   practically  
reinstitutionalised’   (Beverwijk   2006,   p.15).   New   institutions   include   the   National  
Task   Force,   the  Ministry   of  Higher   Education   Science   and  Technology,   a   national  
seminar,   and   new   regulatory   bodies   for   accreditation   and   quality   assurance  
(Hopper  2006).    
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However,   restoring   state   and   institutional   capacity   should   not   be   viewed   solely  
through  a  technical  institutionalist  perspective;  rather,  political  obstacles  are  crucial  
and   capacity-­‐‑building   should   be   supported   by   strong   political   will.   Like   other  
sectors,  HE  may  be  politicised  in  highly-­‐‑contested  post-­‐‑conflict  environments.  Most  
fundamentally,  HE   is  not   autonomous   from  political   forces;   rather   it   is   a   complex  
institution  embedded  in  domestic  social  relations  and  forces  that  at  once  influences  
and   is   influenced   by   politics.   Hebert   (1999,   p.   293)   explains   how   in   Cambodia  
substantial  donor  and  agency  efforts  to  design  and  implement  the  National  Higher  
Education  Action  Plan  were  brought   to  a   standstill  during   the  1996  political   crisis  
and   re-­‐‑eruption  of  violence   in   1997.  This   recognition  of   the  political  nature  of  HE  
reconstruction  is  a  theme  of  the  next  section  addressing  governance.    
3.3.2.2. Governance    
  
Weak   or   non-­‐‑existent   governance   frameworks   can   be   a   major   obstacle   to  
implementing   effective   HE   reconstruction   strategies.   A   core   debate   over   HE  
governance  is  the  degree  of  centralisation.  In  centralised  models  the  state  maintains  
authority  over  most  aspects  of  HE  policy  usually   through  a  government  ministry.  
Lebanon   represents   a   good   example   of   a   centralised   HE   system   in   a   post-­‐‑war  
country.  However,   in  many  post-­‐‑conflict   states  HE  governance  has  been  criticised  
for  being  over-­‐‑centralised;  centralisation  has  been  argued  to  constrain  development  
of   vibrant  university   systems  and   to  violate   the   conditions   for   academic   freedom.  
For  example,  in  Cambodia  various  Ministries  were  responsible  for  individual  HEIs  
thus   creating   a   major   obstacle   to   coordination   and   national   policy-­‐‑making  
(McNamara  1999,  p.91).  
In  many  post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   there  are   frequent  calls   for  decentralisation  and   the  
granting   of   additional   autonomy   to   individual   universities   as   a   central   aspect   of  
rebuilding   HE,   for   example,   in   Afghanistan   (Hopper   2006).   Bosnia   represents   a  
strong   form   of   post-­‐‑conflict   decentralisation;   the   Dayton   Accords   established   HE  
governance   at   cantonal   and   entity-­‐‑levels   rather   than   at   the   national-­‐‑level.   In   this  
decentralised   system   fragmented   governance   led   to   lack   of   coordination   and  
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difficulty  in  achieving  national  HE  goals  (Tiplic  &  Welle-­‐‑Strand  2006).  Further,  the  
absence  of  state-­‐‑wide  legislation  on  certificate  recognition  made  it  difficult  to  ensure  
that  Bosnian  degrees  were  recognised  across  Europe  (USAID  2007).    
  
Furthermore,   leadership   is   considered   a   neglected   yet   important   aspect   of   basic  
education  reconstruction  in  post-­‐‑conflict  settings  (Clarke  &  O’Donoghue  2013)  and  
is  also  held  to  be  critical  to  university-­‐‑level  governance.  Breca  and  Anderson  (2010)  
in   discussing   reforms   at   the   Faculty   of   Education   at   the   University   of   Prishtina  
identify  replacement  of  a  reformist  with  a  conservative  Dean  as  the  main  obstacle  to  
reform;   a   finding   highlighting   the   importance   of   leadership   to   successful   reform  
initiatives.    
  
Afghanistan’s  HE  reform  since  2001  has  been  determined  by  key  MoHE  personnel.  
Michael   Daxner   (2008),   formerly   a   senior  HE   adviser   to   the  Afghan   government,  
describes  a  positive  early  period  under  Minister  Mohammed  Sharif  Feyez  followed  
by   his   dismissal   and   a   conservative   backlash   from   new   administrators   who  
maintained  old  procedures  and  institutions.  He  writes  that  ‘public  higher  education  
is   hardly   breathing   within   a   restrictive   bureaucracy’.   Hayward   (2011)   positively  
appraises  former  Minister  Dadfar  and  his  deputy  Babury  for  reducing  corruption  in  
admissions   and   ‘restoring   integrity’   to   the   MoHE.   This   example   illustrates   the  
importance   of   national   leadership   and   political   will   in   implementation   of   post-­‐‑
conflict  HE  governance.    
  
A  further  governance-­‐‑related  factor  is  the  balance  of  public  and  private  provision  of  
HE  in  post-­‐‑conflict  societies,  which  can  be  expected  to  influence  the  sector’s  role  in  
recovery.  Private  HE  expansion  represents  a  significant  opportunity  in  post-­‐‑conflict  
societies   (see  next  section).  National-­‐‑level  governance  of  HE   is  challenged   in  post-­‐‑
conflict   contexts  where   private  HE   expands   rapidly   beyond   the   state’s   regulatory  
reach.   It   may   be   argued   that   in   predominantly   public   HE   systems   a   greater  




James   (2012)   argues   that   in   the  US   context   for-­‐‑profit  HE  providers  do  not   serve  a  
public   good   function.   This   is   in   contrast   to   established   non-­‐‑profit   private  
universities   with   sizeable   endowments.   In   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   it   has   been   seen  
that  most   private   universities   are   unregulated   and   for-­‐‑profit   institutions.   In   these  
situations   for-­‐‑profit   private  HE’s   contribution   should   be   expected   to   be   even   less  
than  in  the  US  and  other  advanced  economies.  For  example,  public  universities  may  
conduct   research   on   issues   of   social   and   economic   relevance   while   private  
universities   tend   to   function  as   teaching   institutions  offering  degrees  concentrated  
in  a  narrow  set  of  popular  subjects.    
In  support  of  this  argument,  Tierney  (2011)  argues  that  tertiary  education  can  best  
contribute  towards  ‘fixing  failed  states’  through  providing  public  goods.  However,  
it  may   be   contended   that   private  HE   is  more   dynamic   and   responsive   to  market  
needs   than   bureaucratic   public  HEIs   and   therefore   can   be   expected   to   contribute  
more  towards  economic  recovery.  The  issue  of  what  constitutes  a  public  good  that  
HE  is  apt  to  provide  is  closely  connected  to  the  issue  of  advancing  a  broad  vision  for  




‘Vision’  for  the  future  of  both  HE  and  the  shape  of  post-­‐‑conflict  societies  has  been  
identified  as  a  major  variable  affecting  the  HE-­‐‑recovery  relationship.  A  clear  shared  
vision  that  includes  the  major  aspects  of  recovery  is  argued  to  be  a  vital  ingredient  
in   supporting   effective   post-­‐‑war   reconstruction   (Barakat   2005,   p.249).   Common  
visions   can   result   from   the   individual   initiative   of   strong   leadership   or   inclusive,  
participatory   processes   in   which   the   plurality   of   visions   within   post-­‐‑conflict  
societies   is   negotiated   and   reconciled   into   a   shared  national   vision.   In   both   cases,  
political   will   is   considered   a   necessary   condition   for   a   broad   vision   to   affect  
reconstruction  strategy  and  outcomes.    
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National  consultations  on  HE  have  been  held  to  have  fostered  a  shared  vision  and  
enabled  more   effective   recovery   in   several   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts.   In  Mozambique  
frustrated  attempts  to  rebuild  HE  in  the  initial  post-­‐‑war  period  have  been  held  to  be  
overcome  by  formation  of  a  consensus  on  HE  (Brito  2003).  In  1997  the  government  
initiated  a  ‘national  reflection  about  higher  education’  that  led  to  the  Strategic  Plan  
of   Higher   Education   in   Mozambique   2000   –   2010.   A   broad   consultative   process  
involved   the   main   university   and   national   leadership   stakeholders   and   led   to   a  
coalescing   around   a   vision   that   conceived   of   HE   as   central   to   development.  
However,  after  2004  elections   leadership  changes   led   to  a   sidelining  of   that  vision  
(Bailey,   Cloete   &   Pillay   2011,   p.105).   This   example   illustrates   the   obstacles   to  
sustaining   long-­‐‑term   continuity   in   HE   visions   even   in   those   cases   considered  
relatively  successful.    
  
Similarly,   in   Afghanistan   an   open   participatory   process   of   drafting   a   Strategic  
Action  Plan  for  Higher  Education  led  by  the  International  Institute  for  Educational  
Planning   (IIEP)   is   held   to   have   enabled   emergence   of   a   national   vision   for   HE,  
clarified   priorities   for   donor   support,   improved   coherence   between   projects   and  
policies,   and   strengthened   the   hand   of   national   authorities   in   negotiations   with  
external  parties   and  donors   (Martin  &  Mahshi   2005).  However,  McNernery   (2009,  
p.141)   criticises   the   2005   action   plan   as   too   highly   politicised   for   actual  
implementation  and  failing  to  frame  a  common  vision.  He  states  that  ‘the  lack  of  a  
common  vision   for   the  sector’   is   the  major  obstacle   to  effective  HE   financing  with  
unresolved   and   contradictory   visions   held   by   central   government,   MoHE,   and  
HEIs.  While   the   above   two   sources  differ   in  describing  Afghan  HE  both   stipulate  
vision  as  a  central  dynamic  influencing  the  sector’s  progress.    
Tertiary  sector  recovery  is  necessarily  linked  to  a  ‘broad  development  vision  for  the  
country’  that  is  often  not  backed  up  by  political  will  in  transitional  administrations  
(Buckland  2005,  p.64).   In   the   absence  of   agreement  on   the   future  of   economy  and  
society   the  process  of   strategic  HE  planning  may  be   rendered  highly  problematic.  
For   example,   decisions   on   priorities   including   disciplinary   focus   and   research  
priorities   cannot   be   based   on   realistic   projected   scenarios.   By   contrast,   Rwanda’s  
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Vision  2020  offers  an  example  where  HE’s  position  within  an  overarching  national  
vision  is  clearly  articulated  thus  enabling  more  effective  contribution  of  the  sector  to  
post-­‐‑conflict  development.  Moreover,   in  post-­‐‑conflict  societies,   in  particular  where  
independent   civil   society   is   weak   and   domestic   think-­‐‑tanks   and   independent  
research   bodies   are   minimal,   national   universities   can   arguably   be   the   best  
institutional   arena   for   debating   and   reaching   national   visions   for   recovery  due   to  
the   atmosphere   of   dialogue   and   enquiry.   Such   a   shared   vision   could   contribute  
towards  making  ‘ownership’  meaningful,  a  subject  addressed  in  the  next  section.    
3.3.2.4. ‘Local  Ownership’  
  
In  the  context  of  high  donor  influence  over  post-­‐‑conflict  HE  there  is  often  a  tension  
between   externally-­‐‑driven   rebuilding   and   genuine   national   and   local   ownership.  
Several  authors  examining  dynamics  of  post-­‐‑conflict  HE  reform  argue  that  domestic  
actors   actively   shape,   resist,   and   transform   externally-­‐‑derived   reform   agendas.   A  
historical   example   is   the   gap  between  US   and  German  views   for   rebuilding  West  
German   universities   post-­‐‑1945.   While   occupying   authorities   proposed   a   wide-­‐‑
ranging  reformist  agenda,  German  scholars  favoured  a  much  more  limited  process  
and  resisted  (Neave  2011,  p.33).    
A   more   recent   case,   Kosovo’s   transitional   administration   aimed   to   transfer  
‘ownership’   to   local  power-­‐‑holders  to  ensure  statebuilding’s  sustainability  (Narten  
2008).  Efforts  to  rebuild  HE  under  international  administration  generated  resistance  
and   were   greatly   influenced   by   ‘local   actors’   (Den   Boer   &   van   der   Borgh   2011).  
University   administrators   and   Professors   used   various   tactics   to   resist  
implementation   of   externally-­‐‑initiated   faculty-­‐‑level   reforms;   an   exercise   of   agency  
by  ‘subordinate  actors’  very  important  to  project  outcomes  (Bache  &  Taylor  2003).    
Heath  (2009)  describes  the  HE  reform  environment  at  the  University  of  Mitrovica  as  
largely   constrained   by   local-­‐‑level   and   national-­‐‑level   political   factors   and   ethnic  
tensions.  While   there   is   some  space   for   ‘opening  up’  or   reform,   this  dynamic   is   in  
tension  with  ‘closing  down’  or  resistance  by  local  interests  threatened  by  changes  to  
the  status  quo.  She  advocates   slow-­‐‑paced   incremental   changes  enabling   long-­‐‑term  
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transformation   rather   than  short-­‐‑term   fixes   that   satisfy  donors  but   risk  generating  
greater  local  resistance  and  often  failure.  A  report  into  Kosovo’s  HE  law  found  that  
it   was   largely   ignored   during   2002-­‐‑2008,   stating   that   ‘the   situation   can   best   be  
described   as   connivance   between   Ministers,   Ministry   officials,   Professors   of   the  
University   of   Prishtina   and   private   entrepreneurs   in   a   PBHE   (private   higher  
education   institutions)  Licence   lottery,  whose  rules  were  unclear  and  substantially  
ignored’   (cited   in   Bristow   2010).   This   example   illustrates   the   significance   of  
domestic   political   economies   constraining   HE   reform   efforts   and   dangers   of  
externally-­‐‑led   reforms   that   exclude   key   local   actors   and   deny   meaningful  
ownership.    
HE   transfer   in   post-­‐‑conflict   societies   has   been   criticised   for   implementing   foreign  
models   and  policies   in   local   contexts   of  which  donors   are   often   ignorant.   Temple  
(2002)  criticises  Western  donors  for  proposing  reforms  based  on  an  Anglo-­‐‑American  
university   governance   model   inappropriate   to   Bosnia’s   context.   He   argues   for  
‘examining   critically   and   building   on   established   traditions’   as   an   alternative.   In  
support,   Tiplic   and  Welle-­‐‑Strand   (2006)   argue   that   Bosnian   universities   follow   a  
one-­‐‑size-­‐‑fits-­‐‑all  approach,  directly  copying  policies  and  models  from  abroad.  Sabic-­‐‑
El-­‐‑Rayess   (2009)   similarly   argues   that   local   Bosnian   power-­‐‑holders   borrow  
educational   policies   from   external   sources   that   are   transformed   during  
implementation.   She   writes   that   unless   policies   converge   with   local   politicians’  
preferences  ‘the  borrowed  policy  is  either  not  implemented  or  it  is  adapted  so  that  
the  originally   intended  impact   is  rarely  allowed  to  pierce  through  the   institutional  
layers  and  reach  the  classroom  level’.    
  
So   far   in   this   section   cases  of   interaction  between   external   and   internal   influences  
over  HE  policy   and   strategy   in  post-­‐‑conflict   states   have  been   analysed.   It  may  be  
concluded  that  externally-­‐‑driven  HE  reform  denies  local  ‘ownership’,  often  remains  
ignorant   of   local   context,   and   encounters   strong   resistance.   This   is   reflected   in   an  
assumption  on  the  part  of  outsiders   that   in   intervening  to  rebuild  HE  that  conflict  
has  ‘wiped  the  slate  clean’  and  new  systems  may  be  constructed  tabula  rasa.  In  some  
cases   this  may  even  be  celebrated  as  an  opportunity.  For  example,   in  planning  for  
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agricultural  HE  in  South  Sudan  it  is  posited  that  a  post-­‐‑conflict  ‘clean  slate’  enables  
a  long-­‐‑term  strategic  approach  based  on  transfer  of  foreign  models  (Bertelsen  2009).  
Furthermore,  pre-­‐‑war  HE  may  be  judged  to  have  been  defective,  backwards,  or  an  
element   in   conflict   causation.   This   concern  with   pre-­‐‑war   HE   quality   leads   to   the  
subject  of   the  next  section;   the  role  of  educational  features   in  shaping  post-­‐‑conflict  
environments  of  HE  and  recovery.    
  
3.3.3. Educational  factors  
  
In   this   section   the   educational   features   of   access,   equity,   and   quality   will   be  
analysed  in  terms  of  their  theorised  role  in  hindering  or  enabling  HE’s  contribution  
to  post-­‐‑war  recovery.  To  begin,  the  issue  of  access  will  be  considered.    
3.3.3.1. Access    
  
Access   may   be   viewed   as   a   factor   mediating   HE’s   contribution   to   post-­‐‑conflict  
recovery.   It   can   be   expected   that   in   low   access   systems  HE’s   potential   impact   on  
recovery  is  lower  while  in  high  access  systems  potential  impact  is  greater.  However,  
it   may   be   contended   that   very   high   access   may   lead   to   over-­‐‑production   of  
graduates,   increasing  unemployment  and  therefore  hampering  economic  recovery.  
Issues  of  access,  demand,  and  expansion  will  now  be  briefly  explored.    
In  many  post-­‐‑conflict  countries  capacity  for  HE  provision  is  low  and  weakened  by  
conflict   yet   demand   is   high   leading   to   expansion.   A   few   examples   illustrate   this  
dynamic.   In   its   first  post-­‐‑independence  year   the  University  of  East  Timor  enrolled  
students  in  the  absence  of  proper  admissions  standards  to  cope  with  huge  demand  
which  caused  practical  problems  of  over-­‐‑enrolment   (Nicolai  2004,  p.87).  Similarly,  
Afghanistan’s   tertiary   enrolment   in   2001  was   7,881,   down   from   17,370   in   1995;   a  
very  low  figure  globally  for  a  country  of  28  million  (MoHE-­‐‑A  2009,  p.1).  Emerging  
from   war   in   2001,   Afghanistan’s   very   young   population,   long   denied   HE  
opportunities,   drove   high   demand.  Consequently,   20,000   prospective   students   sat  
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university   entrance   examinations   in   2002   (UNESCO   2002,   p.17)   and   enrolment  
almost  doubled  during  2002-­‐‑2006  reaching  62,000  in  2009  (MoHE-­‐‑A  2009,  p.1).    
Rapid  post-­‐‑conflict   enrolment   expansion  may   be   explained   in   several  ways.   First,  
conflict   ending   increases   optimism   about   future   prospects   leading   to   long-­‐‑term  
human  capital  investments  becoming  rational  at  the  individual-­‐‑level.  Second,  facing  
high   youth   unemployment   typical   of   post-­‐‑conflict   states   young   people   choose   to  
enter   universities   and   defer   job-­‐‑searching   (Tierney   2011).   Third,   expansion   may  
occur   due   to   public   policy   with   low   human   capital   stocks   and   need   for   highly-­‐‑
skilled   individuals  viewed  as  obstacles   to  development.  Fourth,  governments  may  
increase  access  as  part  of  a   ‘peace  dividend’   to  reduce  youth  grievances  related   to  
educational  exclusion.    
However,  despite  the  trend  of  expansion  most  post-­‐‑conflict  HE  systems  do  not  have  
capacity   to  meet   demand  due   to   conflict   impacts   on   capacity   and   enrolment   plus  
various  post-­‐‑conflict  challenges.  For  example,  despite  rapid  expansion   in  post-­‐‑war  
Mozambique  HE   opportunities  were   insufficient,  with   10,974   applicants   for   2,342  
places  in  1999  (Mario  et  al  2003,  p.18).  In  particular  where  state  regulatory  authority  
is   low  private  HEIs  emerge   to  meet  excess  demand  and   in  some  cases  account   for  
the  majority  of  expansion.  
While  expansion  may  be  viewed  as  necessary  in  situations  of  low  capacity  and  high  
demand,  rapid  growth  can  bring  problems.  Increased  quantity   in  particular  where  
expansion  is  uncontrolled,  can  lead  to  reduced  quality.  For  example,  in  Bosnia  there  
was  a  ‘mushrooming’  of  HEIs  due  to  HE  system  fragmentation  along  political  and  
ethnic   cleavages,   leading   to   inefficiency,   over-­‐‑stretch   of   resources,   and   poor  
coordination   (Tiplic   &   Welle-­‐‑Strand   2006).   Similarly,   six   new   universities   were  
established  in  Nicaragua  during  1990-­‐‑1993  leading  to  duplication,  concentration  of  
graduates   in   over-­‐‑subscribed   disciplines,   and   consequently   increased  
unemployment   (Arnove   1995).   This   dynamic   constitutes   a   trade-­‐‑off   between  
controlled   growth   concentrating   resources   on   recovery   priorities,   national  
universities  and  elite  institutions  to  maintain  higher  quality  and  rapid  expansion  to  
meet  social  demand.  While  post-­‐‑conflict  states  may  increase  access  expansion  may  
133	  
	  
fail   to   address   existing   inequalities,   an   important   dynamic   examined   in   the   next  
section.    
3.3.3.2.   Equity  
  
Equitable   distribution   of   HE   opportunities   may   be   posited   as   an   influence   upon  
HE’s  contribution  to  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery.  Conflict  can  lead  to  uneven  disruption  
to   education   resulting   in   a   more   selective   post-­‐‑war   HE   admissions   system   with  
greater   exclusion   of  minorities,   the   disabled,   displaced   persons   and   other   groups  
(IIEP  2010,  p.277).  Highly  unequal   access   to  HE   can   lead   to   significant  grievances  
that   are   destabilising   factors   in   fragile   transitional   contexts.   In   particular,   where  
social  divisions  in  terms  of  ethnicity,  religion,  place,  or  class  were  significant  factors  
in   the  original   conflict   inequalities   in  access   to  HE  stratified  along   these  cleavages  
can  reproduce  the  social  bases  of  conflict.9  Ensuring  equity  is  therefore  important  to  
conflict-­‐‑sensitive  strategies  of  HE  development  in  post-­‐‑conflict  societies.    
Moreover,   improving   equity   can   strengthen   public   perceptions   that   post-­‐‑conflict  
institutions  advance  social   justice  and  thereby  constitute  part  of  a  peace  dividend.  
This   may   be   achieved   through   affirmative   action   programmes   and   academic  
enrichment  to  equalise  educational  levels  (IIEP  2010,  p.277).  Furthermore,  where  HE  
provision   reflects   imbalanced   regional   development   opening   new   universities   or  
branch   campuses   in   under-­‐‑served   areas   can   redress   inequity.   In   Angola   in   2002  
after   a   27-­‐‑year   civil   war   there   was   one   university   in   the   capital   Luanda.   The  
government’s   post-­‐‑conflict   strategy   was   opening   new   universities   in   various  
provinces  and  science  and  technology  institutes  in  oil-­‐‑rich  provinces  (AFP  2002).  
However,  others  argue  that  class  differences  in  distribution  of  HE  opportunities  are  
a  major   impediment   to   achieving   educational   equity   in   post-­‐‑conflict   societies   and  
that   therefore   public   HE   expenditure   should   be   reduced.   For   example,   Stewart,  
Brown   and   Cobham   (2009)   argue   that   post-­‐‑conflict   inequalities   may   be   reduced  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




through  progressive  taxation  and  financing  options,  including  reducing  subsidies  to  
HE  systems  because   the  poor  have   low  access   to  HE.  Beyond   issues  of  access  and  
equity  it  is  important  to  now  turn  to  HE  quality.  
3.3.3.3.   Quality  
  
HE   quality   can   be   expected   to   strongly   influence   the   HE-­‐‑recovery   relationship.  
Higher  quality  HEIs  are  held  to  produce  better  graduates  with  more  advanced  skills  
and   knowledge   and   produce   stronger   research   outputs   which   both   function   as  
valuable   inputs   into   recovery   processes.   It   should   be   qualified   that   ‘quality’   is   a  
contested  and  multi-­‐‑dimensional  concept.  However,  with  regards  to  teaching  three  
central   aspects   of   quality   are   inputs,   including   teaching   standards   and   facilities,  
outputs   including   graduates   with   relevant   skills   for   economic   and   social  
development,  and  processes  of  how  students  are  taught  (Green  1994,  p.18).  
Pedagogical  practice   is  a  major  aspect  of  HE  quality.  Didactic   instruction  methods  
including  rote-­‐‑learning  and  heavily  teacher-­‐‑led  classes  are  often  identified  as  objects  
of  reform  in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts  including  Cambodia  (McNamara  1999,  p.90)  and  
Kosovo  (Breca  &  Anderson  2010).  Another  example,  Swenson  and  Sugerman  (2011)  
find   Afghan   legal   education   is   characterised   by   didactic   pedagogy,   rote  
memorisation,   highly-­‐‑theoretical   classes,   and   over-­‐‑reliance   on   lectures.   These  
‘outdated’  methods  can  be  argued  to  limit  the  potential  of  student  critical  thinking  
skills.  It  may  be  argued  that  this  produces  individuals  more  likely  to  accept  violent  
ideologies   and   agendas   and   in   so   doing   increases   conflict   risk.   Participatory  
learning  approaches  including  student-­‐‑centred  classes  are  held  to  have  the  potential  
to  improve  quality  and  transform  student-­‐‑teacher  relations.    
Relevance  of  curricula  and  research  to  social,  economic,  and  developmental  needs  is  
a   further   dimension   of   quality.   Under   conflict   and   isolation   course   content   and  
curricula  can  remain  static  for  many  years.  There  is  therefore  often  major  need  for  
updating  curricula  to  redress  pre-­‐‑war  weaknesses  and  also  reflect  the  altered  post-­‐‑
conflict   context.   Similarly,   adaptation   of   national   research   priorities   to   reflect  
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transitional  and  recovery  needs  is  important  for  maximising  wider  social  impacts  of  
research  outputs.    
  
To   improve   quality   the   implementation   of   quality   assurance   institutions   is   an  
increasingly   common   form   of   HE   governance   including   in   post-­‐‑conflict   states.  
Hopper  (2006,  p.56)  warns  that  while  quality  assurance  mechanisms  can  be  effective  
in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts   including  Mozambique  and  the  West  Bank,   in  others  they  
are   inappropriate   due   to   the   immensity   of   other   challenges   facing   the   sector   and  
limited  capacity  to  meet  those  challenges.  This  variability  in  the  appropriateness  of  
a   major   post-­‐‑conflict   HE   policy   response   highlights   that   some   contexts   are  
structurally-­‐‑constrained   leaving   less   space   for   creative   agential   responses,   a  




3.3.4. Structural  Features  
  
Structural   features  are  defined  as   those  emerging  over  a   long   time  period  and  are  
difficult   to   change.   Structural   features   relevant   to   the   HE-­‐‑recovery   relationship  
include  state  strength/weakness,  demographics,  culture,  and  history.  Firstly,  socio-­‐‑




To   begin,   demography   is   an   important   structural   aspect   of   the   post-­‐‑war  
environment;   post-­‐‑conflict   countries   characterised   by   very   large   percentages   of  
young  persons  or  a  ‘youth  bulge’  face  a  greater  challenge  of  providing  sufficient  HE  
opportunities   to  meet   youth   expectations.   Structural   economic   features   also   affect  
post-­‐‑conflict   HE.   It   may   be   predicted   that   countries   with   higher   GDP   levels   and  
GDP  growth  rates  should  experience  more  effective  HE  reconstruction  and  greater  
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utilisation   of   the   sector   towards   recovery   goals.   This   is   because   HE   systems   are  
complex   and   relatively   resource-­‐‑dependent   institutions   requiring   large   financial  
investment  (Rose  &  Greeley  2006).  Lai  and  Thyne  (2007)  find  that  conflict’s  negative  
impacts   on   educational   expenditures   at   all   levels   continue   after   cessation   of  
hostilities   due   to   physical   destruction,   loss   of   governmental   revenue   and   human  
costs.    
Financing  options  include  introducing  student  fees  in  public  universities,  industrial  
cooperation,   research   commercialisation,   consultancy,   establishing   private  
universities,   reliance   on   donor   funding,   or   greater   solicitation   of   grants   and  
charitable  donations   from  wealthy   individuals.  However,   in  many   cases   there   are  
very   few   opportunities   for   universities   to   mobilise   resources   outside   of   formal  
governmental   and   donor   channels   because   post-­‐‑war   economies   often   are  
characterised  by   slow  growth,   high  unemployment,   informal  market   activity,   and  
macroeconomic  instability.  In  Bosnia  the  ‘segmented’  postwar  economy  limited  HE  
financing   options   and   led   to   student   fee   increases   (Tiplic   &   Welle-­‐‑Strand   2006).  
However,   resource-­‐‑rich   contexts   offer   funding   opportunities;   in  Angola   for   every  
barrel   of   oil   15   cents   is   channelled   into   human   resource   development  with   three  
cents  reserved  for  universities  in  particular  for  petroleum-­‐‑related  courses  (Gomes  &  
Weimer  2011).  
  
3.3.4.2. Contextual  Features  
  
Culture  has  been  viewed  as  an  important  aspect  of  post-­‐‑war  recovery.  Support  for  
this  comes  from  Coyne  (2007)  who  argues  that  a  common  culture  and  shared  beliefs  
are   critical   factors   enabling   successful   post-­‐‑war   reconstruction.   Furthermore,  
Rubinstein   (2003)   argues   that   cross-­‐‑cultural   differences   between   local   and  
international  actors  render  already  complex  peace  operations  even  more  complex.  It  
should  be  qualified  ‘culture’  has  a  very  wide  meaning  that  problematizes  clarity  in  
social  scientific  usage.  A  common  definition  of  culture  accepted  here  is  ‘repertoires  
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of   action  whose  meaning   is   broadly   understood  within   a   given   population’   (Ellis  
cited   in  Berdal   2011,  p.72).   It  may  be   expected   that   societies  placing  high   cultural  
value   on   education,   for   example  Confucian   societies   (Marginson   2011),   should   be  
expected   to   experience   more   rapid   HE   recovery.   Furthermore,   aspects   of   culture  
may  hinder  utilising  HE  towards  post-­‐‑conflict   recovery,   for  example,  conservative  
academic  cultures  may  be  inclined  towards  restoring  the  status  quo  or  pre-­‐‑war  HE  
while   being   resistant   to   innovative   programmes   and   new   modes   of   operation  
capable  of  transformative  reconstruction.    
The   historical   context   of   post-­‐‑conflict   societies   is   a   major   influence   on   post-­‐‑war  
reconstruction  and  peacebuilding  (Berdal  2009,  p.41).  It  can  be  argued  that  historical  
trajectories   of   HE’s   emergence   in   societies   prior   to   conflict   creates   path-­‐‑
dependencies   constraining   the   scope   of   post-­‐‑war   policy-­‐‑making.   Clear   historical  
understanding  is  therefore  vital  to  inform  post-­‐‑war  reconstruction  policy.  However,  
interpretations   of   historical   issues   related   to   HE   are   multiple   and   contested.   For  
example,  Ayres  (1999,  p.53)  explains  that  many  narratives  of  Cambodian  HE  adopt  
a  ‘destruction  discourse’  that  blames  all  the  system’s  ills  on  the  Pol  Pot  regime  thus  
obscuring   other   long-­‐‑term   causes   of   weakness   and   low   quality.   Furthermore,  
historical  experiences  of  HE  and  development  shape  national  expectations  about  the  
sector’s  post-­‐‑war  role.  In  particular,  external  intervention  in  rebuilding  HE  systems  
may  encounter  resistance   from  domestic  actors  who  perceive  outsiders  to  have  no  
understanding  of  historical  context  and  HE’s  pre-­‐‑war  role.  This  influence  of  external  
actors   is   explored   in   the   next   section   analysing   external   features   in   shaping   HE  
recovery  outcomes.    
  
3.3.5. External  Features  
  
Various  external   influences  upon  typical  post-­‐‑war  contexts  of  HE  include  regional  
context   and   external   assistance   levels.   To   begin,   regional   context   is   an   important  
factor   shaping   the   environment   of   post-­‐‑war   reconstruction   (Berdal   2009,   p.38).   It  
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may   be   expected   that   HE   recovery   will   be   easier   in   regions   marked   by   amiable  
neighbourly   relations   and   established   modes   of   cooperation,   for   example,   that  
opportunities   for   HE   assistance   would   be   more   forthcoming   after   a   hypothetical  
civil  war   in   a   Latin  American   country   signatory   to   the   Bolivarian  Alliance   of   the  
Americas   (Alba)   than   in   the   Great   Lakes   region   in   Africa   marked   by   greater  
historical  patterns  of  enmity.   In   the  South  East  European  nations   formed  from  the  
former  Yugoslavia’s  violent  breakup,  post-­‐‑conflict  HE  has  been  heavily   influenced  
by   the   Bologna   Process   and   meeting   EU   membership   conditions.   For   example,  
rebuilding  Kosovan  HE  was  aligned  with  the  Bologna  Process  to  prepare  for  future  
accession  to  the  grouping  (Epp  &  Epp  2010).    
Quality  of  external  assistance   is  another   influence  upon  HE’s  contribution  to  post-­‐‑
conflict   recovery.   HE   tends   to   be   a   low   donor   priority   and   donor   efforts   are  
frequently   uncoordinated.   Cambodia   offers   an   example   of   high   dependence   on  
donor   financing.   In   1997   recurrent   expenditure-­‐‑per-­‐‑student   was   $163   from  
government  budgets  and  $350  for  foreign-­‐‑aid.  However,  donor  aid  was  volatile;  in  
1994  HE  received  approximately  $2.5  million  while  only  $280,000  in  1997.  Further,  
due  to  complex  governance  and  budgeting  procedures  and  poor  coordination  many  
faculties  lacked  capacity  to  spend  allocated  funds  while  access  to  funds  was  high;  in  
1995  and  1996   the  Faculty  of  Medicine   spent  only  42.7%  and  52%  of   its   approved  
budgets   (Minxuan   1998).   Furthermore,   donor   efforts  were   highly   fragmented   and  
individual  donors  entered  bilateral  agreements   to  provide  assistance   to   individual  
colleges   within   the   National   University   of   Phnomh   Pen   conditional   upon  
instruction   in   the   donor   country’s   language.  Consequently,  multiple   languages   of  
instruction  became  an  obstacle  to  a  national  language  strategy  (Duggan  1997).  This  
finding  suggests  donors  may  be  more  attuned  to  pursuing  organisational  reputation  
than  recipient  societies’  needs.  
The   level   of   external   assistance   is   another   major   dynamic   shaping   the   post-­‐‑war  
environment   of   HE.   Most   post-­‐‑conflict   countries   face   considerable   resource  
constraints  with  many  competing  priorities.  Consequently,  mobilising  resources  for  
HE   rebuilding   can   be   difficult   and   donor   funding   is   often   critical.   It   may   be  
139	  
	  
expected   that   where   external   assistance   levels   are   high   the   prospects   for   HE  
recovery   are   more   positive   because   of   the   large   resource   requirements   for  
rebuilding  complex  HE  systems  and  the  multiple  constraints  on  public  expenditure  
in   post-­‐‑conflict   environments.   Rose   and   Greeley   (2006)   report   very   little  
international  assistance  to  HE  in  fragile  and  conflict-­‐‑affected  states.    
  
Furthermore,   current  expenditures   typically  account   for  a  very  high  proportion  of  
budget  allocations   to  HE  and   therefore  capital  expenditure   from  domestic   sources  
will   remain   low,   for   example,   in   Burundi   (Finnegan   2008).   This   structural   feature  
entails  that  donor  financing  of  HE  rebuilding,  even  in  middle-­‐‑income  post-­‐‑conflict  
countries  including  Iraq  or  Bosnia,  represents  a  much  needed  income  source  giving  
donors   considerable   influence.   For   example,   when   Mozambique’s   government  
planned   HE   expansion   in   the   early   1990s   ‘existing   public   higher   education  
institutions  were   devoid   of   financial   resources   for   consolidation   and   institutional  
expansion’  and  the  World  Bank  loaned  over  $50  million  (Chilundo  2006).  However,  
dependence   on   external   assistance   can   undermine   national   ‘ownership’   over   HE  




This  section  provided  analysis  of  the  post-­‐‑war  environment  in  terms  of  its  influence  
upon   the   HE-­‐‑recovery   relationship   organised   around   a   framework   identifying  
structural,   institutional,   educational,   conjunctural,   and   external   features.   While  
actors   in   post-­‐‑conflict   societies   have   little   agency   to   change   structural   or   external  
features   in   the   short-­‐‑term,   there   is   greater   opportunity   to   affect   institutional,  
education,  and  conjunctural  features.  The  relative  weight  of  various  features  should  
be  expected  to  differ  between  cases  and  will  be  investigated  empirically  in  the  Iraq  
and  Libya  case-­‐‑studies.  Furthermore,  various  options  and  opportunities  presented  
to   HE   sectors   in   post-­‐‑conflict   societies   offer   different   means   of   overcoming   the  
obstacles  and  challenges  presented  above  and  will  be  considered  in  the  next  section.    
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3.4. Options  and  Opportunities  
  
In  this  section  options  and  trends  available  for  the  recovery  and  development  of  HE  
in   post-­‐‑conflict   societies   will   be   analysed   in   terms   of   private   HE   provision   and  
internationalisation.  The  section  addresses  RQ5,  which  is  re-­‐‑stated  below:    
RQ5:  What  are  the  opportunities  and  challenges  associated  with  various  options  for  
higher  education  recovery  and  reform  in  post-­‐‑conflict  societies?  
While   each   option   can   be   considered   a   dynamic   affecting   the   HE-­‐‑recovery  
relationship   they   also   reveal   broad   critiques   of   conventional   practice   and   the  
challenges  as  well  as  opportunities  presented  by  each  option.  To  begin,  the  section  
will   now   explore   the   prospects   of   private   HE   and   privatisation   as   HE   recovery-­‐‑
drivers  in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts.    
  
3.4.1. Private  Higher  Education  
  
A  significant   trend   in  contemporary  post-­‐‑conflict   countries   is   considerable  growth  
in   the   private   HE   sector.  While   enabling  HE   capacity   to   increase   under   resource  
constraints   typical   of   post-­‐‑conflict   states,   this   trend   entails   various   negative  
contradictions  that  frustrate  the  ability  of  HEIs  to  positively  contribute  to  post-­‐‑war  
recovery.  With  state  capacity  and  governance  structures  often  weakened  by  conflict  
and  their  role  challenged  by  other  actors  including  donor  agencies,  parallel  service-­‐‑
delivery  structures  such  as  NGOs,  or  market   forces,  private  and  foreign  providers  
can  drive  post-­‐‑conflict  HE  expansion  outside  of  formal  regulatory  channels.      
Proponents   of   private   HE   hold   that   the   private   sector   is   vital   to   bringing   much  
needed  investment   into  under-­‐‑resourced  HE  systems.   In  particular   in  post-­‐‑conflict  
countries  where  HE  is  of  low  quality  and  low  capacity,  private  providers  are  held  to  
‘fill  a  niche’  that  can  increase  capacity  with  little  to  no  public  expenditure  (Hamm  &  
Lehmann   2011).   Furthermore,   private   providers   may   inject   innovation   and  
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competition   into   HE   systems   dominated   by   stifling   public   sectors   and   be   more  
responsive  to  domestic  economic  and  labour  market  needs.  A  clear  statement  of  the  
conventional  view  on  HE  in   fragile  and  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts   is   found   in  Chauvet  
and  Collier  (2007):    
There   is   little  realistic  prospect   that   the  government  of  a   fragile  state  can  afford  to  
finance   the   rehabilitation   of   its   university:   other   educational   priorities   will   come  
first.  Hence,  the  sensible  solution  is   likely  to  be  to  permit  the  university  to  shift  to  
predominantly  private   funding,   through  fees,  while  encouraging   it   to  seek   funding  
for   scholarships   both   from   private   sources   such   as   the   diaspora,   and   from   donors.  
Beyond   this   the   government   can   also   encourage   the   establishment   of   private  
universities  and  colleges.  
In   contrast   to   the   above   position,   the   feasibility   and   desirability   of   public   HE  
investment  in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts  is  defended  in  this  thesis.  Various  problems  and  
negative   consequences   can   be   identified   as   resulting   from   rapid   post-­‐‑conflict  
expansion  of  private  HE.  First,  in  countries  with  significant  resource  constraints,  the  
low  level  of  control  exercised  by  public  authorities  over  enrolments  and  direction  of  
private  HEIs  can  lead  to  many  contradictions  and  a  socially  sub-­‐‑optimal  utilisation  
of  scarce  resources.  For  example,  after  the  Lebanese  civil  war,  explosive  growth  of  
private  universities  had  a  ‘very  damaging  impact  on  the  country’s  higher  education  
sector’  (TEMPUS  2012).  Uncontrolled  proliferation  of  confessional  private  HEIs  led  
to   focus   on   teaching   applied   professional   disciplines   including   business   and  
computer   science  which   ‘marginalised   scientific   research’   and   created   a   ‘scattered  
scientific   community   lacking   a   coherent   and   national   research   strategy’   (Gaillard  
2010).   A   similar   pattern   of   over-­‐‑enrolment   in   business   and   other   market-­‐‑driven  
disciplines   is   found   in   Cambodia   (Kian-­‐‑Woon   et   al   2010)   and   Iraqi   Kurdistan  
(Ala’Aldeen  2011).    
Private   HE   in   post-­‐‑conflict   states   also   raises   concerns   over   equity.   Pre-­‐‑war  
Cambodia  had  no  tradition  of  private  university  education  and  three  private  HEIs  
were  established  in  the  1990s.  At  one  university  student-­‐‑fees  were  $480  per  month  
while  the  average  annual  salary  stood  at  $300  (Minxuan  1998).  In  situations  where  
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private  HEIs  account  for  the  majority  of  post-­‐‑conflict  expansion,  access  is  improved  
for  relatively  wealthy  groups.  Where  poverty,  inequality,  and  social  exclusion  were  
conflict-­‐‑drivers   this   pattern   can   re-­‐‑produce   and   perpetuate   conflict   dynamics   and  
contribute   to   instability   and   conflict   risk.   In   the  private  model  of  post-­‐‑conflict  HE  
state   capacity   to   eradicate   inequalities   through   positive   discrimination   is   limited.  
On  the  other  hand,  most  post-­‐‑conflict  states  have  very  low  gross  tertiary  enrolment  
rates  at  the  end  of  conflict.  Public  subsidies  to  HE  have  been  criticised  as  serving  an  
elite   constituency   that   is   resistant   to   cuts   in   its   privileged   status,   for   example,   in  
Rwanda.  
Post-­‐‑conflict  governance   reforms   in   some  states  have  enabled  private  provision  of  
HE.  In  some  cases  post-­‐‑conflict  states  may  become  signatories  to  global  regulations  
that  impact  on  domestic  HE  governance,  for  example,  HE  is  classified  by  the  WTO  
as  a  tradable  good  and  service  subject  to  fair  competition  rules.  Many  post-­‐‑conflict  
countries   have   undergone   processes   of  marketisation   and   liberalisation   that   have  
permitted  private  providers  to  enter  previously  state-­‐‑run  HE  sectors.  In  some  cases,  
for   example,   Iraq   or   Bosnia,   private   education   may   be   viewed   as   important   to  
manage  a  transition  out  of  state-­‐‑controlled  socialist  economic  systems  into  market-­‐‑
led   liberal   growth   models.   In   these   cases   private   HE   may   fit   better   with   the  
ideological  and  strategic  goals  of  donors  and  powerful  external  agents  including  the  
World  Bank  or  USAID.    
  
An  example  of  private  HE  promoted  by  transitional  bodies  is  East  Timor  where  14  
private   HEIs   were   established   during   2000-­‐‑2004   under   very   low   regulatory  
supervision  to  serve  a  population  of  approximately  one  million  (Nicolai  2004,  p.87).  
Donors   supported   establishment   of   private   HEIs   rather   than   aiding   the   existing  
public   university.   An   East   Timor   publication   suggests   that   the   reason   was   that  
donors  believe  private  universities  ’can  be  more  effective  in  promoting  their  vision  
of  an  export-­‐‑oriented,  privatized  economy’  (Lao’Hamutuk  2003).   In  a  similar  vein,  
Davies   (2004a)   argues   that   UNMIK   promoted   private   universities   in   Kosovo  
because   they   aligned   with   its   market-­‐‑liberal   vision   for   reconstruction.   The  
promotion  of  private  provision  of  HE   in  post-­‐‑conflict   countries   should  be  viewed  
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within   this   context   of   a  market-­‐‑driven   or   neoliberal  model   of   reconstruction   and  
statebuilding.    
  
In  contrast  to  private  HE’s  role  in  neoliberal  statebuilding,  public  HE  can  be  held  to  
have  greater  potential  to  contribute  to  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery  processes  than  private  
provision.   Boughton   (2005)   argues   that   in   East   Timor   gearing   HE   content   to  
reconstruction   and   development   goals,   such   as   agricultural   extension   to   improve  
livelihoods,  requires  public  priority  setting  rather  than  free-­‐‑market  principles.    
  
The   presence   of   governance   structures   offering   strong   regulatory   frameworks   are  
an   important   determinant   of   HE   contributing   positively   to   post-­‐‑war   recovery  
(MoHE-­‐‑A/IIEP  2004,  p.19).  However,  in  many  post-­‐‑conflict  cases  private  university  
expansion  has  occurred  in  very  weak  regulatory  contexts.  For  example,  in  Kosovo,  
the  UNMIK   transitional  administration   in  2002   legislated   for  opening  of   for-­‐‑profit  
HEIs,   followed   by   very   rapid   HE   growth   (GAP   2008).   Many   new   private  
universities  were   of   very   poor   quality   and   forced   to   close   in   2008   by   the  MoHE.  
Similarly,   in   El   Salvador   in   1997,   five   years   after   the   conflict,   eight   private   HEIs  
were  closed  after  nationwide  evaluations  (Harrington  2001).    
  
A  more  extreme  dynamic,  total  collapse  of  governance  structures  enables  all  private  
HEIs  to  emerge  outside  of  formal  regulatory  channels.  Private-­‐‑sector  led  expansion,  
particularly   under   these   conditions,   can   be   an   unchecked   process   leading   to  
duplicative   investment,   profit-­‐‑driven   enterprises,   system   fragmentation,   and   low  
quality  education.   In  Afghanistan  some  private  HEIs  were  established  outside   the  
state’s   regulatory   authority   since   2001.   Private   universities  were   legalised   in   2007  
and  in  the  period  2007-­‐‑2009  twenty  private  universities  were  officially  registered  by  
the  Ministry   (MoHE-­‐‑A  2009,  p.3).  Unregulated  private   institutions   are   continually  
established  to  meet  the  high  demand  for  HE  yet  are  of  low  quality.    
  
MoHE-­‐‑A/IIEP   (2004)  warns   of   negative   consequences   for  Afghan  HE   if   the   sector  
expanded   without   regulatory   institutions   in   place;   ‘anyone   could   establish   an  
144	  
	  
organization   and   call   it   a   university   or   college   without   any   legally   binding  
obligations  whatsoever  either  towards  students,  towards  the  community  or  towards  
the   nation’.   In   this   scenario   average  HEI   size   could   be   too   small,   certain   subjects  
may   be   over-­‐‑provided,   quality   could   be   highly   uneven   with   no   accreditation  
mechanism  to  distinguish  between  degrees,  quality  controls   for  staff,   libraries  and  
facilities   would   be   absent,   and   private   universities   could   deplete   public   HE  
resources  by  offering  more  competitive  wages.  The  above  example  illustrates  clearly  
many   problems   associated   with   post-­‐‑conflict   private   HE.   Another   trend,   private  
HEIs   have   been   linked   to   increased   educational   corruption   in   post-­‐‑conflict   states,  
for  example,  by  issuing  fake  degrees.  Furthermore,  unregulated  expansion  can  lead  
to  increased  credentialism  or  a  boom  in  certificates  without  a  simultaneous  boom  in  
learning  or  quality.  
  
While   analysis   has   so   far   focused   on   private   or   public   providers   as   mutually  
exclusive,  a  clear  dichotomy  between  these  two  poles  may  be  held  to  be  unhelpful  
and   obscure   the   potential   of   public/private   partnerships.   In   Mozambique,   where  
post-­‐‑conflict   HE   is   judged   to   have   been   a   relative   success,   initial   post-­‐‑war   HE  
expansion  was  driven  by   the  public   sector  and   followed  by  a   rapid  private   sector  
expansion  from  1996.  This  illustrates  the  importance  of  sequencing  and  the  creation  
of   regulatory  bodies   capable  of  governing  HE  prior   to  widespread  opening  of   the  
sector  to  private  providers.    
An   interesting   example   is   Guinea-­‐‑Bissau   where   two   HEIs,   one   public   and   one  
private,   were   established   after   the   1998/1999   war.   The   public   University   Amilcar  
Cabral   is   ‘managed   by   a   private   foundation’   consisting   of   a   Portuguese   private  
university  and   the  national  government   (World  Bank  2008).  Due   to   concerns  over  
public  expenditure  on  HE  affecting  basic  education,  the  majority  of  revenues  were  
generated  from  user-­‐‑fees  with  minimal  transfers  from  public  funds.  A  similar  path  
to   privatisation   was   followed   in   El   Salvador   where   private   groups   took   over  
administration  of  public   education   institutions.   In  El  Salvador,   a   leading   technical  
tertiary   institute   was   privatised,   because   technical   education   was   ‘no   longer  
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responsive  to  the  demands  of  the  new  economy’  and  there  were  insufficient  public  
resources  to  reform  the  sector  (Cuellar-­‐‑Marchelli  2003).    
  
In  sum,  pursuing  privatisation  and  private  HE  promises  many  short-­‐‑term  benefits  
including   low-­‐‑cost   expansion   yet   is   fraught   with   dangers   including   unregulated  
sectors   leading   to   duplicative   investments   and   wasted   resources.   Another   major  
option   that   will   now   be   considered,   and   which   can   also   be   characterised   as  
presenting  both  major  rewards  yet  various  risks,  is  the  internationalisation  of  HE.    
  
3.4.2. Internationalisation    
  
HE   assistance   to   post-­‐‑conflict   countries   has   often   taken   the   form   of   promoting  
internationalisation.   Internationalisation   is   theorised   to   connect   domestic   and  
foreign  HE   systems   and   facilitate   cross-­‐‑border   flows   of   skills,   ideas,   and,   cutting-­‐‑
edge  knowledge.  This   circulation   is  held   to  contribute  positively   to   reconstruction  
and  development.   In   fragile   conflict-­‐‑affected  states  HE’s   capacity   to  meet  demand  
and  social  needs   is  often   low.  Internationalisation   is   therefore  viewed  as  crucial   to  
filling  this  domestic  capacity  deficit.  Further,  where  conflict  led  to  HE’s  isolation,  as  
in   Bosnia   and   Afghanistan,   re-­‐‑connection   of   domestic   universities   to   the  
international  academic  community  is  held  to  redress  negative  impacts  of   isolation.  
While   HE   ‘internationalisation’   emerged   strongly   in   the   2000s   there   is   also  
continuity  with  historical  practices  of  rebuilding  HE.  Post-­‐‑WWII  West  German  HE  
reconstruction   had   a   highly   internationalist   character;   educational   exchange  
between   Britain   and   Germany   was   promoted   to   enable   West   Germany’s   re-­‐‑
emergence   from   intellectual   isolation   through   re-­‐‑establishing   links   globally  
(Naumann  2007).    
Three   major   forms   of   cross-­‐‑border   HE   have   relevance   to   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery;  
scholarships,  university  partnerships,  and  branch  campuses.  To  begin,  scholarships  
for   students   in   post-­‐‑war   countries   are   an   increasingly   common   form   of   HE  
assistance  with  several  theorised  benefits  for  recovery  of  post-­‐‑conflict  HE  systems.  
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Postgraduate  training  in  fields  unavailable  domestically  can  provide  critical  human  
resources.   Furthermore,   in   countries   with   low   domestic   postgraduate   capacity  
overseas  study  is  necessary  to  increase  the  numbers  of  PhD  holders,  particularly  in  
contexts  such  as  Afghanistan  in  2010  where  after  nine  years  of  reconstruction  only  
5%  of   faculty  members  possessed  PhDs  and  30%  Masters  degrees   (ARTF  2010).   In  
post-­‐‑conflict   societies   isolated   from   international   academic   life   during   conflict  
sending   students   to   leading   universities   abroad   can   play   an   important   role   in  
sharing   latest   developments   upon   their   return.   Similarly,   students   exposed   to  
foreign  HE  models  can  contribute  to  debate  on  post-­‐‑conflict  HE  reform.    
During  1979-­‐‑2001   the  Hariri  Foundation   funded  over  30,000  overseas  scholarships  
(ICG  2010).  The  Foundation  encourages  scholar  grantees  to  return  to  Lebanon  and  
apply   their   new   skills   in   national   development   and   improving   HE   standards.  
However,  a  large  number  of  recipients  did  not  return.  This  example  highlights  the  
risk   that   scholarships   abroad   present   for   perpetuating   ‘brain   drain’   of   skilled  
human   capital.   Similarly,   Barclay   (2002)   judges   post-­‐‑conflict   scholarship   schemes  
aimed   at   university   capacity-­‐‑building   to   have   had   ‘mixed   results’   because   they  
contributed   to   ‘brain   drain’.   The   mechanisms   of   restriction,   incentive,   and  
compensation   intended   to   stem   the   flow   of   the   University   of   Liberia’s   skilled  
graduates   all   have   shortcomings   that   limited   their   effectiveness,   including   lack   of  
implementation   capacity   on   bond   payments   and   the   greater   material   rewards  
offered  by  more  developed  countries  rendering  incentives  non-­‐‑desirable.    
International  partnerships  between  universities  have  become  a  principal  form  of  HE  
assistance   globally.   The   British   Council’s   Development   Partnerships   in   Higher  
Education   (DELPHE)  programme  has   facilitated  partnerships  between  British  and  
overseas   universities   including   post-­‐‑conflict   countries   such   as   Iraq,   Afghanistan,  
and   Sierra   Leone.   Benefits   of   partnerships   to   recipient   universities   are   held   to  
include   institutional   and   infrastructure   development,   exposure   to   high   academic  
standards,  and  research  collaboration  (Samoff  &  Carrol  2004,  p.116).  
In   post-­‐‑conflict   countries   the   partnership   model   has   also   been   an   increasingly  
common   modality   for   rebuilding   HE,   for   example,   Afghanistan’s   Strengthening  
147	  
	  
Higher   Education   Program   is   the   primary  mechanism   for   rebuilding   the   national  
HE  system.  In   its   first  phase  $72  million  was  provided  by  the  World  Bank,   first   to  
support   five   provincial   universities   plus   the   University   of   Kabul   in   establishing  
partnerships  with  foreign  universities  (Suhrke  et  al  2008),  and  second,  for  capacity-­‐‑
building   programmes   in   the   MoHE.   Partner   institutions   functioned   ‘to   provide  
curriculum   development   assistance,   pedagogical   and   management   advice   and  
training  of  Afghan  university  staff’  (World  Bank  2010a).    
However,  partnerships  may  be  criticised  as  a  means  of  HE  reconstruction.  Samoff  
and   Carrol   (2004,   p.115)   argue   that   the   language   of   ‘partnership’   has   come   to  
describe   all   of  what  previously  was   termed  aid   in   assistance   to  African  HE.  They  
hold   that   while   ownership   and   cooperation   are   principles   of   the   partnership  
discourse   many   negative   dynamics   of   aid-­‐‑dependency   are   reproduced   in   the  
partnership   model.   In   the   context   of   HE   systems   in   post-­‐‑conflict   countries   this  
should  be  expected  to  be  more  likely  than  in  ‘normal’  development  situations.  This  
is   because   universities   are   often  weakened   and  with   limited   resources  which   can  
lead  to  resource  dependence  and  unequal  relationships.    
Another   growing   trend   that  may   be   understood   as   part   of   internationalisation   of  
HE,   but   also   globalisation   and   de-­‐‑territorialisation,   is   establishment   of   branch  
campuses  of   foreign  universities   (Miller-­‐‑Idriss  &  Hanauer  2011).  While   this  model  
has  not  been  widely-­‐‑adopted  in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts,  partly  due  to  obstacles  posed  
by   insecurity   and   instability,   branch   campuses   of  Western   universities   have   been  
established,   for   example   the   American   University   in   Afghanistan.  Moreover,   this  
model  may  be  expected  to  emerge  in  future  post-­‐‑conflict  scenarios,  in  particular  in  
the  Middle  East.  It  may  be  held  that  branches  campuses  have  potential  to  introduce  
high  academic  standards  into  post-­‐‑conflict  countries  and  stimulate  development  of  
university  systems  lagging  far  behind  international  trends.  Furthermore,  in  resource  
constrained   post-­‐‑conflict   states   with   low   resource   allocations   to   HE,   branch  
campuses   may   be   viewed   as   critical   foreign   investments   that   raise   domestic  
educational   capacity   without   significant   domestic   expenditure.   However,   the  
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relevance   of   this   model   of   HE   provision   to   local   development   needs   has   been  
questioned  (Anderson  2012);  an  objection  that  applies  to  post-­‐‑conflict  needs.  
The  American  University  system  with  campuses   in  Beirut  and  Cairo  has  extended  
to  conflict-­‐‑affected  countries  with  American  Universities  in  Iraq-­‐‑Sulaimani,  Kosovo,  
Afghanistan,   and  Bosnia   and  Herzegovina.  Howell   (1993)  writes   of   the  American  
University  of  Beirut  that  the  ‘“missionary  orientation”  in  education  at  AUB  aims  at  
higher   standards   of   health,   respect   for   human   rights,   and   a   more   secular,  
democratic,  freedom-­‐‑loving  political  atmosphere  throughout  the  Arab  world’.  This  
quote   illustrates   how   the   American   University   system   forms   part   of   the   broader  
project  of  promoting  democratic  and  liberal  values  in  post-­‐‑conflict  states.    
The   rationale   that   academics   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   countries   represent   a   critical  
intellectual   capacity   that   must   be   preserved   is   employed   in   the   work   of   various  
refugee  scholar  rescue  programmes.  During  the  2000s,  partly  in  response  to  the  Iraq  
crisis,   scholar   rescue   programmes  were   initiated,   for   example   the   Scholar   Rescue  
Fund,  to  support  academics  that  cannot  return  to  their  home  countries  due  to  threat  
of  harassment,  persecution,  or  deadly  violence  (Jarecki  &  Kaisth  2009).  While  such  
programmes   tend   to   officially   support   scholar   return   to   home   countries,   return  
cannot  be  enforced  and  the  programmes  may  even  be  held  to  discourage  returns.    
  
Such   reasoning   is   not   new   however;   large-­‐‑scale   programmes   to   assist   academic  
refugees   were   established   in   pre-­‐‑Second   World   War   Europe,   for   example,   Lord  
Beveridge  established  the  Academic  Freedom  Fund  in  1933  at  the  LSE  (Zimmerman  
2011).   However,   ‘only   a   tiny   proportion   decided   to   return   to   their   countries   of  
origin’   (Adams   1968).   Furthermore,   the   UNRRA   University   in   Munich   existed  
during   1945-­‐‑1949   and   served   displaced   academics   from   across   Europe.  While   the  
experiment   was   short-­‐‑lived,   the   university’s   vision   is   instructive   today.   Holian  
(2008)   writes   that   ‘by   virtue   of   their   experiences   of   occupation,   persecution   and  
dislocation,  it  was  argued,  displaced  persons  were  uniquely  qualified  to  spearhead  




While   the   forms   of   internationalisation   analysed   in   this   section   offer   significant  
opportunities   the   field   of   HE   assistance   cannot   be   considered   solely   through   a  
technical   educational   lens.   Rather,   geo-­‐‑political   and   strategic   rationales   influence  
the  amount  and  type  of  aid  to  rebuilding  post-­‐‑conflict  HE  systems,  a  dynamic  that  
will  now  be  explored.  
  
3.4.3. Geo-­‐‑politics  of  HE  Assistance  
  
The   rationale   behind   donor   policy   towards   HE   in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   is   major  
influence  upon  HE  and  recovery.  First  it  may  be  argued  that  donors  are  motivated  
by   economic   self-­‐‑interest   and   increasingly   view   conflict-­‐‑affected   countries   as   a  
profit-­‐‑making  opportunity  for  their  domestic  HEIs.  Educational  aid  would  therefore  
be   utilised   to   build   linkages   that   could   lead   to   commercial   deals   and   enable  
educational  exchange  between  donor  and  recipient  countries.  For  example,  French  
education  aid   consists  of   over   50%  of   funds   covering   ‘imputed   costs’   for   study   in  
French   universities;   a   pattern   criticised   for   aiding   French   HEIs   over   education  
systems  in  poor  countries  (UNESCO  2011).    
Another  explanation  of  donor  interest  in  HE  in  post-­‐‑conflict  settings  is  that  donors  
are   motivated   by   interest   in   achieving   global   security.   In   a   global   context   where  
security   and   development   are   increasingly   viewed   as   inter-­‐‑connected   (Duffield  
2001;   2007)   increased  HE   assistance   has   been   held   to   reverse   under-­‐‑development  
and  poverty,  major  drivers  of  insecurity  and  conflict.  This  link  is  most  clearly  seen  
in  debates  over  the  root  causes  of  ‘terrorism’  where  support  to  HE  in  frontline  states  
of  the  ‘War  on  Terror’  has  been  viewed  as  a  strategically  important  investment.  For  
example,  Hillyard  (2008),   in  an  article  entitled  Arab  Education:  The  Front  Line  on  the  
War  on  Terror,  argues  that  ‘education  among  all  22  Arab  countries’  citizens  holds  the  
best  long  term  promise  for  global  security  and  stability’.  Nowhere  is  this  reasoning  
clearer   than   in   Pakistan;   recipient   of  massive   increases   in   development   assistance  
since  President  Musharraf’s  decision  to  support  the  ‘War  on  Terror’  in  2001.  USAID  
allocates   approximately   30%   of   its   educational   assistance   to   Pakistan   to   HE.  
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Hoodbhoy   (2010)   writes   that   post   9/11   donors   and   governments   rushed   to   fund  
Pakistani  HE  on  a  rationale  of   ‘spend  more  money,  get  better  universities  and  less  
terrorism’.    
An  alternative  yet  related  explanation  is   that  HE  assistance  is   intended  to   increase  
strategic   influence   in  post-­‐‑conflict   contexts.  This  view  considers  HE  a   ‘soft  power’  
resource;  defined  by  Nye  (2004a,  p.X)  as  ‘the  ability  to  get  what  you  want  through  
attraction   rather   than   coercion   or   payment’.   HE   assistance   and   educational  
exchange   programmes   are   held   to   increase   influence   over   future   leaders   and   to  
project   a   favourable   image   and   spread   ideals   of   donor   countries   (Bu   1999;   Scott-­‐‑
Smith   2008).  During   the  Cold  War   such  programmes  were   held   to   constitute   ‘the  
fourth   dimension   of   foreign   policy’   (Coombs   1964).   Post   9/11,   after   the   initial  
militaristic  and  aggressive  US  response,  HE  re-­‐‑emerged  as  a  ‘soft  power’  asset  in  the  
‘War   on  Terror’   (Waterbury   2003;  Campbell   2005).  American   education   is   held   to  
create   long-­‐‑lasting   social   networks   and   ties   with   strategically   crucial   individuals;  
50%  of  world  leaders  backing  the  ‘War  on  Terror’  were  once  exchange  visitors  to  the  
USA  (Nye  2004b).  
Mazawi  (2005)  argues  that  establishment  of  American  branch  campuses  in  the  Gulf  
should   be   interpreted   in   light   of   concerns   over   ensuring   cultural   and   economic  
influence   in   these   strategically   important   states.   In   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts,  
establishment   of   branch   campuses   of   the   American   University   in   Iraq   and   the  
American   University   in   Afghanistan   can   be   interpreted   as   part   of   a   strategy   to  
change  public  attitudes  in  countries  with  considerable  hostility  towards  America.  In  
contrast  to  the  security  rationale  in  which  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts  posing  highest  risks  
to   donor   countries   drive   assistance,   strategic   importance   and   opportunity   would  
shape   support   for  HE   and   therefore   recovery   prospects.   For   example,   support   to  
Iranian  HE  in  the  event  of  a  hypothetical  future  war  may  be  higher  based  on  the  soft  
power   rationale   than   to   strategically   peripheral   post-­‐‑conflict   zones   such   as   the  
Central  African  Republic.    
From  the  above  discussion  it  has  been  seen  that  post-­‐‑conflict  HE  assistance  may  be  
viewed   instrumentally   by   donors,   whether   motivated   by   security   or   soft   power  
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rationales,   and   allocated   mostly   to   strategically   important   areas,   for   example,  
Pakistan.  While  all  the  above  theories  have  some  explanatory  weight  the  soft  power  
theory  best  explains  increased  donor  attention  to  HE  in  strategically  important  post-­‐‑
conflict   contexts.   Furthermore,   as  will   be   seen   later,   the   recognition   by   the  US   of  
initial  shortcomings  in  its  Iraq  strategy  resulted  in  a  revised  position  that  recognised  
the  utility  of  a  soft  power  approach  to  HE  in  stabilising  the  country.  
  
3.5. Concluding  Remarks  
  
This   chapter   offered   a   global   view   of   relevant   literature   on   the   HE-­‐‑recovery  
relationship  from  which  multiple  themes,  dynamics,   issues,  and  problems  emerge.  
Firstly,   it   was   seen   that,   in   general,   HE   is   not   viewed   by   the   core   post-­‐‑conflict  
recovery,   peacebuilding,   or   statebuilding   literature   as   an   important   sector   for  
reconstruction.   However,   contrary   to   this,   several   positions   were   identified   that  
viewed   the   sector   as   neglected   and  possessing   strong  potential   to   drive   recovery.  
Secondly,  the  wide  range  of  theorised  roles  of  HE  in  contributing  to  reconstruction  
and   recovery   related   goals   were   presented   in   terms   of   stabilisation,   physical  
reconstruction,   statebuilding,  economic   recovery,  nationbuilding,   research,   conflict  
transformation  and  reconciliation.  This  continuum  of  functions  ranging  from  short-­‐‑
term  stabilisation  to  long-­‐‑term  human  capital  formation  illustrated  clearly  that  HE,  
at  least  in  theory,  connects  to  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery  in  many  ways.    
  
In  the  third  section  major  features  of  the  post-­‐‑war  environment  mediating  the  HE-­‐‑
recovery   relationship  were   analysed.  While   no   single   case   actualises   all  dynamics  
and   trends   identified   in   this   chapter   it   has   revealed   typical   features   of   the   post-­‐‑
conflict   environment   of   HE.   These   provide   the   basis   of   the   analytical   framework  
applied   in   assessment   of   Iraq   and   Libya   in   terms   of   HE’s   contribution   to   post-­‐‑
conflict   outcomes.   Finally,   options   and   opportunities   facing   the   sector   in   post-­‐‑
conflict  contexts  were  considered.    
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Throughout,   a   broad   critique   of   conventional   approaches   to   post-­‐‑conflict   HE  
emerged.   Themes   identified   include   the   contradictions   and   distortions   of   private  
HE,   the   resistance   and   lack   of   political   will   engendered   by   externally-­‐‑owned  
reconstruction   and   the   significant   opportunities   yet   also   challenges   presented   by  
internationalisation.  It  was  seen  that  while  many  hold  that  outsourcing  HE  capacity  
to  foreign,  private  providers  and  relying  on  international  actors  to  drive  processes  
of  HE   recovery   is   a   common  post-­‐‑conflict   response   a  more   developmental   stance  
defends  a  nationally-­‐‑driven  HE  system  that  provides  public  goods  and  connects  to  
transitional   and   recovery   needs.   In   contrast   with   positions   that   view   HE   as   a  
peripheral   post-­‐‑war   sector   a   case   has   been   made   throughout   for   an   alternative  
approach   in   which   HE   is   conceived   of   as   a   vital   strategic   pillar   for   leveraging   a  



























In   this  chapter   the  core  methodological  approaches,   issues,  choices,  and  dilemmas  
faced  by  this  thesis  will  be  addressed.  To  begin,  the  methodological  rationale  will  be  
outlined   in   terms   of   research   design   and   strategy,   theoretical   framework,   and  
philosophical   commitments.   In   the   next   section   data-­‐‑collection   techniques   and  
fieldwork  conduct  will  be  described.  The  chapter  then  considers  strategic  issues  and  
measures   employed   to   mitigate   conceptual   and   practical   obstacles   to   conducting  
fieldwork   and  data   analysis.   Issues   of   triangulation,   generalisability,   validity,   and  
recognition  of  various   forms  of  bias   are   then  addressed.  Finally,   ethical   issues  are  
reflected   upon.   Throughout,   the   problematic   of   undertaking   fieldwork   in   post-­‐‑
conflict  settings  is  analysed.    
  
4.1.  Research  Strategy  and  Framework  
  
Academic   attention   to  HE   in   post-­‐‑conflict   settings   is   very   limited   and   there   have  
been   no   previous   attempts   at   constructing   a   global   theory.   This   thesis   seeks   to  
redress   this   gap.   Therefore,   the   thesis   can   be   considered   exploratory   research  
operating   in   theory-­‐‑building  mode.  HE  sectors  are   complex  and  dynamic   systems  
with  multiple   functions   (Castells   2009;  Davies   2004a)  while   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery  
can   refer   to   a   very   wide   range   of   sectors,   actors,   social   processes,   or   other  
phenomena.10   This   complexity   entails   that   no   single   theory   or   set   of   theories   can  
explain   all   aspects   of   post-­‐‑conflict   HE.   Due   to   absence   of   systematic   research  
presenting  a  global  view  and  the  complexity  of  the  field,  the  first  stage  of  research  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  See	  chapter	  one	  section	  1.1.	  for	  further	  discussion	  of	  definitions	  of	  reconstruction	  and	  recovery	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consisted  of  a  wide-­‐‑ranging   literature   review  to  construct  a   theoretical   framework  
to  support  framing  and  conceptualisation  of  key  issues.    
  
The  framework  is  applied  to  guide  data  collection  and  analysis  in  the  completion  of  
case-­‐‑studies,   which   in   their   structure   to   a   high   degree   resemble   the   structure   of  
chapter   three,   organised   around   research   questions   addressing   HE’s   functions   in  
post-­‐‑conflict   recovery,   features   of   the   post-­‐‑war   environment   affecting   the   HE-­‐‑
recovery   relationship,   and   recovery   options.   Case-­‐‑study   data   was   initially  
structured   around   this   framework.   However,   during   data   collection   and   analysis  
divergent   themes,   dynamics,   and   factors   emerged.   Consequently,   the   structure   of  
the  two  case-­‐‑studies  is  not  identical  but  rather  reflects  idiosyncratic  and  contextual  
features  that  arose  from  an  inductive  process  of  investigation.    
  
This   point   raises   a   foundational   issue   in   social   science   methodology;   tension  
between  approaches  identifying  universal  laws  or  theories  and  approaches  holding  
that   knowledge   is   bound   to   particular   contexts   (Tilly   &   Goodin   2006).   The  
theoretical   framework   is   formed   from   a   literature   review   identifying   significant  
findings   from   diverse   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   including   post-­‐‑WWII  Germany,   post-­‐‑
2001  Afghanistan,   and  post-­‐‑genocide  Rwanda.   It  may  be   countered   that   the   cases  
are   too  dissimilar,   for   example   in   terms  of   resource   levels,   international   attention,  
conflict   impact,   and   status  of  pre-­‐‑war  HE,   to   enable  meaningful   theorisation.   It   is  
accepted   that   cases  exhibit  many  dissimilarities  yet   it   remains   feasible   to   compare  
experiences   and  generate   findings.  While   each  particular   case  must   be   recognised  
for   idiosyncratic   features  and  complexities,   ‘comparisons  can  be  highly   instructive  
in  pointing  to  larger  issues  and  problems  when  intervening  in  societies  ravaged  by  
war  and  violent  conflict’  (Berdal  2009,  p.26).    
  
Based   on   the   logic   of   the   rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return   approach   (Pscharopoulos   1984;  
Pscharopoulos   1988;   Pscharopoulos   &   Patrinos   2004)   reviewed   in   chapter   one,   a  
simple  linear  causal  model  of  the  HE-­‐‑recovery  relationship  can  be  constructed.  The  
model,   represented  below,  posits   that  HE   leads   to  positive   outputs  which   in   turn  
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lead  to  better  recovery  or  conversely  that  HE  creates  negative  outputs   that   lead  to  
worse   recovery.   In   this   conception,   outputs   include  measurable   factors   including  
number   of   skilled   graduates,   research   papers   published,   or   higher   individual  
earnings  due  to  greater  education.    
  
  
However,  this  simple  linear  model  offers  an  implausible  account  of  the  HE-­‐‑recovery  
relationship.   Fine   and  Rose   (2001)   argue   that   the   linear  model   does   not   recognise  
education’s  embeddedness  in  contingent  and  contextual  social  systems  that  mediate  
its  contribution  to  development.  In  chapter  three  it  was  found  that  the  HE-­‐‑recovery  
relationship  is  not  linear,  automatic,  or  simple.  Rather,  multiple  factors  mediate  the  
relationship  which   in   theory  may  often  be   indirect,   temporally  delayed,  and  over-­‐‑
determined   by   competing   forces.   Furthermore,   influential   rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return   studies  
have   been   held   to   offer   unconvincing   empirical   findings   (Bennell   1996;   Lauglo  
1996).    
  
More  fundamentally,  the  discussion  of  human  capital  theory  in  chapter  one  touched  
upon   a   crucial   epistemological   issue;   it   was   seen   that   conventional   rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return  
analysis   cannot   adequately   capture   HE   externalities.   Such   externalities,   in   other  
words   the   social  or  public  benefits  of  HE,   include   supporting  national  knowledge  
production  for  innovation  led  growth  (TFHES  2000),  a  moral  function  in  promoting  
common   values,   increased   productivity   of   the   non-­‐‑educated   (Tilak   2008),   and  
enhanced   social   justice   (Preston   &   Green   2003).   Similarly,   Altbach   (2004,   p.24)  
identifies   the   role   of   universities   in   developing   countries   as   ‘repositories   of  
knowledge’  and  producers  of  basic  and  applied  research  as  broad  benefits  to  society  
that   are   not   captured   by   rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return   analysis.   Furthermore,   Birdsall   (1996)  












education  in  developing  countries.  She  holds  that  social  returns  to  HE  may  include  
increased   efficiency   savings,   economies-­‐‑of-­‐‑scale   from   larger   universities,   and  
reduced  opportunity-­‐‑cost  of  teacher  training  resulting  from  more  graduates.    
  
Such  social  benefits  are   important  drivers  of  development   in  developing  countries  
that  are  also  relevant  to  post-­‐‑conflict  development.  Moreover,  another  externality  of  
public  HE  is  reducing  ‘social  distance’  between  ethnic,  social,  and  religious  groups  
which   is   held   to   reduce   transaction   costs   and   reduce   conflict   over   rent-­‐‑seeking  
activity  (Gradstein  &  Justman  cited  in  Tilak  2008).  This  social  cohesion  externality  is  
of  more   importance   to   conflict-­‐‑affected   and  post-­‐‑conflict   societies   than   in   ‘normal  
development’   contexts.   This   leads   to   the   most   crucial   aspect   of   the   argument  
advanced   here;  most   of   the   functions   of  HE   in   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   analysed   in  
chapter   three   section   3.2   can   be   conceptualised   as   externalities   of   the   sector   that  
connect   to   the   wide   range   of   recovery   tasks.   For   example,   increased   supply   of  
graduates   in   disciplines   related   to   state   functioning   has   positive   externalities   for  
state  and  capacity  building  while  enhanced  civic  education  has  positive  externalities  
that   impact  upon  democratisation  processes.  However,   it   should  be  qualified   that  
externalities  may  also  be  negative,  for  example,  it  was  seen  that  HE  can  perpetuate  
divisive   identities   in  conflict-­‐‑affected  societies  with  negative  externalities  on  social  
cohesion.11    
Broadly   speaking,   the   economistic   human   capital   and   rate-­‐‑of-­‐‑return   approach   is  
wedded   to   positivist   epistemology   that   seeks   to   quantify   values   of   inputs   and  
outputs   of   educational   processes   (Marginson   1997;   Fine  &  Rose   2001;  Abeysekera  
2006).   Furthermore,   critics   hold   that   this   input/output   framework   conceives   of  
education   as   a   ‘Black   Box’   obscuring   the   wider   educational   process   (Blaug   1976;  
Samoff  1996;  Fine  &  Rose  2001;  Mehrotra  2005).  While   the  utility  of   this  approach  
should  not  be  disregarded,  it  is  argued  that  it  is  insufficient  for  uncovering  complex  
and   often   indirect   externalities   of   HE   in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts.   In   contrast   to   life  
earnings  or  additional  contributions  through  taxes,   it   is  held  to  be  very  difficult  to  
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  See	  sections	  2.4	  and	  3.2.7	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accurately  measure  and  quantify  HE’s  externalities  (Tilak  2008;  Rizzo  2004;  TFHES  
2000).    
  
To   capture   the   indirect,   complex,   and  mediated  HE-­‐‑recovery   relationship   a  more  
advanced   model   is   presented   above.   In   this   conceptualisation,   both   the   core  
economic   logic   of   the   input/output   model   and   wider   social   impacts   of   HE   on  
recovery   through   externalities   are   accounted   for.   This   framework   is   particularly  
well   suited   to   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts.   Disruption   to   social   and   economic   systems  
alters   educational   rates-­‐‑of-­‐‑return   which   require   longitudinal   quantitative   data   to  
measure;   a   problematic   requirement   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   contexts.   Due   to   these  
difficulties  in  measuring  and  identifying  externalities  a  thorough  understanding  is  a  
necessary   first   step   before   policy-­‐‑making   or   planning   for   reconstruction.   In   this  
way,   the   thesis  makes   a   specific   contribution   towards  understanding   the   types   of  
externalities  that  can  make  a  major  impact  on  recovery  goals.  
  
4.2.  The  Composite  Approach  
  
The   research   strategy   adopts   a   composite   approach,   a   flexible   and   pragmatic  
approach   combining   quantitative   and   qualitative   methods   and   multiple   data-­‐‑
collection   techniques   that   is   intended   as   an   innovative   approach   to   conducting  
research   in   challenging   conflict-­‐‑affected   and   post-­‐‑conflict   environments   (Barakat,  
Chard   &   Jones   2005).   The   composite   approach   can   be   considered   a   sub-­‐‑class   of  
mixed-­‐‑methods   approaches;   those   combining   quantitative   and   qualitative   data  












Furthermore,   mixed-­‐‑methods   entail   that   both   inductive   and   deductive   reasoning  
can  be  utilised  in  the  conduct  of  research  (Read  &  Marsh  2002,  p.240).  
The   research   strategy   may   be   described   as   a   ‘qualitative   approach   to   mixed  
methods’  (Hesse-­‐‑Biber  2010);  while  statistical  information  is  used  to  triangulate  data  
qualitative   data   is   prioritised.   Some   level   of   basic   quantitative  methods   including  
counting   instances   of   observed   phenomena   are   common   in   qualitative   research  
(Strauss  2003,  p.3)  and  are  employed  in  this  thesis  to  statistically  describe  facts  and  
processes   shaping   structural   contexts   of   the   case-­‐‑studies.   Qualitative   research,   in  
particular   in   the   interpretive   tradition,   is   concerned   with   beliefs,   attitudes,   and  
meanings  attached  by  human  subjects  to  the  social  world  they  inhabit.  As  stated  by  
Given  (2008,  p.xxix)  ‘qualitative  research  is  designed  to  explore  the  human  elements  
of  a  given  topic,  where  specific  methods  are  used  to  examine  how  individuals  see  
and  experience  the  world’.    
However,   the   term   mixed   methods   refers   to   a   broad   church   of   methodological  
approaches  that  combine  qualitative  and  quantitative  techniques.  It  cannot  capture  
the   comparative   advantage   provided   by   the   composite   approach   to   fieldwork   in  
conflict   and   post-­‐‑conflict   settings.   The   composite   approach   is   considered  
appropriate  because  it  enables  the  adoption  of  a  variety  of  methodological  strategies  
and   is  suitable   for  use  as  part  of  a  case-­‐‑study  approach  (Barakat,  Chard,   Jacoby  &  
Lume   2002).   Furthermore,   the   composite   approach   is   well-­‐‑suited   to   this   thesis  
because  the  field  of  HE  and  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery  is  very  under-­‐‑researched  and  also  
complex   which   entails   that   an   adaptable   holistic   approach   yields   the   best  
knowledge-­‐‑generation  potential.    
Another   important   part   of   the   composite   approach   is   triangulation,   viewing   the  
same   fact,   event,   or   piece   of   data   from  various   angles.   It   has   advantages   in   post-­‐‑
conflict  contexts  where  myriad  challenges  limit  the  range  of  methodologies  that  can  
be   utilised   (Barakat   &   Ellis   1996).   Particular   problems   confront   large-­‐‑scale  
quantitative  research  due  to  the  erosion  of  data-­‐‑collection  capacities  during  conflict  
and  difficulties  of  conducting  surveys  and  questionnaires  where  insecurity  hampers  
accessibility   and   heightens   mistrust   thus   distorting   respondents’   responses.  
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Quantitative  data  is  frequently  therefore  hard  to  collect,  unreliable,  and  difficult  to  
compare.   The   flexibility   of   the   composite   approach   to   research   methodology   is  
appropriate  in  such  challenging  environments.  
It   should  also  be  noted   that  qualitative   case-­‐‑study  approaches  are   appropriate   for  
exploratory   research   that   offer   new   insights   into   complex   and   under-­‐‑studied  
phenomena   (Gillham   2000,   p.11)   and   are   therefore   suited   to   this   thesis.  
Furthermore,  the  thesis  adopts  the  position  advanced  by  some  researchers  that  post-­‐‑
conflict  reconstruction  and  statebuilding  is  decisively  shaped  by  local  or  indigenous  
actors   that   inhabit   complex  contexts   (Torjesen  2013,  p.60)  and   therefore  holds   that  
understanding  their  perspective  is  crucial.  As  Mac  Ginty  and  Williams  (2009)  put  it,  
people  must  be  brought  back   in   to  peacebuilding   research  and   for   this   to   succeed  
careful   listening   is   required.   Consequently,   qualitative   methods   are   used   to  
understand  how  actors  interpret  context  and  their  relation  to  it  (Devine  2002).  Most  
significantly,  to  assess  HE’s  contribution  to  recovery  (RQ5),  features  of  the  post-­‐‑war  
environment  shaping  the  HE-­‐‑recovery  relationship  (RQ4),  and  the  utility  of  various  
recovery  options  for  HE  (RQ5),  such  a  perspective  of  prioritising  insider  voices  and  
perspectives   of   expert   participants   possessing   contextual   familiarity   and   affinity  
with  the  cases  under  study  was  deemed  appropriate.    
  
4.3.  Case-­‐‑study  Design  
  
Case-­‐‑studies   are   a   major   approach   to   historical   and   qualitative   social   science  
research.   Gerring   (2007   p.20)   writes   that   ‘a   case   study   may   be   understood   as   the  
intensive  study  of  a  single  case  where  the  purpose  of  that  study  is  –  at  least  in  part  –  
to  shed  light  on  a  larger  class  of  cases  (a  population)’.  In  contrast  to  large-­‐‑N  studies,  
in   which   many   cases   are   subjected   to   non-­‐‑intensive   investigation,   case-­‐‑study  
approaches  tend  to  be  limited  to  a  single  case  or  several  cases.  Gerring  (2007)  holds  
that  boundaries  between  case-­‐‑study  research  and  other  types  of  research  should  be  




It  may  be   contended   that   large-­‐‑N  quantitative   research  has   greater   potential   than  
case-­‐‑study   research   for  yielding   findings   that   could  establish   firm  empirical  bases  
for   testing   theory   about   the   emerging   field   of   HE   in   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery.  
However,   two   main   reasons   weaken   this   option.   Firstly,   there   is   an   absence   of  
established  or   even   speculative   theory  on   the  HE-­‐‑recovery   relationship   that   could  
serve   as   the   starting   point   for   hypothetic-­‐‑deductive   quantitative   study.   Rather,   a  
case-­‐‑study   approach   was   adopted   here   because   the   field   of   post-­‐‑conflict   HE   is  
highly   under-­‐‑researched   and   in-­‐‑depth   contextual   knowledge   was   viewed   as  
appropriate  to  generate  insights  into  the  area  to  enable  theory-­‐‑building.  
  
Secondly,   several   researchers   have   noted   severe   limitations   on   large-­‐‑scale  
quantitative   research   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   and   post-­‐‑conflict   countries,   for   example,  
answers  to  survey  questions  being  influenced  by  fear  and  suspicion  (Barakat  &  Ellis  
1996;   Chard   2005).   This   is   due   to   what   Haer   and   Becher   (2012)   describe   as   the  
widely-­‐‑held   assumption   ‘that   insecurity   strongly   limits   the   possibilities   of   the  
researcher  in  collecting  quantitatively  valid  and  reliable  data’.  For  post-­‐‑conflict  HE,  
the   scope   for   a   large-­‐‑N   study   is   limited  due   to   serious   data   limitations,   time   and  
resource  constraints,  and  under-­‐‑theorisation  of  the  field.  As  noted  above,  capacities  
of   post-­‐‑conflict   societies   to   collect   and   disseminate   reliable   data   necessary   for  
secondary   quantitative   analysis   are   often   severely   eroded   or   limited.   Many   Iraqi  
experts   doubted   the   credibility   of   pre-­‐‑2003   national   statistics   while   the   statistical  
capacity   of  most   institutions  was   decimated   by   looting   in   2003.   For   Libya,   it   has  
been  argued  that  data  was  politically  manipulated  by  the  Qaddafi  regime.  
  
McNabb   (2004;  p.358)   classifies   case-­‐‑studies   into   three  broad  approaches:   intrinsic  
case-­‐‑studies   concerned   with   understanding   particular   phenomena;   instrumental  
case-­‐‑studies   designed   to   investigate   a   broad   issue  with   no   specific   attachment   to  
case-­‐‑study   phenomena;   and   collective   or   cross-­‐‑case   case-­‐‑studies   investigating  
multiple  cases  to  study  a  phenomena  comparatively  and  gain  insight  into  whether  
its   characteristics   are   representative   of   a   universe   of   similar   cases.   The   approach  
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adopted  here  is  the  latter;  a  multiple  case-­‐‑study  design  intended  to  offer  insight  into  
the  theorised  HE-­‐‑recovery  relationship  through  study  of  Iraq  and  Libya.    
  
However,  it  should  be  qualified  that  initially  it  was  intended  that  the  thesis  would  
consist   of   the   single-­‐‑case   of   Iraq.  On   theoretical   considerations,   Iraq  was   selected  
because   HE   suffered   greatly   during   the   2003   invasion   and   its   aftermath.   Case-­‐‑
selection   was   however   not   driven   purely   by   consideration   of   the   weight   of  
dependent,   independent,   and   intervening   variables   in   their   relation   to   the  
theoretical   framework.   Rather,   initial   focus   on   Iraq   came   about   from   the  
researcher’s  prior  familiarity  with  the  case  and  access  to  participants.  Despite  these  
practical   and  opportunistic   considerations   the  outcome  was   serendipitous  as   even  
after   the   researcher   learned   much   more   about   the   topic   Iraq   remains   a   very  
important  case  for  any  study  of  post-­‐‑conflict  HE.      
  
Despite   this   initial   intention   a  multiple   case-­‐‑study   approach  was   adopted.   This   is  
partly   because   difficulties   in   accessing   Iraqi   universities   due   to   insecurity   posed  
severe   restrictions   on   the   feasibility   of   in-­‐‑country   fieldwork.   In   early   2011   the  
Libyan   uprising   and   civil   war   occurred,   offering   an   opportunity   to   conduct  
fieldwork   in   a   post-­‐‑conflict   environment.   A   multiple   case-­‐‑study   approach   was  
adopted   on   both   practical   and   methodological   grounds.   Case-­‐‑studies   provide  
insights   into   single   contexts   and   serve   as   a   basis   for   generalisation.   Elster   (2007)  
argues   that   good   qualitative   case-­‐‑studies   discern   between   contextually-­‐‑unique  
features   of   cases   and   generalizable   aspects.   While   a   well-­‐‑selected   single-­‐‑case  
approach   in   which   the   researcher   gains   intimate   familiarity   and   contextual  
understanding   has   advantages   for   depth   of   findings   (Chard   2005,   p.95)   it   was  
reasoned   that   the   under-­‐‑studied   character   of   the   subject   at   hand   entailed   that  
multiple  case-­‐‑studies  could  generate  a  broader  set  of  empirical  findings  from  which  
to  build  theory.    
  
More   importantly,  Libya,  a  country  not  considered  a  possible  case  at   the  outset  of  
doctoral  research,  quickly  emerged  as  a  ‘most-­‐‑likely’  case.  Eckstein  (1975)  argues  for  
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‘crucial  case’  case-­‐‑study  methodology  in  which  theory  is  tested  against  ‘most  likely’  
or   ‘least   likely’   cases.  Falsification  of  a   ‘most   likely’   case   is  held   to   refute  a   theory  
while  falsification  of  a  ‘least  likely’  case  confirms  the  theory.  Validation  of  most  or  
least   likely   cases   confirms   the   probabilistic   truth   of   the   theory.   The   approach   has  
been   criticised   for   limited   generalisability;   Gerring   (2007)   questions   how   ‘crucial’  
any  single  case  can  be   to  a   theory,  arguing  that  single  cases  are   inherently   limited  
bases  from  which  to  generalise  or  draw  inferences.    
  
While   recognising   limitations   on   generalisability   to   the   sample   population   (post-­‐‑
conflict  states),  the  crucial-­‐‑case  method  is  a  good  fit  for  this  study.  Libya  resembles  
a   ‘most   likely’   case  while   Iraq   approximates   a   ‘least   likely’   case   for   exploring   the  
central   hypothesis.   In   its   post-­‐‑conflict   transition   Libya   possessed   large   resources,  
meaningful   sovereignty,   relatively   low   impact   of   conflict   on  HE,   and   the   highest  
tertiary   enrolment   rate   in   Africa.   Iraq   while   having   ample   resources   faced  
occupation,   protracted   violent   conflict,   pervasive   insecurity,   and   a   HE   system  
damaged   considerably   through   war,   sanctions,   and   occupation.   While   Libya  
possessed   initial   conditions   that   could   lead   to  HE  playing   a   positive   post-­‐‑conflict  
role  Iraq  had  very  poor  initial  conditions.    
  
King,  Keohane  and  Verba   (KKV)   (1994,  p.45)   argue   that  multiple   case-­‐‑studies   can  
lead   to  valid   inference   if   and  only   if   the   type  of  data   collected   is   the   same   across  
units,  between  and  within  cases.  This  is  because  data  is  systematic,  consistent,  and  
therefore  comparable.  They  argue  that  many  social  science  case-­‐‑studies  fail  to  meet  
these   criteria   and   are   therefore   overly   descriptive.   Due   to   the   exploratory   and  
under-­‐‑researched   character   of   the   subject   this   type   of   systematicity   has   not   been  
possible  between  case-­‐‑studies.  This  is  because  the  Iraq  case-­‐‑study  was  conducted  at  
a  different  stage  of  its  post-­‐‑conflict  transition  to  Libya  and  fieldwork  in  Iraq  was  not  
possible.  However,  despite  this  limitation  effort  was  taken  to  ensure  that  the  type  of  
data   collection  was   conducted   in   accordance  with   the  within-­‐‑case   systematic  data  




4.4.  Philosophical  Issues  
  
A   foundational   philosophical   issue   that  will   now   be   examined   is   the   debate   over  
structure   and   agency.   Structural   explanations   account   for   ordered   and   patterned  
features   of   context   that   determine   outcomes   while   agency-­‐‑centred   explanations  
focus   on   purposive   political   action   (Hay   2002,   p.94).   Rather   than   privilege   either,  
structure   and   agency  have  been  widely-­‐‑held   to   be  dialectically   related   (McAnulla  
2002,   p.291)   recognising   ‘the   dynamic   interplay   of   structure   and   agency   and  
material   and   ideational   factors’   (Hay   2006,   p.94).   This   point   can   be   illustrated  
through   the   example   of   institutions,  which   have   been   classified   by   some   as   static  
structures   constraining   action.   However,   Morgan   et   al   (2010,   p.5)   argue   that  
institutions  are  better  conceived  as  resources  deployed  by  actors  that  enable  various  
forms   of   action   and   change.   Furthermore,   criticisms   of   new   institutionalism   as  
conceiving   of   institutions   as   agentless   structures   have   led   to   recognition   of   the  
embodied  character  of  agents  within  institutions,  or  the  co-­‐‑constitutive  relationship  
between  structure  and  agency  (Leftwich  2009).    
  
In  terms  this  debate,  it  is  argued  here  that  both  structure  and  agency  are  important  
and  attention  will  be  paid   to  how  agency   is   exercised   in  navigating   the   structural  
contexts  under   study.  For   example,  perspectives  of  Libyan  MoHE  officials  will   be  
analysed  regarding  how  those  agents  perceive  the  strategic  situation  in  which  they  
operate  and  their  scope  for  policy  choice.  Moreover,  case-­‐‑study  methods  in  political  
science   are   held   to   be   appropriate   for   studying   complex   interaction   between  
structure   and   agency   (McNabb   2004,   p.359).   Furthermore,   interviews   with   key  
actors  are  held  to  be  a  primary  means  of  investigating  the  balance  of  structural  and  
situational   factors   in   explaining   political   events   and   processes   (Rathbun   2008,  
p.691).    
  
A  little  made  theoretical  point  relates  to  structure  and  agency  in  moments  of  rapid  
social   change   such   as   post-­‐‑conflict   transitions.   The   point   has   been   made   that   a  
structuralist  perspective  cannot  account  for  social  change  (Hay  2002,  p.135).  Further,  
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Hay   states   that   ‘structuralism   implies   a   world   of   stability’.   However,   in  
contradistinction  to  this  view,  conflict-­‐‑affected  states  offer  highly-­‐‑unstable  contexts  
where   social,   political,   and   economic   structures   may   be   destroyed,   distorted,   or  
under   intense   contestation.   In   these   contexts   it   may   be   expected   that   room   for  
agency   increases   as   structures   are   destroyed,   rebuilt,   transformed,   and   re-­‐‑
negotiated.  After   periods   of   intense   social   change   structures  may   be   in   flux   for   a  
period  and  then  ‘settle  down’  to  become  more  predictable.  A  further  point  is  that  in  
the   context   of   the   Middle   East   power   is   often   held   in   tight   circles   among   few  
individuals   and   rule   is   highly   personalised   rather   than   institutionalised   (Owen  
2004,  p.40).    
  
Finally,   the   approach   adopted   in   this   thesis   is   influenced   by   historical  
institutionalism  and  the  view  that  ‘history  matters’  for  contemporary  explanation  in  
political  science  (Tilly  2006,  p.417;  Thelen  1999).  It  is  held  here  that  contexts  faced  by  
policy-­‐‑makers  and  HE  administrators  in  post-­‐‑conflict  settings  are,  to  a  degree,  path-­‐‑
dependent,   i.e.,   constrained   by   past   choices,   actions,   and   traditions   (Mahoney   &  
Schensul   2006).   Following   this   premise,   the   case-­‐‑study   approach   is   not   limited   to  
the  conflict  and  post-­‐‑conflict  HE  system  but  begins  with  an  account  of  the  historical  
development  and  pre-­‐‑conflict   context  of  HE.   In   the  Libyan  case,   for   example,   it   is  
shown   that   HE’s   role   in   Qaddafi’s   regime   legitimation   strategies   created   a   path-­‐‑
dependent  trajectory  that  constrained  the  scope  of  post-­‐‑conflict  HE  reform.    
  
4.5.  Data  Collection  Issues  and  Techniques  
  
In   this   section   the   techniques   of   data-­‐‑collection  utilised   in   the   carrying   out   of   the  
empirical   case-­‐‑study   research   will   be   detailed.   To   begin,   the   crucial   issue   of  
sampling  will   be   addressed.  After   this   the   approach   adopted   to   the  main   form  of  
data   collection,   interviews,   will   be   explained.   This   will   be   followed   by   a   brief  
discussion  of   the   treatment  of   textual  primary  and  secondary   sources.  Finally,   the  
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process  of  conducting  research  and  fieldwork  will  be  described  for  the  case-­‐‑studies  
of  Iraq  and  Libya  respectively.  
4.5.1. Sampling  
  
Chard   (2005)   argues   that   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   and   post-­‐‑conflict   settings   the  
difficulties   of   access,   distortions   to   the   local   environment   such   as   population  
displacement,   and   the   personal   bias   arising   from  potential   participants’   increased  
suspicion   of   outsiders   are   all   factors   that   render   traditional   neat   sampling  
procedures   less   applicable.   Rather,   she   explains,   the   practicalities   of   access   and  
security  have  a  strong  effect  on  the  sample  frame  applied  during  research.  Snowball  
sampling   is   held   to   be   effective   in   accessing   difficult   to   reach   populations   (Tracy  
2013,   p.136).   Cohen   and   Arieli   (2011)   argue   that   snowball   sampling   can   usefully  
circumnavigate   some   obstacles   to   research   presented   by   conflict-­‐‑affected   settings  
including   lack   of   information   on   individuals   and   organisations   to   contact.  
Snowballing   is   often   employed   in   political   research   in   the   Middle   East   due   to  
various  difficulties  of   accessing   specific  populations   and   the   ‘culture  of   suspicion’  
that  exists  (Clark  2006).  
  
It   should  be  noted   that   this   sampling  procedure   is  non-­‐‑probabilistic  and   therefore  
may  be  charged  with  introducing  forms  of  bias  including  the  bias  from  participants  
recommending   further   contacts   from   within   their   social   network   who   are   more  
likely   to  share  similar  demographic,   ideological,  or  professional  backgrounds   thus  
limiting   the   broad   representativeness   of   the   sample.   This   was   mitigated   through  
employing  multiple   snowballs   rather   than   one   or   two.   Initial   contacts  were  made  
with   ten   academics   and   no   more   than   three   links   occurred   down   any   single  
snowball  line.  This  limits  personal  bias  such  as  friendship  or  similar  political  views  
influencing  initial  contacts’  suggestions.  
  
This   form  of   non-­‐‑probabilistic   snowball   sampling  was   considered   appropriate   for  
the  research  because  in  both  cases  the  participants  were  to  some  degree  difficult  to  
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access.   In   the   case   of   Iraq   displaced   academics   constituted   a   hidden   population  
although  individual  academics  tended  to  have  extended  social  networks  that  could  
be   utilised   for   effective   snowball   sampling.   In   the   case   of   Libya   the   suspicion   of  
outside   researchers   in   an   unstable   environment   was   greatly   reduced   by   the  
introductions  provided  by  the  snowballing  technique.    
  
Furthermore,  Tansey  (2007)  argues  that  non-­‐‑probability  sampling  is  appropriate  in  
political   case-­‐‑study   research   that   relies   on   elite   interviewing   because   participants  
should  be  selected  according   to  particular  criteria.  A  purposive  sample   frame  was  
therefore  utilised  because  of  the  concern  of  the  study  with  the  strategic  aspect  of  HE  
and   post-­‐‑war   recovery   which   required   the   participation   of   high-­‐‑level   officials   to  
address   most   of   the   research   questions.   In   selecting   potential   participants   those  
occupying  or  formerly  occupying  strategic  and  leadership  positions  in  the  HE  sector  
or   post-­‐‑war   reconstruction   were   favoured.   While   these   participants   can   be  
considered   elite   actors   on   a   conventional   definition   other   participants   including  
faculty  members  and  administrative  staff  would  not  be.  For  this  study,  elites  will  be  
defined  as  those  possessing  expertise  on  the  given  topic.  Some  individuals  may  not  
self-­‐‑identify  as  elites  but  will  be  classified  as  elites  on   this  definition,   for  example,  
Libyan  academics  possess  expertise  on   the  national  HE  system  but  are  not  part  of  
the   economic   or   political   elite.   Elite   interviews   are   useful   for   understanding  
theoretical  positions,  perceptions,  beliefs  and   ideologies  of  elites  and  offer   ‘insight  
into   the  mind-­‐‑set   of   the   actors  who   have   played   a   role   in   shaping   the   society   in  
which  we   live   and   an   interviewee’s   subjective   analysis   of   a   particular   episode   or  
situation’  (Richards  1996).    
  
4.5.2. Primary  and  Secondary  Sources  
  
The   first   stage   of   each   case-­‐‑study  was   a   ‘soaking   and   poking’   process   (George  &  
Bennett  2005,  p.89)   involving  wide  reading  of  primary  and  secondary   literature   to  
gain   familiarity   with   contextual   factors.   For   Iraq,   this   was   greatly   assisted   by  
observations  made  whilst  working  with  Iraqi  academics.  Doctoral  theses,  primarily  
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by  overseas  Iraqi  and  Libyan  students  at  foreign  universities,  provide  an  invaluable  
resource   for   understanding   historical   dynamics   of   HE.   For   other   general   and  
contextual   sources   the   literature   related   to   Iraq   and   Libya   from   political   science,  
development  studies,  and  post-­‐‑war  recovery  studies  was  surveyed.    
While  the  subject  of  post-­‐‑conflict  HE  is  very  under-­‐‑researched  in  academic  literature  
several  scholarly  sources  address  the  issue.  The  majority  analyse  a  single  university  
or  country  with  much  less  global  or  comparative  study.  Reportage  from  analytical  
news   sources   is   an   important   source   of   information   on   HE   in   conflict   and   post-­‐‑
conflict  contexts.  The  Times  Higher  Education  Supplement,  the  Chronicle  of  Higher  
Education,  University  World  News,  and  the  Institute  for  War  and  Peace  Reporting  
all  offer  relatively  objective  and  reliable  journalism.  Online  data  searches  in  archives  
of   these   publications   retrieved   information   particularly   useful   for   tracking   post-­‐‑
conflict  trends  in  HE.    
  
Statistical  data  on  aid  to  HE,  national  educational  expenditure,  student  enrolment,  
and  other  indicators  was  gathered  from  databases  including  the  OECD-­‐‑DAC  Query  
Wizard   for   International   Development   Statistics,   the   Development   Assistance  
Database   (DAD)   sites   for   Iraq,   plus   governmental   statistics   organisations.   In  
addition,   secondary  sources   that  provide  relevant  statistics  have  been  utilised  and  
efforts  made  to  cross-­‐‑check  their  validity.  However,  the  most  important  type  of  data  
was  gained  from  interviews  which  will  be  addressed  now.    
  
4.5.3. Interviews    
  
Semi-­‐‑structured   interviews   with   pre-­‐‑dominantly   open-­‐‑ended   questions   were   the  
primary   data-­‐‑collection   technique   employed   during   fieldwork.   Rather   than   pre-­‐‑
determined  questions  aimed  at  eliciting  short  answers,  a  set  of   ‘guiding  questions’  
(Hatch  2002,  p.101)  were  asked  to  the  vast  majority  of  participants  with  participant  
responses   followed  up  on  and  probed   to   attain   in-­‐‑depth  data.  This   is   appropriate  
due  to  the  exploratory  nature  of  the  research  which  required  a  qualitative  approach  
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that   seeks   to   understand   the   perspectives   of   research   subjects,   their   intentions,  
beliefs,   and   systems   of   meaning   that   inform   their   worldview.   The   majority   of  
interviews  were  conducted  in  English  with  an  Arabic-­‐‑speaking  local  translator  used  
where  necessary.    
  
4.5.4. Iraq  Case-­‐‑study    
  
Primary  data  collection  on  Iraq  occurred  in  a  non-­‐‑typical  process  over  the  majority  
of   the   length   of   study.   Prior   to   commencing   the   doctoral   programme   the   author  
became   involved   in   the   Scholar   Rescue   Fund   Iraq   (SRF)   programme   to   support  
displaced   Iraqi   academics   whilst   working   as   a   researcher   in   Amman,   Jordan.  
Through  acting  as  research  assistant  for  Iraqi  academics  and  frequent  conversations  
a   degree   of   familiarity  with   Iraqi  HE  was   gained.   In   June   2010   involvement   in   a  
workshop  partly  organised  by  the  Post-­‐‑war  Reconstruction  and  Development  Unit  
(PRDU)  on   rebuilding   Iraqi  HE   for   Iraqi   SRF  Scholars   in  Amman,   Jordan  enabled  
greater   knowledge   of   Iraqi   HE   and   also   access   to   a   valuable   group   of   potential  
participants.  This  experience  shaped  the  decision  to  commence  doctoral  research  on  
post-­‐‑war  reconstruction  and  HE  in  Iraq  at  the  University  of  York  in  October  2010.    
  
Between  June  2010  and  February  2011  involvement  as  an  assistant  in  an  SRF/PRDU  
project  aimed  at  gearing  the  research  of  displaced  Iraqi  scholars  towards  rebuilding  
Iraqi   HE   enabled   further   in-­‐‑depth   knowledge   of   the   topic   based   on   contact   with  
Iraqi   academics,   reading   and   editing   of   draft   papers,   and   conduct   of   the   initial  
stages   of   PhD   research.   Furthermore,   this   experience   constitutes   participant  
observation  in  a  programme  designed  to  build  research  capacity  of  Iraqi  scholars  on  
the   rationale   that   upon   their   return   they   would   have   major   impact   on   Iraqi   HE  
through  the  relevance  and  quality  of  their  research.    
  
The   above-­‐‑mentioned   project   culminated   in   a   conference   in   Amman,   Jordan   in  
January  2011  jointly  organised  by  the  Institute  of  International  Education  (IIE),  SRF  
and   PRDU.   In   attendance   were  many   Iraqi   university   Presidents,   representatives  
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from  the  US  Department  of  State,  IIE,  and  over  100  Iraqi  academics.  The  conference  
was   an   important   learning   tool   because   papers   on   Iraqi   HE   stimulated   heated  
debate   and   myriad   perspectives   and   arguments   were   expressed.   The   SRF  
programme   provided   opportunities   for   observation,   informal   discussions,  
secondary   document   analysis,   formal   interviews,   and   gaining   contacts   for   future  
interviews.    
  
In  December  2010  during  a  three-­‐‑week  field  visit  to  Amman,  Jordan  interviews  with  
Iraqi   academics   were   conducted.   Furthermore,   a   conference   on   rebuilding   Basra  
was  attended.  This  was  followed  by  a  four  week  field-­‐‑visit  in  Amman  in  early  2011  
with  over  twenty  interviews  conducted  with  Iraqi  academics  including  former  and  
incumbent  university  Presidents.  After  fieldwork  a  number  of  follow-­‐‑up  interviews  
were   conducted   from   the   UK   either   via   email   or   in   person   with   interviewees  
considered   important   to   the   study   including   former   Ministers,   university  
Presidents,  and  academics.    
  
Problems  of  access  were  encountered  during  fieldwork.  Due  to  security  obstacles  a  
planned   fieldwork  phase   in  Baghdad   and  Basra  was   cancelled   at   a   late   stage   and  
was  unable  to  take  place.  Therefore  the  research  attempts  to  study  Iraq  while  unable  
to   travel   there   to   conduct   primary   research;   a   problem   reflected   upon   by  
contributors   to   Iraq   at   a  Distance:  What  Anthropologists  Can  Teach  Us  About   the  War  
(Robben  2009)  which  documents   innovative  measures  adopted  to  gain   insight  and  
understanding  of  Iraq  without  access.    
  
This   initial   phase   of   primary   research   was   used   to   generate   findings   about   Iraqi  
HE’s  history,  deterioration,  and  reconstruction.  With  little  research  into  post-­‐‑conflict  
HE   and  no   theoretical   frameworks   for   understanding   the   subject   at   a   global-­‐‑level  
this   fortuitous   sequencing   of   research   proved   well   suited.   Conducting   primary  
research  in  the  early  stage  enabled  a  broad  picture  of  Iraqi  HE  to  emerge  from  data.  
This   inductive   approach   led   to   generation   of   categories   for   analysing   conflict  
impacts   and   reconstruction   efforts.  Although   based   on   preliminary   findings   from  
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one   pilot   case-­‐‑study,   these   categories   and   insights   were   useful   in   providing   a  
heuristic   tool   for   analysing   disparate   data   sources   on   post-­‐‑conflict   HE’s   global  
context.    
  
For   interviews   with   Iraqi   academics   sampling   combined   purposive   and  
snowballing  methods.  Access  was   facilitated  by   involvement  with   the  SRF  project  
and  initial  interviews  were  arranged  based  on  contacts  made  during  this  time.  The  
purposive   sample   frame   was   based   on   perceived   usefulness   to   the   study,   for  
example,   more   senior   figures   such   as   ex-­‐‑Deans   or   those   that   made   convincing  
points   during   workshops   on   Iraqi   HE.   This   non-­‐‑probabilistic   sample   method  
introduces  bias  unavoidably  and  is  antithetical  to  random  sampling.      
  
While   the   SRF   can   be   considered   a   gate-­‐‑keeper   in   regulating   access   to   the   SRF  
participants,  due  to  the  fact  that  Iraqis  in  Jordan  are  a  dispersed  hidden  population  
the  issue  of  a  single  gatekeeper  decisively  influencing  access  to  an  entire  population  
and   introducing   forms   of   bias   was   not   a   dynamic   affecting   fieldwork.   However,  
beyond   SRF   scholars,   Iraqi   academics   living   in   Jordan   were   not   easy   to   identify  
during   fieldwork.   Interviewees   were   therefore   asked   to   suggest   potential  
participants.    
  
An   issue   in   the   Iraq  case   is   that  participants  were   interviewed  outside  of   Iraq  and  
most  were   no   longer   permanent   residents   of   Iraq.   It  may   be   held   that   the   special  
category   of   displaced   Iraqi   academics   is   not   representative   of   the   views   of   most  
Iraqi   academics   that   remain   working   and   living   in   their   country.   One   factor  
mitigating   this   problem   is   that   the   overwhelming   majority   of   displaced   Iraqi  
academics  left  during  2006-­‐‑2008  and  were  present   in  Iraq  in  the  most  critical  post-­‐‑
conflict   phase.   Further,   triangulation   of   reports   and   facts  with   other   data   sources  






4.5.5. Libya  Case  Study  
  
A   pre-­‐‑study   of   Libyan  HE  was   conducted   in   the  UK   between   February   and   June  
2012,  consisting  of  over  20  interviews  and  two  focus  groups  with  Libyan  UK-­‐‑based  
postgraduate  students  and  academics  plus  desk-­‐‑based  research.  It  assessed  pre-­‐‑war  
Libyan   HE’s   historical   trajectory,   developmental   role,   and   strengths   and  
weaknesses.  Furthermore,  this  phase  enabled  refinement  of  interview  strategies  and  
questions  to  be  employed  during  fieldwork.    
  
Participants   were   asked   for   advice   on   conducting   research   in   Libya.   Many  
postgraduate  students  interviewed  were  completing  studies  on  Libya  and  therefore  
could   provide   unique   insights.   The   most   common   advice   offered   was   that  
introductions   or   contacts   would   be   important   to   gaining   access   and   trust   of  
potential  participants.  Several  interviewees  stressed  that  Libya  is  a  relatively  closed  
society  and  suspicious  of  outsiders.  However,  five  postgraduate  students  stated  that  
there  are  no  obstacles  to  conducting  research  and  that  people  would  be  very  willing  
to  participate.    
  
From   the   12th   October   until   the   7th   December   2012   fieldwork   was   conducted   in  
Libya.  One  month  was   spent   in  Tripoli   and  visits  were  made   to  Baida,   Benghazi,  
Zawiya,  Misrata,  and  Gharyan.  Interviews  with  academics  and  policy-­‐‑makers  were  
the   primary   data-­‐‑collection   method   although   observation,   focus   groups,   and  
document  analysis  were  also  conducted.    
  
Observation   is   a   simple   and   unintrusive   research   method   appropriate   in   post-­‐‑
conflict   settings   (Barakat   &   Ellis   1996).   An   advantage   of   the   method   is   that   in  
conflict-­‐‑affected  environments  which  are  highly  politicised  collecting  basic  facts  and  
impressions   from   observation   can   assist   the   researcher   in   being   seen   as   a   non-­‐‑
threatening   presence   and   therefore   eases   access   to   research   settings   and  
participants.   Taking   field   notes   on   campuses,   observing   behaviour   in   natural  
settings,  taking  photos,  and  conducting  informal  conversations  were  utilised.  After  
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visiting  HEIs   field-­‐‑notes   and  observations  were  written-­‐‑up   to   collate   impressions,  
ideas,  and  facts  gathered.    
  
Elite   interviews   were   conducted   with   MoHE-­‐‑L   officials,   Economic   Development  
Board   (EDB)  officials,   former  Ministers,  university  Presidents  and  Vice-­‐‑Presidents,  
Deans  of  Faculty,  Heads  of  Department,  and  other  senior  academics.  Also,  non-­‐‑elite  
interviews   were   conducted   with   students,   administrators,   and   junior   academics.  
Furthermore,  three  focus  groups  were  conducted;  one  with  senior  faculty  members  
and   two   with   students.   Focus   groups   were   semi-­‐‑structured   and   in   part   used   to  
cross-­‐‑check   facts,   interpretations,   and   working   conclusions   in   a   group   situation.  
Lastly,   group   conversations   with   students   at   various   universities,   while   not  
classified  as  formal  focus  groups,  addressed  broadly  similar  issues  and  were  useful  
in  gaining  in-­‐‑depth  understanding  of  student  perspectives.  
  
Interview  and  focus  group  data  in  the  vast  majority  of  instances  was  audio  recorded  
and   transcribed   afterwards.   In   a   small   number   of   cases   participants   requested  
handwritten   notes   rather   than   audio.   Audio   recordings   have   the   advantage   of  
capturing  nearly  all  verbal  communication,  however,  they  may  inhibit  responses,  in  
particular  in  a  Libyan  context  where  recording  may  be  associated  with  intelligence  
services   or   Mukhabarat   and   therefore   mistrusted.   To   mitigate   this   problem  
assurances  were  made  to  participants  over  usage  of  audio  recordings.  It  should  be  
noted   that   several   participants   requested   that   recording   cease   for   a   short   period  
while   they   stated   points   they   deemed   sensitive.   Furthermore,   in   several   cases   a  
translator   was   employed,   a   Libyan   male   in   his   mid-­‐‑20s,   and   hand-­‐‑written   notes  
taken.   This   raises   issues   of   translator   bias   including   interviewees’   trust   of   the  
translator   and  mediation  of   interview  data   through   the   interpretive   agency  of   the  
translator.    
  
Purposive  and  snowballing  sampling  was  used  to  guide  the  arranging  of  interviews  
with   Libyan   academics.   The   intention   was   to   access   high-­‐‑level   academics   and  
administrators   in  strategic  positions;   interviews  with  senior   faculty  members  were  
173	  
	  
prioritised   over   interviews  with   junior   faculty  members.   Due   to   gatekeepers   and  
mistrust   snowball   sampling   was   necessary   to   secure   many   interviews.   In   some  
cases   interviewees   were   identified   through   online   information   or   by   contacting  
university  officials.   In  other  cases   two  Libyan  personal   contacts  were  very  helpful  
securing  introductions  to  academics  and  Ministry  staff.  Snowballing  was  pursued  to  
identify   colleagues   of   interviewees   that   possessed   significant   expertise.  
Furthermore,  pre-­‐‑study  participants,  many  of  whom  remained  in  the  UK  pursuing  
postgraduate  studies,  facilitated  interviews  with  their  colleagues  in  Libya.    
  
Given   that   access   to   parts   of   Libya   was   constrained   during   fieldwork   several  
practical   and   methodological   difficulties   emerged   requiring   creative   responses.  
Access   to   Bani  Walid  was   impossible   due   to   the  military   campaign   there   during  
fieldwork   in   late   2012,   access   to   Sabha  was   limited   by   insecurity,  while   access   to  
Benghazi  was  problematic  following  the  recent  killing  of  Ambassador  Stevens  and  
exit  of  foreigners  from  the  city.    
  
Moreover,   in   Benghazi   the   researcher   experienced   intense   suspicion   from   many  
potential  participants  as  an  outsider   in  a  context   in  which  fears  of  espionage  were  
rife  following  the  August  2012  US  embassy  attack.  This  accords  with  Sluka’s  (1995,  
p.283)  finding  that  the  most  common  misperception  of  anthropologists  in  the  field,  
in   particular   in   dangerous   settings,   is   that   they   are   spies.   While   this   was   most  
pronounced   in  Benghazi,   similar   suspicion  and  mistrust  was  experienced   in  other  
cities   due   to   long   legacies   of   repressive   rule   under   Qaddafi   and   the   general  
problematic   of   suspicion   reported   by   scholars   of   Middle   Eastern   studies   in  
conducting  fieldwork  (Clark  2006).  Moreover,  as  Belousov  et  al   (2007)  argue,  even  
seemingly  uncontroversial   topics  can  become  sensitive   in   ‘crisis-­‐‑ridden’  situations;  







4.6.  Strategic  Issues  in  Data  Analysis  
  
As  noted,  the  first  stage  was  a  ‘soaking  and  poking’  (George  &  Bennett  2005,  p.89)  
desk-­‐‑based   review   and   in   the   case   of   Libya   a   pre-­‐‑study   consisting   of   interviews.  
Data  gathered  for  case-­‐‑studies  during  fieldwork  was  then  analysed  through  coding  
of   emergent   categories,   themes,   and   patterns.   Based   on   these,   a   chronological  
narrative   was   constructed   that   provides   a   broad   overview   of   key   facts,   events,  
dynamics,  and  processes.  Due  to  Iraq  being  seven  years  and  Libya  one  year  into  the  
‘post’-­‐‑conflict   phase  during   fieldwork   the   length   of   the   chronological   narrative   in  
each  case-­‐‑study  varies.  The  research  framework,  derived  from  the  literature  review,  
was   applied   to   case-­‐‑studies   to   ‘frame’   issues,   guide   data   collection,   and   structure  
interpretation  and  analysis  of  data.  However,  the  framework  did  not  determine  the  
final   structure   of   case-­‐‑studies;   rather,   emergent   themes   from   data   analysis   led   to  
adaptations  of  several  categories,  themes,  and  factors.    
  
Triangulation  is  defined  by  Gerring  (2007,  p.218)  as  ‘use  of  multiple  methods,  often  
at  different  levels  of  analysis’.  It  is  a  common  feature  of  social  research,  in  particular  
in   a   post-­‐‑positivist   paradigm,   which   views   a   phenomenon   from   two   or   more  
perspectives,  and  aims  at  enhancing  the  validity,  reliability,  and  generalisability  of  
findings  (McNabb  2004,  p.366;  Tracy  2013,  p.40).  This  process  of  cross-­‐‑checking  data  
from  multiple  sources  and  types  of  source  is  a  principal  means  of  strengthening  the  
data-­‐‑collection  process   and  multiple  data   sources  were   sought  wherever  possible.  
Interviews   are   the   primary   data   source   while   published   primary   sources   and  
secondary  literature  are  employed  to  strengthen  or  weaken  interpretations  of  facts,  
events,   and   ideas.   Furthermore,   conferences   and   workshops   provided   valuable  
opportunities   to   hear   many   diverse   perspectives   while   news   monitoring   also  
informed  the  study.  
  
King,  Keohane  and  Verba  (1994)  hold  that  gathering  systematically  comparable  data  
is  a  prerequisite  of  valid  social   science   inference  based  on  comparative  qualitative  
case-­‐‑studies.  George  and  Bennett  (2005,  p.67)  stipulate  that  a  method  of  ‘structured,  
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focused  comparison’  entails  that  general  questions  reflecting  research  objectives  are  
asked   of   particular   aspects   of   the   historical   cases   under   investigation   to   ensure  
cross-­‐‑case   standardisation  and  comparability.   It  must  be  qualified   that   the   type  of  
data  collected  in  the  two  case-­‐‑studies  varies   in  some  respects.  First,   fieldwork  was  
conducted   in   Libya   for   the   Libya   case-­‐‑study   and   primarily   in   Jordan   for   the   Iraq  
case-­‐‑study.   The   dislocation   of   the   Iraq   fieldwork   entails   several   interpretive  
dilemmas;   the   inability   of   the   researcher   to   observe   Iraqi   HEIs   directly   and   the  
spatial  distance  of  participants  from  the  system  they  are  reflecting  upon.    
  
Another   difference   is   temporal;   as   Iraq  was   seven   years   into   the   post-­‐‑war   period  
and   Libya   one   year   data   on   Iraq   includes   much   more   published   primary   and  
secondary  sources.12  Furthermore,  Iraq  interview  data  contains  more  evaluations  of  
success  or  failure  in  HE  recovery  and  its  contribution  to  reconstruction.  Given  that  
HE  sectors  are   large  and  complex   institutions   requiring   time   for   reforms,   changes  
and   many   types   of   outcome,   the   short   time   since   the   end   of   the   Libyan   war  
rendered   many   evaluations   of   outcomes   premature.   Notwithstanding   these  
limitations,   HE’s   contribution   to   Libyan   recovery   is   evaluated   and   assessed   in  
various  dimensions,  for  example,  in  short-­‐‑term  conflict  prevention  and  stabilisation.  
Rather,  much  data  gathered  on  Libya  analyses  various  perspectives  of  Libyan  actors  
on   HE’s   potential   to   support   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   and   forces   shaping   the   post-­‐‑
conflict   environment.   This   approach   partly   resembles   Tilly   and   Goodin’s   (2006)  
definition   of   a   propensity   account;   an   ‘explanation   to   consist   of   reconstructing   a  
given  actor’s  state  at  the  threshold  of  action,  with  that  state  variously  stipulated  as  
motivation,  consciousness,  need,  organization,  or  momentum’.  The  case-­‐‑study  thus  
includes  an  investigation  of  Libyan  HE’s  propensity  to  contribute  to  recovery.      
  
Generalisability   of   findings   is   a   fundamental   issue.   In   research   design,   case-­‐‑
selection   influences   the   scope  of  generalisation  and  selection  was  guided  partially  
by  the  rationale  of  extending  generalisability.  It  should  be  qualified  that  neither  Iraq  
nor  Libya  are   ‘typical’  post-­‐‑conflict  cases   in  all   respects  and  it  may  be  argued  that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  See	  the	  introductions	  to	  chapters	  six	  and	  eight	  for	  brief	  discussions	  of	  the	  use	  of	  sources	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selection   of   other   more   ‘typical’   poor   and   fragile   reconstruction   contexts,   for  
example,   Liberia   or   Afghanistan,   would   have   increased   the   generalisability   of  
findings   to   the   universe   of   post-­‐‑conflict   cases.   However,   as   Berdal   (2009)   argues,  
while  Iraq  may  seem  an  outlier  case  incomparable  to  other  post-­‐‑conflict  settings  it  in  
fact   exhibits   extreme   versions   of   typical   dynamics   shaping   post-­‐‑conflict  
environments.   It   should   be   recognised   that   Iraq   and   Libya   share   significant  
similarities   with   other   post-­‐‑conflict   cases   plus   idiosyncratic   and   particularistic  
features.   Furthermore,   the   ‘most-­‐‑similar’   and   ‘most-­‐‑likely’/’least-­‐‑likely’   research  
design   strengthens   generalisability   by   controlling   for   key   variables   to   the   extent  
possible.    
  
Various  forms  of  bias  can  interfere  with  the  research  process  and  distort  the  validity  
and   significance   of   findings,   for   example,   gender,   spatial,   age,   or   status   bias.   To  
mitigate   forms   of   bias   several   measures   were   taken.   Furthermore,   it   is  
acknowledged   that   it   was   impossible   to   eliminate   all   influence   of   bias   from   the  
research   process.   For   example,   in   both   case-­‐‑studies   the   proportion   of   male  
participants  is  much  larger  than  female  participants;  this  reflects  the  larger  number  
of  male   academics   in   the   Iraqi   and   Libyan  HE   systems,   in   particular   in   top-­‐‑level  
positions  that  the  sample  selection  focused  on.  In  Libya,  where  no  female  managers  
at  the  MoHE  and  very  few  Deans  of  Heads  of  Department  were  interviewed,  effort  
was   made   to   interview   other   female   academics   and   students   which   partially  
mitigated  this  gender  bias.  Cognisant  of  this,  a  reflexive  approach  was  necessary  to  
identify   sources  of   bias   and  accommodate   their   significance  while   analysing  data.  
Moreover,  reflexivity  enables  researchers  to  mitigate  bias  related  to  the  position  of  




Adherence  to  ethical  rules  is  a  defining  characteristic  of  social  research  in  academic  
settings.   In   line   with   disciplinary   ethical   procedures,   the   fieldwork   plans   were  
reviewed  by  a  supra-­‐‑departmental  ethics  board.  Full  disclosure  about  the  research,  
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the   interview   process,   use   and   protection   of   data,   the   ability   to   withdraw   from  
interview   at   any  point,   and   the   option   of   a   guarantee   of   anonymity  was   given   to  
participants  verbally  prior  to  interviews.    
  
At  a  minimum,  the  ethical  principle  of  ‘do  no  harm’  should  constrain  social  research  
involving   human   subjects   in   conflict   and   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   (Goodhand   2000;  
Wood   2006).   Many   Iraqi   participants   displaced   in   Jordan   were   subjected   to  
harassment,   death-­‐‑threats,   or   attempts   on   their   life.   Others   witnessed   traumatic  
events   including   the   murder   of   colleagues.   Kubaisy   and   Kubaisy   (2011)   estimate  
that   85%   of   displaced   Iraqi   academics   suffer   from   PTSD   of   various   levels   of  
intensity.   Zwi   et   al   (2006)   explain   that   in   conducting   research   with   participants  
affected   by   violence   there   is   danger   of   ‘re-­‐‑traumatization’.   As   Goodhand   (2000)  
writes,  in  conflict-­‐‑affected  contexts  ‘researchers  may  inadvertently  re-­‐‑open  wounds  
by  probing   into  areas   respondents  may  not  wish   to   talk  about’.  While   conducting  
interviews   signs  of  distress  or  adverse  emotional   reaction  were  monitored.   In  one  
case,  a   former  Dean  and  Professor  while  recounting  his  university’s  destruction   in  
2003   was   visibly   upset.   When   asked   whether   to   continue   he   responded   yes   and  
stated  that  he  wanted  the  world  to  know  the  truth  about  Iraqi  academia.    
  
Anonymity   and   data   protection   were   crucial   ethical   issues.   Iraqi   academics   have  
been   victims   of  widespread   violence.   One   Iraqi   academic   displaced   in   Jordan   for  
several  years  was  assassinated   in  2011  while  en  route   from  Baghdad  International  
Airport  to  his  family  home  in  Baghdad  indicating  that  his  attackers  were  aware  of  
his   movements.   This   illustrates   the   fear   which   many   participants   continued   to  
experience   outside   of   Iraq  years   after   leaving.  Understandably,  many  participants  
were   adamant   that   their   names   were   not   revealed,   in   particular,   where   sensitive  
topics   including   sectarian   and   ethnic   politics   were   addressed.   In   these   cases  
anonymity   has   been   granted.   In   a   small   number   of   cases   anonymity   was   not  
requested.   In   Libya   the   converse   holds;   most   participants   did   not   request  




Beyond   ‘do  no  harm’,   an   ethical  obligation  on   researchers   to   in   some  way  benefit  
participants   or   the   wider   population   of   the   group,   community,   or   society   under  
study  can  be  claimed,  or  to  ‘do  some  good’  (Goodhand  2000).  This  can  take  the  form  
of  providing  resources  and  sharing  research   findings  with  participants.  Moreover,  
in  particular  while  conducting  fieldwork  on  Iraqi  HE,  some  academics  viewed  the  
interview   as   an   opportunity   to   redress   perceived   silence   on   the   crisis   of   Iraqi  
academia.   This   raises   the   further   dilemma   of   raising   expectations   among  





This   chapter   has   provided   an   overview   of   the   research   design,   data-­‐‑collection  
techniques,   and  methodological   challenges  of   this   thesis.   It  has  been   seen   that   the  
research   adopts   a  multi-­‐‑method   ‘composite   approach’   that   nonetheless   prioritises  
qualitative  data-­‐‑collection  methods,  in  particular  interviews.  A  multiple  case-­‐‑study  
research   design   is   employed   with   a   ‘most-­‐‑similar’   strategy   for   case   selection  
identifying   Iraq   as   a   difficult   test   of   the   central   hypothesis   and   Libya   as   a   ‘most-­‐‑
likely’   case.   Data   collection   was   then   described   introducing   techniques   and  
processes  utilised,  problems  encountered,  and  their  mitigation.  Next,  data  analysis  
was   discussed   through   various   core   strategic   issues   including   validity,  
triangulation,   sampling,   generalisability,   and   bias.   Finally,   practical   and   ethical  
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The  purpose  of   this  chapter   is   to  analyse  contextual   themes   important   to   the  case-­‐‑
study   of   Iraq.   Analysis   focuses   on   three   key   points   of   contextualisation;   the  
developmental   contribution   of   Iraqi   HE,   post-­‐‑war   reconstruction,   and   conflict’s  
impact  on  Iraqi  HE.  To  start  with,  Iraqi  HE’s  role  in  development  will  be  analysed.  
After  that,  impacts  of  the  Iran-­‐‑Iraq  war,  Gulf  War,  and  sanctions  on  Iraqi  HE  will  be  
addressed.   Next,   the   2003   invasion   and   immediate   post-­‐‑invasion   environment   of  
Iraqi   HE   will   be   examined.   This   analysis   beginning   with   the   Iran-­‐‑Iraq   war   and  
ending   with   occupation   contributes   towards   answering   RQ2   on   the   impact   of  
conflict  on  HE.  Furthermore,  tracing  pre-­‐‑2003  Iraqi  HE’s  turbulent  trajectory  is  vital  
to  understanding  post-­‐‑2003  reconstruction,  the  subject  of  chapter  six.    
  
  
5.1.Iraqi  Higher  Education  and  Development  
  
In   this   section   Iraqi  HE  will  be  briefly  described   from  historical   antecedents   to   its  
‘Golden  Age’   in   the   1960s   and   1970s.   This   is   important   to   establish   the   post-­‐‑war  
institutional   inheritance   of   the   Iraqi  HE   system   in   2003.   Furthermore,   the   section  
enables   analysis   in   the   next   chapter   as   to   whether   the   historical   Iraqi   HE  model  
offered  an  appropriate  response  to  post-­‐‑war  challenges  or  rather  that  it  constituted  
a   ‘defective’   model   necessitating   its   replacement   with   a   new   model   constructed  
from  a  ‘blank  slate’.  This  issue  is  also  addressed  in  the  final  section  of  the  chapter,  
where   the   relative   weight   of   internal   and   external   factors   in   causing   Iraqi   HE’s  




5.1.1.   Emergence  and  Expansion  
  
To  begin,   Iraq’s   long   learning  heritage   should  be  noted;  Baghdad  was   an   integral  
centre   for   advanced   learning   and   scholarship   during   the   Islamic   Golden   Age  
(Norton   2011;   Warren   2005).   Baghdad   in   the   eleventh-­‐‑century   boasted   advanced  
learning  centres  including  the  Nizamiya  colleges,  preceding  Western  universities  by  
over   100   years   (Makdisi   1961),   and   Al-­‐‑Mustansiriya,   an   important   institution   in  
development  of  Islamic  thought.    
Modern  HE  however  emerged  in  1908  when  two  colleges,  Theology  and  Law,  were  
established  in  Baghdad  based  on  the  British  model.  Founding  of  new  colleges  was  
largely   driven   by   industrial   and   societal   demands   after   WWII   (Qubain   1966).  
Colleges   remained  small   and  elite;  between   the  Monarchy’s   founding   in  1921  and  
its  overthrow  in  1958  enrolment   increased  from  99  to  8,568  (Batatu  1978,  p.477).  A  
general  consensus  holds  that  academic  standards  were  high  during  this  period.13  
Development   of   secondary   and   HE   pre-­‐‑1958   drove   political   development   by  
catalysing  nationalism  and   civil   associations   (Davis   2005b,  p.73).  Despite   colleges’  
elite   nature,   selection   was   impartial   and   a   broad   demographic   of   students  
enrolled.14   Educational   institutions   and   associations   reached   beyond   sectarian  
divisions,   ‘indicative  of  a  developing  civic  consciousness’  (Davis  2005b,  p.73).  Two  
Iraqi   participants   described   pre-­‐‑1958   HE   as   the   real   ‘Golden   Age’   of   Iraqi   HE  
primarily   because   of   high   academic   standards   and   relatively   strong   academic  
freedoms.      
  
One  year  previous  to  the  1958  coup  the  University  of  Baghdad  was  established,  its  
first   academic   term   starting   in   1958.   It   incorporated   several   existing   colleges   plus  
new  departments  and  faculties  (Al-­‐‑Arif  1986,  p.40).  Enrolment  accelerated  after  the  
1958  coup  from  8,568  to  75,270  in  1975/76  (Batatu  1978,  p.1120).  Initial  HE  expansion  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Based	  on	  numerous	  interviews	  with	  Iraqi	  academics	  
14	  Professor	  Khalid	  Ismael,	  former	  Dean,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	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in   the   1960s   included   three   new   provincial   universities   and   two   universities   in  
Baghdad   (Qubain   1966,   p.220;  UNESCO   2004,   p.78).   Furthermore,   the   scholarship  
programme   expanded   further   with   more   students   sent   to   Western   universities  
(Qubain  1966,  p.283;  Marr  1970).    
    
Table  2.  Expansion  of  Iraq’s  HE  system  from  1960s-­‐‑present  
   Universities   Technical  Institutes  
1960s   5   4  
1970s   1   13  
1980s   9   9  
1990s   2   10  
2000-­‐‑2003   3   3  
2003-­‐‑2010   13   0  
Source:  UNESCO  (2004,  p.78)  
  
From  1968  the  Iraqi  state,  buoyed  by  rising  oil  revenues,  adopted  ambitious  national  
development   plans   to   rapidly   accelerate   industrialisation.   Labour   shortages,  
particularly   skilled   labour,   were   the   most   important   obstacle   to   implementing  
development  plans  (Mehdi  &  Robinson  1983).  To  supply  required  skilled  labour,  in  
particular   science   and   engineering   graduates,   the   state   expanded  universities   and  
established  technical  institutes  transforming  Iraqi  HE  from  a  few  elite  colleges  to  a  
large   diversified   system.   Many   research   centres,   funded   by   rapidly   rising   oil  
revenues,  were  opened.  Tuition,  accommodation,  meals,  and  a  small  stipend  were  
provided  free  (Qubain  1966).  
  
During  this  period  Iraq  was  widely-­‐‑regarded  as  possessing  a  regionally  leading  HE  
system   (Allawi   2007,   p.377).   In   the   1960s   and   1970s   strengths   included   high  
enrolment,   strong   publishing   record,   and   ample   research   funds.   Many   Iraqi  
academics  worked   abroad,   Iraqi   school   and  university   textbooks  were  donated   to  
other   Arab   countries,   and   free   HE  was   offered   to   international   students   with   all  
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receiving  free  tuition,  boarding,  meals,  textbooks,  and  a  small  stipend  (Qubain  1966,  
p.232).15  Many  Iraqi  academics  held  that  a  ‘Golden  Age’  of  HE  existed  in  this  period.  
  
However,   rapid   expansion   was   accompanied   by   declining   academic   standards  
(Khadduri   1969,   p.156;   Qubain   1966,   p.231).16   Problems   included   fewer   facilities,  
higher   student-­‐‑teacher   ratios,   reduced   admissions   standards,   and   less   qualified  
faculty  members.  During   1963-­‐‑1972   49%  of   students   failed  preparatory  BA   exams  
due   to   increased   workload   on   teachers   (Shaw   1981).   While   expansion   lowered  
general   academic   standards,   engineering,   scientific   and  medical   fields  maintained  
high   standards;   an   OCHA   report   states   that   ‘higher   education,   especially   the  
scientific   and   technological   institutions  were   of   international   standard,   staffed   by  
high  quality  personnel’  (De  Santisteban  2005).    
  
Didactic   pedagogy   and   weak   academic   freedom   are   held   to   have   limited   HE’s  
developmental  role.  Describing  1940s   teaching,  Batatu  (1978,  p.481)   identifies  rote-­‐‑
learning  and  memorization  as  constraining  students’   intellectual  development.  He  
explains   this   through  government   fear   that   ‘to   think  meant   to   raise  questions   that  
would  have  involved,  sooner  or  later,  probing  into  the  foundations  of  society  and  a  
rejection  of  much  of  what  existed’.  Roy  (1993)  reports  differentiation  in  freedom  of  
expression;   in   traditional   scientific   disciplines   creativity   was   permitted   while   in  
humanities  and  social  sciences  free  inquiry  and  questioning  of  knowledge  were  not  
tolerated.    
  
5.1.2.   Economic  development  
  
As  noted  above,  HE  emerged  due  to  ‘need  for  specialized  manpower’  (Qubain  1966,  
p.220)  during  rapid  industrialisation  and  modernisation.  HE  was  expected  to  align  
with   national   development   priorities   and   plans.   Universities   conducted   R&D   in  
support   of   Import   Substitution   Industrialisation   (ISI)   (Harb   2008),   offered  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Based	  on	  interviews	  with	  Iraqi	  academics	  
16	  This	  finding	  was	  confirmed	  by	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  Iraqi	  academic	  participants	  during	  interviews	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consulting  services  to  firms  through  university  contracting  offices,  tailored  curricula  
to   fulfil   market   needs,   and   expanded   greatly   to   provide   a   skilled   workforce.  
Cooperative   research   projects   between   universities   and   Iraqi   firms   led   to  
development  of  70  new  medicines  not  previously  produced  domestically   (Arsalan  
2003).   Universities   competed   to   state   their   contribution   towards   industry   and  
R&D.17    
  
While   not   all   universities   approximated   this  model,   the  University   of   Technology  
(UOT),  established  in  1976,  illustrates  HE-­‐‑industry  integration.  Curricular  structure  
was   designed   to   maximise   supply   of   technicians   and   engineers,   students   had  
mandatory   industrial   placements,   course   content   was   determined   by   industrial  
needs,  and  university  and  industry  maintained  reciprocal  representation  on  Boards  
of  governance  while  there  was  joint  cooperation  over  student  supervision,  research  
projects,  consultancy,  and  evaluations  (Al-­‐‑Naimi  &  Al-­‐‑Nassri  1981).  The  University  
of   Technology   was   followed   by   establishment   of   technical   institutes   providing  
specialised  scientific  and  engineering  skills.  
  
HE-­‐‑industry   linkages  were   state-­‐‑coordinated;   a   common   feature   of   academic   and  
technological   advancement   in   developing   nations   (Schiller   &   Liefner   2007).   The  
Council   for   Scientific   Research   (CSR)   was   established   to   deepen   HE-­‐‑industry  
linkages,   promoting   scientific   and   medical   research   with   direct   industrial  
application.   The   CSR   was   dissolved   in   1986   (Duelfer   Report   2005),   or   1989  
according   to   Bishay   (2003).   Iraq’s   national   agricultural   system   possessed   strong  
institutional   inter-­‐‑relationships   and   complementarities   across   research   bodies   and  
universities.  After   the  CSR  was  disbanded  withdrawal  of   its  coordinative   function  
negatively   affected   linkages   between   research   bodies   and  universities   and   eroded  
national   agricultural   research   capacity   (Bishay  2003).  This   illustrates   the   centrality  
of  state  coordination   to  successfully   fostering   institutional   linkages;  an  example  of  
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the   ‘etatist   model’   of   university-­‐‑industry-­‐‑government   relations   (Etzkowitz   &  
Leydesdorff  2000).    
  
Despite  success   in  some  areas  HE  and  industry  were  far  from  perfectly  calibrated.  
Labour  market   supply   and  demand  were  unaligned   in   the  mid-­‐‑1970s   as   the   Iraqi  
state   pledged   in   1974   to   absorb   unemployed   graduates   into   government   jobs  
(Batatu  1978,  p.1123).  However,  overall,  HE-­‐‑industry  integration  was  an  important  
driver   of   Iraq’s   economic   growth   and   developmental   gains   (Vongalis-­‐‑Macrow  
2006).   State   intervention   coordinated  activity   and   intensified   institutional   linkages  
and   cooperation.   While   not   approximating   the   developmental   university   system  
model   identified   in   chapter   one   the   Iraqi   system   exhibited   some   of   the   model’s  
characteristics  in  integration  with  industry.    
  
5.1.3. Political  Development  and  Politicisation  
  
HE   has   made   important   contributions   to   Iraq’s   political   development.   HE  
expansion  was   a   tool   of  mass  mobilisation   and   nation-­‐‑building.   For   example,   the  
policy  adopted  in  the  1970s  of  establishing  one  university  in  each  governorate  was  
intended   to   achieve  national   integration   (UNESCO  2004,   p.77).  However,   by   2003  
there  were  considerable  regional  inequities  in  HE  access;  students  per  100,000  of  the  
population   varied   considerably   between   regions   with   1,400   in   ‘south   and   central  
regions’  and  670  in  the  ‘north’  (UN/World  Bank  2003).    
However,   despite   these   gains,   it   has   been   frequently   held   that   HE   became  
increasingly  ‘politicised’  under  the  Baath  regime.  To  assess  this  claim  it  is  necessary  
to  first  consider  HE  and  politics  in  pre-­‐‑Saddam  Iraq.  Iraqi  HE  has  long  been  affected  
by   turbulent   national   and   regional   politics.   Before   1958   under   a   nationalist  
movement   with   ‘strong   democratic   impulses’   and   which   ‘emphasised   cultural  
tolerance’   (Davis   2005a)   Iraq   possessed   strong   academic   freedom   regionally.  
Campuses   were   however   not   apolitical;   resistance   to   the   monarchy   was  
concentrated   in   HE.   Batatu   (1978,   p.645)   writes   that   in   the   1940s   ‘colleges   in  
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Baghdad   had   more   the   character   of   revolutionary   beehives   than   of   educational  
institutions’.    
  
During   1958-­‐‑1968   Iraqi   politics   was   marked   by   fear   and   suspicion   of   coups   and  
counter-­‐‑coups;   a   context   influencing   HE.   After   the   1958   coup,   HE   became  
increasingly   politicised   as   the   new   revolutionary   regime   permitted   political  
activities   leading   to   ideological   conflict   playing  out   on   campuses   (Khadduri   1969,  
p.156).   After   the   1963   ‘Ramadan   Revolution’   HE   was   heavily   affected   compared  
with   other   institutions.   Many   students   and   staff   were   arrested   due   to   the   many  
communist   cells   in   HEIs   (Khadduri   1969,   p.200).   Another   major   purge   of  
Communist   faculty  members  by  the  Ba’ath  Party  occurred   in  1968.   It   is  clear   from  
this  brief  discussion  that  HE  ‘politicisation’  pre-­‐‑dates  the  Baath  Party  and  Saddam  
Hussein.    
  
However,  it  is  often  argued  that  under  the  Baath  Party  ‘politicisation’  intensified.  It  
is  held  that  after  the  second  Baath  coup  in  1968  the  education  system,  at  all   levels,  
was  utilised  as  an  apparatus  for  mobilising  support  for  Ba’athist  ideology  (Slugett  &  
Farouk-­‐‑Slugett  1978).  National  and  Socialist  Culture  was  a  compulsory  course  and  
new  university  textbooks  were  introduced  to  propagate  official  state  interpretations  
of   the   past   (Davis   2005b).   In   addition,   some   colleges   were   restricted   to   party  
members.  
  
In   1979   Saddam   consolidated   power   around   himself   marking   transition   from  
authoritarian   to   totalitarian   rule   (Stansfield   2007,   p.96).   This   is   commonly   held   to  
constitute  a  critical  turning-­‐‑point  in  HE.  For  example,  Harb  (2008)  writes  that  post-­‐‑
1979   universities   ‘gradually   lost   their   intellectual   dynamism   and   became  
increasingly  politicized  in  the  service  of  the  new  regime’.  Al-­‐‑Khafaji  and  Darweesh  
(cited   in  Watenpaugh  et   al   2003)   argue   that   after   1979   the   situation  became   ‘truly  
unbearable’   with   universities   losing   control   over   appointments.   Appointments,  
career  advancement,  scholarships,  and  admissions  are  held  to  have  been  influenced  
more   by   political   loyalty   than   academic   merit.   Furthermore,   Mohamed-­‐‑Marzouk  
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(2012)  argues  that  a  ‘culture  of  silence’  was  implemented  through  recruiting  faculty  
members  and  students  to  collect  intelligence  on  classmates  and  colleagues.    
  
However,   many   Iraqi   academics   interviewed   refute   this   characterisation   holding  
that   HE   remained   largely   meritocratic   with   assessment   according   to   marks,  
interview  performance,  and  selection  committee  discussion  albeit  with  instances  of  
particularistic   appointment   and   admissions.   They   point   out   that   some  Deans   and  
Presidents  were  not  Baath  Party  members  and  that  career  advancement  was  aided  
by   but   not   dependent   upon   party   loyalty.   For   instance,   a   former   MoHE-­‐‑I  
scholarship   committee   member   explained   that   ‘we   never   prevented   non-­‐‑Baathist  
students  if  they  got  the  right  marks.  However,  we  would  help  some  Baathists  to  join  
by   lowering   requirements’.18   Furthermore,  Munthe   (2003b)  maintains   that   quality  
was  maintained  because  academics   ‘were  so  adept  at  resisting  the  politicisation  of  
their  subjects’,  at  least  until  post-­‐‑Gulf  War  sanctions.  
  
In   conclusion,   politicisation   has   been   present   throughout   Iraq’s   post-­‐‑colonial  
history,  and  did  not  begin  with  the  Baath  coup  or  Saddam’s  leadership.  While  this  
provides   a   more   balanced   assessment   than   many   accounts   it   has   been   seen   that  
politicisation  deepened  under  Saddam’s  rule.  However,   it  should  be  qualified  that  
Saddam   assumed   power   one   year   prior   to   the   Iran-­‐‑Iraq   war   and   governed   in  
perpetual   crisis  until  2003  which  could  have  placed  additional  burdens  on  regime  
security   thus   explaining   greater   instrumentalisation   of   Iraq’s   considerable   HE  
capacity.  Politicisation  may   therefore  be   considered  a  distortion  brought   about  by  
war,  which  is  the  subject  of  the  next  section.    
  
5.2.Impact  of  War  and  Sanctions  on  Iraqi  Higher  Education  
  
In  the  previous  section  it  was  seen  that  politicisation  and  expansion  are  commonly  
identified  as  factors  that   initiated  a  decline   in  Iraqi  HE  standards.  As  will  be  seen,  
two  wars  and  sanctions  were  major  factors  that  deepened  erosion  with  long-­‐‑lasting  
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negative  consequences.  This  historical  consideration  is  particularly  relevant  to  RQ2  
and  the  next  chapter  on  post-­‐‑war  HE  because  it  addresses  issues  of  conflict’s  impact  
on  HE  and  efforts  at  rebuilding  after  the  Iran-­‐‑Iraq  and  Gulf  wars.    
  
5.2.1. Iran-­‐‑Iraq  war  
  
The   1980-­‐‑1988   Iran-­‐‑Iraq  war  was   the   longest   twentieth-­‐‑century  war   and   costly   in  
human  lives  with  an  estimated  100,000-­‐‑250,000  Iraqis  killed  (Stansfield  2007,  p.119;  
Tripp  2008,  p.239).  By  1983  the  conflict  was  largely  a  ‘war  of  attrition’  fought  along  
the  lengthy  Iran-­‐‑Iraq  border  with  major  impacts  on  nearby  infrastructure  and  wide  
regional   repercussions   (Potter   &   Sick   2004).   Few   HEIs   were   directly   affected   by  
fighting.  However,  with   its  main   campus   located   on   the   left/east   of   the   Shatt  Al-­‐‑
Arab  waterway  or   the   “wrong   side”,   the  University  of  Basra  was  on   the   frontline  
and  repeatedly  shelled  by  Iranian  artillery  causing  damage  to  facilities  and  deaths  
of  approximately  ten  students  and  three  faculty  members.19    
Physical   damage  was  minimal   compared   to  war’s   impact   on   daily   life.20   By   1986  
Basra   University  was   highly  militarised   and   students  wore  military   uniform   and  
carried  guns  to  classes  which  continued  whilst  being  bombarded  (Al-­‐‑Derzi  2011).  In  
one   college   staff   and   students   erected   a   protective   wall   by   filling   iron   bookcases  
with   sand   around   the   college   perimeter   to   withstand   shelling   which   occurred  
periodically  while  classes  were  ongoing.21    
However,   aside   from  Basra  University   the   impact   on  HE   nationwide  was   largely  
indirect.  Under  war-­‐‑time  political  pressures   the  state   further  encroached  upon  HE  
autonomy,   particularly   in   control   of   curriculum   content   (Roy   1993).   Further,   HE  
was  partially  militarised  with  academics  pressed   to  either   join   the  Ba’ath  Party  or  
the  Popular  Army.  Travel   for   faculty  members  became  restricted  severely   limiting  
international   conference   attendance,   academic   exchange   opportunities,   and  
sabbaticals   (Harb   2008;   Watenpaugh   2004).   Overseas   scholarships   decreased  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





substantially   with   resources   re-­‐‑directed   towards   building   domestic   graduate  
education   capacity   (Al-­‐‑Bakaa   2013).   Dissatisfaction   amongst   faculty   members  
increased  leading  to  a  wave  of  highly-­‐‑skilled  migration.  
  
War  had  major  economic  costs  calculated  at  $452.6  billion   including  external  debt,  
infrastructural   damage,   and   lost   GDP   revenue   (Mofid   cited   in   Alnasrawi   1994,  
p.100).   Moreover,   there   was   a   high   opportunity   cost   as   development   spending  
almost   halted   in   1983   with   many   ambitious   projects   cancelled   (Alnasrawi   1994,  
p.88).   HE   was   affected   by   reduced   social   spending   as   military   expenditure  
increased   from  7.3%  of  GNP   in  1960   to   30.2%   in   1987  while  health   and  education  
allocations   fell   (Ismael   2003).   Subscriptions   to   periodicals   and   journals   were  
cancelled   and   funds   re-­‐‑directed   to   military   budgets   (Al-­‐‑Bakaa   2013).   It   must   be  
qualified   that   enrolment   increased   dramatically   during   the   1980s   while   HE  
expansion   plans   proceeded.   Furthermore,   despite   wartime   manpower   shortages  
students   were   exempted   from   conscription   until   graduation   unless   failing   two  
consecutive   academic   years   (Jabar   2004;   Zangana   2008).   However,   Jabar   (2004,  
p.123)  argues  that  war  had  wider  impacts  on  an  entire  ‘war  generation’  who  could  
not   experience   normal   life   and   career   development   therefore   leading   to   youth  
alienation  and  disloyalty  to  the  state  thus  eroding  Iraqi  unity.    
  
Iraq’s   HE   system   has   been   predominantly   public   since   its   emergence.   Private  
universities   were   permitted   from   1987   to   increase   capacity   under   isolation   and  
financial   constraints   of   a   war   economy.   After   establishment   of   three   private  
university   colleges,   Al-­‐‑Turath,   Al-­‐‑Mansour,   and   Rafidain   in   1988,   a   MoHE-­‐‑I  
decision  was   taken   that   private  HE   could   not   succeed  without   removing   the   best  
faculty   from   the   public   system.   Seven   more   private   university   colleges   were  
established   pre-­‐‑2003.   Under   sanctions  wages   for   public   HE   faculty   fell   to   $5-­‐‑$10.  
Meanwhile   private   HEIs   often   paid   more   than   double   this   monthly   salary   for  
individual   lectures.   Public   university   faculty   frequently   gave   lectures   in   private  
institutions   to   supplement   their   income.   This   negatively   impacted   continuity   and  
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perpetuated   a   lack   of   research   at   private   HEIs   although   attracting   many   top  
Professors  to  teach.    
     
5.2.2. Gulf  War  and  Sanctions  
  
After   Iraq’s   invasion   and   occupation   of   Kuwait   in   1990   the   ‘international  
community’   launched   ‘the  most   intensive  aerial  bombardment   ever   seen’   in  a   six-­‐‑
week   campaign   (Stansfield   2007,   p.128).   Direct   physical   damage   to   HEIs   was  
negligible.22  However,  destruction  of  civilian  infrastructure  affected  universities.  In  
particular,  a  nuclear   reactor  and   the  Nuclear  Research  Centre  were  destroyed  and  
research   facilities,   MIC   infrastructure,   and   associated   research   centres   damaged  
(Alnajjar  et  al  2004).  Furthermore,  after  humiliating  defeat  of  the  Gulf  War  the  state  
was   highly   vulnerable   facing   domestic   threats   from  mobilised   Shiite   groups   and  
Kurdish  parties.  The  1991   ‘southern   Intifadah’  affected  HE  as  a   large   ‘mob’   swept  
through  the  south  looting  state  institutions  including  universities  in  Babylon,  Basra,  
and  Kufa.23    
  
After   these   two   wars   there   were   efforts   to   rehabilitate   the   limited   amount   of  
damaged   infrastructure   at   specific   universities.   The   University   of   Basra   received  
resources,  equipment  and  staff   from  other  Iraqi  HEIs.24  Rebuilding  was  reportedly  
completed   within   two   months   (Asquith   2006);   a   stark   contrast   with   post-­‐‑2003  
rebuilding.   In   addition,   following   the   Southern   Intifadah   rebuilding   at   Kufa   and  
Babylon   was   rapid   with   full   restoration   within   one   month   after   which   the  
institutional  expansion  that  was  already  underway  continued.25    
Rather   than   direct   physical   impacts,   the   most   damaging   impact   on   HE   was   on  
human  capacity.  It  is  estimated  that  military  and  civilian  casualties  plus  those  killed  
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during  1991  uprisings  and  deaths  due  to  hardship  and  disease  were  94,000-­‐‑281,000  
(Alnasrawi   1994,   p.119).   However,   no   reliable   statistics   indicate   numbers   of  
students   or   HE   sector   workers   affected.   ‘Brain   drain’   accelerated   with   major  
negative   impacts   on   academic   standards   and   staff   morale.   For   example,   in   one  
department   at   the   University   of   Technology   six   of   thirteen   faculty   members   left;  
replaced  with  new  graduates,  MSc  holders,  and  part-­‐‑time  military  staff.26    
  
Post-­‐‑Gulf  War   sanctions  had  serious  negative   impacts  on  HE.  UN  Resolution  661,  
the   first   instance  of  UN  sanctions   to  not   exempt   transfer   of   scientific   information,  
was   described   by   Hans   von   Sponeck,   former   UN   Humanitarian   Coordinator   for  
Iraq,  as  an  ‘intellectual  embargo’.27  Cooperation  between  signatory  countries  to  UN  
sanctions   and   Iraqi   HEIs   was   banned   leading   to   termination   of   many   university  
agreements.28  Furthermore,   it  became   increasingly  difficult   for   faculty  members   to  
participate  in  academic  life  abroad.    
  
Procurement   became   a   major   challenge.   During   1990-­‐‑2000   no   new   American   or  
European  academic   journals   legally   entered   Iraq  due   to  Postal  Service   regulations  
(Richards   &  Wall   2000).   While   a   black   market   for   scholarly   publications   existed,  
libraries   and   collections   suffered   greatly.   Trade   restrictions   prevented   importing  
much  needed  materials,  for  example,  items  with  ‘dual-­‐‑use’  in  chemical  or  biological  
weapons   production   were   restricted   leading   to   the   notorious   banning   of   pencils.  
Restrictions  on  computer  imports  seriously  impeded  keeping  pace  with  fast-­‐‑moving  
technological   change   that  was   transforming   societies   globally,   stunting   growth   in  
emerging  disciplines  of  computer  science  and  IT  (Arsalan  2003).    
  
Watenpaugh   (2004)   claims   that   after   1991   the   number   of   Iraqi   students   overseas  
became   negligible.   However,   Qasem   (1998,   p.97)   finds   12,321   bachelors   students  
enrolled   abroad   in   1995/96,   representing   8%   of   Iraq’s   undergraduates   (Bashshur  
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2004,  p.97).  Additionally,  6.5%  of  Masters  students  and  5.4%  of  PhD  students  were  
enrolled   overseas   in   1995/96   (Bashshur   2004,   p.97).   While   numbers   significantly  
declined   these   findings  contradict   the  claim  that  scholarships  became  a   ‘negligible  
trend’.  Destinations   of   scholarship  holders   shifted   from   the  US,  UK,   and  Western  
Europe  to  the  Soviet  bloc.  A   ‘two-­‐‑tier’   faculty  stratification  emerged  with  an  older  
generation  possessing  degrees  from  the  West  and  younger  products  of  Iraq’s  newly  
established  graduate  schools  with  weaker  language  skills  and  fewer  PhDs.  
  
Another   impact   of   economic   sanctions  was   compressed  wages,   for   example,   from  
1992   the   average  monthly   salary   for   Professors  was   $100  while   the   equivalent   in  
Jordan   was   $1000.   Further   damage   was   incurred   with   currency   devaluation   and  
subsequent   reduced   living   standards.   Furthermore,   economic   hardship   led   to  
increased   corruption   and   ‘brain   drain’   in   HE.29   Al   Ali   (2005)   states   that   ‘higher  
education  has   virtually   collapsed   and  degrees   became  worthless   in   the   context   of  
widespread  corruption  and  an  uninterrupted  exodus  of  university  professors  in  the  
1990s’.    
  
Participants   commonly   view   sanctions   as   more   damaging   to   HE   than   either   the  
Iran-­‐‑Iraq   or  Gulf  wars.   Isolation,   beginning  with   the   Iran-­‐‑Iraq  war   and  deepened  
under   sanctions,   impeded   flows   of   knowledge   and   skills   vital   to   maintaining  
quality  HEIs.  Long-­‐‑term  and  systemic  effects  of   isolation  are  generally  considered  
more   serious   than   damage   caused   by   conflict.   However,   isolation   also   led   to  
adaptations  that  will  now  be  considered.    
  
Porter  (2003)   identifies  the  Gulf  war  and  sanctions  as  probable  causes  of  declining  
publication   levels.   All   major   research   institutes   published   drastically   less   during  
1996-­‐‑2003  than  1984-­‐‑1991,  except  Saddam  University  which  increased  publications.  
Porter  argues  that  university  research  capacities  were  directed  towards  military  use.  
Interviews   with   MIC   and   university   officials   support   this   explanation.   Research  
funding  for  universities  increased  as  the  state  intervened  to  coordinate  HE-­‐‑military-­‐‑
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  Former	  Professor,	  Faculty	  of	  Political	  Science,	  Al-­‐Nahrain	  University	  -­‐	  Amman,	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industry   linkages   (Arsalan   2003).   The   MIC   utilised   universities   for   consultancy  
work   including  project   design,   evaluation30   and  R&D   (Duelfer  Report   2005,   p.11).  
University   research   centres   were   aligned   with   national   security   objectives   for  
example,   developing   chemical   and   biological   weapons.   University-­‐‑industry  
linkages   also   intensified   due   to   post-­‐‑war   infrastructural   rebuilding   projects.31  
Currency   depreciation   reduced   HE   budget   allocations   and   lowered   salaries  
rendering  financial  incentives  for  industrial  activities  more  rewarding  for  academics  
(Owen  2007).  
  
Another   significant   adaptation   to   adverse   circumstances  was   the   shift   to   a   ‘multi-­‐‑
tiered  and  hierarchical’  HE  system  privileging  elite  institutions  for  producing  party  
technocrats   at   the   expense   of   traditional   and   provincial   learning   centres  
(Watenpaugh   et   al   2003).   Saddam  University32  was   established   in   1987   as   a   small  
elite   university   reportedly   after   Saddam   received   a   report   detailing   declining  
academic   standards.   With   financial   resources   diverted   to   war,   the   university’s  
rationale   was   to   produce   a   small   pool   of   elite   highly-­‐‑skilled   graduates.   A  
Presidential   Order   enabled   Saddam   University   to   use   the   facilities   of   any   public  
university  and   the  MIC.33   In  addition,   the  university  paid   the  highest   salaries  and  
attracted   many   top   Professors   domestically.   A   former   senior   Professor   from   SU  
claimed  that  an  evaluation  conducted  by  an  Irish  university  concluded  that  quality  
was  of  a  very  high  standard  comparable  to  many  European  universities.    
  
However,  while   resources  were   increasingly  concentrated  on  elite   institutions,  HE  
continued   expanding   during   the   1990s.   Over   ten   technical   institutes   were  
established  plus  universities  and  university  colleges.  Ghougassian  rhetorically  asks  
‘why   would   [Hussein]   create   all   these   universities   at   a   time   when   Iraq   was  
financially  strapped?’  answering  that  ‘for  the  shrewd  politician,  he  did  not  want  to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30Former	  senior	  manager,	  MIC	  research	  centre,	  who	  remains	  anonymous	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
31	  Professor	  Mazin	  Kadhim,	  former	  Vice-­‐President,	  Saddam	  University	  and	  senior	  adviser	  to	  MoHE-­‐I	  -­‐	  
Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
32	  The	  material	  on	  Saddam	  University	  draws	  on	  five	  interviews	  with	  former	  members	  of	  the	  
university	  
33	  Professor	  Mazin	  Kadhim,	  former	  Vice-­‐President,	  Saddam	  University	  and	  senior	  adviser	  to	  MoHE-­‐I	  -­‐	  
Amman,	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see  the  Iraqi  youth  in  the  streets,  and  given  the  economic  conditions  of  Iraq  he  did  
not   want   to   see   the   youth   doing   nothing’   (quoted   in   UCSD   Guardian   2004).  
Furthermore,   under   isolation   the   regime   sought   self-­‐‑sufficiency   by   expanding  
tertiary  capacity.    
  
In  conclusion,  war  and  sanctions  had  many  negative   impacts  on  HE  yet   sanctions  
were   the  most   damaging.   It   has   also   been   seen   that   the  HE   system   responded   to  
survival  needs  under  adverse  conditions  with  war  and  isolation  distorting  and  re-­‐‑
directing  Iraqi  HE.  Rebuilding  after  the  Iran-­‐‑Iraq  and  Gulf  wars,  re-­‐‑direction  of  HE  
to   elite   and   military   production,   and   continued   expansion   indicate   a   degree   of  
adaptive  capacity  on  the  part  of  the  Iraqi  state  and  HE  system  not  often  recognised  
in  accounts  of  this  period.    
  
5.3.2003  Invasion  and  Post-­‐‑war  Reconstruction  
  
The   2003   invasion   of   Iraq   was   a   major   early   twenty-­‐‑first   century   event   with  
profound   and   long-­‐‑lasting   consequences.   The   invasion  was   the   first   ‘pre-­‐‑emptive  
strike’  against  perceived  threat  of  Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction  (WMD).  However,  
invasion  went  beyond  merely  targeting  WMD  and  aimed  for  regime  change  (Rogers  
2006,   p.2).   Various   reasons  were   propounded   in   the   run-­‐‑up   to   invasion.   O’Leary  
(2009)  classifies  these  as  the  Bush  Administration’s  formal  goals  of  removing  WMD  
threat,   dismantling   terrorist   infrastructure   and   liberating   Iraq’s   people;   Bipartisan  
Congressional   goals   of   regional   stabilisation,   removing   Iranian   influence,   and  
restoring   America’s   credibility;   and   goals   imputed   to   the   Bush   administration  
including   demonstrating  US   power,   establishing  military   bases,   installing   a   client  
regime,  controlling  oil  and  gas,  and  serving  Israeli  interests.  Others  accused  the  US  
of  overthrowing   Iraq’s   regime  as   ‘imperial  grand  strategy’  aimed  at   reshaping   the  
Middle   East   (Callinicos   2005).   Furthermore,   Tony   Blair   appealed   to   humanitarian  
rationales  while  George  Bush  likened  Iraq’s  liberal  democratic  polity  to  a  beacon  of  




Reconstruction   planning   began   prior   to   the   decision   to   invade.   The   State  
Department  Future  of   Iraq  project  was   initiated   in  October  2001  18  months  before  
invasion.  Moreover,  Mac   Ginty   (2003)   documents   extensive   pre-­‐‑war   planning   for  
reconstruction   including  huge  contracts   for   rebuilding  granted   in  non-­‐‑competitive  
bidding  processes;   a   fact   prompting   critics   to   impute   a   further  motive   for   regime  
change   in   serving   economic   interests   of   large   American   firms.   Moreover,  
insufficient   pre-­‐‑war   planning   has   also   been   identified   as   a   major   obstacle   to  
effective   reconstruction.   For   example,   insecurity   has   been   explained   partly   by  
insufficient   troop  numbers;   the  Bush  Administration  was  warned  of   requirements  
for   ‘hundreds   of   thousands’   of   troops   yet   ignored   advice   out   of   ‘ideology   and  
hubris’  (Diamond  2004).    
  
The  Bush  Administration  relied  on  Iraqi  exiles  that  provided  partial  intelligence  and  
information,  for  example,  misleading  the  US  on  WMD  and  the  positive  welcome  the  
Coalition  would  receive  (Phillips  2005,  p.7).  ‘Pentagon  planners  assumed  that  Iraqis  
would  joyously  welcome  U.S.  and  international  troops  as  liberators’  while  ignoring  
the   State   Department’s   Future   of   Iraq   Project   which   foresaw   many   post-­‐‑war  
difficulties   (Diamond   2004).   Phillips   (2005)   holds   that   based   on   these   optimistic  
assessments  Coalition  expectations  were   for  an  orderly  and  smooth   transition   to  a  
liberal-­‐‑democratic   state   under  which  US   forces  would   be  welcomed   as   liberators.  
Instead,  occupation  began  much  more  chaotically;  public  buildings  and  institutions  
were   looted   during   April   and   May   while   an   insurgency   emerged.   Furthermore,  
state-­‐‑collapse   empowered   localised   factions   and   armed   militias,   for   example,  
Moqtada  Al-­‐‑Sadr  (Dodge  2007,  p.23).    
  
From  May  2003  until  June  2004  the  Coalition  Provisional  Authority  (CPA)  ran  Iraq.  
Key   early  CPA  decisions,   in   particular   de-­‐‑Baathification   and  disbanding   the   Iraqi  
army,   arguably   led   to   state-­‐‑breakdown  and   insecurity.  De-­‐‑Baathification   removed  
thousands   of   Iraq’s   most   qualified   individuals   necessary   to   state   functioning  
leading  to  severe  human  resource  constraints  in  important  institutions.  Disbanding  
the   500,000   member   Iraqi   National   Army   provided   violent   groups   with   an   ideal  
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recruitment   pool   of   young   unemployed   males   with   combat   training;   a   dynamic  
worsened   by   absence   of   DDR   programming   or   incentives   (O’Leary   2009,   p.7;  
Ozerdem  2010).    
Another   important   critique   is   that   the  CPA   implemented   a  market-­‐‑liberal   growth  
strategy   consisting   of   privatisation   and   liberalisation   that   precipitated   the   Iraqi  
economy’s   collapse.   Harvey   (2005,   p.7)   argues   that   the   US   imposed   a   model  
neoliberal   state   so   that   ‘profitable   capital   accumulation’   could   commence  
immediately  in  the  interests  of  domestic  Iraqi  and  foreign  capital.  Coalition  policies  
in  post-­‐‑war  Iraq  have  been  criticised  for  constituting  an  externally-­‐‑driven  top-­‐‑down  
blueprint  for  reconstruction  (Dodge  2006;  Papagianni  2008).  
At  a  general  level,  Herring  and  Rangwala  (2006)  provide  a  convincing  explanation  
that  post-­‐‑war   reconstruction   failed  because   the  Coalition  prioritised   coercion  over  
legitimacy.  It  is  held  that  military  and  counter-­‐‑insurgency  dominated  reconstruction  
and   stabilisation   strategy   at   the   expense   of   service-­‐‑delivery   and   basic   needs   that  
could   have   secured   state   legitimacy.   Reconstruction   efforts   were   generally  
perceived   to   have   failed   as   basic   goods   and   services   such   as   electricity   were   not  
provided.   On   top   of   this,   the   Iraqi   economy   remained  moribund  with   very   high  
unemployment,  oil  production  below  pre-­‐‑2003  levels,  and  industrial  collapse.    
In  June  2004  sovereignty  was  formally  handed  to  the  Iraq  Interim  Government.  The  
first   national   elections   were   held   in   December   2005   and   the   Iraqi   Constitution  
passed   in  October   2005.  However,   by   2005   Iraq  was   descending   into   increasingly  
violent  sectarian  conflict,  insurgency,  criminality,  and  corruption.  Iraq  during  2003-­‐‑
2012  was   consistently   ranked   a   ‘Failed   State’   and  was   at   the   centre   of   the   global  
‘War   on   Terror’.   Protracted   conflict,   weak   state   institutions,   very   poor   service  
delivery,   corruption,   organised   crime,   and   population   displacement   all   drove  
continued   state   fragility.   During   2005-­‐‑2008   sectarian   violence   reached   very   high  
levels  with  some  analysts  labelling  the  situation  a  ‘civil  war’  (Tripp  2008).  Security  
improvements  in  2008  were  attributed  to  the  ‘troop  surge’  (Ricks  2009)  and  counter-­‐‑
insurgency   strategy   becoming   responsive   to   local   politics   and   knowledge;   a   shift  
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marked   by   the   Sahwa  movement   turning   away   from  Al  Qaeda   (Al-­‐‑Sheikh  &   Sky  
2011).    
Stansfield   (2007)   argues   that   the   Coalition   and   international   reconstruction   actors  
were   largely   ignorant   of   Iraq’s   context   for   example,   history,   society,   culture,   or  
politics.   Similarly,   it   has   been   argued   that   the   Coalition   was   informed   by   a  
simplified  cognitive   framing   in  which  complex  social  relations  and  identities  were  
reduced  to  sectarian  conflict  between  Sunni  and  Shiite  and  ethnic  conflict  between  
Arab  and  Kurd.  This  point  raises  a  major  debate  about  post-­‐‑war  Iraq  over  sectarian  
and   ethnic   identity.  On   the   one   hand,   it   is   argued   that   deep   ethnic   and   sectarian  
divisions  that  Saddam’s  rule  ‘kept  a  lid  on’  exploded  with  disastrous  effect  after  his  
removal  (Stansfield  2007).  For  some,  this  provides  evidence  that  Iraq’s  varied  ethnic  
and   sectarian   groups   have   robust   identities   and   that   Iraqi   nationalism   withered  
away   with   the   artifice   of   Saddam’s   regime   (Kauffman   2006).   For   example,   Nasr  
(2006)   holds   that   the   Ba’ath   regime’s   fall   was   widely-­‐‑perceived   by   Iraqis   as   an  
‘opportunity  to  redress  injustices  in  the  distribution  of  power  among  the  country'ʹs  
major  communities’.    
Alternatively,  post-­‐‑2003  design  of  political  institutions  is  held  to  have  contributed  to  
Iraq’s  ethno-­‐‑sectarianisation.   Interim  Governing  Council  members  were  appointed  
according  to  ethno-­‐‑sectarian  quotas  (Herring  &  Rangwala  2006).  Davis  (2008)  holds  
that  quotas  created  strong  incentives  for  ‘sectarian  entrepreneurs’  to  solicit  political  
support   from   exclusive   ethno-­‐‑sectarian   communities.   As   Dawisha   (2008)   writes,  
under   the  CPA   and   subsequent   Iraqi   administrations   ‘ethnosectarianism  by  word  
and  deed  was  purposely   and  purposefully   institutionalized   in   the   body  politic   of  
the  country,  as  well  as  being  implanted  into  the  mindset  of  the  people’.  This  process  
pushed  Iraq  towards  fragmentation  and  conflict  rather  than  building  a  unified  state  
with  a  common  national  identity.    
Around  the  2008  elections  analysts  reported  that  many  Iraqis  were  tired  of  sectarian  
politics  and  conflict  and  were  eager   to  endorse  centralist  non-­‐‑sectarian  candidates  
(Ghanim  2011,  p.114);   a   trend  Visser   (2009a)   labelled   a   ‘silent   revolution’   towards  
cross-­‐‑sectarian   politics.   However,   during   2009-­‐‑2012   Iraq   experienced   several  
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political   crises   including   a   protracted   de-­‐‑Baathification   process   that   perpetuated  
sectarian  politics.  The   last  US   troops   left   Iraq   in   late   2011  with   Iraqi   armed   forces  
and  police  solely  responsible   for  security.  However,   Iraq  remained  a   ‘fragile  state’  
under  widespread  insecurity  with  frequent  attacks  on  state  personnel  and  civilians.    
  
5.4.  Post-­‐‑invasion  Erosion  of  Higher  Education  
  
In  this  section  impact  of  conflict  on  Iraqi  HE  will  be  analysed;  a  direct  contribution  
towards   answering   RQ2.   This   analysis   is   not   limited   to   the   invasion   but   rather  
invasion   and   its   aftermath;   the   immediate   chaotic   post-­‐‑war   environment   during  
2003   and   2004.   Invasion   led   to   a   collapse   in   state   institutions,   rule   of   law,   and   a  
‘chaotic’   environment.   Moreover,   Iraq   in   mid-­‐‑2003   cannot   be   classified   as   ‘post-­‐‑
conflict’;  rather  protracted  conflict  and  insurgency  emerged  in  an  anarchic  context.  
Iraqi  HE  was   affected   by   invasion,   its   aftermath   and   occupation   in   several  ways.  
This   section   analyses   these   impacts   that   occurred   during   the   early   years   of   Iraq’s  




To  begin,  effects  on  physical,  human,  and  institutional  capacity  will  be  considered  
as  outlined   in   chapter   two.   In  general   it   can  be   stated   that   the   impact  of   invasion  
and  the  post-­‐‑invasion  environment  on  Iraqi  HE  was  very  severe  and  more  intense  
than  almost  all  cases  considered  in  the  literature  review.    
5.4.1.1.    Physical  Capacity  
  
Direct  physical  damage  to  universities  and  their  personnel  through  aerial  bombing  
and   fighting   was   relatively   minor.   Reported   incidents   include   the   University   of  
Basra  where  on  6th  April  2003  the  faculty  accommodation  area  was  bombed  causing  
deaths  of  approximately  seventeen  staff  and  damage  to  ‘many  buildings’  including  
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laboratories.34   Another   example,  Anbar  University  was   ‘affected   very   badly’  with  
damage  to  facilities  and  infrastructure  when  the  US  army  entered  campus.35    
  
By   April   2003   many   significant   Iraqi   institutions   and   buildings   including   the  
Baghdad   Museum   and   the   National   Library   had   been   broken   into,   vandalised,  
robbed,   and/or  burned.   Iraq’s  HEIs  were   severely   affected  by  post-­‐‑invasion   chaos  
with  one  study  claiming  that  84%  of  Iraq’s  HEIs  were  burned,  looted,  or  destroyed  
(Reddy   2005a).   Widespread   reports   indicate   that   some   campuses   were  
comprehensively   targeted   with   physical   features   including   light   fittings,   door  
frames,   and   laboratory   equipment   stolen.   Al-­‐‑Mustansiriya   University   did   not  
possess   a   single   chair   or   computer   after   looting   (Al-­‐‑Bakaa   2013)   while   Basra  
University   was   systematically   burned.   Iraqi   participants   frequently   describe  
looting’s   impact   as   greater   than   pre-­‐‑war   damage   sustained   from   wars   and  
sanctions.36    
Conventional  explanations  for  looting  focus  on  poles  of  the  ‘greed  versus  grievance’  
debate.   On   the   one   hand   looters   are   held   to   be   motivated   by   self-­‐‑interest   for  
personal  enrichment,  responding  to  the  permissive  opportunity  structure  presented  
by  the  chaotic  situation.  On  the  other  hand  looters  have  been  portrayed  as  venting  
grievances   built-­‐‑up   under   long   repressive   rule   that   were   unleashed   by   attacking  
state  symbols.  Mac  Ginty  (2004)  argues  that  the  label  ‘looting’  is  commonly  applied  
to  all  types  of  theft  during  conflict  and  used  pejoratively  to  imply  rational-­‐‑choice  or  
‘greed’  explanations  of  motivations  for  looting.  Rather,  a  more  complex  explanation  
of   various  motivations   behind   post-­‐‑conflict   theft   is   required   and   recognition   that  
individuals  may  hold  mixed-­‐‑motives.    
The  uneven  distribution  of   looting’s   impact  on   Iraqi  universities  brings   into   focus  
some  competing  explanations.  The  widely-­‐‑cited  figure  of  84%  of  Iraqi  HEIs  looted,  
burned,   or   destroyed   does   not   reveal   the   spread   of   destruction   with   some  
universities   destroyed   and   some   affected   only   minimally.   In   Baghdad,   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Former	  President,	  University	  of	  Basra	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
35	  Anonymous	  former	  Assistant	  to	  President	  of	  Al-­‐Anbar	  University	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	  
36	  This	  view	  is	  common	  but	  not	  universal	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University  of  Baghdad’s  main  campus  and  Al-­‐‑Nahrain  University  received  minimal  
damage  compared  to  the  University  of  Technology,  Al-­‐‑Mustansiriya  University  and  
the  University  of  Baghdad’s  Adhamiyah   campus  which  were  very  badly  affected.  
One   explanation   is   that   the  University   of   Baghdad   and  Al-­‐‑Nahrain   are   located   in  
the  same  middle-­‐‑class  district  while  UoT  and  Al-­‐‑Mustansiriya  border  Sadr  City  and  
were  therefore  nearby  targets  for  its  poor  inhabitants.  The  assumption  is  that  poorer  
inhabitants   had   greater   need   to   steal   goods.   Alternatively,   it   has   been   suggested  
that  the  UoB  and  Al-­‐‑Nahrain’s  location  in  a  US-­‐‑protected  district  ensured  very  little  
opportunity  for  looting.    
After   looting,  many  mosques   held   amnesties   during  which   goods  were   returned.  
Some  faculty  estimated  that  up  to  50%  of   looted  material  was  recovered,  although  
returns  were   reported   as  minimal   at   some  universities.37   Return   of   goods  may   be  
held  to  challenge  explanations  that  focus  solely  on  individual  economic  motivation  
because  returned  goods  represent  foregone  profit  for  individual  utility-­‐‑maximising  
agents.  While   this  may  be  partially   true   as   a  wide   range  of   goods  were   returned,  
frequently  the  returned  items  were  damaged  sophisticated  equipment,  with  little  re-­‐‑
saleable  value.  Such  goods  represent  a  cost  for  owners,  for  example,  by  occupying  
space  and  entailing  future  risk  of  punishment  after  restoration  of  rule  of  law.    
A  grievance-­‐‑based  explanation  for  uneven  distribution  of  ‘looting’  and  destruction  
is  that  some  parts  of  the  HE  system  were  perceived  to  be  culturally  affiliated  with  
the  Coalition.  For  example,  one   former  University  of  Baghdad  Dean  reported   that  
departments  of  English  Literature  were  prioritised  for  looting  and  arson  due  to  their  
association  with   perceived   imperialistic   hegemony   and   aggression   of   the   US   and  
UK.38  
Several   Iraqi   Professors   held   that   ‘heroic   defence’   of   universities   by   faculty  
members   minimised   looting.   Al-­‐‑Nahrain   University   was   minimally   impacted   by  
looting.   This   has   been   explained   through   personal   qualities   of   commitment   and  
bravery  shown  by  staff  members  who  patrolled  campus  with  machine  guns  to  deter  
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  Anbar	  25-­‐50%,	  Mosul	  40-­‐50%,	  Mustansiriya	  negligible.	  	  
38	  Former	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Languages,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	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looters.   One   Professor   reportedly   slept   armed   in   his   department   saying   ‘my  
laboratory   is  my  home,   I   can’t   live  without   it’.39   Similarly,   a   former   lecturer   from  
Anbar  University  held   that   there  was  no   looting  because   the  predominantly   rural  
and   conservative   culture   of   Anbar   is   very   different   from   Baghdad   and   people  
defended  HEIs.40   This  may   be   termed   the   cultural   explanation   for   the   absence   of  
looting.  
Another   explanation   focuses   on   foreign   actors   targeting   Iraqi  HE.   Several   former  
senior   faculty   members   of   the   University   of   Basra,   which   was   severely   affected,  
described   foreign   interference   in   the   university’s   destruction.   One   respondent  
claimed   that   a   convoy   of   open-­‐‑backed   vehicles   carried   groups   of   Kuwaiti   armed  
forces  wearing   black   t-­‐‑shirts  who  proceeded   to  methodically   strip-­‐‑bare   buildings,  
spray   flammable   fluid   from   canisters,   and   set   buildings   alight.41   Kuwaiti  motives  
were   held   to   be   retribution   for   destruction   of   Kuwaiti   institutions   and   buildings  
during  Iraq’s  1990  invasion  and  occupation  of  Kuwait.    
It   should   be   concluded   that   looting   cannot   be   explained   by   a   simple   dichotomy  
between  ‘greed’  and  ‘grievance’.  Closer  analysis  reveals  a  range  of  explanations  for  
the   occurrence   of   ‘looting’,   arson,   and   destruction.   Moreover,   whatever   the  
motivations,   looting  crippled   the  physical  and   institutional  capacity  of  many   Iraqi  
HEIs  although  it  did  so  unevenly.    
5.4.1.2.  Human  Capacity  
  
After   2003   many   other   factors   continued   to   negatively   affect   HE.   Over   600  
academics  were  killed  in  intense  sectarian  violence  peaking  in  2005-­‐‑07.  This  in  part  
triggered  ‘brain  drain’  as  over  10,000  academics  emigrated  along  with  an  estimated  
40%   of   the   professional   class.   Breakdown   in   university   authority   empowered  
student   groups   linked   to   militias   and   political   factions.   Furthermore,   many  
universities   became   relatively   homogenous   in   ethno-­‐‑sectarian   composition,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Former	  Vice-­‐President,	  Al-­‐Nahrain	  University	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	  
40	  Former	  consultant	  to	  MoHE-­‐I	  and	  lecturer,	  Anbar	  University	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	  
41	  Former	  President,	  University	  of	  Basra,	  who	  remains	  anonymous	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	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reflecting   the   wider   conflict.   Further,   a   climate   of   insecurity,   checkpoints,   and  
security   walls   rendered   freedom   of   movement   incredibly   difficult.   While   these  
trends   are   briefly  mentioned   to   complete   the   chronological   narrative   of   Iraqi   HE  
erosion,  the  same  factors  will  be  explored  in  chapter  six.    
However,  violence  against  academics  warrants  closer  analysis  at  this  point.  During  
March  2003-­‐‑October  2008  there  were  a  reported  31,598  violent  attacks  against  Iraqi  
educational  institutions  (UNESCO  2010).  Up  to  May  27th  2010  the  Associated  Press  
reports   438   academics   killed   since   2003.   The  Ministry   of   Education   reported   296  
assassinations  of  academics  in  2005.  Statistics  on  the  exact  number  of  HE  deaths  face  
similar   problems   to   total   civilian   casualty   estimations.   The   Brussels   Tribunal  
provides   a   minimum   number   by   listing   confirmed   killings   of   named   Iraqi  
academics.  As  of  19th  August  2011  the  figure  was  471.42    
Various   explanations   have   been   forwarded   for   the   violence.   First,   Allawi   (2007,  
p.376)  notes  that  when  killings  began  in  2003  targets  were  assumed  to  be  ‘pillars  of  
the  former  regime’.  Second,  one  participant  estimates   that  60-­‐‑70%  of  killings  arose  
from  competition  between  factions,  for  example,  if  a  militia  group  wanted  to  put  a  
preferred   candidate   into   a   particular   academic   post   such   as   Dean   or   President.43  
Third,  it  must  be  considered  that  killings  were  not  targeted  at  academics  per  se  but  
professionals,  as  evidenced  by  the  number  of  doctors  murdered.  It  has  been  argued  
that   violence   against   academics   was   indiscriminate   because   targets   included   all  
political   agendas,   ethnic   and   sectarian   identities,   and  disciplines   (Jarecki  &  Kaisth  
2009).    
It  is  also  argued  that  academics  were  intentionally  targeted  in  a  strategy  of  ‘cultural  
cleansing’.   A   study   of   Iraqi   academics   found   that   ‘targeting   of   academics   is  
perceived  to  be  part  of  the  targeting  of  higher  education  as  a  whole  in  a  deliberate  
attempt  to  destroy  the  pillars  the  country  is  built  on,  and  ultimately  to  destroy  Iraq  
as   a   nation’   (Paanakker   2009).   However,   such   arguments   are   difficult   to   falsify  
because  no  individuals  have  been  brought  to   justice  for  killings  of  Iraqi  academics  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  See	  http://www.brusselstribunal.org/Academics.htm	  -­‐	  data	  accessed	  13/10/2013	  
43	  Anonymous	  former	  Professor	  of	  Engineering,	  Al-­‐Nahrain	  University	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  01/2011	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(Al-­‐‑Bakaa  2013)  which  renders  the  assignment  of  intentions  to  the  violence  a  largely  
speculative  exercise.  
Whatever   the   motive,   the   severe   impact   on   human   capacity   is   deeply   inter-­‐‑
connected  with   reduced   institutional,   the   subject  of   the  next   section,  as   it  must  be  
understood   that   institutions   are   not   ‘black   boxes’   in   that   they   cannot   function  
without  individuals  who  embody  institutional  memory  and  praxis  (Leftwich  2009).    
  
5.4.1.3.  Institutional  Capacity  
  
In  the  context  of  a  highly-­‐‑centralised  HE  system  state-­‐‑collapse  severely  affected  the  
institutional  capacity  of  Iraqi  HEIs.  With  the  emergence  of  myriad  political  factions,  
militias,   student   groups   and   competing   social   forces   the   power   of   university  
administrations   was   limited.   Furthermore,   uncertainty   regarding   the   division   of  
powers  and  direction  of  HE  reform  was  a   further  obstacle   to   institutionalised  HE.  
For  example,  at  Al-­‐‑Mustansiriya  University  three  separate  individuals  claimed  to  be  
the   incumbent   President   simultaneously.   While   this   dynamic   emerged   in   the  
immediate  post-­‐‑war  period  it  remained  a  key  trend  and  will  be  explored  in  chapter  
six.44    
Furthermore,   as   will   also   be   seen,   de-­‐‑Baathification   removed   many   presidents,  
deans  and  top-­‐‑level  administrators  that  embodied  the  institutional  capacity  of  HEIs.  
Additionally,   the  MoHE-­‐‑I  was   looted   and  burned   several   times   leading   to   loss   of  
many  records,  although  some  were  preserved,  hidden  in  underground  basements.45  
Similarly,   staff   at   Al-­‐‑Mustansiriya   University   took   records   home   thus   protecting  
vital  information.46  Considering  the  heavily  paper-­‐‑based  administrative  system  this  
constitutes  a   significant  depletion  of   institutional  memory  and  a  major  obstacle   to  
effective  university  governance.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  See	  sections	  6.3.1.2.	  and	  6.3.3.4.	  
45	  Professor	  Mazin	  Kadhim,	  former	  Vice-­‐President,	  Saddam	  University	  and	  senior	  adviser	  to	  MoHE-­‐I	  -­‐	  
Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
46	  Former	  Professor	  of	  Engineering,	  Al-­‐Mustansiriya	  University	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  01/2011	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In   the   context   of   the   destructive   looting   and   consequent   erosion   of   physical   and  
institutional  capacity  some  Iraqi  HEIs  demonstrated  that  while  their  capacities  were  
severely   depleted   they   retained   a   degree   of   resilience   and   capacity.   This   is  
illustrated   by   the   challenge   of   re-­‐‑opening   HEIs;   the   major   priority   following  
invasion  and   looting.47  There  were   immense   logistical  challenges   in  re-­‐‑starting  HE  
to  finish  the  academic  year  with  no  tables,  chairs,  or  light  fittings.  Staff  attempted  to  
recover  stolen  equipment  for  example  by  re-­‐‑purchasing  goods  in  markets  but  most  
was   damaged   beyond   repair.48   However,   many   participants   held   that   faculty  
members  were  relatively  successful   in  re-­‐‑starting  their   institutions,   in  particular  to  
finish   examinations  before   the   end  of   the   academic  year.  While   in   the   face  of   this  
challenge  HEIs  showed  resilience  other  stresses  and  dynamics  exerted  by  the  post-­‐‑
war  environment  could  not  be  withstood  and   led   to  distortions  of   the  HE  system,  
which  will  be  examined  in  the  next  section.  
5.4.2. Distortions    
  
Occupation   created   a   number   of   distortions   of   the   post-­‐‑war   environment   that  
negatively   impacted  HE.  Roadblocks,   security   checks,   and  blast  walls   emerged   to  
shape  Iraq’s  urban  landscape  rendering  free  movement  difficult.  Consequently,  the  
amount   of   time   spent   by   staff   and   students   in   universities   reduced   dramatically.  
Furthermore,   in   some   areas   control   by   militias   and   regular   fighting   completely  
restricted   access   to   some   universities.   For   example,   many   students   at   Diala  
University,   north   of   Baghdad,  were   prevented   from   travelling   to   their   institution  
(Sa’dawi  2007).    
  
Beyond   physical   impacts,   psychological   effects   of   invasion   and   occupation   were  
reported.   In   April   2003   a   US   army   battalion   entered   and   began   to   use   student  
dormitories  of  Baghdad  and  Al-­‐‑Mustansiriya  universities,  evicting  all  students  and  
taking   over   the   entire   complex   by   June   2003.   Agresto   (2007,   p.161)   holds   that  
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  Email	   interview,	  Dr	  Tahir	  Al-­‐Bakaa,	  former	  Minister	  of	  Higher	  Education	  and	  Scientific	  Research	  -­‐	  
Response	  received	  05/2012	  




although  the  incident  was  relatively  minor  it  was  a  ‘catalyst  in  reversing  the  initial  
favourable  student  opinion  towards  our  efforts  and  towards  America’.    
  
Moreover,  several  participants  held  that  Coalition  failure  to  prevent  looting  of  Iraq’s  
cultural   and   educational   heritage   marked   a   turning-­‐‑point   in   their   perception   of  
occupation.   Synott   (2008,   p.208),   CPA   regional   coordinator   for   Southern   Iraq,  
describes  how   the  President  of  Basra  University   requested   that   looters  be   shot  on  
sight  but  was  denied  because  summary  executions  would  have  been  unlawful  thus  
undermining  the  international  legitimacy  of  occupation.  
  
Destruction  of  Iraqi  HE  was  referred  to  by  John  Agresto,  CPA  advisor  on  HE,  as  an  
‘opportunity  for  a  clean  start’  (Ismael  2008).  This  attitude  reflects  an  assumption  on  
the  part  of  the  Coalition  and  some  research  bodies49  that  Iraqi  HE  was  pathological  
and   the   dilapidated   state   of   universities   resulted   from   inherent  weaknesses.   This  
framing   of   looting   and   destruction   as   an   opportunity   can   be   considered   a   major  
distortion  of  the  post-­‐‑war  environment  in  that  it  informed  a  far-­‐‑reaching  approach  
to   HE   reform   that   was   insufficiently   grounded   in   Iraq’s   contextual   realities   and  
incognisant   of   existing   capacity   upon   which   a   firmer   ground   for   post-­‐‑war   HE  
intervention  could  have  been  based.    
The   clean   slate   perspective   is   informed   by   the   argument   that   structural  
contradictions  in  Iraqi  HE  explain  negative  outcomes  of  the  1990s  and  early  2000s.  
Destruction  is   then  seen  as  clearing  away  the  discredited  state-­‐‑led  Iraqi  HE  model  
and  enabling  a  more  effective   implementation  of  a  new  model   in   the  vision  of   the  
transitional   administration.   The   argument   that   structural   contradictions   in   Iraq’s  
pre-­‐‑war  HE  model  caused  Iraqi  HE’s  decline  is  challenged  by  Khafaji  and  al-­‐‑Rawi  
(quoted  in  Watenpaugh  et  al  2003)  who  locate  external  factors  rather  than  internal  
contradictions  as  the  most  significant  explanatory  variables.    
While  Khafaji  and  al-­‐‑Rawi  (quoted  in  Watenpaugh  et  al  2003)  are  correct   to   locate  
external   factors   as   precipitating   HE   decline,   external   factors   exacerbated   pre-­‐‑
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existing   structural   tensions.   These   ‘pre-­‐‑existing   structural   tensions’   are   not  
pathological   features   of   an   overly-­‐‑centralized   socialist   state-­‐‑directed   system  
necessitating  liberalisation,  decentralisation,  and  marketisation.  Rather,  it  was  seen  
earlier   that   structural   tensions   of   university   expansion,   declining   government  
expenditure   due   to   war   efforts,   politicisation,   and   ‘brain   drain’   contributed   to  
systemic  vulnerability  in  HE.  Within  this  fragile  context  the  force  of  wars,  sanctions,  
and   occupation   could   not   be   absorbed   therefore   precipitating   breakdown   in   the  
system.   It   should   therefore   be   qualified   that  Agresto   correctly   identifies   the   post-­‐‑
war  moment  as  an  opportunity  to  enact  change  in  Iraqi  HE;  rather,  the  criticism  is  
that   existing   strengths   and   capacities   were   not   adequately   recognised.   This  
argument  is  further  supported  by  the  finding  that  Iraqi  HE  exhibited  some  adaptive  
capacity   even  under   sanctions  during  which  many   external   stresses   led   to   overall  
deterioration.    
  
In   sum,   this   section   has   provided   an   overview   of   post-­‐‑invasion   erosion   of   HE.  
Looting   stripped  most  HEIs   of   physical   and   institutional   capacity   after   their   long  
struggles  for  survival  under  conditions  of  isolation  in  the  1990s.  It  can  be  concluded  
that  isolation  and  looting  were  the  two  most  damaging  dynamics  affecting  the  HE  




In   conclusion,   it   has   been   shown   that   Iraq   has   a   long   and   proud   educational  
heritage  and  achieved  impressive  HE  standards  relative  to  the  Arab  region  from  the  
1960s   until   the   1980s.   Iraqi   HE   developed   rapidly,   playing   an   important   role   in  
modernisation   and   industrialisation.   In   comparison   to   regional   states   Iraqi   HE  
played  a  positive  developmental  role  in  its  manpower  function,  scientific  research,  
and  university-­‐‑industry  linkages.  However,  HE  became  increasingly  burdened  with  
contradictions   of   expansion   and   subjected   to   high   levels   of   political   interference.  
Moreover,  the  Iran-­‐‑Iraq  war,  Gulf  war,  and  sanctions  had  a  major  negative  impact  
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on   the   sector.   These   factors   weakened   academic   standards   and   constrained   the  
developmental  role  of  Iraqi  HE.  This  fall  in  standards  marks  the  beginning  of  Iraqi  
academia’s   decline   from   its   ‘Golden   Age’.   Next,   Iraq’s   post-­‐‑war   context   was  
introduced   by   reviewing   rationales   for   invasion   and   the   main   challenges   of  
reconstruction.  Finally,  the  impact  of  the  2003  invasion  and  subsequent  occupation  
on   the  HE  sector  was  analysed   finding  severe   impacts  on   the  system  due   to  post-­‐‑
invasion  looting,  violence,  and  state-­‐‑collapse.  Following  on  from  the  above  analysis,  
the  next  chapter  will  consider  post-­‐‑war  efforts  to  rebuild  the  HE  system  and  utilise  






























Iraq  once  possessed  one  of  the  leading  HE  systems  in  the  Middle  East  yet  by  2003  
that  system  was  almost  in  ruins.  Iraq’s  HE  system  has  been  selected  for  this  study  
because   the   country   experienced   three   wars,   international   sanctions,   the   2003  
invasion,   and   subsequent   attempts   at   post-­‐‑war   reconstruction.   The   story   of   how  
Iraqi   universities   were   impacted   by   and   responded   to   these   events   is   highly  
significant   for   the  study  of  HE   in  conflict  and  recovery.  After   the  widely-­‐‑accepted  
failure  of  Iraq’s  reconstruction  much  lesson-­‐‑learning  and  critical  reflection  on  best-­‐‑
practice  in  post-­‐‑conflict  reconstruction  and  statebuilding  occurred  (Bowen  2009).  It  
is   important   to   examine  HE’s   role   in   post-­‐‑war   Iraq   and   to   learn   the   lessons   from  
attempts  to  rebuild  HE.    
  
A   note   on  methodology,   throughout   the   chapter   data   from   interviews  with   Iraqi  
academics  and  policy-­‐‑makers  is  cross-­‐‑referenced  in  footnotes.50  Interviews  represent  
the   most   important   type   of   data   utilised   in   the   chapter.  While   there   is   a   lack   of  
systematic  research  on  HE  in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts  including  Iraq  a  number  of  good  
quality   sources   exist;   a  notable   contrast   to   chapter   eight   on  HE   in  post-­‐‑war  Libya  
where  very  few  published  sources  were  available  due  to  low  interest  in  the  case  and  
the   early   stage   of   Libya’s   post-­‐‑conflict   transition   during   which   research   was  
conducted.   In   terms   of   sources   for   this   thesis,   reliable   journalistic   reports   were  
utilised   for   some   factual   and   narrative   information   regarding   Iraqi   HE   although  
published   academic   articles   and   monographs   were   privileged   where   possible.  
Several   sources   offer   primary   data   and   these   were   the   most   valued   material  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




available;   John  Agresto’s51  memoir  Mugged  By  Reality:  The  Liberation   of   Iraq   and   the  
Failure  of  Good  Intentions,  Wayne  Bowen’s52  diary  Undoing  Saddam:  From  Occupation  
to   Sovereignty   in   Northern   Iraq,   and   contributions   of   Iraqi   academics   to   the   IIE  
Conference   “Reconstruction   of   Iraqi   Higher   Education   Post-­‐‑Conflict”   held   in  
January  2011  in  Amman,  Jordan.    
  
To  begin,   analysis   of  post-­‐‑war  HE   reconstruction  will   be  given   in   terms  of  needs,  
financing,  CPA-­‐‑led  reform,  physical  reconstruction,  and  ‘soft’  assistance.  After  this,  
three   sections  will   each   in   turn  address  a   separate   research  question.  Firstly,   Iraqi  
HE’s  contribution  to  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery  will  be  reviewed  finding  an  overall  low  
contribution.  The  chapter  will  then  seek  to  explain  this  finding  through  analysis  of  
the   features   of   the   post-­‐‑war   environment   affecting   the   HE-­‐‑recovery   relationship.  
Lastly,  perspectives  and  debates  on  various  options  for  recovery  of  Iraqi  HE  will  be  
explored  by  considering  opportunities   they  offer  alongside  possible   trade-­‐‑offs  and  
challenges,  in  particular  internationalisation,  private  HE,  and  the  potential  for  ‘brain  
gain’.      
  
  
6.1. Reconstruction  of  Iraqi  Higher  Education  
  
In   this   section   the   post-­‐‑war   response   to   Iraq’s   HE   sector   is   analysed   in   terms   of  
needs,  modalities  of  financing  the  sector,  CPA-­‐‑led  reform,  physical  rebuilding,  and  
‘soft’   assistance.   This   is   crucial   because   it   will   be   seen   that   in   the   context   of   the  
widespread  destruction  and  distortion  of  Iraqi  HE  reviewed  in  the  previous  chapter  
an   inadequate   post-­‐‑war   response   that   under-­‐‑funded   and   de-­‐‑prioritised   Iraqi   HE  
while  neglecting  vital  physical   reconstruction  was  decisive   in   shaping   the   sector’s  
post-­‐‑war   role.   Analysis   will   focus   on   2003-­‐‑2007   although   it   is   not   limited   to   that  
period.   2008   is   significant   due   to   improvement   in   security   and  marks   a   point   at  
which  HE  development  has  been  held  to  have  accelerated.  The  material  addressed  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  John	  Agresto	  was	  Senior	  Adviser	  to	  the	  CPA	  on	  HE	  




in   the   section   does   not   directly   address   a   single   research   question;   rather,   it  
provides  analysis  of   several  key  dynamics   shaping   the  post-­‐‑war  experience  of   the  
sector  that  is  vital  to  informing  the  rest  of  the  chapter.      
  
6.1.1. Needs    
  
To   begin,   Iraqi   HE   possessed   very   high   post-­‐‑war   needs;   from   section   5.4   some  
indicators   can  be   summarised.   Firstly,   human,  physical,   and   institutional   capacity  
was   depleted   by   invasion   and   occupation.   For   physical   capacity   it   was   seen   that  
84%  of  HEIs  were  burned,   looted,  or  destroyed.  On  human  capacity,  hundreds  of  
academic   staff   were   killed,   thousands   of   faculty   members   displaced,   and   the  
percentage  of  PhD  holders  in  most  academic  departments  fell  sharply.  Institutional  
capacity  was  also   impacted;   records  were  burned  and   looted,   and  both  university  
and  ministry-­‐‑level   institutions  were   affected   by   fragmentation,   politicisation,   and  
weakened  governance.  
  
In   this   context,   Iraqi   HEIs   had   numerous   ‘needs’;   financial,   human   resources,  
technological,   security,   and   pedagogic.   Physical   rebuilding   and   security   were  
unanimously  considered  paramount  priorities  by  participants.  For  example,  Wayne  
Bowen,  himself   stationed   in  Northern   Iraq,   reported   that  university   leaders’  main  
priorities   were   funds   for   physical   rebuilding,   control   over   finances,   and   for  
campuses  to  be  ‘no-­‐‑go  zones’  for  Coalition  forces.53  At  the  destroyed  University  of  
Basra   three   months   after   looting   one   Professor   when   asked   what   priorities   were  
stated  that   ‘we  are  not  talking  about   libraries  and  laboratories  right  now;  we  need  
chairs,  blackboards,  and  chalks!’  (Ahmed  2005).    
  
However,   beyond   material   needs   there   are   major   unmet   psychological   needs.  
Kubaisy  and  Kubaisy  (2011)  found  that  an  estimated  85%  of  displaced  Iraqi  scholars  
suffered   from   Post   Traumatic   Stress   Disorder   of   varying   degrees   of   intensity.  
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Personal   testimony   from   participants   reveals   that   many   experienced   traumatic  
events  that  limited  their  capacity  to  productively  pursue  academic  careers.    
  
Based  on  agency  needs  assessments,  Iraqi  HE  was  held  to  require  massive  funding  
in   the   immediate   post-­‐‑war   period.   John   Agresto   estimated   that   $1.2   billion   was  
required  to  enable  Iraq  to  ‘take  its  rightful  place  in  the  world’s  intellectual,  cultural,  
economic,   and   political   communities’   (Chandrasekaran   2007).   The   same   needs  
assessment   was   offered   by   the   MoHE-­‐‑I.   The   UN/World   Bank   Joint   Needs  
Assessment   (2003)  estimated   initial  Emergency  Rehabilitation/Reconstruction  costs  
of   $100   million   for   tertiary   education   in   2004.   In   addition,   $1,317   million   was  
projected   for   Universities   Rehabilitation/Reconstruction   and   $439   million   for  
Technical  Institutes  Rehabilitation/Reconstruction  for  2005-­‐‑07.    
  
Projected  primary  education  needs  were  more  balanced  between  2004  and  2005-­‐‑07  
than  for  HE;   this  pattern   indicates  greater  priority  attached  to  basic  education,   the  
primary   sector   entering   the   reconstruction   phase   in   2004  while   tertiary   education  
was  in  the  emergency  phase.  In  addition,  costs  for  teaching  materials  and  supplies  
were  forecast  at  $72.2  million  for  2004  and  $267.7  million  for  2005-­‐‑07.  Total  capital  
investment   needs   equalled   $1.856   billion   with   an   additional   $339.9   million   for  
MoHE-­‐‑I   supplies   and   materials   during   2004-­‐‑07.   In   the   next   section   the   extent   to  
which   these   needs  were  met   in   the   financing   of   post-­‐‑war   rebuilding   of   the   sector  
will  be  analysed.    
  
6.1.2. Financing  post-­‐‑war  higher  education  
  
Iannone:  Did  you  receive  the  funds,  the  supplies,  the  resources  that  you  needed?  
Agresto:  We  received  virtually  nothing.54  
              
The  above  quote  from  the  CPA  senior  adviser  on  HE,  John  Agresto,   illustrates  the  
negligible   financing  of  HE   in  post-­‐‑war   Iraq.   In  2003,  $18.4  billion  was  pledged   for  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Iannone	  (2006)	  
211	  
	  
Iraqi  reconstruction   in   the   Iraq  Relief  and  Reconstruction  Fund  yet  no  money  was  
allocated  for  HE.  Simultaneously,  USAID  allocated  $28  million  towards  an  arguably  
ineffectual  and  irrelevant  partnership  programme;  a  cause  of  frustration  within  the  
CPA   (Agresto   2007,   p.144).   In   2004   $120   million   was   requested   from   the   US  
Government  and  the  sum  received  was  $8  million.    
  
Agresto  (2007,  p.141)  explains  that  with  no  money  from  the  supplemental,  financing  
HE   reconstruction   was   dependent   upon   donors.   However,   despite   needs  
assessments  estimating  over  $1  billion   required   for  HE,  at   the  2003  Madrid  donor  
conference  no  money  was  pledged  for   the  sector.  The  total   figure  of  DAC  country  
contributions  to  Iraq’s  HE  system  from  Table  3  for  2003-­‐‑2008  was  $63.44  million  or  
5.3%  of  assessed  needs,  based  on  the  MoHE-­‐‑I  assessment.    
  
Table  3.  DAC  Funding  to  HE  in  Iraq  2003-­‐‑2008  in  millions  USD  
  
Year   2003   2004   2005   2006   2007   2008  
All  Donors,  Total   6.37   13.93   10.93   8.72   10.63   12.86  
DAC  Countries   6.37   13.93   10.93   8.72   10.63   12.86  
Source:  OECD  Qwery  Wizard  for  International  Development  Statistics  (QWIDS)55    
  
A  total  of  $55.36  million  was  committed  and  $28.99  million  disbursed  as  ODA  flows  
since   2003.   From  Table   4   it   can  be   seen   that   few  donor   countries  provided   funds.  
Half   the   donors,   Spain,   UK,   and   Italy   fully   disbursed   pledges,   while   Korea  
disbursed  over  two-­‐‑thirds  the  amount  pledged.  There  is  a  substantial  gap  between  
commitments   and  disbursals   of   both  UNDG   Iraq  Trust   Fund  and   the  US.   Jobbins  
(2005)  reports  numerous  aid-­‐‑delivery  problems;  a  university  President  claimed  that  
less   than  10%  of  pledged  aid   reached  universities.  Similarly,  Agresto   (2007,  p.142)  





notes  that  CPA  HE  spending  was  impeded  by  difficulties  in  accessing  World  Bank  
held  funds.    
  
Table  4.56  Committed  and  Disbursed  ODA  Flows  to  Iraq  HE  
  
Source:  GOI  Ministry  of  Planning  (MOP)  Development  Assistance  Database  (DAD)  
Iraq57  
  
The   Qatar   Foundation   donated   $15   million   to   the   Qatar   Foundation/UNESCO  
International   Fund   for  Higher  Education   in   Iraq,   providing   laboratory   equipment  
and   materials,   engineering   equipment,   furniture,   and   computers   in   addition   to  
fellowships,  textbooks,  and  conferences  that  drew  global  attention  to  Iraqi  academia  
(UNESCO  2006).  However,  several  participants  criticised  the  UNESCO  programme.  
Former   Minister   Tahir   Al-­‐‑Bakaa   argued   that   ‘the   bureaucracy   of   UNESCO  
prevented   the   arrival   of   aid   in   a   timely  manner’.58  Another   criticism  was   that   the  
majority  of  the  grant  was  used  by  UNESCO  for  running  projects  with  only  30-­‐‑40%  
of  funds  spent  in  Iraqi  HEIs.59    
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The   largest   single   donor   project   for   rebuilding   Iraqi   HE   was   USAID’s   Higher  
Education   and  Development   (HEAD)  program,   scheduled   to   run   from  September  
2003  until  end  of  2005.  The  $20  million  programme  funded  university  partnerships  
between  individual  departments  in  US  and  Iraqi  universities.  A  main  objective  was  
to   modernise   ‘teaching   methodologies,   research,   and   curricula’   (USAID   2004).  
Agresto  (2007,  p.144)  argues  that  USAID  strategy  was  disconnected  from  Iraqi  HE  
needs   and   prioritised   the   HEAD   Program   when   there   ‘were   far   more   pressing  
needs’  at  a  critical  early  recovery  phase.  HEAD’s  value  was  more   than  double   the  
CPA  HE   budget.   Further,   HEAD   has   been   criticised   for   primarily   benefitting   US  
universities   rather   than   Iraqi   universities   that   were   the   intended   programme  
beneficiaries.60   In   sum,  USAID’s  HEAD  Program  was  expensive  and   implemented  
prematurely.  
  
At  the  national-­‐‑level,  HE  funding  modalities  constitute  a  major  obstacle  to  effective  
reconstruction.   Budget   execution   for   HE   is   centralized   and   treasury-­‐‑controlled  
(Ahmad   et   al   2005).   During   1988-­‐‑1989   academic   year   Government   of   Iraq   (GOI)  
education   spending   was   6.9%   of   GDP;   a   relatively   high   figure   by   international  
standards,61   and   20%   of   this   sum  went   to   HE   (De   Santisteban   2005).   It   has   been  
argued  that  post-­‐‑2003  funds  were  too  low  to  meet  needs  and  highly  unpredictable.  
The  budget  was  an  estimated  $122.1  million  in  2004  (GAO  2004,  p.73).  During  2003-­‐‑
2007   the   annual   HE   operating   expenses   budget   varied   in   the   range   of   $125-­‐‑225  
million.  Former  Minister  of  Planning  Ali  Baban  holds  that  due  to  low  prioritisation  
MoHE-­‐‑I  was  among  the  first  ministries  to  experience  budget  cuts  after  downwards  
oil-­‐‑price  fluctuations.62  Considerable  budget  variation  is  identified  as  an  obstacle  to  
effective  long-­‐‑term  planning  by  the  MoHE-­‐‑I  (El-­‐‑Ghali  et  al  2010).    
  
Furthermore,   HE   expenditure   is   overwhelmingly   on   the   current   budget   (Harb  
2008).   In   particular,   wages   and   salaries   are   a   large   expenditure   with   50,000  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Personal	  communication	  with	  Peter	  Buckland,	  Coordinator	  for	  INEE	  -­‐	  King’s	  Manor,	  University	  of	  
York,	  11/2010	  
61	  Average	  for	  developing	  countries	  of	  3.8%	  (Hassan	  2005)	  
62	  Ali	  Baban,	  former	  Minister	  of	  Planning	  -­‐	  Manchester,	  England	  04/2013	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estimated   staff   in   the   MoHE-­‐‑I   in   2004   (GAO   2004,   p.73).   Several   participants  
emphasised  the  problem;  there  were  significant  needs  for  investment  in  damaged  or  
destroyed   physical   facilities   and   infrastructure   but   capital   investment   was  
negligible  due  to  crippling  current  expenditure.63    
  
Another   theme   in   interviews  was   rigidity   in   funding   arrangements.   For   example,  
the  Dean  of  Physics  at  one  university  returned  four  million  Iraqi  Dinars  (ID)  to  the  
MoHE-­‐‑I  rather  than  invest  in  much  needed  lab  equipment,  reportedly  to  please  the  
Ministry.64  In  another  example,  the  Iraqi  budget  is  announced  on  1st  January  which  
one  year  at  Nahrain  University  led  to  an  announcement  in  mid-­‐‑December  that  two  
billion   ID   were   to   be   spent   on   refurbishment   in   three   weeks   leading   to   massive  
disruption   in   the   university.65   These   examples   illustrate   a   broader   trend   of  
universities  without  the  capacity  to  spend  funds  on  rebuilding  work.    
  
Several  participants  noted  that  allocation  of  funds  to  each  public  university  from  the  
MoHE-­‐‑I   budget   has   been   stated   to   have   been   determined   by   enrolment.66   This  
funding   pattern   has   been   criticised   for   not   basing   allocations   on   individual  
university  needs.67  To  illustrate,  while  some  HEIs,  including  the  University  of  Basra,  
required   large-­‐‑scale   rebuilding   others   for   example  Al-­‐‑Nahrain  University   did   not  
have   significant   rebuilding   needs.   It   should   be   qualified   that   the   Iraqi   Cultural  
Attaché  to  Jordan  contended  that  this  report  was  not  valid  and  that  both  enrolment  
and  needs  assessment  determined  allocations.68    
  
In   conclusion,  HE   funding   in   post-­‐‑war   Iraq   at   the   donor   and   national   levels  was  
low,   unpredictable,   and   inefficiently   allocated.   This   funding   pattern   constituted   a  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	   Interviews	   with	   Iraqi	   Professors,	   Amman,	   Jordan	   during	   2010	   and	   2011.	   A	   University	   of	   Basra	  
Professor	   stated	   there	  was	   no	  money	   for	   infrastructural	   investment	   and	   no	   rebuilding	   had	   taken	  
place	  since	  2003.	  	  
64	  Former	  PhD	  student,	  Department	  of	  Physics,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  01/2011	  
65	  Former	  Dean	  of	  Engineering,	  Al-­‐Nahrain	  University	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  01/2011	  
66	  Former	  Vice-­‐President,	  Al-­‐Nahrain	  University.	  Amman,	  Jordan	  2011	  
67	  Khaled	  Ehsan,	  Monitoring	  and	  Evaluation	  Specialist,	  UNDP,	  Iraq	  Country	  Office	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  
02/2011	  




significant  obstacle  to  rebuilding  HE.  The  situation  reflects  HE’s  marginal  position  
in  Coalition  reconstruction  priorities;  a  theme  explored  in  the  next  section  on  CPA-­‐‑
led  reform.    
  
6.1.3. Iraqi  Higher  Education  under  the  CPA:  May  2003-­‐‑June  2004  
  
In   this  section   the   impact  of   the  CPA-­‐‑led  reform  of   Iraqi  HE  during   the   first  post-­‐‑
invasion   year   will   be   analysed;   a   crucial   period   that   influenced   the   post-­‐‑war  
trajectory   of   the   sector.   In   the   first   months   of   occupation   the   CPA  made   several  
policy   decisions   significantly   affecting   Iraqi  HE.   First,   on   16th  May   2003   the   CPA  
issued  Order  Number  One   ‘De-­‐‑Baathification  of   Iraqi  Society’   for   removing  Baath  
Party   members   from   public   office   and   exempting   them   from   future   public  
employment.  The  Order   removed  academics  and  university   staff   from  their  posts;  
one   thousand  according   to   IU/BUIC/DIUS   (2009)  or   ‘about   2,000’   (Munthe  2003b).  
At  the  University  of  Baghdad  alone  close  to  300  academic  staff  were  removed  from  
their  positions  (Allawi  2007,  p.376).  The  majority  removed  were  in  senior  positions;  
at   the   University   of   Baghdad’s   Politics   Department   65   of   70   staff   members   were  
found   to  be  Ba’ath  Party  members  while  only  six  were  deemed  sufficiently   senior  
for  removal  (Wong  2004).    
De-­‐‑Baathification   emerged   strongly   as   a   theme   from   interviews   with   many  
participants   holding   that   it   had   strong   negative   consequences.   There   was   near  
unanimous   consensus   amongst   participants   that   de-­‐‑Baathification   went   too   far.69  
The   process   was   criticised   because   many   removed   academics   had   only   nominal  
Baath  party  membership.  Membership  was  held  to  aid  career  progression  and  was  
not   a   strong   indicator   of   high-­‐‑level   party   involvement.70   At   the   University   of  
Baghdad   the   newly-­‐‑elected   President   Sami   Mudhaffar   was   tasked   with  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Examples	  of	  non-­‐anonymous	  participants	  defending	  this	  widely	  held	  view	  include;	  email	  interview	  
with	  Dr	  Mohamed	  Al-­‐Rubeai,	  former	  senior	  adviser	  to	  the	  MoHE-­‐I	  and	  CPA,	  and	  Chairman,	  Network	  
of	   Iraqi	   Scientists	   Abroad;	   also	   email	   interview	   with	   Tahir	   Al-­‐Bakaa,	   former	   Minister	   of	   Higher	  
Education	  and	  Scientific	  Research	  
70	  Professor	  Mazin	  Kadhim,	  former	  Vice-­‐President,	  Saddam	  University	  and	  senior	  adviser	  to	  MoHE-­‐I.	  
Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	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implementing  de-­‐‑Baathification.  Predicting  the  university’s  inoperability  after  firing  
hundreds   of   competent   staff   members,   he   refused   and   promptly   offered   his  
resignation  (Riverbend  2005).   In  his  words,   ‘the  situation   is  collective  punishment.  
Some   of   those   are   good   people,   some   are   very   bad   people.   You   don'ʹt   punish   all  
people  for  the  same  crime’  (Wong  2004).    
  
Many   experienced   academics   were   made   redundant   at   a   critical   moment   thus  
eroding   the   human   capacities   of   HEIs.   In   the   words   of   one   participant   ‘de-­‐‑
Baathification  came  and  threw  people  away’.71  Further,  de-­‐‑Baathification  initiated  a  
reform  trajectory  that  institutionalised  sectarianism  through  ethno-­‐‑sectarian  quotas  
on   academic   appointments   (Adriaensens   2009);   a   dynamic   that  mirrors   the  wider  
institutionalisation   of   sectarianism   through   ethno-­‐‑sectarian   quotas   in   national  
political   institutions   (Dawisha   2009;  Herring  &  Rangwala   2006).   This   argument   is  
supported   by   events   of   2011   when   140   faculty   members   were   removed   at   Tikrit  
University;  a  move  perceived  by  the  university’s  predominantly  Sunni  community  
‘as  due  to  sectarian  loyalties  rather  than  historical  misdeeds’  (Waleed  2011).    
  
CPA  Order  Number  Eight   ‘Travelling  Abroad  for  Academic  Purposes’  was   issued  
on   7th   June   2003.   The   order   gave   University   Presidents   ‘exclusive   authority’   to  
approve  travel  requests.  Travel  restrictions  were  previously  imposed  and  the  order  
re-­‐‑established  academic   linkages  between  Iraq  and  foreign  universities.  Testimony  
from  participants  reveals  that  many  were  very  enthusiastic  about  the  prospect  of  re-­‐‑
starting   academic   exchanges   and   linkages.  Order  Number   Eight   emphasises  HE’s  
centrality  to  reconstruction,  stating  that  ‘the  free  exchange  of  ideas  and  the  pursuit  
of  academic  excellence  is  necessary  to  the  establishment  of  self-­‐‑government  in  Iraq’  
(CPA  2003b).  However,   the  CPA’s  rhetorical  commitment   to  HE  was  not  matched  
with  appropriate  resources.  
  
In   its   ‘An   Historic   Review   of   CPA   Accomplishments’   introduction   of   legislation  
changing  procedures  for  selecting  University  Presidents  and  Deans  is  listed  as  a  key  
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  Professor	  of	  Engineering	  at	  Philadelphia	  University	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	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achievement   (CPA   2004).   The   previous   system   for   electing   Deans   involved   the  
President   consulting   Department   heads,   compiling   a   shortlist,   and   sending  
nominations  to  the  Minister.  To  appoint  a  University  President  the  Minister  would  
nominate  three  names  to  the  President’s  Office.  Career  advancement  in  Saddam-­‐‑era  
Iraqi   universities  was   perceived   to   be   subject   to   regime   loyalty.   Accordingly,   the  
CPA,  under  Andrew  Erdman,  introduced  elections  with  both  Deans  and  Presidents  
selected   by   ballot.   John  Agresto   (2007,   p.83)  writes   that   elections   ‘may  well   have  
been   the   first   free  elections  held   in   Iraq   in  decades’.  Further,  he  describes  how   ‘at  
the   election   of   their   own   president   and   other   officials,   the   professors   on   some  
campuses   cried’.   Introducing   elections   was   viewed   as   a   significant   act   of  
liberalisation  that  would  remove  power  from  a  Stalinesque  autocracy  and  empower  
individual  universities  and  faculty  members.    
  
Several  Iraqi  Professors  who  experienced  the  first  elections  offer  critical  accounts  of  
their   impact.72   First,   voting   patterns   frequently   split   along   sectarian   lines.   For  
example,   one   Professor   stated   that   ‘elections   were   a   mockery’,   claiming   that   Al-­‐‑
Mustansiriyya   University’s   College   of   Engineering   Deanship   elections   were   split  
with   24   Shiite   faculty   voting   for   one   candidate   and   23   Sunni   faculty   voting   for   a  
second   candidate,   while   the   Dean  was   elected   but   assassinated   after   two   years.73  
Another   Professor,   formerly   Vice-­‐‑President   of   Saddam   University,   reported   that  
although  many  old  names  re-­‐‑appeared   in  elections,  other  new  candidates  with  no  
history  of   leadership  or  administration  were  put   forward  and  elected  as  Deans  or  
Presidents   and   as   a   consequence   ‘there   was   chaos’.74   Elections   were   cancelled  
shortly  after  the  CPA  was  disbanded  and  sovereignty  formally  granted  to  Iraq.  The  
system  reverted  back  to  procedures  used  for  decades  previously.    
  
Another  major   area   of   CPA   reform  was   decentralised   governance.   In  mid-­‐‑2003   a  
meeting   was   convened   by   the   CPA  with   all   Presidents   of   Iraqi   universities.   It   is  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  Professor	  of	  Engineering	  at	  Philadelphia	  University	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	  
73	  Professor	  of	  Engineering	  and	  a	  founding	  member	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Technology.	  Amman,	  Jordan	  
02/2011	  
74	  Professor	  Mazin	  Kadhim,	  former	  Vice-­‐President,	  Saddam	  University	  and	  senior	  adviser	  to	  MoHE-­‐I.	  
Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	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reported   that   Andrew   Erdman   informed   university   Presidents   that   universities  
were   to   gain   control   of   admissions   and   complete   autonomy   from   the   MoHE-­‐‑I.75  
Erdman   offered   the   example   of   the   US  where   a   world-­‐‑leading   university   system  
operates  with  no  MoHE  and  held  that  Iraqi  HE  could  therefore  prosper  after  closing  
its  MoHE.  The  Iraqi  position  was  that  universities  lacked  the  capacity  or  experience  
to  fulfil  this  new  role,  and  that  the  Ministry  should  be  maintained.  Moreover,  it  was  
argued  that  centralised  HE  was  a  common  feature  of  all  Arab  states  and  therefore  
decentralisation   would   not   work.76   Plans   for   radical   decentralisation   were   not  
implemented  and  the  MoHE-­‐‑I  retained  centralised  control  over  HEIs.    
  
Other   CPA   reforms   included   a   new   performance-­‐‑based   pay-­‐‑scale   for   faculty  
members  under  which  junior  staff  could  receive  higher  remuneration  than  tenured  
Professors.  Salaries  increased  to  approximately  $1000  per  month  in  2003  and  $1500  
in  2005  (Reddy  2005a).  Many  participants  held  that  increased  salaries  were  one  area  
of  improvement  after  2003.77  The  CPA  reform  was  reversed  by  the  2007  universities  
law   that   increased   salaries   and   re-­‐‑introduced   the   former   hierarchy   and  
predictability.  Salaries  rose  to  approximately  $3,150  monthly  for  Professors  in  active  
service;   a   level   favourable   in   regional   terms   and   higher   than   Egypt,   Syria,   and  
Jordan  (1,200  –  1,500  JOD).    
  
It  may  be  asked,  what  was  the  effect  of  above-­‐‑described  CPA  reforms?  CPA  (2004)  
lists  its  accomplishments  as  MoHE-­‐‑I  reform,  democratisation  of  selection  for  Deans  
and  Presidents,   increased  salaries,   international  re-­‐‑engagement  of  universities,  and  
an   official   statement   on   academic   freedom.   However,   contrary   to   this   positive  
evaluation,   interviews  with   Iraqi   academics   indicate   that   very   little  was   achieved  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	   Personal	   communication	   with	   Peter	   Buckland,	   Coordinator	   for	   the	   Inter-­‐Agency	   Network	   for	  
Education	  in	  Emergencies	  –	  York,	  UK	  
76	  Professor	  Mazin	  Kadhim,	  former	  Vice-­‐President,	  Saddam	  University	  and	  senior	  adviser	  to	  MoHE-­‐I	  -­‐	  
Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
77	  Examples	  of	  participants	  sharing	  this	  view	  include	  a	  former	  Professor	  of	  Economics,	  University	  of	  
Baghdad	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011;	  email	  interview	  with	  Tahir	  Al-­‐Bakaa,	  former	  Minister	  of	  Higher	  
Education	   and	   Scientific	   Research;	   Dr	   Akeel	   T.	   Al-­‐Kazwini,	   Dean	   of	   School	   of	   Applied	   Medical	  
Sciences,	   German	   Jordanian	   University	   –	   Amman,	   Jordan	   02/2011;	   an	   IIE	   Visiting	   Scholar	   at	   the	  
British	  Institute	  in	  Jordan	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	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during  the  first  two  years.78  Moreover,  as  has  been  seen  above,  elections  and  radical  
MoHE-­‐‑I   reform  were   reversed  at  a   later  date.  Furthermore,   it   is   important   to  note  
that   the   CPA   did   not   include   de-­‐‑Baathification   of   academia   as   an   achievement,  
possibly   due   to   its   negative   impact   or   more   likely   owing   to   sensitivities   of  
presenting  the  process  as  driven  by  Iraqi  actors  for  example,  Ahmed  Chalabi,  rather  
than  the  CPA.    
  
The  Minister   that  assumed  responsibility   for   the  sector  after   the  disbanding  of   the  
CPA  stated  of   its   impact   that   ‘we  thought   that   their  performance  would  be  better,  
although  we  have   to  applaud  the  efforts  of  some  American  advisers’.79  This  quote  
recognises   the  weak  record  of   the  CPA  yet  also   the  difficult  context   in  which  they  
operated.    
  
One  factor  explaining  difficulties  faced  by  the  CPA  was  the  poor  security  situation  
during   occupation.   On   November   24th   2003   CPA   adviser   Jim   Mollen   was   killed  
driving   an   unauthorised   vehicle   in   the   Red   Zone   in   Baghdad   (Stephenson   2007,  
p.120).   Restrictions   on   movement   reduced   contact   between   Coalition   and   Iraqi  
officials  leading  to  deterioration  in  relationships  as  Iraqis  felt  marginalised.    
  
Similarly,  several  participants  who  offered  criticism  of  CPA  HE  strategy  contended  
that   reforms   were   inappropriate   considering   Iraq’s   idiosyncratic   contextual  
dynamics.   Kadhim   argues   that   CPA   plans   to   institute   elections   for   Deans   and  
Presidents,  to  abolish  the  MoHE-­‐‑I,  and  restructure  the  pay-­‐‑scale  failed  because  the  
CPA   did   not   understand   Iraqi   HE   history   or   the   context   of   Arab   education  
systems.80   He   stated   that   ‘you   can’t   abolish   what   worked   for   50   years,   you   can’t  
invade   and   change   everything   in   a   few   days’.   He   held   that   despite   CPA   reform  
initiatives  Iraqi  HE  governance  circa  2010  remains  almost  identical  to  the  system  in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Former	  Dean	  at	  Basra	  University	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010;	  a	  former	  Professor	  of	  Engineering	  at	  
Al-­‐Mustansiriya	  University	  –	  Amman,	   Jordan	  02/2011;	  Also,	  Professor	  Mazin	  Kadhim,	   former	  Vice-­‐
President,	  Saddam	  University	  and	  senior	  adviser	  to	  MoHE-­‐I	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
79	  Email	  interview	  with	  Tahir	  Al-­‐Bakaa,	  former	  Minister	  of	  Higher	  Education	  and	  Scientific	  Research	  
80	  Professor	  Mazin	  Kadhim,	  former	  Vice-­‐President,	  Saddam	  University	  and	  senior	  adviser	  to	  MoHE-­‐I.	  
Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	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1980.   Another   criticism   is   that   CPA  HE   strategy   had   ‘no   vision’.81   Buckland   held  
that  plans  to  disband  the  MoHE-­‐‑I  were  flawed  for  ignoring  the  need  for  centralised  
control  and  national  manpower  planning  to  calibrate  graduate  numbers  with  labour  
needs;  a  challenge  made  almost  impossible  in  a  completely  decentralised  system.    
  
Reflecting  on  CPA  HE  efforts,  Agresto  (2007,  p.74)  writes  that   ‘when  the  Coalition  
first  entered  Iraq,  the  universities  were  substantially  on  the  side  of  our  forces.  By  the  
time   I   left,   it  was  one  of   the  sectors  most  against  us’.  He  explains   this  outcome  as  
related   to   ‘ill-­‐‑treatment’   by   Coalition   military,   the   ‘psychological   and   ideological  
vacuum  left  by  the  fall  of  the  regime’,  rising  religious  extremism  and  the  ‘desperate  
physical  conditions  of   the  universities’;   the   last  point  highlights  a  central  dynamic  
limiting  the  post-­‐‑war  role  of  the  sector  which  will  be  analysed  in  the  next  section.    
  
6.1.4. Physical  Reconstruction  
  
In  this  section  the  physical  reconstruction  of   Iraqi  HE  is  analysed;  a  pressing  need  
after   84%   of   Iraq’s  HEIs  were   destroyed,   damaged,   or   looted   (Reddy   2005a).   The  
MoHE-­‐‑I’s   immediate   post-­‐‑war   goal   was   rebuilding   physical   infrastructure,   in  
particular   campus   buildings,   libraries,   classrooms,   and   laboratories   (McConnell  
2003).  Moreover,  alongside  security,  the  vast  majority  of  participants  cited  physical  
rebuilding   as   the   central   priority,   in   particular,   laboratories,   lecture   halls,  
classrooms,  offices,  dormitories,  and  libraries;  in  short  the  critical  infrastructure  and  
facilities  of  HE.82  
No   national-­‐‑level   statistics   on   physical   reconstruction   of   HE   could   be   located.  
However,   several   sources   provide   general   indictors.   Reddy   (2005a)   reported   that  
‘40%  of   the  reconstruction  of  destroyed  buildings  have  been  achieved  through  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	   Personal	   communication	   with	   Peter	   Buckland,	   Coordinator	   for	   the	   Inter-­‐Agency	   Network	   for	  
Education	  in	  Emergencies.	  
82	  As	  stated,	   this	   finding	  emerged	  strongly	   from	  interview	  data.	  For	  example,	  a	  senior	  Professor	  at	  
University	  of	  Technology	  listed	  security,	  rebuilding	  facilities,	  and	  replacing	  looted	  equipment	  as	  the	  
three	  main	  priorities;	  a	  common	  ordering	  of	  priorities.	  Email	  interview	  with	  Arkan	  Al	  Taie.	  Professor	  
of	  Engineer	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Technology	  -­‐	  response	  received	  August	  2013	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existing  budget’.  This  figure  was  quoted  as  an  indicator  of  progress  in  a  UN  report  
that   does   not   acknowledge   a   source.   Interviews   with   Iraqi   academics   provide   a  
clearer  picture  of  HE  rebuilding.  However,  it  must  be  qualified  that  quoted  figures  
are   estimations   from   individuals   and   should   be   viewed   as   indicative   rather   than  
precise  measurements.    
A  former  university  President  claimed  that  30-­‐‑40%  of  university  infrastructure  was  
rebuilt   in   the   first   two   years   while   an   Iraqi   cultural   attaché   held   that   40-­‐‑50%   of  
infrastructure   was   rebuilt   in   the   first   year.83   A   lower   figure   was   quoted   by   the  
University  of  Technology’s  President  who  claimed  that  at  his  institution  10-­‐‑15%  of  
infrastructure  was  rebuilt  in  the  first  two  years  while  the  figure  in  2010  stood  at  70-­‐‑
80%  with   rapid   progress   after   2008.84   An   academic   at   Basra   University,   the  most  
affected  institution,  explained  that  despite  small  rebuilding  projects  ‘you  do  not  feel  
the  impact  of  reconstruction’.85  A  former  senior  academic  at  the  same  university  was  
more  damning   stating   that   ‘no   rebuilding  has   taken  place   since   2003’   due   to   vast  
current  budgets.86    
Agresto  (2007,  p.149)  writes  that  ‘the  first  goal  of  my  office  –  rebuilding  the  physical  
infrastructure  of  Iraq’s  burned,  damaged,  and  decayed  universities  –  was  a  failure  
at   least   in   so   far   as  direct   help   from   the  US  government  was   concerned’.  Agresto  
(2007)  explains  this  as  in  part  due  to  the  allocation  of  funds  to  USAID’s  partnership  
programme   whilst   physical   rebuilding   needs   were   paramount.   The   meagre   $8  
million   for   rebuilding   HE   was   allocated   to   the   priority   issue   of   laboratory  
rebuilding,  yet  the  CPA  did  not  issue  contracts  swiftly  and  after  months  of  waiting  
security   deteriorated   leading   to   failure   of   rebuilding   plans   (Agresto   2007,   p.147).  
This   example   identifies   under-­‐‑funding,   bureaucratic   procedure,   and   insecurity   as  
obstacles  to  effective  physical  rebuilding.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Dr	  Sadiq	  Nasrullah,	  Cultural	  Attaché,	  Embassy	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Iraq	  in	  Jordan	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  
02/2011	  
84	  Dr	  Kahtan	  Al-­‐Khazraji,	  President,	  University	  of	  Technology	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  01/2011	  
85	   Dr	   Juliana	   Dawood	   Yusuf,	   Lecturer,	   Faculty	   of	   Linguistics,	   Basra	   University	   -­‐	   Amman,	   Jordan	  
12/2010	  
86	  Former	  President,	  University	  of	  Basra,	  who	  remains	  anonymous	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	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Physical   rebuilding   was   also   affected   by   conceptual   issues   over   what   constitutes  
reconstruction.   In  published  material  donors  assisting   Iraqi  HE   frequently  use   the  
terms   ‘rehabilitation’   and   ‘revitalisation’.   For   example,   in   December   2005   USAID  
published   a   list   of   its   Top   Ten   Strategic   Accomplishments   in   Iraq.   Number   ten,  
‘Restoring   Excellence   in   Higher   Education’,   stated   that,   ‘university   facilities   -­‐‑  
libraries,  computer  and  science  laboratories,  lecture  halls,  and  buildings  -­‐‑  have  been  
rehabilitated  at  colleges  throughout  the  country’  (USAID  2005).    
However,   many   participants   held   that   ‘reconstruction’   frequently   labels   mere  
refurbishment.   It   is   argued   that   painting   of   building   interiors   and   exteriors,   and  
purchase  of  furniture  and  fittings  is  typically  described  as  successful  reconstruction  
while   critical   infrastructure   including   laboratories,   libraries,   and   dormitories   are  
neglected.87   As   one   participant   stated   ‘they   say   there   were   billions   invested   in  
reconstruction  but  just  painted  the  walls  and  said  it  was  reconstruction’.88  Similarly,  
one   Iraqi   intellectual   reported   that  many   donor   claims   to   have   rehabilitated   Iraqi  
educational   institutions   are   on   closer   inspection   often   little   more   than   repainting  
(Barakat  &  Milton  2010).  It  was  reported  that  Baghdad  University  Arts  College  had  
its  façade  repainted  annually  for  several  years.89  This  example  indicates  the  lack  of  
rational  strategy  for  altering  reconstruction  plans  where  resources  are  used  to  meet  
contractual  obligations  rather  than  respond  to  needs.    
One   explanation   of   this   discrepancy   between  what   is   labelled   reconstruction   and  
perceived  dominance  of  HE  assistance  by   refurbishment   and   rehabilitation   is   that  
donors  have  an  interest  in  presenting  mere  refurbishment  as  evidence  of  successful  
‘reconstruction’  (Barbooti  2011).  However,  an  alternative  explanation  is  that  a  wider  
conception   of   ‘reconstruction’   is   frequently   adopted   by   donors   to   include  
incorporation  of  human  rights,  gender  equality,  new  teaching  pedagogies,  and  non-­‐‑
traditional   subjects   such  as  peace  and  conflict   studies.  These   form  a  wide-­‐‑ranging  
HE  reform  agenda  that  differs,  in  the  Iraqi  case,  from  a  common  conceptualisation  
of  reconstruction  as  rebuilding  critical  university  infrastructure.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  SRF	  Scholar,	  British	  Institute,	  Jordan	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2012	  
88	  Former	  Professor	  of	  Economics,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	  
89	  SRF	  Scholar	  and	  former	  lecturer,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  01/2011	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This  dichotomy  of  Iraqi  and  international  understandings  of  reconstruction  can  be  
illustrated   through   analysis   of   official   documents   of   international   agencies   and  
donors  involved  in  HE  in  post-­‐‑war  Iraq.  Many  statements  proclaim  success  in  post-­‐‑
war  Iraqi  HE.  As  early  as  late  July  2003  Munthe  (2003)  wrote  that  ‘universities  have  
been   a   rare   success   story   for   the   post-­‐‑Saddam   regime’,   citing   democratisation   of  
faculty   selection,   wage   increases,   regular   committee   meetings,   and   curricula  
revision  as  evidence.  Some  donors  or  agencies  have  released  press  releases  or  other  
‘grey  material’  that  contain  evaluations  of  their  own  projects.  For  example  the  CPA  
(2004)   Historic   Review   of   its   accomplishments   listed   its   successes;   the  
democratisation  of  selection  for  Deans  and  Presidents,  the  MoHE-­‐‑I  drive  to  increase  
salaries   of   faculty  members,   the   re-­‐‑engagement  of  universities,   staff,   and   students  
with   institutions   abroad,   and   an  official   statement   on   academic   freedom.  Another  
example,  USAID   (2005)  published   its  Top  Ten  Strategic  Accomplishments   in   Iraq.  
Number  ten  ‘Restoring  Excellence  in  Higher  Education’  states:  ‘university  facilities  -­‐‑
libraries,  computer  and  science  laboratories,  lecture  halls,  and  buildings  -­‐‑  have  been  
rehabilitated   at   colleges   throughout   the   country’.   This   statement   is   notable   as   the  
only   one   of   the   four   sources   cited   here   that   refers   to   physical   rebuilding   as   an  
indicator  of  success.    
Despite   the   large   number   of   projects   completed,   there   are   few   publicly   available  
evaluations   of   HE   projects   in   post-­‐‑conflict   environments,   other   than   the   above-­‐‑
reviewed  self-­‐‑evaluations  of  donors  and  agencies.  One  exception  is  CSIS  (2004),  an  
evaluation  of  reconstruction  efforts,  based  on  research  conducted  during  June  2004,  
that  found  HE  to  have  the  most  positive  indicators  of  all  education  sectors.    
US   Army   units   provided   another   source   of   HE   assistance,   in   particular,  
refurbishment   and   rebuilding   of   infrastructure   and   facilities.   For   example,   in  
Nineveh   the  US  Army  provided  $250,000   for  projects  at   four  HEIs90   in  addition   to  
electricity   generators   and   fibre-­‐‑optic   cable   for   internet   connectivity.91   Another  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  The	  four	  HEIs	  were	  the	  University	  of	  Mosul,	  Nineveh	  Technical	  College,	  Nineveh	  Technical	  Institute	  
and	  Al	  Hadba	  University	  College.	  	  
91	  Email	   interview,	  Wayne	  Bowen,	   former	  Civil	  Affairs	  officer	   responsible	   for	  Higher	  Education	  and	  
Antiquities	  in	  Northern	  Iraq,	  US	  Army	  -­‐	  Response	  received	  05/2012	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example,   an   Army   combat   team   in   Baquba   rebuilt   infrastructure   at   Yarmouk  
University   College   and   Baquba   Technical   Institute   which   were   damaged   during  
militia  attacks  in  2004  (Skelly  2005).  Furthermore,  Provincial  Reconstruction  Teams  
(PRTs),   assisted   in   rebuilding  HE;   from   2005   the   PRT   education   team   performed  
various  roles  for  example,  restoring  engineering  laboratory  facilities,  consulting  on  
accreditation,   and   training   faculty   in   student   advisory   services   (NASA   2010).   Al-­‐‑
Bakaa  held  that  military  cooperation  in  some  areas  was  very  effective  but  depended  
on  leadership  of  individual  commanders  and  that  the  military  was  sometimes  part  
of   the   problem   rather   than   solution.92   The   range   of   assistance   beyond   physical  
repair  provided  by  US  armed  forces  connects  to  the  theme  of  the  next  section,  ‘soft’  
assistance  to  Iraqi  HE.    
6.1.5. ‘Soft’  Assistance  
  
‘Soft’   assistance   refers   to   forms   of   HE   assistance   including   textbook   provision,  
library  support,  and  information  technologies.  CSIS  (2004,  p.87)  reports  ‘enormous  
outpouring  of  support  for  Iraq’s  universities  during  the  postwar  period  by  foreign  
universities   and   the   Iraqi   diaspora’.   Quantity   of   assistance   through   textbooks,  
university  partnerships,  virtual  libraries  and  other  similar  schemes  was  substantial  
compared   to   many   other   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts.   However,   assistance   was   largely  
local   and   ad   hoc.   Spurr   (2008,   p.273)   laments   that   no   major   foundations   offered  
support,   writing   that   ‘few   of   the   salient   international   actors   have   risen   to   the  
occasion  at  a  time  of  need’.    
  
Book   donations   constitute   the   single   largest   form   of   ‘soft’   assistance.   Books  were  
provided  by  donors,  including  the  Qatar  Foundation,  the  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia,  
and  UNESCO;   by   civil   society   organisations   including   the   Books   Beyond  Borders  
project   that   distributed   a  world-­‐‑wide   call   for   donations   to   Iraqi   universities;   and  
individual   universities   and   publishers   including   Duke   University   and   the  
University  of  Edinburgh  (Johnson  2005;  Agresto  2007).   In  quantitative  terms,  book  
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   Email	   interview,	  Dr	   Taher	   Bakaa,	   former	  Minister	   of	   Higher	   Education	   and	   Scientific	   Research	   -­‐	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donations  were  a  qualified  success   in  particular  universities  and  departments.  For  
example,   the  University  of  Baghdad’s  Faculty  of  Languages   collection  was  almost  
replenished   to   pre-­‐‑war   levels.93   In   another   example,   the   British   Council   provided  
logistical  support  for  shipment  of  55  tonnes  of  donated  books  (Johnson  2005).    
  
However,   various   criticisms   have   however   been   made   of   book   donations.   First,  
some  book-­‐‑drives  were  not  tailored  towards  actual  needs  of  university  libraries.  As  
Spurr   writes,   ‘Iraqi   faculty   and   students   need   books   right   now—and   not   simply  
books  to  fill  the  libraries  but  text  books  to  pass  to  students,  particularly  in  the  hard  
and   applied   sciences’   (cited   in   Johnson   2005).   Where   criteria   for   book   inclusion  
existed   it   was   often   broad,   such   as   post-­‐‑1995,   and   not   developed   in   consultation  
with  Iraqi  universities.  One  telling  example  is  a  US  Army  organised  book-­‐‑drive  for  
the  University  of  Mosul  that  delivered  thousands  of  books  from  the  US  yet  months  
after   delivery   95%   remained   in   boxes   because   most   books   were   primary   to  
secondary-­‐‑level  textbooks  with  many  duplicates  (Bowen  2007,  p.35).    
  
Another   criticism   is   that   book   donations   reflect   donor   political   agendas.   Johnson  
(2005)  quotes  a  book-­‐‑drive  from  a  US  organisation  that  received  some  CPA  support:    
  
Think  tanks  and  public  policy  institutes  within  the  freedom  network  to  donate  books  
and  other  publications  on  market  ideas  to  school  libraries  in  Iraq.  Since  we’re  in  the  
business  of  promoting  ideas,  what  better  way  to  spread  the  principles  and  virtues  of  
free-­‐‑market  capitalism!  
  
Such   statements   indicate   politicisation   of   ‘charitable’   action   towards   Iraqi   HE.  
Further,  advancement  of  free-­‐‑market  agendas  through  book  donations  forms  part  of  
the   wider   use   of   Iraqi   education   reform   as   a   tool   of   ‘democracy   promotion’   in  
service   of   wider   Bush   administration   goals   in   creating   a   liberal-­‐‑market   polity  
(Saltman  2006).    
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  Former	  Dean,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  01/2011	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Another   form   of   ‘soft’   assistance   was   support   for   rebuilding   university   libraries,  
which   it  was  seen   in   the  previous  chapter  were  severely  affected  by  post-­‐‑invasion  
looting.   Spurr   (2008)   holds   that   capacity-­‐‑building   for   Iraqi   university   librarians  
through   training   overseas   was   one   of   the   few   notable   successes   in   post-­‐‑war   HE  
assistance.   Much   assistance   for   HE   libraries   was   in   the   form   of   free   or   heavily  
discounted  access  to  online  content  of  academic  publishers.  For  example,  the  British  
Council   established   resource   centres   at   five   universities   (Johnson   2005).   Another  
example   is   the   US   State   Department   initiative   the   Iraqi   Virtual   Science   Library,  
which   provides   electronic   access   to   journals   and   online   subscriptions.   However,  
Virtual   Libraries   did   not   benefit  many   academics   due   to   the   failure   of   electricity  
provision   and   computer   shortages   caused   by   looting   and   under-­‐‑investment.94  
Moreover,  such  spending  may  be  criticised  as  an  inefficient  allocation  of  resources,  
particularly  when  there  were  pressing  physical  rebuilding  needs.    
  
In  sum,  HE  reconstruction  efforts  can  be  characterised  as  prioritising  small-­‐‑scale  ad-­‐‑
hoc  projects  over  physical   rehabilitation  of   critical  university   infrastructure.  When  
asked  about  HE  reconstruction  an  Iraqi  academic95  replied:  
  
What  reconstruction?  There  has  been  a  reversal  –  starting  in  2004  with  the  
sectarian  violence  many  teaching  staff   left  abroad,  either  because  of  direct  
threat   or   abduction.   Infrastructure   was   kept   as   it   is.   There   has   been   no  
serious  attempt  to  rebuild  the  industrial,  economic,  or  educational  systems.  
Some  colleges  got  assistance  from  NGOs  to  rebuild  some  damaged  colleges  
and   laboratories.   Some   NGOs   gave   furniture.   In   the   University   of  
Baghdad’s   Faculty   of   Languages   the   Germans   aided   the   German  
Department,  the  Italians  the  Italian  Department  and  so  on.  There  was  also  
some  repainting,  building  of  new  classrooms,  provision  of  computers  (from  
Germany)   and   furniture,   electrical   equipment,   lab   equipment,   and   air  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Former	  President,	  Al-­‐Mustansiriya	  University	  –	  Amman,	   Jordan	  01/2011.	  Also,	   former	  Professor,	  
University	  of	  Baghdad	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010.	  	  
95	  Former	  Faculty	  Dean,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010.	  Also,	  former	  Professor	  of	  
Economics,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  –	  02/2011	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conditioning   (from   Italy).  Additionally,  new  books  were  provided   for   the  
library,  except  in  Hebrew  or  Persian!  
  
The  above  quote  illustrates  the  trend  for  rebuilding  critical  infrastructure  to  receive  
significantly  less  resources  and  attention  than  ‘softer’  forms  of  assistance;  a  situation  
Agresto  (2007)  described  as  ‘all  assistance  short  of  actual  help’.  In  sum,  physical  HE  
reconstruction   was   under-­‐‑funded,   a   low   priority,   and   mis-­‐‑conceptualised   as  
rehabilitation.  The  Iraq  experience  suggests  the  need  for  a  holistic  HE  recovery  plan  
with  quick  and  effective  rebuilding  of  physical  infrastructure  including  laboratories,  
dormitories,  and  libraries.    
An  innovative  proposal   to  assist   Iraqi  HEIs,  a   ‘University   in  a  Box’,  was  proposed  
by  the  Office  of  Transition  Initiatives  (OTI)  to  provide  each  university  with  ‘desks,  
chairs,  doors,  blackboards,  lecterns…  whatever  was  needed  to  get  universities  back  
up   to   some   semblance   of   normality’   (Agresto   2007,   p.145).   This   type   of   response  
would  have  addressed   immediate  needs  with  major   impacts  on  HE  capacity  at  an  
early   recovery   stage.  However,   the   proposal  was   not   implemented   leading   to   the  
failure   to  meet  raised  expectations  of  university  Presidents.  This  section  has  so  far  
analysed  the  type  of  assistance  and  rebuilding  efforts  in  Iraqi  HE;  in  the  next  section  
it  will  be  seen  that  the  forms  of  HE  recovery  in  some  ways  evolved  over  the  course  
of  Iraq’s  post-­‐‑war  transition.    
  
6.1.6. Transfer  of  Sovereignty  
  
On   28th   June   2004   sovereignty   was   officially   transferred   to   the   Iraqi   Interim  
Government.   Political   transition   was   accompanied   by   both   continuity   and  
discontinuity  with  CPA  HE  policy.  The  newly  appointed  Minister  Tahir  Al-­‐‑Bakaa  
notes   five   new  directions   in  HE   policy   under   the   interim   government;   increasing  
faculty   salaries   by   100%,   increasing   rebuilding   budgets,   allocating   $100   million  
annually  for  scholarships  abroad,  granting  universities  autonomy,  and  establishing  
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international   university   partnerships.96   Increased   salaries   and   rebuilding   mark  
minor   modifications,   while   internationalisation   and   greater   autonomy   are  
continuations  of  CPA-­‐‑initiated  policies.    
  
In  May  2005  the  Iraqi  Transitional  Government  was  formed  and  Sami  Al-­‐‑Mudhaffer  
appointed   Minister.   In   the   2005-­‐‑2008   period   the   broad   contours   of   HE   policy  
remained   in   place   with   decentralisation,   privatisation,   internationalisation,   and  
reconstruction   spending.   With   major   insecurity   during   2005-­‐‑08   due   to   sectarian  
violence,  HE  suffered  considerably.  A  significant  drop  in  violence  in  2008,  widely-­‐‑
attributed   to   the   troop   surge   and   Sahwa   movement,   is   viewed   as   an   important  
moment   for  HE.   Improved   security   removed   several  major   obstacles   to   academic  
life.  Importantly,  sectarian  conflict  that  threatened  universities  in  the  first  five  post-­‐‑
war  years  decreased  in  intensity.    
  
Iraq’s   HE   system   by   2010   was   proclaimed   to   have   recovered   and   moved   into   a  
development   and   internationalisation   phase   (Lindsay   2012).   In   January   2009   the  
ambitious   Iraq   Education   Initiative   was   announced   with   $1   billion   pledged   for  
overseas   scholarships.   Additionally,   with   improved   security,   international  
partnerships   established   between   Iraqi   and   foreign   universities   increased.   These  
developments  brought  increased  attention  to  Iraqi  HE  which  was  now  viewed  more  
as  a  potential  market  than  a  tragic  story.  Iraq’s  HE  sector,  once  a  neglected  aspect  of  
reconstruction,   emerged   as   a   relatively   high-­‐‑profile   policy   issue.   Ambitious   HE  
reform  plans  were  announced  in  2011  including  greater  autonomy,  establishment  of  
specialised   institutes,   and   opening   of   foreign   branch   campuses   with   the   goal   of  
establishing  a  knowledge-­‐‑society  (Sawahel  2011).  Furthermore,  Iraqi  HE  came  to  be  
viewed   as   a  means   of   stabilisation.   Former  US  Ambassador   to   Iraq  Ryan  Crocker  
(2008b)  writes  that:  
As  a  barometer   for   Iraq'ʹs   future,  University   of  Baghdad'ʹs  Class   of  2008   signals   a  
step  towards  normalcy.  In  a  secure  environment,  away  from  the  noise  of  politicking  
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  Email	  interview,	  Dr	  Tahir	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  of	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  and	  Scientific	  Research.	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and  free  from  the  influence  of  malign  actors,  Iraqi  students  show  a  strong  interest  in  
professional   careers   as   doctors,   engineers   or   scientists,   while   still   possessing   a  
broader  appreciation  for  languages,  history  and  literature.  
In  sum,  the  narrative  holds  that  frustrated  recovery  during  2003-­‐‑07  was  followed  by  
relatively   healthier   academic   development   from   2008   under   more   favourable  
conditions.   At   an   IIE   conference   on   rebuilding   Iraqi   HE,   it   was   observed   that  
serving  university  Presidents   and  a  Cultural  Attaché  presented   such  a  narrative.97  
However,   this   narrative   was   challenged   by   many   participants,   the   majority   of  
whom  had  fled  Iraq.  It  was  held  that  the  Presidents  were  attempting  to  cover  over  
the   negative   points   to   promote   their   universities   and   secure   opportunities   for  
outside  assistance  and  cooperation.98  This  position  is  also  defended  by  Jawad  (2010)  
in  criticising  HE  Minister  Abd  Ajaili’s  positive  appraisal  of  Iraqi  HE  (Labi  2010a).    
However,   with   US   troop   withdrawal   in   2011,   protracted   insurgency,   political  
gridlock,  and  serious  gaps  in  state  capacity  Iraq  during  2008-­‐‑2013  remained  a  fragile  
state.   HE   was   a   source   of   potential   instability   in   this   period.   For   example,   de-­‐‑
Baathification  of  universities  in  Salah  ad  Din  was  a  tense  political  issue  with  faculty  
members  removed  or  demoted  in  2006  and  2007.  The  majority  of  Sunnis  in  Salah  ad  
Din   province   view   de-­‐‑Baathification   ‘as   a   psychological   symbol   of   what   they  
perceive  to  be  a  Shia-­‐‑dominated  government'ʹs  rejection  of  their  participation  in  the  
political   process’   (Crocker   2007).   In   this   fragile   context   de-­‐‑Baathification   of  
university   faculty   was   feared   to   significantly   increase   grievances   and   potentially  
turn  disaffected  citizens  towards  insurgent  groups  (Khalilzad  2006).  The  removal  or  
demotion  of  140  Professors  at  Tikrit  University  in  2011  sparked  a  political  crisis  and  
inflamed  sectarian   tensions   in   the  province.  Moreover,  deterioration  of   security   in  
2013   to   pre-­‐‑2008   levels   threatened   to   reverse   fragile   gains   and   shatter   growing  
optimism  around  HE  development  and  international  cooperation.    
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  Based	  on	  observation	  of	  presentations	  and	  discussions	  at	  the	  IIE/SRF	  Conference	  “Reconstruction	  
of	  Iraqi	  Higher	  Education	  Post-­‐Conflict”.	  26-­‐28	  January	  2011	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  Amman,	  Jordan.	  
98	  Former	  vice-­‐President	  for	  Academic	  Affairs,	  al-­‐Nahrain	  University	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011;	  also	  





In  this  section  efforts  to  rebuild  and  reform  post-­‐‑war  Iraqi  HE  have  been  analysed  
in  terms  of  CPA-­‐‑led  reform,  physical  reconstruction,  and  ‘soft’  assistance.  The  main  
findings   are   that   CPA-­‐‑initiated   reforms  were   not   developed   in   consultation  with  
Iraqi  academic  experts,  met  with  considerable  resistance,  and  in  some  ways  further  
eroded   rather   than   supported   existing   capacities.   It   was   also   seen   that   physical  
reconstruction  was  unsuccessful,  receiving  insufficient  resources  and  attention.  This  
was   explained   by   weaknesses   in   HE   financing   modalities,   HE’s   low   priority   in  
reconstruction   strategy,   and   a   conception   of   ‘reconstruction’   held   by   donors   and  
agencies   that   incorporated   a   wider   set   of   tasks   than   physical   rebuilding.   Rather,  
‘soft’   assistance   was   forthcoming,   which   while   offering   valuable   resources   at   a  
critical   moment,   arguably   was   not   an   optimal   resource   allocation   given   the  
immediate  needs  presented  by  physical  destruction.  In  the  next  section  analysis  will  
shift   from   considering   the   reconstruction   of   Iraqi  HE   to   the   contribution   that   the  
sector  made  towards  post-­‐‑war  recovery.    
  
6.2. Assessing   the   Contribution   of   Higher   Education   to   Post-­‐‑conflict  
Recovery  
  
In   this   section   Iraqi  HE’s  contribution   to  post-­‐‑conflict   recovery  will  be  assessed   in  
terms  of  the  broad  categories  surveyed  in  chapter  three  in  order  to  address  RQ3.  To  
begin,   stabilisation   will   be   analysed   followed   by   physical   and   sectoral  
reconstruction,   economic   recovery,   statebuilding,   democratisation,   conflict  
transformation,   and   reconciliation.   It   will   be   seen   that   Iraqi   HE’s   contribution   to  
recovery  should  be  judged  to  be  low;  a  finding  that  is  subsequently  analysed  in  the  
following   section   on   features   of   the   post-­‐‑war   environment   influencing   the   HE-­‐‑




6.2.1. Stabilisation  and  Security  Reform  
  
Iraq’s   post-­‐‑war   environment   can   be   characterised   as   highly   unstable  with   intense  
violence,   weak   rule   of   law,   state   fragility,   and   perpetual   political   crisis.  
Stabilisation’s   emergence   as   a   primary   concern   of   post-­‐‑war   reconstruction  
interventions   was   in   part   driven   by   the   perceived   failure   to   maintain   a   level   of  
stability   sufficient   to   achieving   positive   post-­‐‑war   outcomes   in   Iraq   (Gordon   2010;  
Griffin  2011).  While  it  may  be  expected  that  HE  is  far-­‐‑removed  from  hard  security  
concerns  of  stabilisation,   Iraqi  HE  has  been  viewed  as  both  driving   instability  and  
acting  as  a  bulwark  against  destabilisation.  Iraqi  HE’s  positive  role  in  stabilisation  is  
reflected  in  a  USAID  statement  in  2004:  
Iraq'ʹs   universities   are   leading   efforts   to   increase   stability   and   advance   democratic  
progress.   Universities   provide   jobs   and   opportunities   for   sound   intellectual  
development   to   the   important   demographic   of   18-­‐‑25   year   old   youth.   These  
intellectual   leaders   and   youths   are   potential   targets   for   terrorist   recruiters,   who  
manipulate   them   as   foot   soldiers   and   seek   the   technical   expertise   of   scientists   and  
technicians.  
This   statement   makes   a   strong   claim   that   post-­‐‑war   Iraqi   HE   functioned   in   the  
manner   identified  in  chapter  three  by  providing  an  outlet   for   the  energy  of  young  
potentially  destabilising  youth  and  thereby  contributed  to  conflict  prevention.99  It  is  
commonly   held   that   a   major   driver   of   state-­‐‑breakdown   and   fragility   was   CPA  
Order   Number   2   which   disbanded   Iraq’s   security   forces   leaving   hundreds   of  
thousands   of   mostly   fighting-­‐‑age   males   with   little   non-­‐‑military   experience  
unemployed  thus  enabling  easy  recruitment  for  militias  and  insurgent  groups  (Al-­‐‑
Marashi  &  Salama  2006,  p.206;  Pfiffner  2010).    
  
The   USAID   claim   is   that   HE   reduced   this   large   recruiting   pool   thus   mitigating  
conflict  and  insecurity.  Looney  (2005)  supports  this  claim  citing  the  fact  that  83%  of  
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  See	  section	  3.2.1.	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students   returned   to  HEIs   in   2003   as   evidence   of   the   sector’s   positive   affect   upon  
stabilisation.   However,   it   should   be   qualified   that   security   obstacles   dramatically  
lowered  attendance  rates100  thus  limiting  the  absorptive  capacity  of  the  HE  sector  in  
relation  to  stabilisation  goals.    
  
Following   the   Iraqi   army’s   disbanding   no   national-­‐‑scale   DDR   programme   was  
established.   Given   Iraq’s   high   level   of   secondary   education   completion   and   very  
high   percentage   of   its   population   in   the   critical   17-­‐‑24   age   group   the   HE   system  
could   have   played   a   significant   role   in   any   DDR   process.   In   this   counter-­‐‑factual  
scenario   purpose   and   direction   could   have   been   provided   to   young   unemployed  
males  through  HE  opportunities  thus  mitigating  a  major  conflict-­‐‑risk.    
  
However,  rather  than  view  HE  as  a  tool  for  stabilisation,  US  planners  and  Coalition  
forces   predominantly   framed   HE   as   a   security   threat.   Before   invasion   Iraqi  
universities  were  suspected  of  involvement  in  weapons  programmes  including  the  
elusive  WMD.   In   pre-­‐‑war   reconstruction   planning   the  MoHE-­‐‑I  was   placed   under  
the  Department  of  Defence  as   lead  agency  with  two  Ministerial   functions   listed  as  
‘training/testing   facilities   of   WMD’   and   ‘recruitment   of   scientific   personnel   for  
WMD  scientists’  (Benashel  et  al  2008,  p.61).  Furthermore,  the  first,  albeit  short-­‐‑lived,  
CPA   HE   advisor,   Andrew   Erdmann,   was   a   WMD   expert   (Asquith   2004).  
Watenpaugh  et  al  (2003)  write  that:  
  
The  American   agenda   for   Iraq’s   universities   is   not   an  unqualified   commitment   to  
the  development  of  a   system  of  higher   education   that  will   serve  as  a  basis   for  civil  
society.  Rather  counter-­‐‑terrorism  and  non-­‐‑proliferation  drive  American  efforts.  
  
Iraqi   HE   and   academia   were   considered   a   limited   threat   during   invasion.  
Reportedly,   one   institute   at   the   University   of   Baghdad-­‐‑Abu   Ghraib   campus,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




suspected   of   producing   anthrax,   was   destroyed   by   the   Coalition   in   2003.101  
However,   HE   was   still   viewed   as   a   security   threat   during   occupation.   The  
universities-­‐‑terrorism  link  is  made  by  a  report  describing  the  University  of  Mosul  as  
a   ‘safe   haven   for   terrorists  who  pose   as   and   intimidate   real   students’   and   that   its  
Chemistry  Department  was  ‘actively  assisting  terrorism  on  a  tactical  level’  (Butenis  
2008).  
  
Significantly,   Iraq’s   nuclear   and   weapons   scientists   were   targeted   with   two  
programmes   intended   to   prevent   their   migration   to   countries   seeking   nuclear  
weapons.  Roston   (2004)   reports   that   the  CPA  2004  budget  allocated  $60  million   to  
programmes  for  re-­‐‑directing  WMD  scientists;  a  very  large  figure  compared  to  the  $8  
million  initially  budgeted  for  CPA  HE  programming.  One  participant  who  was  part  
of   the   programme   argued   that   they  were   not   structured   towards   re-­‐‑skilling   Iraqi  
scientists  but  rather  to  prevent  their  flight  and  as  a  result  a  major  potential  human  
capital  resource  for  contributing  to  reconstruction  was  not  utilised.102  
  
Further  into  Iraq’s  post-­‐‑war  trajectory  HE  became  more  fully  recognised  as  a  means  
of   improving   security.   HE   was   integrated   into   the   Security   Sector   Reform   (SSR)  
effort   through   the  National  Defence  University   (NDU)   established   in   2006   by   the  
NATO  Training  Mission  in  Iraq  (NTM-­‐‑I)  and  functioning  as  an  umbrella  institution  
for   officer   education   and   training.  While  NDU   is   not   a   conventional   university   it  
forms   part   of   Iraq’s   HE   system.   The   university   offers   three-­‐‑year   degrees   and  
graduated  approximately  3,933  officers  across  its  various  programmes  during  2006-­‐‑
2011  (NATO  2011).    
On  balance  it  can  be  concluded  that  Iraqi  HE  made  a  moderate  contribution  to  the  
task  of  stabilisation  although  the  sector’s  potential  was  limited  by  the  securitisation  
of  the  sector  and  lack  of  innovative  DDR  programmes.  Another  area  where  Iraqi  HE  
made  some  contribution  to  recovery  goals,  albeit  frustrated  by  various  factors,  was  
in  physical  and  sectoral  reconstruction  which  will  be  considered  now.    
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6.2.2. Physical  and  Sectoral  Reconstruction  
  
Decades  of  war  and  displacement  had  a  devastating  impact  on  Iraq’s  human  capital  
leaving   the  HE  sector  with  an   immense  challenge  of  producing  graduates   to  meet  
post-­‐‑war  human  resource  needs.  This  section  will  assess  Iraqi  HE’s  contribution  to  
meeting   human   capital   needs   for   reconstruction   of   key   sectors.   Furthermore,  
utilisation  of  university  expertise  and  capacity   in  research  and  consultancy  related  
to  post-­‐‑war  reconstruction  activities  will  be  addressed.    
  
In   terms   of  HE  programmes   there  was   little   indication   that   content   and   curricula  
were  adapted  to  reconstruction  needs.  While  new  programmes  were  introduced  in  
subjects  including  human  rights  and  conflict  resolution  there  are  very  few  examples  
of   new   courses   on   technical   or   practical   dimensions   of   rebuilding   damaged  
infrastructure.   For   example,   engineering   curricula   require  major   revision   to  meet  
industrial   development   and   physical   rebuilding   needs   (Mohamed   2012).   In  
particular,  petroleum  and  chemical  engineering,  geology,  and  related  disciplines  are  
held  to  insufficiently  support  oil-­‐‑sector  reconstruction.103    
A   contrary   example,   an   Iranian  university  provided  assistance   to  Kufa  University  
through   training   for   architecture   faculty   members   on   rehabilitation   and  
sustainability   which   are   of   direct   relevance   to   reconstruction.104   Furthermore,   in  
2011  the  British  Council  (n.d.)  DelPHE  programme  supported  cooperation  between  
Salford   and   Basra   universities   to   establish   a   built   environment   research   centre   to  
supply  Iraqi  graduates  in  rebuilding,  urban  planning,  and  project  management  vital  
to   physical   reconstruction.   While   this   is   a   positive   example   of   international  
assistance   providing   relevant   skills,   such   programmes   could   have   had   a   major  
impact  in  the  early  recovery  stages.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  Former	  Minister	  of	  Planning	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  Baban	  -­‐	  Manchester,	  England	  04/2013	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  An	  Iranian	  Professor	  of	  Architecture	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2011	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Post-­‐‑war  medical  education  was  expected  to  produce  the  new  generation  of  health  
professionals  that  could  rebuild  Iraq’s  shattered  healthcare  system.  In  1999  Iraq  had  
a   doctor-­‐‑to-­‐‑population   ratio   of   53   per   100,000   people,   low   by   regional   standards;  
four   times   lower   than   neighbouring   Jordan   (Garfield   &   McCarthy   2005).   This  
situation   was   significantly   worsened   post-­‐‑2003   as   the   Iraqi   Medical   Association  
estimated   that   of   34,000  physicians  working   in   Iraq   in   2003   2,000  were  killed   and  
18,000   fled   abroad   (Webster   2009a).   Physicians   and   academics   in   health-­‐‑related  
fields   were   disproportionately   affected   by   violence   (Webster   2009b).   Moreover,  
health  professionals  suffered  strongly  from  international  isolation  as  many  studied  
abroad  prior   to   sanctions   (Amin  &  Khoshnaw   2003).   The   need   to   restore  medical  
sector   human   resources   was   therefore   an   urgent   health   reconstruction   task.  
However,  Mosawi  (2008)  found  that  physician  supply  from  Iraqi  medical  education  
was  not  aligned  with  healthcare  human  resources  needs.    
  
Moreover,  Iraq’s  post-­‐‑war  environment  was  shaped  by  a  major  public  health  crisis  
(Rawaf   2005).   Recognising   Iraqi   universities’   potential   to   respond   to   this   crisis  
Hughes   et   al   (2005)   describe   their   involvement   in   a   capacity-­‐‑building   project   to  
improve   expertise,   training,   and   public   health   service   provision   in   Mosul  
University’s  public  health  education.  However,   they  hold  that   in  general   there  are  
major  limitations  to  this  model  because  in  their  words  Iraqi  ‘universities  have  been  
unable   to   help   because   under-­‐‑funding   and   isolation   from   their   professional  
colleagues  has  limited  their  effectiveness’.  Moreover,  medical  knowledge  was  found  
to   be   very   limited;   only   20%   of   physicians   with   post-­‐‑graduate   qualifications   had  
knowledge   of   evidence-­‐‑based   medicine   (Webster   2009b).   In   a   study   of   Iraqi  
physicians   21%   viewed   medical   education   as   the   main   priority   for   future   health  
system   reconstruction,   the   second   highest   priority   after   administration,   35%  
(Squires,   Sindi   &   Fennie   2010).   These   weaknesses   limited   Iraqi   medical   schools’  
contribution  to  post-­‐‑war  humanitarian  and  reconstruction  challenges.    
  
Rapid   processes   of   privatising   state-­‐‑owned   enterprises,   liberalisation,   and  
marketisation   (Yousif   2006;   Abboud   2008)   combined   with   insecurity,   corruption,  
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and  mismanagement  triggered  collapse  of  Iraq’s  post-­‐‑war  economy.  This  structural  
context  limited  HE’s  contribution  to  economic  recovery  and  reconstruction.  Earlier  
it  was  seen  that  Iraqi  university-­‐‑industry  linkages  and  military-­‐‑university-­‐‑industry  
linkages  were  relatively  strong.  The  former  were  frustrated  by  domestic   industrial  
collapse  which  limited  opportunities  to  conduct  research  and  consultancy  while  the  
latter   were   frustrated   as   the   Coalition   did   not   permit   the   re-­‐‑opening   of   military  
industries.105  A  former  senior  MIC  scientist  stated  that  while  some  grants  were  still  
available   it   was   less   than   10%   of   pre-­‐‑war   levels.106   Furthermore,   old   university-­‐‑
industry   collaboration   models   were   disrupted.   For   example,   due   to   industrial  
collapse  University  of  Technology  students   could  no   longer  have  placement  years  
in  industry  thus  impeding  skills-­‐‑transfer  and  reducing  employability.107    
With   many   reconstruction   firms   operating   in   Iraq   there   were   opportunities  
available   for   consultancy   and   applied   research.   However,   Iraqis   were   largely  
ignored   as   employees   by   many   reconstruction   contractors,   in   particular   at  
management-­‐‑levels  (Herring  &  Rangwala  2006).  As  Crocker  (2004)  writes  ‘the  Bush  
administration’s   reliance  on   large  U.S.   contractors   to  perform  reconstruction  work  
in  Iraq  is  not  only  far  more  expensive  than  hiring  Iraqi  companies,  it  also  means  that  
too   small   an   amount   of   U.S.   reconstruction   funds   is   being   used   to   hire   Iraqis,  
capitalize  Iraq’s  economy,  and  build  local  capacity’.    
It   should   be   qualified   that   some   universities   did   conduct   consultancy   for  
reconstruction   firms,   for   example,   the   University   of   Technology108   and   Al-­‐‑
Mustansiriya   University109   through   their   Engineering   Consultancy   Bureaus.  
However,   in   general   this   may   be   described   as   a   missed   opportunity   to   harness  
domestic   capacity   for   reconstruction   while   at   the   same   time   contributing   to   HE  
regeneration.    
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  Dr	  Sadiq	  Nasrullah,	  Cultural	  Attaché,	  Embassy	  of	  the	  Republic	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  Iraq	  in	  Jordan.	  Amman,	  Jordan	  
02/2011	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  Dr	  Rawa	  Said,	  Ex-­‐Manager,	  Iraqi	  Space	  Centre.	  Amman,	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  12/2010	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  Dr	  Kahtan	  Al-­‐Khazraji,	  President,	  University	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  01/2011	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   Email	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   Engineer	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   received	   August	   2013.	   Also,	   Dr	   Kahtan	   Al-­‐Khazraji,	   President,	   University	   of	   Technology.	  
Amman,	  Jordan	  01/2011	  
109	   Former	   Professor	   of	   Engineering	   and	   Head	   of	   the	   Engineering	   Consultancy	   Bureau	   at	   Al-­‐
Mustansiriya	  University	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2012	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Brain   drain   and   violence   against   professionals   also   severely   limited   the   ability   of  
Iraqi   expertise   to   contribute   to   reconstruction.   There   was   a   consensus   among  
interviewees   that   weakening   of   Iraq’s   professional   and   academic   classes   was   a  
central   factor   explaining   perceived   failure   of   post-­‐‑war   reconstruction.   Here   it   is  
worth   quoting   Scott   Ritter,   former  WMD   Inspector   (quoted   in   Salama   &   Hunter  
2006).  
Saddam   was   extremely   successful   in   running   the   country   because   of   the   ample  
reservoir   of   technocrats   at   his   disposal.   While   he   had   people   such   as   Ja'ʹafar,  
accomplished   scientists   capable   of   swiftly   rebuilding  damaged  public   services   such  
as  water  and  electricity,  the  new  Iraqi  government  and  coalition  forces  are  lacking  in  
such  resources,  and  therefore  not  nearly  as  successful  in  the  reconstruction  of  Iraq.  
The  vital  contingent  of  human  academic  resources  is  currently  simply  not  available.  
The   last   sentence   of   the   above   paragraph   strongly   illustrates   the   point   that  
intellectual   capacity   is   a   fundamental   factor   influencing   effective   post-­‐‑war  
reconstruction.   However,   a   central   conclusion   from   this   section   is   that   post-­‐‑war  
Iraq’s   intellectual   capacity   was   weakened   and   under-­‐‑utilised   in   physical   and  
sectoral   reconstruction.   Another   area   in   which   Iraq’s   academic   and   intellectual  
capacities   were   under-­‐‑utilised   was   in   post-­‐‑war   statebuilding,   a   vital   task   that   is  
considered  in  the  next  section.    
  
6.2.3. Statebuilding    
  
On  statebuilding  goals   Iraqi  HE  made  a   limited  contribution  due  to   low  resources  
invested   in   areas   of   HE   critical   to   restoring   state   and   institutional   capacities.  
Rathmell  et  al  (2007)  find  that  capacity-­‐‑building  efforts  through  overseas  training  of  
Ministry   staff   were   perceived   to   be   generally   ineffective.   Efforts   to   improve  
governance   faced   numerous   obstacles   including   insecurity   and   elite   resistance  
(Brinkerhoff   &   Mayfield   2005).   However,   it   has   been   held   that   if   HE   had   been  
supported   thoroughly   at   an   early   stage   of   recovery   and   linked   strategically   to  
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capacity-­‐‑building   efforts   then   it   could  have  had   a  major   impact.   For   example,  Ali  
Baban,  former  Minister  of  Planning,  110  states  that:  
  
There  is  a  lack  of  robust  focus  on  higher  education  –  it   is  a  case  of  the  chicken  and  
the   egg   –  we  need   a   critical  mass   of   educated   students   to   be   immediate   leaders   in  
science  and  technology  –  architects,  engineers,  experts  etc  –  but  in  Iraq  they  are  not  
being   churned   out.   Development   agencies   are   filling   the   gap   but   half-­‐‑heartedly.  
With  these  graduates  there  can  be  genuine  ownership  over  a  period  of  time.  
  
Similarly,  Ghani  and  Lockhart   (2008,  p.143)  criticise  under-­‐‑prioritisation  of  HE  for  
precipitating   a   culture   of   technical   assistance   that   is   implemented   by   numerous  
agencies,   poorly   coordinated,   and   therefore   incapable   of   addressing   ‘Iraqi  
priorities’.  They  hold   that   investing   in  HE  could  have  enabled  much  greater   long-­‐‑
term  sustainability  of  capacity-­‐‑building  efforts.  
  
In   terms   of   legitimacy,   failure   to   create   legitimate   institutions   drove   post-­‐‑war  
fragility  (Herring  &  Rangwala  2006;  Papagianni  2008).  Effective  HE  service-­‐‑delivery  
did   not   enhance   the   Iraqi   government’s   performance-­‐‑related   legitimacy.   Rather,  
destruction  of  Iraqi  universities  and  continued  challenges  facing  the  sector  worked  
to  undermine  the  state’s  fragile  legitimacy  in  the  eyes  of  the  academic  community,  
students,   and   the   wider   public.111   To   underline   HE’s   relevance   to   popular  
conceptions   of   legitimacy   in   the   Iraqi   context,   it   should   be   noted   that   elite   exile  
politicians  and  CPA  staff  were  described  as  touting  their  academic  certificates  and  
credentials   in   a   bid   to   enhance   public   confidence   in   their   abilities   (Allawi   2007).  
Furthermore,  this  credentialist  imperative  to  bolster  legitimacy  was  itself  a  dynamic  
negatively   affecting   HE   as   it   increased   the   trend   of   forgeries,   degree-­‐‑mill  
universities,  and  academic  corruption.    
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  Ali	  Baban,	  former	  Minister	  of	  Planning.	  Manchester,	  England	  04/2013	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  SRF	  Scholar	  and	  former	   lecturer,	  University	  of	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  01/2011;	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   02/2011;	   former	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Establishing  rule  of  law  is  central  to  statebuilding  and  it  is  held  that  legal  education  
can   support   legal   and   justice   institutions   in   post-­‐‑conflict   societies.   As   one  
participant   asked   ‘how   can   you   actually   get   people   to   take   part   in   the   system,   to  
respect   it,   to   enrich   democratic   experience   and   accept   rule   of   law   and   all   of   that  
when   they   are   not   properly   educated?’.112   Several   international   assistance  
programmes  were  launched  to  support  Iraqi  legal  education  including  through  the  
American   Bar   Association   and   USAID   (Hill   2011).   The   British   Council   DelPHE  
programme   in   2010   supported   a   cooperative   project   between   De   Montfort   and  
Kerbala  universities  on  forensic  science;  a  clear  recognition  of  the  importance  of  HE  
capacity   in   specialised   fields   to   the   complex   process   of   building   a   modernised  
justice  sector.    
  
However,   despite   these   efforts   legal   education   insufficiently   supplied   human  
capital  needs  in  the  legal  profession.  It  is  reported  that  ‘the  higher  legal  curriculum  
is   lacking   an   adequate   syllabus’   thus   creating   an   ‘education   gap’   that   must   be  
addressed   to   ‘re-­‐‑build  an   independent   legal  system’   (EU  2010).  Furthermore,   legal  
education   struggled   to   adapt   effectively   to   the   complex   changes   in   the   legal   and  
administrative  spheres  of  Iraq’s  post-­‐‑conflict  environment.  An  indicator  of   this,  an  
Iraqi   Professor   reported   that   in   some   law   faculties   seven   years   after   the   former  
regime  fell  Saddam-­‐‑era  law  was  still  taught.113  Furthermore,  Hamoudi  (2005)  argues  
that  Iraq’s  legal  education  is  highly  didactic  and  lacking  in  clinic-­‐‑based  experiential  
learning.  He  states   ‘one  of   the  best  ways   to  prepare  a  student   to  practice   law  is   to  
have  the  student  actually  practice  law’.  Iraqi  law  graduates  are  found  to  be  lacking  
in  experience   that   could  enable   them   to  have  a  greater   impact  on  establishing   the  
rule  of  law  and  strengthening  justice  sector  reform  immediately  after  graduation.    
  
In   addition,   legal   expertise   of   Iraqi   universities   was   not   mobilised   towards  
transitional   tasks.  The  passing  of   the   Iraqi   constitution  of   2005  marked  one  of   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  Dr	  Dlawer	  Ala’aldeen,	   former	  Minister	  of	  Higher	  Education	   in	   the	  KRG	  and	  Professor	  of	  Clinical	  
Microbiology	  at	  Nottingham	  University.	  Nottingham,	  UK.	  07/2013	  
113	   Personal	   communication,	   anonymous	   Professor	   of	   Law,	   University	   of	   Basra.	   Conference	   on	  
Rebuilding	  Basra.	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	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most  significant  moments  in  the  post-­‐‑war  statebuilding  process.  There  was  concern  
in  the  Iraqi  academic  community  over  ‘marginalization  of  prominent  constitutional  
experts   and   law   professors   in   Iraqi   universities   and   excluding   them   from   the  
constitutional   commission   mandated   to   draft   Iraq’s   future   constitution’   (UNDP  
2003b).    
  
In  conclusion  it  can  be  stated  that  Iraqi  HE  made  a  very  low  contribution  towards  
the  main  tasks  of  statebuilding.  Moreover,  given  the  significance  of  state  weakness  
to   Iraq’s   continued   post-­‐‑war   problems   this   could   be   considered   a   major   missed  
opportunity.  Central  to  the  challenge  of  rebuilding  the  Iraqi  state  was  the  process  of  




Building   democratic   institutions   and   a   democratic   culture  were   central   to   the  US  
conception  of  Iraq’s  statebuilding  project  as  one  of  constructing  a  liberal  democratic  
polity  in  the  Middle  East  to  act  as  a  democratic  beacon  for  the  region.  Iraqi  HE  was  
viewed   by   several   key   external   actors   as   having   potential   to   support  
democratisation.   For   example,   the   US   State   Department’s   Future   of   Iraq   Project  
stresses  the  importance  of  post-­‐‑war  HE  founded  on  meritocracy,  state  regulation  of  
new  ethnic  or  religious  HEIs,  introduction  of  elective  modules,  and  offering  courses  
on   democratic   thought,   constitutions,   and   processes   (Department   of   State   2002).  
However,   democratisation  was   not   a  major   theme   in   interview   data;   rather  most  
participants   viewed   issues   of   democratisation   and   human   rights   as   very   low  
priorities  given  the  immense  post-­‐‑war  challenges  facing  Iraq.    
  
Latif   (2005)   states,   ‘university   students   represent   the  most-­‐‑educated   tier   of   Iraq’s  
young   men   and   women.   The   prospect   of   democracy   in   Iraq   largely   rests   on   the  
shoulders  of  these  students,  as  they  will  be  the  future  leaders  and  policy  makers  of  
this   country’.   He   found   that   while   there  was   broad   support   for   democracy  most  
students   valued   democracy   for   instrumental   rather   than   intrinsic   reasons,   for  
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example,  holding  that  95%  believed  that  universal  employment  was  fundamental  to  
democracy  with  only  55%  reporting   the   same   for   freedom  to   join  political  parties.  
Davis   (2005a)   proposes   university-­‐‑based   civic   education   programmes   to   address  
this  lack  of  democratic  knowledge.    
  
It  was  seen  in  chapter  three  that  in  theory  HE  can  function  as  a  ‘training  ground’  for  
political   and   civic   life   through   participation   in   student   organisations   and   other  
campus-­‐‑based  activities.  On  the  one  hand,  student  unions  were  established  with  a  
charter  setting  out  democratic  principles   to  govern  student  elections.  Although,  as  
the  Economist   (2004)  reports,  some  student  elections  were  cancelled  due  to  fear  of  
violence.    
  
However,  participants  held  that  this  model  was  constrained  by  the  perceived  need  
of   university   management   to   prevent   the   infiltration   of   student   groups   and  
activities  by  ‘outside’  actors  such  as  political  parties  and  militia.114  For  example,  the  
President   of   the   University   of   Technology   held   that   he   threatened   to   resign   if  
political   and   sectarian   groups   were   active   on   campus.115   As   a   result   of   this  
imperative  to  maintain  order  on  campus  the  potential  of  the  sector  to  contribute  to  
civil  society  and  political  development  was  limited.    
  
Yet,  as  will  be  seen  in  more  detail  later,  while  universities  including  the  University  
of  Technology  and  Mosul  were  held  to  be  relatively  successful  at  maintaining  order,  
others   did   not   possess   such   control   and   powerful   student   groups   allied   with  
‘outside’  parties  emerged.   In   these  cases  HE  was  perceived   to   function  partly  as  a  
‘hothouse’   for   students   to  enter   illicit  networks  and   intimidate  other   students  and  
staff  rather  than  as  a  ‘training  ground’.      
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  SRF	  Scholar	  at	  British	   Institute	   in	   Jordan	  –	  Amman,	   Jordan	  02/2011;	   former	  Dean,	  University	  of	  
Baghdad	   –	   Amman,	   Jordan	   12/2010;	   former	   Professor	   of	   Engineering,	   Al-­‐Nahrain	   University	   –	  
Amman,	  Jordan	  01/2011;	  former	  Dean,	  Basra	  University	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
115	  Dr	  Kahtan	  Al-­‐Khazraji,	  President,	  University	  of	  Technology	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  01/2011	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Since  2003  there  have  been  efforts  to  introduce  ‘non-­‐‑traditional’  subjects  to  enhance  
democratisation.   Curriculum   reform   is   cited   as   a   relative   success,   for   example,  
Reddy   (2005a)   notes   the   ‘progress’   of   introducing   subjects   including   democracy,  
human   rights,   and   ‘anti-­‐‑terrorism’;   UNESCO   (2008)   recommends   ‘courses   and  
programmes  in  Iraqi  universities  that  enhance  national  identity  and  promote  active  
citizenship,   freedom   of   expression,   as   well   as   civil   society   and   human   rights  
culture’;   and   Harb   (2008)   proposes   introducing   ‘conflict   resolution   and  
reconciliation,   institutions   and   institution   building,   civil   society,   rule   of   law,  
women’s   studies,   and   human   and   civil   rights’.   However,   many   new   subjects  
promoted   by   donors   are   held   in   low   esteem   by   participant   academics.116   Iraqi  
academic  culture  is  therefore  viewed  as  an  obstacle  to  long-­‐‑term  implementation  of  
these  courses.    
  
Agresto   held   that   one   of   his   main   tasks   for   Iraqi   HE   was   to   ‘give   them   some  
exposure   to   liberal   rather   than   simply   specialized   education’   (Iannone   2006).  
Elsewhere,  Agresto  (2007,  p.123)  talks  of  the  ‘inconceivability’  of  the  ‘liberal  idea  of  
a   seminar’   in   Iraqi   academic   culture   geared   towards   lecture-­‐‑based   instruction   in  
highly-­‐‑specialised   disciplines.   He   links   introducing   liberal   arts   to   long-­‐‑term  
transformation  of   Iraqi   society   in  support  of  establishing   liberal  democracy.   In  his  
view,  liberal  education  would  broaden  the  minds  of  Iraqi  youth  and  future  leaders  
who  would  be  more  open  to  different  viewpoints  and  tolerant   in  a  plural  political  
system.   Further,   the   structure   of   electives,   minors,   and   majors   in   the   US   system  
allows   self-­‐‑reflection   and   individual   freedom   that   ‘might   lead   to   religious   and  
familial   reform   also,   not   just   educational   reform   with   a   political   effect’.   Agresto  
reflects  on  how  this  transformative  vision  was  not  supported  by  the  CPA.  A  lack  of  
vision  was  also  a  limiting  factor  in  the  contribution  of  HE  to  economic  recovery,  a  
dynamic  addressed  in  the  next  section.    
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  This	  finding	  is	  confirmed	  by	  Dr	  Sadiq	  Nasrullah,	  Cultural	  Attaché,	  Embassy	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Iraq	  
in	  Jordan	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	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6.2.5. Economic  Recovery  
  
In   this   section   the   contribution   of   Iraqi   HE   to   post-­‐‑war   economic   recovery   is  
examined.   Overall   it   is   found   that   Iraqi   HE   made   low   contribution   to   economic  
recovery;  a  finding  explained  partly  by  low  quality  and  lack  of  research  capacity  but  
also   by   the   context   of   economic   collapse   that   restricted   the   opportunity   to  
participate  in  recovery.  However,  participants  expressed  a  range  of  views  on  HE’s  
role  in  economic  recovery  which  will  now  be  analysed.    
  
It   was   seen   in   section   6.2.2   that   engineering   and   oil-­‐‑related   education   was  
insufficient   to  meet   oil-­‐‑sector   rebuilding   needs,   the   engine   of   economic   recovery.  
Beyond  oil,  there  is  a  strong  recognition  by  Iraqis  that  diversification  is  vital  to  long-­‐‑
term  economic  development117  yet  a  clear  development  vision  outlining  what  form  
this  would   take  and  how   it   could  be   reached  did  not  emerge.  This  made  aligning  
HE   with   a   long-­‐‑term   economic   vision   impossible.   For   example,   one   non-­‐‑Iraqi  
participant   held   that   economic   recovery   requires   public-­‐‑private   partnerships  
supported   by   investing   in   HE   for   private   sector   skills   re-­‐‑training   although  
insufficient  political  will  existed  to  make  this  option  viable.118    
  
A  major  economic  recovery  challenge  was  gearing  HE  towards  economic  needs  and  
requirements.  However,   amongst   participants   consensus   holds   that   Iraqi  HE  was  
not   producing   skills   and   knowledge   relevant   to   economic   recovery   and  
development.   A   Professor   from   the   University   of   Baghdad   in   2007   stated   that  
graduates  would  have   less   than  60%  of   the  knowledge   they   require  and   therefore  
lack  core  competencies  to  perform  their  jobs  (IRIN  2007b).  In  part  this  is  explained  
by  weakness  of  university  research  capacity.  Al  Ali  et  al  (2012)  note  that  teaching  is  
not   research-­‐‑led   due   to   barriers   including   inadequate   laboratory   space,   poor  
language  skills,  and  insufficient  libraries.    
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   For	   example,	   Email	   interview	   with	   President	   of	   Dijla	   University	   College	   –	   response	   received	  
05/2012.	  Also	  Former	  Professor	  of	  Economics,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011.	  	  




The   KRG’s   Vision   for   Higher   Education   recognises   the   imbalance   of   supply   and  
demand  of  graduates,  stating  that  ‘our  Universities  are  busy  teaching  conventional  
topics   without   keeping   pace   with   the   reality’   (Ala'ʹAldeen   2009).   One   participant  
explained  that  KRG  universities  were  producing  many  graduates  with   insufficient  
skills   to   meet   future   employer   requirements.   Collaboration   with   industry   in  
determining  curricula  content  in  key  subjects  including  engineering  and  economics  
was  held  to  be  a  viable  strategy  for  reducing  the  gap  between  outdated  curriculum  
content  and  market  demands   for   relevant   skills   and  knowledge.  South  Korea  was  
cited  as  an  instructive  case-­‐‑study  in  which  universities  cooperate  closely  with  firms  
to  provide  appropriate  vocational  and  skill-­‐‑specific  training.119      
  
Similarly,  in  the  rest  of  Iraq  enrolments  by  discipline  are  sub-­‐‑optimal  in  supplying  
labour  market  needs.  Rigidity  in  allocating  undergraduate  places  has  been  a  strong  
trend  in  Iraq’s  centrally  administered  HE  system.  Science  and  technology  has  been  
prioritised  over  social  sciences  and  humanities.  Students  are  allocated  places  based  
on   a   school   leavers’   exam  with   the   best   pupils   enrolled   in  medicine,   engineering,  
and   science.   Under   the   constraints   of   multiple   post-­‐‑war   social   and   economic  
transitions   there  are  strong   imperatives   for  planned  allocation  of  university  places  
by   discipline.   Firstly,   to   initiate   and   sustain   economic   growth   graduates  must   be  
produced  for  labour  market  sectors  that  require  skilled  labour.120  As  Peter  Buckland  
argued,  Iraq  in  2003  required  HE  policy  to  be  strongly  coordinated  with  manpower  
planning.121   Secondly,   a   conflict-­‐‑sensitive   HE   policy   should   reduce   graduates   in  
fields   with   poor   employability   prospects   due   to   the   linkage   between   high   youth  
unemployment  and  instability.    
  
However,   in   the   absence   of   detailed   labour   market   analysis   aligning   long-­‐‑term  
human  capital  needs  with  HE   is  problematic.   It   is  necessary   to   establish  graduate  
numbers   in   each   discipline   capable   of   absorption   by   various   economic   sectors.  
Dlawer   Ala’Aldeen,   Minister   of   HE   in   the   KRG,   notes   the   high   proportion   of  
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  Senior	  Economic	  Adviser	  to	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  the	  KRG	  -­‐	  Erbil,	  Iraq,	  04/2010	  	  
120	  Former	  Professor	  of	  Economics,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	  
121	  Personal	  communication	  with	  Peter	  Buckland	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students   in   the  KRG   in   law.   Seven  new  private   universities   sought   permission   to  
establish  law  faculties.  It  was  argued  that  this  would  flood  the  market  with  lawyers  
and  inevitably  lead  to  graduate  unemployment.122  This  example  illustrates  the  need  
for  a  supervisory  state  body  to  coordinate  the  HE  system  and  avoid  contradictions  
brought  about  in  a  fully-­‐‑deregulated  environment.    
  
In   conclusion   it   can  be   stated   that   Iraqi  HE  made   a   low   contribution   towards   the  
post-­‐‑war  task  of  economic  recovery.  Curricula  and  course  content  was  not  aligned  
with  economic  needs,  a  vision  for  economic  recovery  capable  of  guiding  HE  reform  
was   absent,   and   research   capacity   remained   very   low.   However,   it   should   be  
qualified   that   Iraq’s   collapsed   post-­‐‑war   economy   represents   a   difficult   structural  
context  for  any  HE  system  to  adapt  to.  The  final  recovery  task  to  be  considered  in  
terms   of   the   contribution   of   HE   to   recovery   is   nationbuilding   and   conflict  
transformation,  which  will  be  addressed  now.    
  
6.2.6. Nationbuilding  and  Conflict  Transformation123  
  
It  was  seen  in  chapter  three  that  HE  can  perform  a  moral  function  in  strengthening  
the  bases  of  national  identity  and  social  cohesion  thus  supporting  nationbuilding.124  
Also,  in  chapter  five  it  was  seen  that  HE  in  1950s  Iraq  strengthened  a  unified  Iraqi  
civic   nationalism.125   Furthermore,   once   Iraqi   Kurdistan   gained   de   facto   autonomy  
after   the  Gulf  War  HE  played   an   important   role   in  nation-­‐‑building  by  promoting  
Kurdish   language,   history,   and   nationalism.   In   post-­‐‑2003   Iraq   where   insecurity,  
protracted  conflict,   and  communal  divisions  were  present   it  may  be   thought   Iraqi  
HE   had   the   potential   to   perform   a   similar   role   thereby   supporting   conflict  
resolution  and  transformation.  As  one  participant  stated,  ‘education  is  supposed  to  
transcend   and   see   a   larger   vision   to   provide   leadership   that   recognises   that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	  Dr	  Dlawer	  Ala’aldeen,	   former	  Minister	  of	  Higher	  Education	   in	   the	  KRG	  and	  Professor	  of	  Clinical	  
Microbiology	  at	  Nottingham	  University	  -­‐	  Nottingham,	  UK.	  07/2013	  
123	  This	  section	  is	  relatively	  brief	  because	  many	  issues	  relevant	  to	  it	  are	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	   in	  
the	  next	  section	  
124	  See	  section	  3.2.7.	  	  
125	  See	  section	  5.1.1.	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pluralistic   differences   can   co-­‐‑exist.   In   Iraq   higher   education   needs   this   function  
especially  in  the  Disputed  Internal  Borderlands’.126    
A  strong  position  on  the  centrality  of  HE  to  Iraqi  nation-­‐‑building  was  offered  by  the  
Minister  of  HE  for  the  KRG  who  stated  that:127  
For  nation-­‐‑building,  to  actually  sustain  it,  to  build  it,  to  make  it  evolve  in  a  healthy  
way,  to  actually  then  incrementally  go  towards  nation-­‐‑building  -­‐‑  it’s  the  education  
of  individuals,  institutions  and  management  and  leaders,  investing  in  people.  How  
do  you  invest  in  people  if  you  don’t  have  quality  graduates?  
However,  rather  than  play  a  similar  role  in  post-­‐‑Saddam  Iraq,  it  may  be  argued  that  
Iraqi  HE  since  2003  has  served  more  to  divide  than  unify  Iraqis.128  As  is  discussed  in  
more  detail  below,  in  the  post-­‐‑war  period  universities  became  divided  along  ethnic  
and  sectarian  lines,  campuses  were  controlled  by  powerful  student  groups  affiliated  
with  political  parties,  and  HE  was  in  an  overall  state  of  disorder.  In  this  context  HE  
served  to  further  intensify  societal  divisions  and  fractures  overlaying  the  protracted  
conflict  in  post-­‐‑war  Iraq  rather  than  provide  an  arena  for  transforming  the  identity  
bases  of  conflict  in  the  positive  manner  outlined  in  chapter  two.    
Similarly,  rather  than  aid  transitional   justice  and  reconciliation  issues  HE  has  been  
held  to  be  an  obstacle.  Re-­‐‑writing  of  curricula  was  carried  out   to  remove  Ba’athist  
influence.  However,  the  wider  process  of  de-­‐‑Baathification  in  HE  developed  into  a  
continuous   dynamic   that   divided   academic   communities   and   worked   counter   to  
reconciliation  goals.  There  was  a  widespread  perception  amongst  Sunni  academics  
that  de-­‐‑Baathification  was  conducted  selectively  by   the  Shiite-­‐‑led  government  and  
perpetuated   a   sense   of   exclusion   and   injustice   in   the   wider   Sunni   community  
(Hasan   2013).   In   conclusion,   it  may   be   provisionally   stated   that   Iraqi  HE  made   a  
negative   contribution   to   nationbuilding   and   conflict   transformation;   while   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  Khaled	  Ehsan,	  Monitoring	  and	  Evaluation	  Specialist,	  UNDP,	  Iraq	  Country	  Office	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  
02/2011	  
127	  Dr	  Dlawer	  Ala’aldeen,	   former	  Minister	  of	  Higher	  Education	   in	   the	  KRG	  and	  Professor	  of	  Clinical	  
Microbiology	  at	  Nottingham	  University	  -­‐	  Nottingham,	  UK.	  07/2013	  
128	  Ali	  Baban,	  former	  Minister	  of	  Planning.	  Manchester,	  England	  04/2013.	  Also,	  several	  anonymous	  
participants	  agreed	  with	  this	  statement.	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evidence  for  this  claim  has  not  been  reviewed  in  this  section  the  basis  for  the  claim  
is  presented  below  in  sections  6.3.1.2  and  6.3.1.3.  
6.2.7. Conclusion  
  
In  this  section  it  has  been  found  that  Iraqi  HE’s  contribution  to  recovery  was  limited  
and   in   some   respects   made   a   negative   contribution.   Iraqi   academics   generally  
perceive  rebuilding  of  HE  as  a   failure,  at   least   in   the   first   five  post-­‐‑war  years.  The  
most  positive   contribution  was   in   short-­‐‑term   stabilisation  and   conflict  prevention.  
However,   even   in   that   domain   the   sector’s   potential   was   not   capitalised   upon;  
rather  HE  was  itself  securitised.  Similarly,  HE  performed  some  roles  in  physical  and  
sectoral   reconstruction   although   in   the   final   analysis   there   was   a   major   missed  
opportunity  to  integrate  HE  with  recovery.  In  terms  of  long-­‐‑term  goals  in  economic  
recovery,  statebuilding  and  democratisation  the  contribution  of  the  sector  was  very  
low.   Finally,   on   nation-­‐‑building,   reconciliation,   and   conflict   transformation   the  
sector  made  a  negative  contribution;  a  dynamic  explored  in  more  depth  in  the  next  
section.      
  
  
6.3.   Post-­‐‑war  Environment  of  Higher  Education  
  
In  the  last  section  efforts  to  rebuild  HE  were  found  to  have  had  little  success.  This  
section   analyses   central   mechanisms   and   dynamics   shaping   the   post-­‐‑war  
environment   of   Iraqi   HE   and   why   HE   made   a   low   contribution   to   post-­‐‑war  
recovery.   Drawing   primarily   on   interviews   with   Iraqi   academics,   conjunctural,  
educational,   institutional,   structural   and   external   features   will   be   analysed.   To  
begin,  the  central  and  cross-­‐‑cutting  issue  of  insecurity  will  be  introduced.    
6.3.1. Conjunctural  Features  
  
To   begin,   conjunctural   features,   those   emerging   from   a   conjuncture   of   other  
processes  and  trends,  will  be  analysed.  The  four  features  are  to  a  degree  amorphous  
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and   have   considerable   synergies,   in   particular   between   security,   conflict,   and  
stability   and   order.   These   three   conjunctural   features   are   among   those   that   most  
decisively  mediated  the  HE-­‐‑recovery  relationship.    
  
6.3.1.1.   Security    
  
A  strongly  emergent  theme  from  interviews  was  that  participants  ranked  insecurity  
as  a  decisive  constraint  upon  the  post-­‐‑war  role  of  the  HE  sector.  Iraq  during  2003-­‐‑
2010  was   consistently   ranked   in   the  Failed  States   Index   ten  worst-­‐‑performers   and  
was  one  of  the  world’s  most  dangerous  places  with  several  overlapping  protracted  
conflicts  and   insurgencies.  As  was   seen  earlier,   insecurity  posed  a  major   logistical  
challenge   to   CPA-­‐‑led   reconstruction   efforts.   Furthermore,   violence   against  
academics   was   systematic,   resulting   in   large   loss   of   life,   general   insecurity   and  
widespread   fear   which   made   normal   operation   of   HEIs   much   more   challenging.  
Due   to   insecurity   attendance   rates   at   Iraqi   HEIs   plummeted;   some   universities  
operated  at  10-­‐‑20%  of  capacity  (Krieger  2007a).  In  one  estimate  approximately  one-­‐‑
third  of  university  students  regularly  attended  classes  while  another  found  that   in  
early   December   2006   only   6%   of   faculty   and   students   attended   classes   at   the  
University   of   Baghdad   (Spurr   2007).   Furthermore,   in   a   chaotic   Baghdad   littered  
with   checkpoints,   journeys   to   campus   could   take   hours   and  were   physically   and  
emotionally  taxing.    
  
In   the   climate   of   insecurity   and   violence   security   regulations   were   strengthened  
considerably.   At   Al-­‐‑Mustansiriya   University   a   12-­‐‑foot   blast   wall   was   constructed  
around  the  campus  perimeter.  Furthermore,  the  presence  of  Iraqi  security  guards  on  
campus   had   negative   impacts.129   Many   were   militia   members   and   exercised  
considerable  power  at  university  authorities’  expense,  pressured  staff  and  students,  
and   interfered  with  administration.130  These   claims  are   supported  by   testimony  of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	   Former	  Professor	  of	   Languages,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	   -­‐	  Amman,	   Jordan	  12/2010.	  Also,	   former	  
lecturer,	  Department	  of	  Political	  Science,	  Al-­‐Nahrain	  University	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	  
130	  A	   former	  Professor	   in	   the	   Faculty	   of	   Languages	   at	   the	  University	   of	   Baghdad	   stated	   that	   there	  
were	  50-­‐70	  security	  guards	  at	  his	  college	  alone	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former  Minister   of   HE  Abd  Ujayli   who   claimed   that   guards   are   often   untrained,  
infiltrated  by   the  Badr  Brigade   and   Jaish   al-­‐‑Mahdi  militias,   and   allowed  militants  
onto  campus  to  kidnap  students  (Khalilzad  2006).131    
  
Moreover,   insecurity  was   a  major   obstacle   to   the  MoHE-­‐‑I,  most   damagingly  with  
the  kidnap  by  around  80  gunmen  of  approximately  150  employees,  academics,  and  
visitors   at   a  Ministry   building   in  November   2006.   According   to   Jawad   (2012)   the  
incident   occurred   in   broad   daylight   with   no   response   from   security   forces   and  
resulted  in  execution  of  most  victims.  He  holds  that  the  MoHE-­‐‑I  Grants  department  
was  targeted  because  it  was  responsible  for  validating  certificates  which  threatened  
many  elite  fake-­‐‑degree-­‐‑carrying  politicians  with  scandal.      
  
Insecurity  was  consistently  ranked  by  participants  as  a  major  obstacle  to  HE.  In  the  
words  of  one  Professor,   ‘security   is  an  absolute  pre-­‐‑requisite   for  reconstruction’.132  
Correspondingly,  Al  Ali  et  al  (2012)  rank  lack  of  security,  widespread  violence,  and  
political   instability  as  among   the  major   challenges   facing   the   sector.   Similarly,  Al-­‐‑
Janabi   and   Urban   (2011)   attribute   failure   to   reconstruct   education   to   instability,  
violence,  and  insecurity;  as  a  result  ‘actions  remained  event-­‐‑driven,  and  it  has  been  
impossible   to   re-­‐‑institute   a   viable   education   community   capable   of   fulfilling   its  
mandate’.   This   statement   illustrates   insecurity’s   impact   in   constraining   strategic  
thinking  and  educational  practice  in  a  manner  also  identified  in  Libya  (see  chapter  
eight).    
  
Furthermore,   fear   of   association   with   the   Coalition   or   the   US   made   cooperative  
relationships  between  Iraqi  universities  and  US  actors  difficult.  For  example,  a  Dean  
at  Mosul  University   expressed   desire   to  work  with   the   local   PRT   but   feared   that  
contact  with  the  US  Government  would  endanger  him  and  his  family  (Grant  2006).  
Stuart  Bowen  reports  that  management  of  many  Iraqi  HEIs  requested  that  Coalition  
forces  deem  campuses  a  ‘no  go  zone’  for  troops.  However,  he  states  that  this  was  a  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131	  The	  Minister	  further	  noted	  that	  it	  was	  impossible	  to	  change	  the	  guards	  because	  it	  might	  provoke	  
a	  violent	  response	  by	  the	  militias.	  
132	  Former	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Languages,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
250	  
	  
‘non-­‐‑starter’   due   to   the   number   of   attacks,   including   rockets,   IEDs,   and   mortars  
‘originating   from   the   university   district   or   campuses’.  Wayne   Bowen   (2007,   p.39)  
describes   how   Coalition   troops   patrolling   the   University   of   Mosul   in   early   2004  
disregarded  Iraqi  security  officials,  established  observation  points,  and  were  present  
on   campus   overnight.   Patrols   led   to   worsening   relations   between   students,   the  
university,  and  the  Coalition.    
To   isolate   security   as   a   factor   the   case   of  Anbar  University   is   instructive.   During  
2005-­‐‑2007,  when  Anbar  province  was  the  heart  of  the  insurgency,  Anbar  University  
main   campus  was   reportedly   controlled   by  Al  Qaeda   leading   to   gun   battles  with  
Coalition   forces   who   intended   to   prevent   the   group   recruiting   students   and  
producing   IEDs   in   a   campus-­‐‑based   factory   (Crocker   2008a).   Several   participants  
held   that   after   the   troop   surge   and  Sahwa  movement   led   to   considerable   security  
gains  in  Anbar  province  Anbar  University,  once  dubbed  ‘the  most  dangerous  place  
in  Iraq’,  recovered  strongly  and  should  be  ranked  among  the  most  improved  HEIs.  
For   example,   one  participant   argued   that  Anbar  University   faced  many  problems  
yet   made   remarkable   progress   due   to   security   improvement   and   that   a   similar  
pattern  occurred  in  Mosul.133  While  other  factors  are  also  influential  and  outcomes  
over-­‐‑determined   it   is  clear   that  security  was  a  decisive   feature  shaping  HE’s  post-­‐‑
war  environment.  A  related  feature  that  is  also  considered  decisive  is  stability  and  
order,  which  will  now  be  analysed.    
  
6.3.1.2. Stability  and  Order  
  
The   Iraqi   Higher   Education   Council   on   March   14th   2004   produced   the   Erbil  
Declaration  which   stipulated   that  HE   should   be   independent,   free   from   religious  
and  political  intimidation,  and  sanctuaries  protected  from  violence  (Al-­‐‑Bakaa  2013).  
However,  in  what  transpired  the  Erbil  Declaration  remained  a  normative  vision  far  
from  actual  post-­‐‑war  conditions.  In  his  memoir,  Agresto  (2007,  p.74)  writes:  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The  universities  had  experienced  the  equivalent  of  a  new  birth  of   freedom  with  the  
coming  of   liberation.  Professors  knew  this  and,   it   seemed,  at   the  beginning,   so  did  
the   students.   But   quickly   the   climate   on   the   campuses   was   changing.   And   the  
impetus   for   change,   a   change   to   a   new   form   of   repression,   was   coming   primarily  
from  students.  
The  above  quote  identifies  students  as  a  main  negative  influence  upon  post-­‐‑war  HE.  
Many  participants  support  this  view,  holding  that  inability  to  impose  order  on  the  
student   body   and   empowerment   of   student   groups   allied   to   political   parties   and  
militias   were   fatal   to   the   recovery   of   universities.134   Students   frequently   made  
unreasonable  demands  on  faculty  members  and  issued  threats  if  demands  were  not  
met.  This  claim  is  further  supported  by  media  accounts  of  student  factions’  power  
over   campus   life.   Student  groups   reportedly   intimidated,   threatened,   and   coerced  
university  staff,  for  example,  to  receive  good  grades  (IRIN  2007a).  Another  example,  
it  is  reported  that  militia  members  sit-­‐‑in  on  lectures  and  intimidate  university  staff.  
Furthermore,   Jawad   (2007)   identifies   re-­‐‑writing   of   syllabi   according   to  
particularistic   preferences   as   one   of   the   trends   most   threatening   to   academic  
freedom.    
The   rise   of   powerful   student   groups   was   enabled   by   the   chaotic   context   where  
centralised   political   control,   law,   order,   and   governance   structures   largely  
collapsed.   Latif   (2006)   writes   that   ‘liberated   from   the   binds   of   dictatorship,  
universities   have   become   the   hub   for   the  myriad   of   religious,   political   and   social  
movements  newly  emerging  after  decades  of  suppression’.   In   this  power  vacuum,  
various  groups  attempted  to  exert  influence  and  viewed  HEIs  as  an  important  site  
of  control.  Students  allied  to  ‘parties  and  sects’  were  held  to  protest  repeatedly  for  
‘unwarranted  reasons’  to  ‘impose  their  will  and  power  over  universities’  (Al-­‐‑Bakaa  
2013).  These  political  factions  allied  with  student  groups  came  to  hold  considerable  
power  on  some  campuses,  for  example,  the  powerful  Student  League  allied  to  PM  
Maliki  at  Al-­‐‑Mustansiriya  University.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134	  As	  noted,	  this	  view	  emerged	  strongly	  from	  interview	  data	  and	  is	  supported	  by	  secondary	  sources.	  
Examples	   of	   participants	   holding	   this	   view	   include;	   Former	   Vice-­‐President,	   Al-­‐Nahrain	  University	   -­‐	  
Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	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This   process   has   been   explained   as   in   part   due   to   campus-­‐‑based   radicalisation   as  
fundamentalist   groups   filled-­‐‑in   the   ideological   void   left   by   Ba’athism’s   collapse  
(Latif   2006;  Agresto   2007).   Similarly,   rising   student   power   is   related   to   the   ethno-­‐‑
sectarianisation   of   Iraqi   society   because   the   overwhelming   majority   of   political  
factions  are  defined  by  sectarian  or  ethnic  identity.  An  indicator  of  this  confluence  
of   student   politics   and   sectarian   influence,   students   at   one   university   forcibly  
secured   inclusion   of   a   religious   cleric’s   teachings   in   a   humanities   course   covering  
Kant  and  Heidegger  (Krieger  2007a).  
However,  while   inability  to  control  empowered  student  groups  was  found  to  be  a  
general   challenge   it   did   not   affect   all   HEIs   equally.   Many   participants   cited  
University   of   Technology   as   a   positive   case   of   maintaining   order.   Relative  
orderliness   was   explained   through   the   personal   leadership   and   qualities   of   the  
University   President.135   The   President   claimed   that   he   was   very   strict   and  
threatened   to   resign   if   student   politics   and   sectarian   parties   were   active   on  
campus.136  Similarly,  relative  success  at  the  University  of  Mosul  has  been  explained  
as  due   in   large  part   to   the   influence   of   a   strong  university  President.   It   is   argued  
that   the   President   prevented   the   type   of   situation   witnessed   in   some   other  
universities  where  students  aligned  with  political  factions  were  highly  disruptive.137  
These  two  cases  identify  presence  of  strong  and  determined  leadership  as  a  crucial  
intervening  variable  influencing  campus  politics.    
An  alternative  explanation  is  that  the  UoT’s  non-­‐‑political  disciplines  spared  it  from  
campus-­‐‑level  conflict  and  rule  by  students.  Two  participants  claimed  that  it  was  not  
the   President’s   role   but   the   nature   of   scientific/technical   disciplines   that   created   a  
relatively  de-­‐‑politicised  atmosphere  and  therefore  staff  and  students  were  generally  
not   sectarian  or   ‘extremists’.138  Contrastingly,  HEIs  with  greater   social   science  and  
humanities  provision   including  Al-­‐‑Mustansiriya,   the  Baghdad  College  of  Business  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	   Importantly	   this	   point	   was	   widely	   emphasised	   by	   participants	   both	   with	   affiliation	   to	   the	  
University	  of	  Technology	  and	  those	  with	  no	  institutional	  affiliation	  to	  the	  university.	  
136	  Dr	  Kahtan	  Al-­‐Khazraji,	  President,	  University	  of	  Technology	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  01/2011	  
137	  A	  leaked	  US	  Embassy	  cable	  reports	  on	  a	  meeting	  with	  the	  President,	  stating	  that	  he	  ‘repeatedly	  
insisted	  that	  there	  should	  be	  no	  place	  for	  politics	  at	  the	  university’	  (Butenis	  2008).	  	  
138	  Anonymous	  former	  Professor	  of	  Engineering,	  University	  of	  Technology	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011;	  
also	  Professor	  of	  Engineering,	  Philadelphia	  University	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	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and  Administration,  the  College  of  Fine  Arts,  and  the  University  of  Baghdad  have  
experienced  serious  conflict  and  violence  between  student  groups  and  between  staff  
and  students,   for  example,  over  curriculum  content.139  However,   the  University  of  
Mosul   case,   where   positive   claims  were  made   about   leadership   strength   limiting  
politicisation,   shows   that   even   in  a   large  and  comprehensive  university  offering  a  
wide   range   of   courses   including   social   science   and   humanities   the   presence   of  
strong  leadership  was  viewed  as  important  in  ensuring  order.    
While   it   may   be   granted   that   institutions  with   highly   concentrated   social   science  
and  humanities   students  are  more  vulnerable   to   student  unrest,   strong   leadership  
appears   to  be  a   significant  determinant  of  order   in   Iraqi  universities.  This  view   is  
supported  by  Wayne  Bowen   (2007,  p.75),   stationed   in  Northern   Iraq   in  2004,  who  
identifies   the   Mosul   University   Chancellor   as   a   primary   obstacle   to   effectively  
running  the  university.  He  writes  that:  
A   university   is   far   more   than   classroom   buildings   and   engineering   equipment.   More  
important   are   the   strategic   vision   of   campus   leaders,   their   commitment   to   academic  
freedom,  and  their  willingness  to  unite  students,  faculty,  and  staff  to  promote  progressive  
ideas  and  intellectual  curiosity.  
From  this  discussion  it  is  clear  that  instability  and  a  lack  of  order  on  campus  were  
major   features   of   the   post-­‐‑war   environment   shaping   the   context   of   post-­‐‑war  HE.  
Further  support  for  viewing  stability  as  a  decisive  issue  comes  from  the  Minister  of  
HE  for  the  Kurdistan  Regional  Government  (KRG)  Dlawer  Ala’aldeen140  who  stated  
that:  
The  only  reason  why  we  could  do  things  in  Kurdistan,  the  only  reason  why  I  as  an  
individual  was  able  to  introduce  things  that  weren’t  even  in  the  programme,  in  the  
manifesto  was  because  it  was  stable,  Ministers  were  Ministers,  people  coming  with  
or  without   gun  means   nothing   to   the  Minister   –   that   stability  will   bring   reform,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  Former	  Professor	  of	  Economics,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	  
140	  Dr	  Dlawer	  Ala’aldeen,	   former	  Minister	  of	  Higher	  Education	   in	   the	  KRG	  and	  Professor	  of	  Clinical	  
Microbiology	  at	  Nottingham	  University	  -­‐	  Nottingham,	  UK.	  07/2013	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bring  evolution  –  but  in  Iraq  until  certain  areas  become  stable  you  can’t  talk  about  
reform,  what  reform?  
However,  it  should  be  qualified  that  the  Iraqi  Cultural  Attaché  to  Jordan  held  that  
instability   driven   by   politicised   students   decreased   as   a   factor   over   time,   in  
particular   after   2007,   although   recognising   that   at   its   height   the   above-­‐‑described  
dynamic  was  a  major  challenge  facing  the  sector.141  One  major  driver  of   instability  
in  post-­‐‑war  Iraq  was  the  incidence  of  over-­‐‑lapping  protracted  conflicts;  a  dynamic  




Post-­‐‑war   Iraq   was   beset   by   violence,   societal   polarisation,   and   conflict.   Conflict-­‐‑
drivers   included   organised   crime,   high   unemployment,   economic   collapse,  
breakdown   in   rule   of   law,   and   occupation.   Notwithstanding   these,   post-­‐‑2003  
intensification  of  ethnic  and  sectarian  divisions,   the   ‘ethno-­‐‑sectarianisation  of   Iraqi  
society’,   is   widely   regarded   as   a   major   factor   driving   protracted   conflict   and  
violence.   The  Coalition’s   broad   post-­‐‑war   strategy   increased   the   salience   of   ethno-­‐‑
sectarian   identities   and   precipitated   civil   conflict   (Ismael   &   Fuller   2008;   Aitken  
2007).  Iraqi  HE  was  both  affected  by  this  context  as  campuses  became  increasingly  
polarised   and   also   contributed   to   the   process   by   perpetuating   communal   and  
particularistic  identities.    
  
Ethno-­‐‑sectarian   conflict   is   frequently   cited   by   participants   as   a   major   obstacle   to  
effective  HE  reconstruction.  Many  participants  held  that  prior  to  the  2003  invasion  
they   were   not   aware   of   the   ethno-­‐‑sectarian   profile   of   the   vast   majority   of   their  
colleagues.   In   the   words   of   one   participant   ‘in   all   Iraqi   history   nothing   has  
determined   Iraqi  academia  based  on  sectarianism’.142   In   the  post-­‐‑war  environment  
the  atmosphere  changed  at  previously  secular  HEIs  as  religious  and  sectarian  issues  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141	  Dr	  Sadiq	  Nasrullah,	  Cultural	  Attaché,	  Embassy	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Iraq	  in	  Jordan	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  
02/2011	  
142	  Former	  Professor	  of	  Economics,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	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became  politicised.  For  example,  at  the  University  of  Baghdad,  efforts  were  made  to  
prevent   Shiite   students   from   wearing   black   and   completing   processions   around  
campus   because   the   rite   inflamed   sectarian   tensions   between   students.   However,  
contrary   to   the   pre-­‐‑2003   period,   university   authorities   and   MoHE-­‐‑I   could   not  
prevent  students  celebrating  religious  festivities.143  A  former  Mustansiriya  Professor  
stated  that  ‘teaching  was  subjected  to  strain  of  religious  activity’.  He  also  noted  the  
effect  of  many  religious  festivities  on  campus,  and  said  that  ‘you  don’t  feel  like  you  
are  in  an  academic  institution;  you  feel  like  you  are  in  a  mosque  and  don’t  have  the  
right  to  criticise’.144    
  
Post-­‐‑2003  violence  escalated  in  2005  and  peaked  in  2007  triggering  large  population  
movements   with   up   to   500,000   internally   displaced   and   1.8   million   refugees   by  
November   2006   (Allawi   2007,   p.451).   In   Baghdad,   security   walls   and   ‘communal  
boundaries’   were   erected   keeping   apart   many   previously   ‘mixed’   communities,  
frequently   along   sectarian   divides   (Steele   2009,   p.243;   Tripp   2008,   p.306).   With  
faculty  members   killed,   threatened,   and   harassed   often   for   their   ascribed   identity  
many  university  staff  left  their  posts  including  a  large  number  of  the  participants  in  
this   study.   Displacement   of   academics   occurred   along   ethno-­‐‑sectarian   divides.  
While   the   extent   of   this   trend   cannot   be   accurately   measured   due   to   insufficient  
data,  and  notwithstanding  reports  that  the  trend  was  in  reversal  with  the  upturn  in  
security  since  2009,145  testimony  from  participants  suggests  that  it  was  considerable.    
  
The  staff  and  student  body  composition  in  terms  of   identity  has  been  transformed  
due  to  rising  sectarianism  as  a  powerful  political  force.  Some  individual  universities  
came   to   be   associated   with   sectarian   and   political   divides,   for   example,   Al-­‐‑
Mustansiriya   was   perceived   as   a   Shiite   institution   while   Al-­‐‑Nahrain   a   Sunni  
institution.  However,   the  University   of   Baghdad   retained   its   ‘mixed’   composition  
during   this   period  due   to   its   vast   size   and   geographical   dispersal   throughout   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143	  Anonymous	  former	  Dean,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
144	  Anonymous	  former	  senior	  Professor,	  Al-­‐Mustansiriya	  University	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011.	  Also,	  
former	  Professor	  of	  Law,	  University	  of	  Basra	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  01/2011	  	  
145	  Anbar	  University,	  once	  named	  the	  most	  dangerous	  place	  in	  Iraq,	  at	  one	  point	  is	  said	  to	  have	  had	  
no	  Shiite	  students	  attending	  which	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  case.	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city.   Outside   Baghdad,   displacement   along   ethno-­‐‑sectarian   divides   occurred,   for  
example,  many  minorities   left   relatively  homogenous  cities   including  Kerbala  and  
Anbar.  The  University  of  Basra,  situated  in  a  once  highly  diverse  and  cosmopolitan  
city,   experienced   decreased   intra-­‐‑national   mix,   with   many   minority   groups  
including  Christians,  Sabaeans,  and  Sunni  Muslims  migrating.146  As  Krieger  (2007a)  
writes,   ‘militias  have  made  universities   throughout   the  country  unsafe   for  anyone  
of  the  "ʺwrong"ʺ  ethnic  group’.  
  
While  many  faculty  members  fled,  more  remained,  often  due  to  economic  insecurity  
facing   displaced   scholars.   Faculty   members   are   permitted   two   years   leave   at  
another   Iraqi   HEI.   During   intense   civil   conflict   of   2005-­‐‑2008   many   Iraqi   faculty  
applied   to   use   this   procedure   to   seek   employment   at   universities   perceived   as  
offering   greater   security.   Staff   applying   for   this   scheme   in   2007  would   have   been  
required   to   return   to   their   original   posts   in   2009   after   the   security   situation   had  
improved.   This   two-­‐‑year   period   enabled   some   faculty   members   to   ‘see   out’   the  
worst   sectarian   violence   in   safer   locations   before   returning   to   their   original  
institution.  
Ethno-­‐‑sectarian  conflict  within  HE  and  the  wider  society  is  the  primary  explanation  
offered   by   interviewees   for   perceived   post-­‐‑war   failures   in   HE.147   However,   the  
universities   of   Mosul   and   Basra   are   often   held   to   have   recovered   relatively  
successfully   since   2003.148   Relative   progress   at   these   universities   can   be   explained  
through   increased   ethno-­‐‑sectarian   homogeneity   since   2003.   Of   Mosul,   Butenis  
(2008)   explains   ‘the   university  was   a   bastion   of   the   Baathist   system   and   over   the  
past   four   years   it   has   become   increasingly   difficult   for   non-­‐‑Sunni  Arabs   to   study  
and   work   there’.   In   contrast   to   the   University   of   Baghdad   where   substantial  
‘mixing’   is   a   fact   of   life   and   conflicts   are   still   played   out   on   campus,   relative  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  This	  finding	  is	  based	  on	  interviews	  with	  four	  current	  or	  former	  Basra	  University	  faculty	  members	  
and	   also	   was	   confirmed	   during	   attendance	   at	   a	   conference	   on	   the	   rebuilding	   of	   Basra	   held	   in	  
Amman,	  Jordan	  in	  December	  2010.	  
147	   This	   finding	   emerged	   very	   strongly	   from	   interview	   data	   with	   no	   participants	   rejecting	   the	  
hypothesis	  that	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  conflict	  was	  a	  major	  factor	  influencing	  post-­‐war	  Iraqi	  HE.	  	  
148	   Participants	   almost	   unanimously	   held	   that	   Mosul	   and	   Basra	   universities	   recovered	   relatively	  
successfully	  compared	  to	  the	  national	  average	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homogeneity  enabled  Mosul  and  Basra  universities   to   recover   in  a   less   conflictual  
environment.149    
This   within-­‐‑case   comparison   isolates   ethno-­‐‑sectarian   conflict   as   a   variable   to   the  
extent  possible  and  supports   the  conclusion  that   it   is  a  major  factor  explaining  the  
HE-­‐‑recovery   relationship.   While   this   de   facto   separation   positively   influenced  
conditions   for   successful   reconstruction   in   the   short-­‐‑term,   primarily   security   and  
stability,   the   ‘ethnic   enclave’   model   should   be   expected   to   be   less   beneficial   in  
contributing   to   long-­‐‑term   peacebuilding   goals   of   overcoming   conflict   through  
promoting  inter-­‐‑communal  understanding  and  social  cohesion.    
In   2011,  many   Iraqi   university   Presidents   and   officials   held   that   sectarianism  had  
receded  and  was  no  longer  a  primary  challenge  facing  HE.150  However,  dismissal  of  
over   100   Tikrit   University   faculty   members   demonstrates   the   continued  
divisiveness  of  ‘de-­‐‑Baathification’,  viewed  by  some  as  a  smokescreen  for  pursuit  of  
sectarian   agendas.   Overall,   HE   in   post-­‐‑war   Iraq   negatively   impacted   conflict  
dynamics.   Any   imputed   gains   of   human   rights   courses,   peace   and   conflict  
education,  and  other  effects  in  peacebuilding  are  outweighed  by  the  re-­‐‑enforcement  
of  ethno-­‐‑sectarianism  that  a  divided  HE  landscape  has  maintained.    
All  three  features  analysed  above,  security,  instability  and  order,  and  conflict  have  
been   found   to   form   a   significant   and   inter-­‐‑connected   set   of   obstacles   to   HE’s  
contribution   to  post-­‐‑war  recovery.  There   is  widespread  consensus   that   these   three  
features  have  been  detrimental  to  recovery  outcomes  in  HE.  Further  support  comes  
from  former  Minister  of  Higher  Education  Tahir  Al-­‐‑Bakaa  who  held  that  terrorism,  
militias,   and   intervention   of   parties   were   the   three   main   obstacles   to   HE  
reconstruction   which   corresponds   approximately   to   the   above   three   features.151  
Furthermore,  these  features  restricted  the  freedom  of  the  sector  and  connect  to  the  
concern  of  the  next  section  with  academic  freedom.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149	   This	   explanation	   was	   supported	   by	   Dr	   Mazin	   Kadhim.	   Professor	   Mazin	   Kadhim,	   former	   Vice-­‐
President,	  Saddam	  University	  and	  senior	  adviser	  to	  MoHE-­‐I	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
150	   This	   position	   was	   defended	   by	   university	   presidents	   at	   a	   workshop	   held	   between	   SRF	   and	   IIE	  
officials	  and	  around	  20	  Iraqi	  university	  presidents	  in	  Amman,	  Jordan	  in	  January	  2011	  
151	  Email	  interview,	  Dr	  Tahir	  Al-­‐Bakaa,	  former	  Minister	  of	  HE	  -­‐	  Response	  received	  05/2012	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6.3.1.4. Academic  Freedom  
  
After   invasion   in   2003   it   was   expected   that   a   climate   of   academic   freedom   and  
liberation  would  free  the  creative  energies  of  a  university  system  long  repressed  by  
the   Baath   regime.   Article   Seven   of   the   2004   Erbil   Declaration   issued   by   Iraqi  
academics  states  that   ‘the  freedom  of  thought,  belief  and  clothing  is  guaranteed  to  
all   of   the   academic   community   as   long   as   does   not   interfere   with   the   learning  
process’   (sic)   (Al-­‐‑Bakaa   2013).   However,   several   features   of   the   post-­‐‑war  
environment  limited  the  flourishing  of  academic  freedom.    
  
Freedom  of  movement  of   academics   is   vital   for   effective   functioning  of  HE  but   is  
limited   across   Iraq   by   insecurity.   An   Iraqi   Professor   held   that   insecurity   in   the  
university  was  the  greatest  threat  to  academic  freedom.  Movement  of  academics  is  
restricted   and   contact   hours   are  dramatically   reduced,   for   example,   one  professor  
stating   he   only   visits   campus   for   a   few   hours   per   week.   To   improve   attendance  
levels  a  national  law  in  2007  decreed  that  University  staff  remain  on  campus  during  
8am-­‐‑2pm,  approximately;  a  move  that  restricts  freedom  of  movement  for  university  
staff.    
  
Restrictions  on  academic  freedom  are  well   illustrated  by  the  case  of  the  University  
of   Mosul.   In   Mosul   during   2003-­‐‑2004   security   levels   were   favourable   yet  
deteriorated   in   2005.   Many   checkpoints   were   built   and   movement   became  
restricted;   one   academic   stated,   ‘between   one   checkpoint   and   another   checkpoint  
there   are   more   checkpoints’.   In   2007   after   municipal   elections   the   Peshmerga  
withdrew  and   the   Iraqi  Army  was   tasked  with  providing   security   as   ‘insurgency’  
shifted  its  centre  of  gravity  to  Mosul.  The  Army  added  more  checkpoints  and  built  
concrete  walls  with  one  or   two  entrances  so   that  all  quarters  of   the  city,  both  East  
and  West,   are   encircled.  Movement   of   students   and   university   staff   became   very  
difficult.  To  enter  the  University  of  Mosul  in  a  car  sometimes  required  over  an  hour  
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wait   for  a  search  of  every  vehicle.  There  have  been  attacks  on  students,  especially  
Christian  students,  waiting  in  these  long  lines.152  
More   fundamentally,   political   actors   including   newly   emergent   militias,   political  
parties,  and  student  factions  impeded  post-­‐‑2003  academic  freedom.  Al-­‐‑Lami  (2010)  
explains   that   ‘academic   freedom   and   autonomy   in   Iraq   went   from   tough   state  
control   and   repression  during   the  Baath  Party   regime   to   chaotic,  multi-­‐‑actor  non-­‐‑
state   control   after   the   “liberation”   in   2003’.  One   former  Professor   held   that   under  
these  conditions  of  plural  threats  to  academic  freedom,  while  you  may  criticise,  it  is  
dangerous  and  can  lead  to  silencing,  side-­‐‑lining,  threats,  or  violence.153    
  
Whilst   freedom   of  movement   is   restricted   at   the  University   of  Mosul   it   has   been  
held   to   have   maintained   greater   academic   freedom   and   more   liberal   character  
relative   to  many  universities.  Sectarian  and  political   influence  has  not  been  strong  
in   comparison   to   other   universities   such   as   Mustansiriyya   and   other   Baghdad  
universities.   This   was   explained   partly   through   refusal   of   academics   to   bow   to  
sectarian   influence   and   due   to   Mosul’s   provincial   location.   However,   it   was  
qualified   that   the   university   administration   is   subject   to   many   allegiances   with  
political  parties  and  factions.154  
Furthermore,   institutional   factors   at   the   governmental   and   university   levels   have  
affected  the  conditions  for  academic  freedom.  First,  HE  remains  highly  centralised  
and  did   not   permit   a   level   of   autonomy   sufficient   for   the   emergence   of   academic  
freedom.  Second,  at  the  university-­‐‑level  various  threats  have  arisen.  For  example,  it  
was  reported  that  the  University  of  Baghdad  planned  to  install  security  cameras  in  
classrooms  to  ensure   ‘quality’   (Jawad  2010).  One  participant  stated  that   this  was  a  
direct   violation   of   academic   freedom   used   to   prevent   teachers   from   addressing  
critical  or  controversial  subjects.155      
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  Professor,	  University	  of	  Mosul	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
153	  Former	  Dean,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
154	  Professor,	  University	  of	  Mosul	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
155	  SRF	  Scholar	  at	  British	  Institute	  in	  Jordan	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	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It  may  be  concluded  that  while  Iraqi  HE  may  enjoy  negative  academic  freedoms  in  
that   no   laws   formally  proscribe   the   freedom  of   faculty   and   students   the  post-­‐‑war  
environment   poses  many   constraints   on   the   exercise   of   academic   freedom;   in   the  
words   of   one   participant   ‘academic   freedom   from   the   point   of   view   of   theory   is  
available   but   in   practice   is   not’.156   The   concern   with   academic   freedom   and   its  
impact  on  classroom  teaching  and  experience  connects  with  the  subject  of  the  next  
section;  educational  issues  and  dynamics  within  post-­‐‑war  Iraqi  HE.    
  
  
6.3.2. Educational  Features  
  
Educational  features  of  access,  quality,  and  equity  will  now  be  turned  to.  It  is  found  
that  while  access  and  equity  did  not  emerge  from  interview  data  as  strongly  as  the  
above-­‐‑analysed  conjunctural  features  of   insecurity,   instability,  and  conflict   the  low  
quality   of   Iraqi   HE   was   viewed   widely   by   participants   as   a   highly   significant  
influence  in  shaping  the  HE-­‐‑recovery  relationship  in  post-­‐‑war  Iraq.    
  
6.3.2.1.   Access  
  
It   was   seen   in   chapter   five   that   Iraqi   HE   expanded   considerably   including  
throughout  the  Iraq-­‐‑Iraq  and  Gulf  wars  and  subsequent  sanctions  and  by  the  1990s  
possessed  a  mass  HE  system  with  a  diversified  institutional  base.  Furthermore,  the  
sector   continued   to   expand   following   the   2003   invasion.   While   data   regarding  
access   should   be   treated   with   caution   because   it   varies   between   sources   some  
quantitative  data  indicate  that  HE  expanded  continuously  from  the  pre-­‐‑war  to  post-­‐‑
war  period  without  interruption.  Due  to  this  expansion  it  can  be  stated  that  absolute  
enrolment   levels   are   not   a   major   factor   affecting   the   HE-­‐‑recovery   relationship   in  
Iraq.    
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  SRF	  Scholar	  at	  British	  Institute	  in	  Jordan	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	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Table  5.  Total  Tertiary  Student  Population157
  
As  is  shown  in  the  table  above,  total  tertiary  student  enrolment  increased  annually  
in   2000-­‐‑2008   maintaining   an   upwards   trend   at   a   similar   gradient   since   2000.   A  
similar  pattern  can  be  identified  from  the  table  below  although  data  is  not  provided  
for  2001  and  2003.    
Table  6.  Tertiary  education  (ISCED  5  and  6)  Enrolment158  
  
It   can   be   surmised   from   this   limited   data   that   HE   enrolment   was   not   adversely  
affected   by   invasion   and   occupation.   Moreover,   according   to   CSIS   (2004,   p.72)  
‘college   applications’   rose   from   63,000   in   2002-­‐‑2003   to   97,000   in   2003-­‐‑2004,   a   rise  
attributed  by  the  Ministry  of  Education  to  ‘applicants’  beliefs  that,  with  the  ousting  
of   the  Ba’ath  party,   they  will  no   longer  be  denied  admission  for  political  or  ethnic  
reasons’.  This   finding  supports   the   theory  described   in  chapter   three   that  demand  
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  Source.  IU/BUIC/DIUS  (2009)  UNESCO	  Institute	  of	  Statistics.	  
http://issuu.com/universitiesuk/docs/iraq_final_report	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for   HE   is   high   in   post-­‐‑war   contexts   because   the   end   of   conflict   is   viewed   as   a  
rational  opportunity  to  invest  in  long-­‐‑term  human  capital.    
However,  several  participants  held  that  high  access  was  an  obstacle  to  effective  HE  
reconstruction   and   limited   HE’s   contribution   to   recovery.   For   example,   it   was  
argued  that  continued  post-­‐‑war  expansion  with  already  high  enrolment  ratios  was  a  
main   challenge   because   the   system   was   already   over-­‐‑burdened   with   inadequate  
resources  to  improve  capacity  based  on  existing  enrolment  let  alone  a  larger  student  
body.159  Similarly,  it  was  held  that  only  half  the  number  of  HEIs  were  required  and  
that   having   a   university   in   each   province   spread   resources   too   thinly   thus  
constituting   a   major   obstacle   to   attaining   quality,160   a   feature   which   will   now   be  
analysed.    
6.3.2.2.   Quality  
  
It  was  seen  in  chapter  five  that  Iraqi  HE  up  until  the  1980s  was  a  regionally  leading  
HE   system  with   relatively  high  quality   of   teaching   and   research.  However,  many  
participants   held   that   low   quality   was   a   central   problem   facing   the   sector   and  
limiting  its  contribution  to  reconstruction.  One  participant  stated  ‘there  is  no  higher  
education  in  Iraq  now’,   identifying  the  erosion  of  standards  and  exodus  of  staff  as  
the  major  factors  behind  the  reduced  quality.161  Another  example,  the  Iraqi  Cultural  
Attaché   to   Jordan   held   that   ‘lack   of   quality   programmes’  was   the   second   highest  
priority   for   improvement.  However,   there   are   various   dimensions   of   quality   that  
will  now  be  analysed.    
  
One  dimension  of  quality  is  the  level  and  competence  of  teaching  staff.  As  has  been  
seen,   widespread   violence,   de-­‐‑Baathification,   and   forced   displacement   negatively  
affected   Iraq’s   human   resources.   Experienced   academics   constitute   a  
disproportionate   amount   of   displaced   academics.   Therefore,   less   experienced   and  
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   Email	   interview,	   Dr	   Mohamed	   Al-­‐Rubeai,	   former	   senior	   adviser	   to	   the	   MoHE-­‐I	   and	   CPA,	   and	  
Chairman,	  Network	  of	  Iraqi	  Scientists	  Abroad	  -­‐	  Response	  received	  08/2012	  
160	  Anonymous	  former	  Professor	  of	  Engineering,	  Al-­‐Nahrain	  University	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  01/2011	  
161	  Former	  vice-­‐President	  for	  Academic	  Affairs,	  Al-­‐Nahrain	  University	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	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younger  staff,  most  of  whom  received  graduate  training  in  Iraq,  filled  vacant  posts;  
a   fact  which  one  academic   ranked  as   the  single   largest  post-­‐‑war  obstacle   to  HE.162  
The   table   below   indicates   the   balance   of   highest   qualifications   among   university  
faculty  members.  That  just  over  50%  of  faculty  members  possessed  Master’s  degrees  
as   their   highest   qualification   indicates   a   serious   skills   shortage.   Furthermore,   153  
scientific  sub-­‐‑fields  experienced  forced  closure  due  to  exodus  of  advanced  expertise  
from  HEIs  (Al-­‐‑Bakaa  2013).    
  
Table  7.  Highest  Qualification  of  Faculty  Members  in  Iraqi  Universities  
  
  
For   the   staff   that   remained,  poor  post-­‐‑war  material   conditions  negatively   affected  
quality.  Despite  vast  resources  committed  to  reconstruction  many  basic  goods  such  
as  electricity163  were  in  short  supply.  It  was  reported  that  a  Professor  was  forced  to  
write  all  papers  by  hand  due  to  electricity  shortages  and  therefore  could  not  publish  
research  (Krieger  2007a).  One  former  Professor  explained  that  low  quality  of  life  in  
terms  of  insecurity,  poor  facilities,  and  lack  of  communications  ‘was  not  conducive  
for   university   staff   to   be   creative   and   lead   to   innovation   and   therefore   reflected  
badly  on  the  university’.164  The  President  of  Kufa  University  cited  poor  provision  of  
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  Former	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Languages,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	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  Many	  Iraqis,	  not	  just	  those	  interviewed	  for	  this	  study,	  are	  confounded	  by	  perceived	  failure	  of	  the	  
Coalition	  armed	  with	  vast	  financial	  resources	  to	  restore	  a	  basic	  public	  good	  such	  as	  electricity	  	  




electrical  power,  lack  of  instruments  and  chemicals,  and  insufficient  laboratories  as  
the  main   challenges   to   the  university.165  This   statement   illustrates   the   centrality  of  
basic  physical  needs  to  the  priorities  of  most  HEIs.    
  
Furthermore,   a   common   theme   emerging   from   interviews   is   an   emphasis   on  
‘rebuilding   people’.166  As   one   interviewee   stated,   the   challenge   is   ‘how   to   rebuild  
brains  and  people  -­‐‑  we  must  take  into  account  the  human  factor’.167  This  emergent  
theme  from  interviews  contains  a  broad  critique  of  Coalition  and  Iraqi  government-­‐‑
led   reconstruction   of   HE   that   areas   including   training,   psycho-­‐‑social   support   for  
traumatised   staff   and   students,   and   campus-­‐‑level   reconciliation   were   neglected.  
Moreover,   it   is   held   that   this   constituted   an  obstacle   to  quality   in   that   the  human  
dimension  of  rebuilding  HE  was  missing.    
  
Al-­‐‑Rubeai   cites   outdated   curricula   and   obsolete   pedagogical   skills   as   two   of   five  
major   obstacles   to   MoHE-­‐‑I   efforts   to   reconstruct   the   university   system.168   In   the  
immediate  post-­‐‑invasion  period,  removal  of  Ba’athist  influence  from  curricula  was  
an   immediate   priority   of   the   CPA   and   Iraqi   educators.   However,   the   need   for  
curriculum   reform   was   much   deeper.   For   example,   in   2003   law   school   course  
content  had  been  updated  very   little  over  30  years   (Hamoudi  2005).  Similarly,   the  
syllabus   in  microbiology  at  Basra  University   in  2003  was   ‘decades  old’;  a  problem  
addressed  with  training  courses  on  modern  techniques  and  methods  (Ahmed  2005).  
One   indicator   of   progress   on   curriculum   reform   is   that   in   2010   a   university   law  
school   in  Basra  was   still   teaching  Saddam-­‐‑era   laws   seven  years  after   they  became  
obsolete.169    
     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165	  Email	  interview,	  Dr	  Akeel	  Yasseen,	  President,	  Kufa	  University	  -­‐	  Response	  received	  05/2012	  
166	   Variations	   including	   ‘focus	   on	   human	   beings’	   and	   the	   need	   to	   ‘reconstruct	   people’	   were	  
emphasised	  by	  participants.	  An	  SRF	  Scholar	  resident	  in	  Syria	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011.	  Also,	  an	  SRF	  
Scholar	  at	  Princess	  Sumaya	  University	  for	  Technology	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	  
167	  Professor	  Mazin	  Kadhim,	  former	  Vice-­‐President,	  Saddam	  University	  and	  senior	  adviser	  to	  MoHE-­‐I	  
-­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
168	   Email	   interview,	   Dr	   Mohamed	   Al-­‐Rubeai,	   former	   senior	   adviser	   to	   the	   MoHE-­‐I	   and	   CPA,	   and	  
Chairman,	  Network	  of	  Iraqi	  Scientists	  Abroad	  -­‐	  Response	  received	  08/2012	  




Several  reports  hold  that  quality  of  pedagogical  approaches  in  Iraqi  HE  is  poor  and  
far   from   international   best-­‐‑practice   (UNESCO   2003;   Mohamed-­‐‑Marzouk   2012).  
Furthermore,   an   ex-­‐‑student   held   that   Iraqi   students   feel   that   they   are   oppressed  
under   hierarchical   and   rigid   teacher-­‐‑student   relations.170   However,   it   should   be  
qualified   that  although   low  teaching  standards  emerged  strongly  as  a   theme  from  
interviews  with  Iraqi  academics  outdated  pedagogy  did  not.    
  
Efforts   to   reform   teaching   pedagogy   face   various   obstacles.   First,   poor  
student/teacher   ratios   place   large   workloads   on   faculty,   rendering   time-­‐‑intensive  
teaching   methods   a   heavy   burden.   Second,   faculty   members   long-­‐‑isolated   from  
global   ‘best-­‐‑practice’   offer   resistance;   Hamoudi   (2005)   found   that   resistance   to  
‘unorthodox   and   untested’   clinic-­‐‑based   teaching,   faculty   shortages,   and   general  
insecurity   were   the   largest   obstacles   to   pedagogical   reform   in   law   schools.   It   is  
cautioned  that  imposing  foreign  pedagogies  will  be  unsuccessful  and  that  a  flexible,  
gradual,  approach  recognising  existing  capacities,  resistance,  and  culture  tailored  to  
individual  context  is  required.  Finally,  pressure  from  political  and  religious  groups  
is   an   obstacle   to   reform.   For   example,   a   religiously-­‐‑affiliated   student   group  
successfully   demanded   withdrawal   of   a   course   on   literary   interpretation.   This   is  
explained   by   reluctance   of   groups   central   to   religious   knowledge-­‐‑production   to  
permit  a  course  challenging  the  epistemic  basis  of  their  claim  to  expert  status  in  that  
it  trains  students  to  offer  multiple  interpretations.    
  
The  finding  that  low  quality  was  a  major  obstacle  to  the  effective  contribution  of  HE  
to   recovery   is   summed  up   in   the  words   of   the   former  Minister   of   Planning,  who  
responded   to   the   question   ‘do   you   think   that   universities   have   made   a   positive  
contribution   to   reconstruction?’  with   the  words   that   ‘no,   no.   The   research   is   very  
limited,   the   quality   of   higher   education   is   in   a   bad   state,   politics   intervene   in   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170	   Graduate	   of	   Mamoun	   University	   College	   working	   in	   the	   Republic	   of	   Iraq	   Embassy	   in	   Jordan	   -­‐	  
Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	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university  and  the  standard  of  lecturers  and  teachers  is  not  good’.171  Beyond  quality,  
a  final  educational  feature  to  be  considered  is  the  issue  of  equity  in  Iraqi  HE.    
  
6.3.2.3.   Equity  
  
Little  evidence  was  found  to  indicate  that  access  inequalities  were  a  major  dynamic  
influencing   the   HE-­‐‑recovery   relationship.   However,   two   areas   where   equity  
concerns   were   raised   were   scholarship   allocations   and   gender   relations.   Several  
participants  alleged  that  control  of  overseas  scholarships  under  the  Prime  Minister’s  
office  led  to  particularistic  political  and  sectarian  bias  in  selection.172  This  is  held  to  
violate   meritocratic   principles   and   de-­‐‑legitimise   the   government   in   the   eyes   of  
academia.173   However,   despite   the   high   degree   of   significance   placed   upon  
sectarianism   as   a   factor,   discrimination   based   on   ethno-­‐‑sectarian   criteria   in  
undergraduate  admissions  did  not  emerge  as  a  theme  from  interviews.    
In   terms   of   gender,   female   students   are   quantitatively   well-­‐‑represented   in   HE.  
However,   Zangana   (2008)   argues   that   deteriorated   post-­‐‑war   material   conditions  
caused   the   burden   of   survival,   family   rearing   and   domestic   tasks   to   fall  
disproportionately   on   women   reversing   long-­‐‑standing   gender   equality   in  
educational   access,   rendering  HE   a   ‘luxury’   item.   Female   student   distribution   by  
discipline  shows  lower  representation  in  fields  offering  greater  career  prospects  and  
social  status  including  medicine  and  engineering.  Further,  female  academics  are  not  
well-­‐‑represented   in   high-­‐‑level   academic   or   administrative   positions.  According   to  
Taylor-­‐‑Weathers   (2006,   p.118)   the   CPA   did   not   push   for   greater   involvement   of  
women  in  post-­‐‑war  planning  for  HE.  
Coalition   promotion   of   women’s   rights   tainted   the   issue   as   driven   by   outside  
interests   therefore   prompting   considerable   domestic   opposition,   a   ‘conservative  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  Ali	  Baban	  Former	  Minister	  of	  Planning	  -­‐	  Manchester,	  England	  04/2013	  
172	  Professor	  Mazin	  Kadhim,	  former	  Vice-­‐President,	  Saddam	  University	  and	  senior	  adviser	  to	  MoHE-­‐I	  
-­‐	   Amman,	   Jordan	  12/2010.	  Also	   a	   former	   Professor	   of	   Engineering	   at	  Al-­‐Mustansiriya	  University	   –	  
Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	  
173	   See	   the	   final	   section	   of	   this	   chapter	   on	   internationalisation	   of	   Iraqi	   HE	   for	   more	   in-­‐depth	  
discussion	  of	  the	  accusation	  of	  sectarian	  bias	  in	  the	  scholarship	  programme.	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backlash’,   causing   decline   in   women’s   freedoms   (Al   Ali   2005).   This   dynamic  
impacted  HE;  since  2003  females’  position  within  HE  has  been  threatened  primarily  
by   increased   power   of   conservative   religious   groups.   Religious   parties   and   their  
proxies   on   campus   attempted   to   segregate   classes   by   gender   and   enforce   Islamic  
dress   codes  on   female   students   (Jarecki  &  Kaisth  2009,  p.46).   In   support  of   this,   it  
was   reported   that   security   guards   at   the   University   of   Baghdad   tried   to   enforce  
Islamic  dress  on  female  students.174    
Al   Ali   et   al   (2012)   in   a   study   of   female   Iraqi   academics   find   that   while   male  
colleagues   also   face   many   similar   challenges   most   female   academics   feel  
disadvantaged   because   they   are   female   and   conclude   that   there   is   ‘systematic  
marginalisation  and  exclusion’   in  HE.  At  an  IIE  conference  on  rebuilding  Iraqi  HE  
in  2011  a  female  Iraqi  academic  delivered  a  paper  defending  a  similar  finding  to  Al  
Ali  et  al  (2012).  It  was  observed  that  during  discussion  the  overwhelming  majority  
of   male   Iraqi   participants   rejected   the   characterisation   of   Iraqi   HE   as   strongly  
excluding  females.175  This  topic  was  deemed  controversial  and  the  male  bias  in  the  
interview  sample  for  the  study  in  part  explains  the  low  recognition  of  gender  equity  
as  a  significant  dynamic.    
In   conclusion,   in   this   section   it   has   been   seen   that   educational   features   were  
significant   although   interview   data   supports   the   position   that   quality   was   more  
influential  in  constraining  the  post-­‐‑war  role  of  Iraqi  HE  than  equity  or  access.  In  the  
next  section   it  will  be  seen   that   institutional   features  constitute  another  significant  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174	   Former	   Dean	   of	   Languages,	   University	   of	   Baghdad,	   who	   remains	   anonymous.	   Amman,	   Jordan	  
12/2010	  
175	  Institute	  of	  International	  Education	  and	  Scholar	  Rescue	  Fund	  Conference	  “Reconstruction	  of	  Iraqi	  
Higher	  Education	  Post-­‐Conflict”.	  26-­‐28	  January	  2011	  in	  Amman,	  Jordan.	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6.3.3. Institutional  Features  
  
In  this  section  institutional  features  including  governance,  vision,  and  capacity  will  
be  analysed.  While  these  factors  emerged  as  significant  from  interviews  with  Iraqi  
academics  and  policy-­‐‑makers,  in  contrast  to  insecurity  and  instability  which  receive  
widespread   media   and   policy   attention   when   addressing   post-­‐‑war   Iraqi   HE,  
institutional   dynamics   are   under-­‐‑addressed   in   published   secondary   sources.   To  
begin,  the  important  issue  of  ‘ownership’  of  HE  policy  will  be  addressed.    
  
6.3.3.1.   Ownership176  
  
A   lack   of   local   ‘ownership’   is   identified   by   some   analysts   as   a   major   obstacle   to  
rebuilding  HE.  As  was  seen  earlier,   the  CPA  controlled  HE  policy  until   June  2004.  
Watenpaugh   et   al   (2003)   criticise   CPA   HE   policy   arguing   that   Iraqi   universities  
‘have   been   placed   in   a   subordinate   and   dependent   position…   the   US   is   placing  
itself,  with  planned  USAID  HE  subcontracts  to  American  universities,  in  a  position  
to  dominate  Iraqi  educational  structures  for  the  foreseeable  future’.  Moreover,  they  
assert  that   ‘Iraqis  did  not  design  the  “bedrock  principles”  as  a  formula  for  reform,  
but  rather  they  derive  from  a  plan  drawn  up  before  the  occupation  of  the  country  in  
Washington’.   Earlier   analysis   of   CPA-­‐‑led   HE   reconstruction   also   identified  
resistance   by   local   actors   to   externally-­‐‑devised   strategies   as   a   major   cause   of   the  
ultimate  failure  of  reforms  to  take  root.    
  
The  perception   that   reconstruction  after   the   Iran-­‐‑Iraq  war  and  First  Gulf  War  was  
fast  and  effective  influences  the  discourse  of  some  Iraqi  academics  about  post-­‐‑2003  
HE.  Such  instances  of  quick  recovery  are  frequently  invoked  to  express  frustration  
at  perceived  failure  of  externally-­‐‑led  reconstruction.  Post-­‐‑2003  reconstruction  under  
occupation  backed  by  enormous  financial  resources  is  contrasted  with  the  Iraqi-­‐‑led  
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  Section	  6.1.3.	  on	  CPA-­‐led	  reform	  includes	  findings	  on	  ‘local	  ownership’	  relevant	  here	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recovery   in   the   early   1990s   with   significantly   less   resources   that   rebuilt   critical  
infrastructure  including  bridges  and  power  stations.177  Crucially,  sidelining  of  Iraqi  
expertise   and   the   presence   of   occupation   are   held   to   have   driven   failed  
reconstruction.    
While   ‘ownership’   of   HE   policy   was   absent   under   occupation,   after   transfer   of  
sovereignty   in   June   2004   control   of   HE   formally   rested   with   Iraq’s   government.  
After  transition  HE  received  greater  priority,  evidenced  by  an  increased  budget  and  
a  University  Service  Law  leading  to  100%  salary  increases  for  faculty  members  (Al-­‐‑
Bakaa   2013),   although   remaining   a   low   priority   overall.   Furthermore,   overseas  
scholarships   and   international   partnerships   became   central   to   HE   strategy.178  
However,   there   was   no   dramatic   improvement   in   HE   recovery   due   to   immense  
challenges  facing  the  sector.  This  indicates  that  ‘ownership’  alone  was  not  a  decisive  
causal  factor.    
Yet  following  the  ‘Golden  Hour’  concept,  which  posits  that  the  first  post-­‐‑war  year  is  
critical   to   determining   long-­‐‑term   reconstruction   outcomes   (Stephenson   2007),   the  
impact   of   excluding   Iraqi   actors   from   shaping  HE  policy  during  March   2003-­‐‑June  
2004   had   significant   path-­‐‑dependent   effects   on   the   system’s   trajectory,   including  
alienating   the   Iraqi   professoriate   and  deprioritising  HE.   Furthermore,   the   absence  
under  occupation  of  Iraqi  actors  from  devising  strategy  and  vision  for  HE  recovery  
connects  to  the  subject  of  the  next  section.    
  
6.3.3.2.   Strategy  and  Vision  
  
A  common  explanation  offered  by  participants  for  the  parlous  state  of  HE  is  the  lack  
of  vision  and  strategy,  two  inter-­‐‑connected  phenomena,  on  the  part  of  both  the  CPA  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177	   This	  was	   a	   common	   theme	   raised	   by	   participants.	   Examples	   of	   those	   that	   supported	   this	   view	  
include;	   Professor	  Mazin	   Kadhim,	   former	   Vice-­‐President,	   Saddam	  University	   and	   senior	   adviser	   to	  
MoHE-­‐I	   -­‐	   Amman,	   Jordan	   12/2010.	   A	   former	   President	   of	   Al-­‐Mustansiriya	   University	   –	   Amman,	  
Jordan	  01/2011;	  a	  Professor	  of	  Engineering,	  Philadelphia	  University	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	  
178	  Email	  interview,	  Dr	  Tahir	  Al-­‐Bakaa,	  former	  Minister	  of	  Higher	  Education	  and	  Scientific	  Research	  -­‐	  
Response	  received	  05/2012	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and   transitional   Iraqi   authorities.179   For   example,   it   was   held   that   ‘no   particular  
strategy  exists’  for  HE  reconstruction180  while  Al  Sa’dawi  (2007)  writes  that  ‘there  is  
a  complete  absence  of  any  methodological  planning  to  develop  universities  in  Iraq’.  
Similarly,   Al-­‐‑Janabi   and   Urban   (2011)   hold   that   a   strategic   plan   was   expected   in  
2004  and  the  failure  of  strategic  planning  resulted  in  ‘waste  of  several  crucial  years’.  
Nasrullah  explains  that  many  strategies  are  proposed  but  not   implemented  due  to  
instability.181   Furthermore,   a   former   Minister   of   Higher   Education   held   that   in  
particular   after   2005   elections   and   the   sectarian   quota   system   which   further  
politicised   Ministerial   appointments   there   was   a   ‘policy   of   the   minister   not   a  
philosophy   of  ministry’.182   Similarly,   it   was   held   that   five  ministers   each   brought  
completely   new   staff   thus   delimiting   the   possibility   of   vertical   policy  
development.183    
  
The  lack  of  HE  strategy  developed  in  an  inclusive  consultative  process  is  also  held  
to   explain   poor   HE   recovery.   UNESCO   (2008)   recommended   that   developing   a  
broad   national   vision   for   education   is   made   central   to   future   Iraqi   educational  
reform.  A  consultative  process   involving   representatives   from  all   levels  of   the  HE  
system,   students,   government,   civil   society,   and   industry   would   foster   a   shared  
vision  that  could  guide  HE’s  future  transformation.  In  2008  a  process  sponsored  by  
UNESCO-­‐‑Iraq,   UNICEF,   and   the   World   Bank   was   initiated   to   foster   a   national  
vision   for   education   at   all   levels,   involving   representatives   from   the   Ministry   of  
Education  (MoE)  and  MoHE  from  both  the  GOI  and  KRG  (IIEP  2010).    
  
Such   a   vision,   if   achieved,   may   be   expected   to   strengthen   HE   reform   processes.  
However,  HE  revitalisation  will  require  a  shared  national  vision  of  reconstruction  in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179	  Professor	  Mazin	  Kadhim,	  former	  Vice-­‐President,	  Saddam	  University	  and	  senior	  adviser	  to	  MoHE-­‐I	  
-­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
180	   Email	   interview,	   Dr	   Mohamed	   Al-­‐Rubeai,	   former	   senior	   adviser	   to	   the	   MoHE-­‐I	   and	   CPA,	   and	  
Chairman,	  Network	  of	  Iraqi	  Scientists	  Abroad	  -­‐	  Response	  received	  08/2012	  
181	  Dr	  Sadiq	  Nasrullah,	  Cultural	  Attaché,	  Embassy	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Iraq	  in	  Jordan	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  
02/2011	  
182	  Email	  interview,	  Dr	  Tahir	  Al-­‐Bakaa,	  former	  Minister	  of	  Higher	  Education	  and	  Scientific	  Research	  -­‐	  
Response	  received	  05/2012	  




addition   to   a   sector   specific   consultation   and   strategic  plan.  Buckland   (2005,  p.64)  
writes  that  Iraqi  tertiary  education  shows  that:  
  
Reform  of  higher   levels  of   the   system   is   linked  more  directly   to   the   emergence  of  a  
broad  development  vision  for  the  society.  Such  a  vision  often  involves  political  and  
educational   policy   choices   that   interim   political   and   educational   authorities   are  
unwilling  or  unable  to  make.  
  
The  type  of  vision  to  which  Buckland  is  referring  may  be,  for  example,  whether  or  
not  Iraq  chooses  to  pursue  a  strategy  of  economic  diversification  or  oil-­‐‑dependency.  
Overall  reconstruction  strategy  in  post-­‐‑Saddam  Iraq  has  lacked  such  a  shared  vision  
capable  of  guiding  recovery  efforts  (Barakat  2005).  In  the  absence  of  such  agreement  
on   the   future   direction   of   Iraq’s   economy   and   society   the   process   of   strategic  
planning   for  HE   is   rendered  highly  problematic.  For  example,  decisions  on  which  
disciplines  to  focus  resources  and  the  type  of  graduates  to  produce  cannot  be  based  
on  realistic  projected  scenarios.    
  
A  lack  of  vision  emerged  strongly  as  a  theme  from  interview  data.  The  absence  of  
vision   may   be   explained   by   the   deprioritisation   of   HE   amongst   policy-­‐‑makers  
which  led  to  a  failure  to  recognise  its  potential  to  contribute  towards  reconstruction.  
Furthermore,   it   is  also  explained  by   the  divided  political   landscape   that  produced  
several  mutually-­‐‑incompatible  visions,  demarcated  along  communal  lines,  for  HE’s  
role  in  Iraq’s  future.  For  example,  the  vision  for  decentralised  HE  advanced  by  the  
CPA  was  viewed  positively  by  supporters  of  federal  and  secessionist  constitutional  
options  while  rejected  by  centralist  nationalists;  a  major  political   fault-­‐‑line   in  post-­‐‑
war   Iraqi   politics   on   which   agreement   around   a   common   vision   would   be   very  
difficult.   Furthermore,   weak   vision   and   strategy   can   also   be   explained   by   low  






6.3.3.3.   State  and  Institutional  Capacity  
  
After  invasion  and  looting  capacity  of  the  MoHE-­‐‑I  was  weakened.  Ministry  offices  
were   looted   and   burned   eroding   physical   capacity   while   lost   records   constituted  
significant  loss  of  institutional  memory.  ‘Student  records,  personnel  records,  faculty  
files,   and   many   other   sorts   of   records   which   provide   the   “nuts   and   bolts”   of  
education  administration  were  lost’  (al-­‐‑Tikriti  2005).  For  example,  MoHE-­‐‑I  finances  
were   reportedly   ‘in   disarray’   due   to   burning   of   contracts   associated  with   the  UN  
Oil-­‐‑for-­‐‑Food  programme   (McConnell  2003).  A  UNESCO  (n.d.)  Roundtable   in  2005  
found  that   ‘urgent  needs   include  the  enhancement  of   the  capacity  of   the  MoHE  in  
policy,  planning  and  management  of  the  higher  education  system’.    
  
Many   international   organisations,   for   example,   the   British   Council,   DAAD,   and  
UNESCO,   implemented   capacity-­‐‑building   programmes,   mostly   for   MoHE-­‐‑I  
personnel   and   high-­‐‑level   university   administrators.   A   former   consultant   to   the  
MoHE-­‐‑I  stated  that  the  Ministry  sent  many  staff  abroad  on  training  courses.184  There  
is   limited   evidence   to   assess   long-­‐‑term   effectiveness   of   these   efforts.   A   positive  
evaluation,   British   Council   (2009)   claim   that   ‘rewards   have   been   immense’   in  
reference   to   its   programme  Connecting  Classrooms,   Skills   for   Employability,   and  
Excellence   in  Higher  Education.  A  more  negative   indicator,   a  World  Bank   (2011a)  
education  sector  capacity-­‐‑building  project   identified  strategic  planning  and  policy-­‐‑
design  as  critical  MoHE-­‐‑I  capacities  requiring  strengthening.    
  
While   the   language   of   capacity   was   not   commonly   employed   by   Iraqi   faculty  
members   interviewed   for   this   study   the  problem  was  explicitly   referred   to  among  
the   smaller   sub-­‐‑set   of   participants   that   held  Ministerial,   consultant,   or   aid   agency  
positions.185   However,   many   participants   did   explicitly   refer   to   issues   of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184	  Former	  consultant	  to	  MoHE-­‐I	  and	  lecturer,	  Anbar	  University	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	  
185	  Email	   interview	  Dr	  Tahir	  Al-­‐Bakaa,	   former	  Minister	  of	  Higher	  Education	  and	  Scientific	  Research;	  
Email	   interview,	   Dr	   Mohamed	   Al-­‐Rubeai,	   former	   senior	   adviser	   to	   the	   MoHE-­‐I	   and	   CPA,	   and	  
Chairman,	  Network	  of	   Iraqi	   Scientists	  Abroad;	  Khaled	  Ehsan,	  Monitoring	  and	  Evaluation	  Specialist,	  
UNDP,	  Iraq	  Country	  Office	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011.	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governance,   which   are   strongly   inter-­‐‑related   with   capacity,   and   which   will   be  




Various  governance-­‐‑related  obstacles  and  challenges  to  HE’s  post-­‐‑war  role  emerged  
from   interview   data.   To   begin,   it   should   be   noted   that   Iraq’s   troubled   post-­‐‑war  
environment   was   not   a   context   conducive   to   stable   governance.   Rather,   divisive  
politics,  state  weakness,  and  low  ministerial  capacity  all  problematised  governance  
with   negative   consequences   for   the   HE   sector.   For   example,   former   Minister   of  
Planning  Ali  Baban  argued  that  one  of  the  major  reasons  for  reduced  quality  of  Iraqi  
HE   was   ‘quick   changes   in   government’   which   prevented   stable   governance.186  
Furthermore,   it  was   reported   that  many  major  decisions  became  subject   to  prime-­‐‑
ministerial  approval  thus  reducing  the  MoHE-­‐‑I’s  centrality  to  HE  policy.187  
  
At  the  university-­‐‑level  politicisation  and  sectarianisation  contributed  to  breakdown  
in   authority   within   hierarchical   HE   governance   structures.   For   example,   the  
University   of   Baghdad’s   University   Promotion   Committee   (UPC)   was   held   to   be  
very   weak   with   a   former   member   stating   that   ‘if   you   have   no   authority   then  
implementation   of   reform   is   impossible   and   cannot   succeed’.188  He   explained   that  
proliferation   of   private   interests   within   different   committees   and   political   party  
influence   on   the   university   significantly   decreased   UPC’s   power.   A   necessary  
condition   for  effective  university  governance  was  held   to  be   influence  of  a  central  
coordinating  committee  in  all  parts  of  the  decision-­‐‑making  chain  of  sub-­‐‑groups  and  
committees  within  universities  and  up  to  Ministerial  Committees.  The  same  pattern  
of   loss   and   fragmentation   of   power   was   identified   within   the   MoHE-­‐‑I.  
Particularistic  appointments   to  ministerial  positions  eroded   technocratic   standards  
expected  of  civil  and  university  administration.  Conflict  of   interest  between  heads  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186	  Former	  Minister	  of	  Planning	  Ali	  Baban	  -­‐	  Manchester,	  England	  04/2013	  
187	  Professor	  Mazin	  Kadhim,	  former	  Vice-­‐President,	  Saddam	  University	  and	  senior	  adviser	  to	  MoHE-­‐I	  
-­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
188	  Anonymous	  Iraqi	  Professor	  and	  former	  Dean,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	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of   sub-­‐‑committees   aligned   with   different   political   factions   is   a   barrier   to   strong  
leadership  within  the  ministry.    
  
A   strong   emergent   theme   from   interview   data   was   a   technocratic   vision   for   the  
governance  and  recovery  of  the  HE  sector.189  In  this  vision  the  sector  would  be  run  
by  competent  officials  in  a  meritocratic  and  depoliticised  environment.  This  finding  
corresponds  with  the  wider  technocratic  vision  for  post-­‐‑war  reconstruction  held  by  
Iraqis   identified   by   the   author   in   a   previous   study   (Barakat   &   Milton   2010).  
However,   the  overwhelming  majority  of  participants  held   that   this  vision  was   far  
removed  from  the  reality  of  increasing  particularism  and  political  interference.190  It  
was   commonly   held   that   in   contrast   to   the   relatively   technocratic   pre-­‐‑2003  
government   the   post-­‐‑invasion   context   led   to   incompetent   party   loyalist  
appointments   in   ministerial   jobs   and   university   leadership   and   administrative  
positions   with   negative   consequences   for   governance   and   HE   quality.   A   strong  
statement  of  the  significance  of  this  problem  is  made  by  one  participant  who  stated  
that   ‘as   long   as   appointments   in   official   positions   remain   based   on   political  
affiliation   no   real   rebuilding   of   university   infrastructure  will  materialise’.191  Many  
participants  noted  that   the  Minister  of  HE  Ali  Al-­‐‑Adeeb  was  accused  of  holding  a  
forged  PhD  certificate  and  that  this  was  an  indicator  of  unqualified  leadership  of  the  
sector.192    
  
Bowen’s   (2009)   report   Hard   Lessons   consistently   ranks   endemic   corruption   as   a  
major   challenge   to   Iraqi   reconstruction.   Participants   widely-­‐‑cited   corruption   as   a  
major   obstacle   to   effective  HE   reconstruction   and   several   identified   corruption   as  
the  greatest  problem.  Budget   allocations   to  HEIs,   along  with   all   other   sectors,   are  
frequently  subject  to  corruption  and  theft.  Isam  al-­‐‑Khafaji  states  that  ‘corruption  is  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189	   Examples	  of	  participants	  agreeing	  with	   this	   view	   include;	  a	   former	  vice-­‐President	   for	  Academic	  
Affairs	  of	  al-­‐Nahrain	  University	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011.	  A	  Professor	  of	  Engineering	  at	  Al-­‐Nahrain	  
University	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan,	  01/2011.	  A	  former	  Dean	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  
12/2010.	  Professor	  Mazin	  Kadhim,	  former	  senior	  adviser	  to	  MoHE-­‐I.	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
190	  For	  example,	  a	  former	  Dean	  at	  Basra	  University	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2012	  
191	  Professor	  Mazin	  Kadhim,	  former	  senior	  adviser	  to	  MoHE-­‐I	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
192	   Former	   Professor	   of	   Engineering,	   Al-­‐Mustansiriya	   University	   -­‐	   Amman,	   Jordan	   01/2011.	   Also	  
Professor	  of	  Engineering	  at	  Philadelphia	  University	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	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so   widespread   that   no   money   is   coming   to   the   Universities’   (Krieger   2007a).  
Furthermore,  many  participants  cited  proliferation  of  fraudulent  qualifications  as  an  
indicator   of   HE   corruption.   A   common   criticism   was   that   prominent   Iraqi  
politicians   were   awarded   or   purchased   PhDs   without   completing   any   education  
(Allawi   2007).   It   is   reported   that   20,000-­‐‑50,000   fake   certificates  were   used   to   gain  
employment,   including  many  MPs,  with   black-­‐‑market   fees   of   around   $7,000   for   a  
PhD   (Ramzi   2011;   Abdul-­‐‑Kadir   2011).   Moreover,   one   participant   described   her  
exasperation  at  proliferation  of  forged  certificates  which  would  be  a  major  scandal  
in  other  contexts  but  was  relegated  to  the  status  of  a  minor  problem  due  to  it  being  
not  life-­‐‑threatening.193      
  
In  sum,  inter-­‐‑linked  institutional  features  of  the  post-­‐‑war  environment,  in  particular  
weak  governance,  vision  and  capacity,  were  a  major  obstacle  to  HE  making  a  major  
contribution   to   recovery.   Corruption,   appointive   bureaucracy,   low   levels   of  
competency,   and   coordination   failures   are   connected   issues.   Empowerment   of  
sectarian  political  parties   led   to  highly-­‐‑particularistic   appointments  and   standards  
of   relative   meritocracy   and   technocratic   competence   were   eroded.   This   situation  
was   characterised   by   breakdown   in   inter-­‐‑ministerial   coordination   and   high  
corruption.   Furthermore,   intra-­‐‑ministerial   cooperation   was   reduced   as   internal  
political   struggles  within   the  MoHE-­‐‑I  became  a  major  obstacle   to  effective  reform.  
Additionally,   there   was   a   lack   of   cooperation   between   universities   and   the  
Government.   Rebuilding   ministerial   capacity   and   implementing   a   whole-­‐‑of-­‐‑
government   approach   to   HE   reconstruction   and   governance   should   therefore   be  
central   to   future   recovery   strategy.  This   context  of   institutional  weakness   can   in  a  
sense  also  be  considered  a  structural  factor,  the  subject  of  the  next  section.    
  
6.3.4. Structural  Features  
  
While   the   above-­‐‑analysed   institutional   features   were   found   to   be   significant   in  
shaping   the   context   of   post-­‐‑war   HE   in   Iraq   in   a   manner   more   stable   than  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193	  Former	  Professor	  of	  Economics,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	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conjunctural   features   they   also   were   affected   by   the   inter-­‐‑play   of   structure   and  
agency,   for   example,   in   the   formation   of   vision   and   strategy   for   the   sector   or   in  
leadership.  Structural  features,  by  contrast,  refer  to  more  permanent  aspects  of  the  
Iraqi  context  and  will  be  considered  now.    
To  begin,  culture  did  not  emerge  strongly  as  a  theme  during  interviews.  However,  
it  was  raised  in  relation  to  a  number  of  other  issues  and  can  be  considered  a  cross-­‐‑
cutting   theme.  For  example,   it  was   seen   that  a   culture  of   corruption  and  Wasta   or  
favouritism   was   an   obstacle   to   financing   and   building   a   meritocratic   HE  
environment  respectively.194  Former  Minister  of  HE  in  the  KRG  Dr  Ala’aldeen  held  
that  while  a  conservative  academic  culture  was  an  impediment  to  reform  initiatives  
in   that   new   concepts   and   proposals   were   resisted   culture   was   a   surmountable  
obstacle.195   Furthermore,   it   was   held   that   absence   of   well-­‐‑developed   ‘academic  
ethics’   in   Iraqi   universities   was   a   major   challenge.   Several   participants   held   that  
academic   culture   was   devastated   by   war,   sanctions,   and   occupation   and  
necessitated  deep  revitalisation  of  academic  communities.    
A   theme   emerging   from   interviews   is   appeal   to   Iraq’s   educational   heritage   as   a  
resource  upon  which  to  revitalise  Iraqi  HE  in  the  present.  This  is  reflected  in  the  title  
of   Allan   Goodman’s   speech   ‘Re-­‐‑building   the   House   of   Wisdom   in   Iraq’.   One  
participant   claimed   that   Iraq   should  draw  on   its   ‘civilisational  heritage’   to   restore  
HE  to  its  former  glory.  Similarly,  a  debate  over  the  purpose  of  rebuilding  emerged  
at   a   conference   in  Amman.  Yahia  Kubaisy   criticised  UNESCO  and  other   agencies  
working   in   Iraq   for   wanting   to   restore   the   past   system.196   In   interview   with   a  
UNESCO   official   this   criticism  was   addressed   directly;   ‘the   goal   is   to   restore   the  
level  and  glory  of  the  past  system  –  not  to  rebuild  the  old  system’.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194	   Email	   interview,	   Dr	   Mohamed	   Al-­‐Rubeai,	   former	   senior	   adviser	   to	   the	   MoHE-­‐I	   and	   CPA,	   and	  
Chairman,	  Network	  of	  Iraqi	  Scientists	  Abroad	  -­‐	  Response	  received	  08/2012	  
195	  Dr	  Dlawer	  Ala’aldeen,	   former	  Minister	  of	  Higher	  Education	   in	   the	  KRG	  and	  Professor	  of	  Clinical	  
Microbiology	  at	  Nottingham	  University	  -­‐	  Nottingham,	  UK.	  07/2013	  
196	  Kubaisy’s	  criticism	  is	  unfair;	  UNESCO	  programmes	  and	  documents	  relating	  to	  higher	  education	  in	  
Iraq	   reveal	   a	   future-­‐oriented	   direction	   premised	   on	   the	   transformation	   of	   Iraqi	   higher	   education	  
rather	  than	  merely	  rebuilding	  the	  old	  system	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This   tension  reflects   the  wider  debate  over   the  goals  of  post-­‐‑war  recovery.  On   the  
one   hand,   Etzioni   (2004)   for   example   argues   that   reconstruction   should   be   about  
restoring  the  status  quo  ante.  However,  others,  for  example  Barakat  and  Zyck  (2009)  
hold  that  this  risks  reproducing  inequalities  and  vulnerabilities  that  led  to  the  initial  
conflict.   This   debate   illustrates   the   point   that   visions   of   Iraqi   HE   drawing  
inspiration   from   perceived   past   glories   may   be   criticised   for   their   conservative  
ideology   while   visions   drawing   on   transformation   and   modernisation   may   be  
viewed  as   insufficiently  rooted   in  Iraqi  history  and  culture.   In   the  next  section  the  
external  dimensions  of   the  post-­‐‑war   environment  will   be   considered;   it   should  be  
noted   that   these   may   be   classed   as   structural   in   that   they   refer   to   the   external  
strategic  context  in  which  post-­‐‑war  Iraqi  HE  operated.    
  
6.3.5. External  Features  
  
While  regional  politics  was  not  frequently  raised  by  interviewees,  a  minority  stated  
forcefully   that  external  political   interference,   in  particular   from  Iran,  affected   Iraqi  
HE.  The  argument  that  regional  influence  was  a  major  obstacle  can  be  sub-­‐‑divided  
into  the  claim  that  regional  states  directly  influenced  Iraqi  HEIs  and  the  distinct  but  
related  claim  that  because  HE  sector  prospects  depend  upon  Iraq’s  political  context,  
given   that   Iraqi   politics   is   determined   by   regional   powers,   primarily   Iran,   Saudi  
Arabia   and   the   USA,   Iraq’s   HE   prospects   are   therefore   dependent   on   regional  
politics.    
On   the   former   claim,   first   and   most   damningly   there   is   a   perception   prevalent  
among  some  participants  that  foreign  regional  powers,  in  particular  Iran  and  Israel,  
specifically   targeted   academics   through   assassinations.197   Beyond   this   unverifiable  
claim,  several  former  senior  academics  at  the  University  of  Basra  claimed  that  Iran  
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   Former	   senior	   adviser	   to	   the	   MoHE-­‐I	   –	   Amman,	   Jordan	   02/2011;	   former	   Dean	   of	   Faculty,	  




strongly  influenced  its  top-­‐‑level  officials.198  The  US  Embassy  advocated  educational  
exchange  with   Basra  University   to   increase  US   soft   power   and   reduce   Iran’s   soft  
power   generated   by   training   Basrawi   staff   and   students   in   Iran   (Naland   2009b).  
Suspicion   of   a   former   University   of   Basra   Chancellor’s   pro-­‐‑Iranian   sympathies  
constituted   an   obstacle   to   US   cooperation   while   his   replacement   by   a   new   ‘UK-­‐‑
educated  and  westernized’  Chancellor   in  2009  would  ‘set  the  stage  for  a  sustained  
and  mutually   beneficial   relationship’   between   the   university   and   the  US   (Naland  
2009a).   However,   there   is   insufficient   evidence   on   this   sensitive   political   issue   to  
claim  that  it  was  a  major  factor  nationally.    
On   the   latter   point,   it   was   seen   earlier   that   political   dynamics   including   political  
influence  on  campus  and  sectarian  divisions  were  central  influences  upon  post-­‐‑war  
HE.  The  extent  to  which  Iraqi  politics  is  influenced  by  external  actors  is  a  contested  
issue.   For   example,   some   hold   that   Iran   exerts   strong   influence   on   Iraq’s   Shiite  
political   parties   while   others   contend   that   influence   is   weak   (Visser   2009b).   One  
participant   in   discussing   regional   influence   of   Iran   and   other   states   claimed   that  
‘you   need   to   understand   politics   to   understand   the   reconstruction   of   higher  
education’.199  If  it  is  accepted  that  political  dynamics  are  the  most  important  obstacle  
to  HE  contributing  to  recovery  and  that  Iraqi  politics  is  overlaid  by  external  powers  
then  the  argument  can  be  considered  sound.  However,  while  political  dynamics  are  
considered  central,  the  argument  expressed  by  some  participants  that  Iraqi  politics  
is  determined  by  exterior  forces  is  not  accepted;  rather  Iraqi  politics  are  influenced  




In   this   section   the   features   shaping   the   post-­‐‑war   environment   in  which   Iraqi   HE  
operated  were  analysed  in  order  to  explain  the  finding  of  the  previous  section  that  
the   sector  made  an  overall  very   low  contribution   to  post-­‐‑war   recovery.  There   is   a  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198	   Former	  Dean	   of	   Faculty,	   University	   of	   Basra.	   Amman	   -­‐	   Jordan	   12/2010;	   also	   former	   President,	  
University	  of	  Basra	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
199	  Former	  vice-­‐President	  for	  Academic	  Affairs,	  Al-­‐Nahrain	  University	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	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consensus   in   the   literature  on   Iraq   and   the   interview  data   collected   for   this   study  
that   insecurity,   conflict,   and   instability   are   primary   challenges   to   the   effective  
contribution  of  HE  to  recovery.  The  section  has  sought   to  show  that  beyond  these  
widely-­‐‑considered   features   other  major   obstacles   to   the   post-­‐‑war   role   of   Iraqi  HE  
include   low   quality,   weak   governance,   vision,   and   leadership   and   unmet  
educational   needs.   In   the   following   section   the   various   options   and   opportunities  
for  overcoming  these  myriad  challenges  will  be  analysed.    
  
6.4.   Major  Policy  Options  for  Higher  Education  
  
This  section  will  evaluate   the  effectiveness  of  various  HE  policy  options   including  
private   HE,   internationalisation,   and   ‘brain   gain’.   The   overall   analysis   offers   a  
critique  of  reconstruction  strategies  that  are  commonly  presented  in  media  reports  
as   offering   positive   opportunities  with   little   consideration   of   potential   challenges.  
Throughout,  a  range  of  Iraqi  perspectives  will  be  explored  to  provide  an  overview  
of   key  debates   and  points   of   consensus  on   the  prospects   of   Iraqi  HE   contributing  
towards   post-­‐‑war   recovery   and   long-­‐‑term   development.   To   begin,   the   major  
dynamic  of  privatisation  and  private  HE  will  be  considered.    
  
  
6.4.1. Private  Higher  Education  
  
Expansion  of  private  education  at  all  levels  has  been  an  important  dynamic  in  post-­‐‑
Saddam   Iraq   (Saltman   2006).   After   2003   establishment   of   private   HEIs   was  
permitted  as  part  of  CPA-­‐‑led  economic  liberalisation.  Many  university  applications  
that   had   lain   dormant   were   processed   and   eight   new   private   institutions  
administered   by   the  MoHE-­‐‑I   were   established,   six   in   2004   and   2005.   Private   HE  
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expanded  rapidly   in  Kurdistan  with  eleven  new   institutions   in  2004-­‐‑2010  and  one  
semi-­‐‑public  university.200  
  
Several   participants   noted   that   many   new   private   universities   and   university  
colleges   had   a   strong   religious   nature.201   For   example,   Al   Alamein   Institute   was  
reportedly   established   in   Najaf   in   2008   although   it   struggled   to   receive   MoHE-­‐‑I  
recognition.   The   institute   is   notable   because   a   large   endowment   from   the  
Marja'ʹiyah,  a  group  of  senior  Shiite  clergy,  covered  around  80%  of  costs  (Hill  2010).  
However,   one   participant   stated   that   ‘political   parties   started   interfering   with  
private  colleges  in  same  way  as  public  universities’.202  Given  the  lower  capacity  and  
autonomy   of   new   private  HEIs,   resisting   external   pressures  was   held   to   be  more  
difficult  leading  to  many  institutions  reflecting  particularistic  sectarian  and  political  
interests.203  One   participant   on   the  University   of   Baghdad’s  University   Promotion  
Committee   described   external   pressure   placed   on   the   committee   to   permit  
recognition   of   certificates   from   small   private   religious   university   colleges   and  
grades  from  Iranian  religious  institutions.204  These  reports  support  the  finding  that  
private  HE  further  strengthened  sectarian  division  and  conflict  in  post-­‐‑war  Iraq.    
  
Among   interviewees,   further   strong   criticism   of   existing   private   HE   emerged.  
Problems   reported   include  many   institutions   with   no   permanent   staff   relying   on  
part-­‐‑time  lecturers  from  public  HEIs,205  poor  facilities,  high  fees,  and  low  academic  
standards.   A   quote   illustrating   the   perceived   contribution   of   private   HE   to  
reconstruction   is   that   ‘unless   private   universities   increase   quality   they  will   create  
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  Ms.	   Sameerah	   Saeed.	   Assistant	   to	   the	  Director	   of	   the	  Quality	   Assurance	   division,	  MoHE-­‐KRG	   -­‐	  
Newcastle,	  UK	  02/2012	  
201	  SRF	  Scholar	  at	  British	  Institute	  in	  Jordan	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011;	  Dr	  Sadiq	  Nasrullah,	  Cultural	  
Attaché,	  Embassy	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Iraq	  in	  Jordan	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	  
202	  Professor	  Mazin	  Kadhim,	  former	  Vice-­‐President,	  Saddam	  University	  and	  senior	  adviser	  to	  MoHE-­‐I	  
-­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
203	  Former	  President,	  Al-­‐Mustansiriya	  University	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  01/2011	  
204	  Former	  Dean,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
205	  Former	  Dean,	  University	  of	  Basra	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	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more   problems   than   benefits’.206   There   was   a   general   perception   amongst  
participants  that  many  new  private  HEIs  were  solely  profit-­‐‑driven;207   in  the  words  
of   the   President   of   the   University   of   Technology   ‘our   job   is   to  make   science   and  
technology,   their   aim   is   to   make   money’.208   More   damningly,   doubt   over   the  
existence   of   some   institutions   was   raised   by   participants   while   others   suggested  
degrees  could  be  bought  without  education.  However,  several  participants  held  that  
private  colleges  established  pre-­‐‑2003,   including  Mansour  and  Mamoun,   should  be  
distinguished   from   private   institutions   founded   since   2003,   with   the   former  
established   while   stronger   regulations   existed   and   possessing   higher   academic  
standards  in  contrast  to  many  predatory  HEIs  established  in  the  unregulated  post-­‐‑
war  environment.209  
  
However,   some   limited   support   was   given   to   the   notion   of   private   HE.   Several  
participants   stated   that  HE  should  not  be   free  because   it   leads   to   complacency;   in  
the   words   of   one   participant,   through   fees   ‘students   should   be   made   to   feel   the  
value   of   education’.210   Others   argued   that   not-­‐‑for-­‐‑profit   private   HE   should   be  
encouraged   to   create   a   balanced   system.   In   general   however   there  was   strongest  
support   for   the   idea   of   public   universities   providing   public   goods   including  
research  relevant  to  development,  universal  and  free  education,  and  public  service.  
This   is   explained   by   Iraq’s   long   tradition   of   free   and   universal   education   at   all  
levels.    
  
Concern  over  equity   issues   in  relation   to  private  HE  was  another  emergent   theme  
from   interviews.   Iraq’s   GDP   per   capita   is   $3,800   and   fees   at   some   private  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206	  Anonymous	  Iraqi	  Professor,	  former	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Languages,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  -­‐	  Amman,	  
Jordan	   12/2010;	   Professor	   Mazin	   Kadhim,	   former	   Vice-­‐President,	   Saddam	   University	   and	   senior	  
adviser	  to	  MoHE-­‐I	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
207	  Professor	  of	  Engineering	  at	  Philadelphia	  University	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	  
208	  Dr	  Kahtan	  Al-­‐Khazraji,	  President,	  University	  of	  Technology	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  01/2011	  
209	  Professor	  Mazin	  Kadhim,	  former	  Vice-­‐President,	  Saddam	  University	  and	  senior	  adviser	  to	  MoHE-­‐I	  
-­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010;	  Former	  Professor	  of	  Economics,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  
02/2011;	   also	   graduate	  of	  Mamoun	  University	  College	  working	   in	   the	  Republic	  of	   Iraq	  Embassy	   in	  
Jordan	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011	  




institutions   represent   a   significant   proportion   of   this   sum;   approximately   $2,000  
annually   for   accountancy,   IT,   computer   science,  management   and   similar   subjects  
and  $5,000   for  medicine  and  engineering.211   It  was   reported   that  during  2004-­‐‑2005  
fees  at  private  colleges  in  Baghdad  rose  dramatically  and  continued  rising  because  
of  wage   increases   in   public   universities   (Kadhum   2005).   In   one   private   college   in  
Baghdad   annual   fees   for   engineering   courses   were   reported   at   $50,000.212   While  
Iraqi  HE  enabled  social  mobility  historically,  there  was  fear  that  in  a  new  context  of  
growing   urban   poverty   and   marginalisation   that   if   private   HE   were   expanded  
rapidly  access  polarisation  between  the  wealthy  and  poor  could  emerge.213    
  
Shortly  after  invasion,  Fattah  (2003)  warned  that  ‘if  university  privatization  is  to  be  
administered   in   compliance   with   the   CPA’s   vision,   regardless   of   Iraqi   views   or  
experience,  it  will  traumatize  the  higher  education  system’.  Private  HE  in  the  USA  
emerged   organically   over   a   long   period   and   has   been   supported   by   strong  
traditions  of  private  philanthropy  and  many  wealthy   individuals.  This   experience  
contrasts   markedly   with   often   superficial   private   HE   in   the   developing   world.  
Private   HE   provision   is   not   deeply-­‐‑rooted   in   Iraq’s   academic   culture   yet   private  
expansion  is  now  part  of  its  long-­‐‑term  HE  trajectory.    
  
Overall,  private  HE  made   low  contribution   to   recovery  due   to   low  standards  and  
predatory   ‘degree-­‐‑mill’   institutions   while   it   risks   excluding   poor   students.  
Furthermore,  the  emergence  of  private  HEIs  in  a  chaotic  post-­‐‑war  environment  that  
lacked  regulatory  capacity  can  be  considered  a  de  facto  process  of  decentralisation  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211	  Dr	  Sadiq	  Nasrullah,	  Cultural	  Attaché,	  Embassy	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Iraq	  in	  Jordan	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  
02/2011	  
212	   Figure	   not	   verified.	   Personal	   communication,	   anonymous	   lecturer,	   Shatt	   Al-­‐Arab	   University	  
College	  -­‐Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
213	  Former	  Dean,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	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6.4.2. Decentralisation  and  Autonomy  
  
Granting  greater  autonomy  to  Iraq’s  universities  has  been  a  central  post-­‐‑war  policy  
debate.   Successive   Iraqi   Ministers   stated   that   government   policy   favours   greater  
autonomy   and   decentralisation.214   Furthermore,   one   participant   who   advised   the  
MoHE-­‐‑I  holds   that  granting  university  autonomy  was  a   turning  point  after  which  
better  HE  outcomes  were  achieved.215  However,  a  strong  theme  in  interviews  is  that  
participants  hold  that  there  has  been  minor  change  in  the  degree  of  centralisation.216  
The  Iraqi  Cultural  Attaché  in  Jordan,  who  offered  relatively  positive  appraisals  on  
other  aspects  of  Iraqi  HE  in  comparison  with  displaced  scholars,  stated  that  ‘there  is  
no  greater  freedom  for  universities  today  than  in  2003’.217    
  
Iraqi   HE   has   since   its   foundation   remained   highly   centralised,   except   the   self-­‐‑
governing  KRG.  The  MoHE-­‐‑I  controls  admissions  policies,  examinations,  curricula,  
textbooks,   funding,   and  many   other   administrative   functions.   Local   governorates  
and   municipalities   exercised   little   control   over   substantive   components   of  
university   governance   with   local   branches   of   line   ministries   implementing  
centrally-­‐‑designed  policies   (Ahmad  et  al  2005).  Harb  (2008)  concurs   that  post-­‐‑2003  
the  system  became  ‘more  open  and  transparent’  but  remains  highly  centralised.    
  
There   have   been  many   calls   for   decentralisation.218   For   example,   the   President   of  
Kufa  University   cited  decentralisation   as  his   institution’s   top  priority.219  UNESCO  
(2004,   p.121)   advocated   decentralisation   because   it   would   increase   academic  
excellence   and   academic   freedom.   It   has   been   argued   that   strategies   of  
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  Email	  interview	  Dr	  Tahir	  Al-­‐Bakaa,	  former	  Minister	  of	  Higher	  Education	  and	  Scientific	  Research	  
215	   Email	   interview	   Dr	   Mohamed	   Al-­‐Rubeai,	   former	   senior	   adviser	   to	   the	   MoHE-­‐I	   and	   CPA,	   and	  
Chairman,	  Network	  of	  Iraqi	  Scientists	  Abroad	  
216	   This	   view	   emerged	   very	   strongly	   from	   interviews	   –	   participants	   supporting	   it	   include:	   Khaled	  
Ehsan,	  Monitoring	  and	  Evaluation	  Specialist,	  UNDP,	  Iraq	  Country	  Office	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2011;	  a	  
former	   Professor	   of	   Engineering,	   Al-­‐Mustansiriya	   University	   –	   Amman,	   Jordan	   02/2011;	   former	  
Dean,	  University	  of	  Baghdad	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  12/2010	  
217	  Dr	  Sadiq	  Nasrullah,	  Cultural	  Attaché,	  Embassy	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Iraq	  in	  Jordan	  -­‐	  Amman,	  Jordan	  
02/2011	  
218	  For	  example,	  the	  International	  Conference	  on	  Higher	  Education	  in	  Iraq,	  held	  in	  Erbil	  in	  2007.	  
219	  Email	  interview,	  Dr	  Akeel	  Yaseen,	  President,	  Kufa	  University	  -­‐	  Response	  received	  05/2012	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decentralisation  and  increasing  university  autonomy  would  enable  innovation  and  
new   educational   initiatives   currently   frustrated   by   central   control   (Harb   2008).   A  
selective  process  of  decentralisation  has  been  held  to  be  necessary  to  move  towards  
a   more   balanced   system.   Autonomy   to   develop   new   programmes   and   courses  
would   enable   tailoring   curricula   to   local   economic   and  developmental   needs.   For  
example,  universities  and  institutes  in  regions  with  large  oilfields  should  be  free  to  
introduce   new   courses   in   petroleum   engineering   and   geosciences.   Control   over  
funding  would  permit  universities  and  technical  institutes  to  attract  new  sources  of  
revenue,  essential  while  HE  investment  budgets  remain  insufficient.    
  
However,   it  has  been  cautioned   that   implementing  decentralisation  would   further  
increase   the   influence   of   local,   private,   and   sectarian   interests   to   dominate   the  
university   system,   and   place   an   obstacle   to   the   emergence   of   a   shared   national  
vision   of   HE,   which   is   important   to   the   future   prospects   of   reconstruction.220   A  
strategy  of   ‘centralisation  before  decentralisation’  could  enable  rebuilding  MoHE-­‐‑I  
capacity  before  granting  greater  autonomy  to  individual  universities  at  a  later  date  
within   the   context   of   a   national   framework   and   strategy.   Such   a   strategy   was  
favoured   by   the   KRG   Minister   of   HE   who   held   that   granting   full   autonomy   to  
universities   before   developing   central   regulatory   authority   would   ‘lead   to   the  
creation  of  many  mini-­‐‑dictatorships’.221    
  
So  far   the  focus  has  been  primarily  on  Arab  Iraq  or  non-­‐‑Kurdistan  Iraq.  The  main  
reason  is  that  post-­‐‑Saddam  era  Kurdistan  was  no  longer  in  the  reconstruction  phase  
but   rather   in   ‘normal’   development.   However,   the   experience   of   HE   in   Iraqi  
Kurdistan   is   an   aspect   of   the  debate  over  decentralisation.  Writing  of   the   security  
sector,  O’Leary  (2009,  p.95)  holds  that  ‘the  KRG  offers  a  positive  model  of  what  may  
be  possible  in  the  rest  of  Iraq  if  the  local  politicians  pursue  either  regionalization  or  
provincialization’;  an  argument  that  may  be  held  to  apply  to  HE.  Such  an  argument  
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  Former	  President,	  Al-­‐Mustansiriya	  University	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  01/2011;	  also	  SRF	  Scholar	  -­‐	  
Amman,	  Jordan	  10/2010	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  Dr	  Dlawer	  Ala’aldeen,	   former	  Minister	  of	  Higher	  Education	   in	   the	  KRG	  and	  Professor	  of	  Clinical	  
Microbiology	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  Nottingham	  University	  -­‐	  Nottingham,	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is  presented  by  the  reform  process  in  the  KRG  which  involves  decentralisation  as  a  
main  component.  The  KRG  vision  has  been  presented  as  an  instructive  model  of  HE  
development  for  the  rest  of  Iraq  and  the  wider  region  by  the  former  Minister  of  HE  
at   an   IIE   conference   in   2011   and   the   question   of   its   applicability  was   explored   in  
depth  during  interview.222  
  
To  briefly  contextualise  the  Kurdistan  case,  while  during  2003-­‐‑2013  Kurdistan  was  
not   a   ‘post-­‐‑conflict’   region,   long-­‐‑running   conflicts   between   the   Iraqi   government  
and  Kurdish  militias,  the  Iran-­‐‑Iraq  war,  the  Anfal  campaign,  and  the  Kurdish  Civil  
War   during   1994-­‐‑1998   had   important   consequences   for   HE   in   Kurdistan.   For  
example,   breakdown   of   a   peace   agreement   between  Kurdish   forces   and   the   Iraqi  
government   in   1974   led   to   widespread   repression,   fleeing   of   academics   and  
students,  and  eventual  displacement  of  the  University  of  Sulaimani  to  Erbil  (Mojab  
&  Hall  2003,  p.163).    
  
Since   1992   after   the  Gulf  War  Kurdistan   gained  de   facto   autonomy   from   the   Iraqi  
state.  During  the  1990s  Iraqi  Kurdistan  faced  the  challenge  of  recovering  from  these  
conflicts  whilst  isolated  from  the  rest  of  Iraq  yet  subject  to  sanctions.  Isolation  was  
the   major   constraint   facing   Kurdistan’s   HE   in   that   period   (Mojab   &   Hall   2003,  
p.163).  However  during  1992-­‐‑2003  universities  were  rebuilt  and  rehabilitated,  acting  
as  an  important  institution  in  the  emergent  Kurdistan  nation  and  state-­‐‑in-­‐‑formation.  
Moreover,  1990s  HE  rebuilding  was  a  remarkable  success   in   testing  circumstances  
(Mojab  &  Hall  2003).  Moreover,  recovery  of  Kurdistan’s  HE  supports  the  theory  of  
autonomous  recovery  advanced  in  chapter  four.    
KRG-­‐‑administered   universities   experienced   both   similarities   and   differences   in  
historical  trajectory  compared  to  the  rest  of  Iraq.  A  significant  continuity,  in  1992  the  
Kurdistan   National   Assembly   (KNA)   adopted   the   HE   ‘governing   structures   and  
laws   and   regulations   being   applied   throughout   Iraq’   (Sadik   2008).   A   major  
difference   however   is   that   the   2003   invasion   did   not   directly   affect   HEIs   in   Iraqi  
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  Dlawer	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   former	  Minister	  of	  Higher	  Education	   in	   the	  KRG	  and	  Professor	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Kurdistan,   for   example,   there   was   no   looting   and   destruction.   Furthermore,   the  
region  maintained  order  and  security  to  a  very  high  degree  relative  to  Iraq  or  even  
the  wider  Middle  East  region,  labelled  as  an  ‘oasis’  or  the  ‘other  Iraq’.  Harb  (2008)  
holds  that  KRG  academic  freedom  is  greater  compared  to  the  rest  of  Iraq.  However,  
depictions  of  KRG  as  ‘an  oasis  of  stability  and  tranquillity’  (Krieger  2007b)  free  from  
violence   were   challenged   by   2011   protests   met   with   repressive   force   by   KRG  
security  that  led  to  temporary  closure  of  universities.  
With   re-­‐‑incorporation   of   Iraqi   Kurdistan   into   Iraq’s   federal   structure   a   2004   law  
granted  the  new  KRG  de  jure  in  addition  to  de  facto  authority  over  its  HE  system.  HE  
expanded  rapidly  post-­‐‑2003  in  line  with  huge  capital  investment  and  a  construction  
boom   in   the   region.   In   2008   there   were   twenty-­‐‑two   thousand   students   enrolled  
across   five   public   universities223   in   the   KRG   (Harb   2008).   A   University   of   Exeter  
Needs  Assessment   of  Universities   concluded   that   laboratories  were   often   in   poor  
conditions,   materials   lacking,   library   and   IT   systems   required   upgrading,   and  
pedagogic  tools  updating  (Kaghed  &  Dezaye  2009).  However,  it  should  be  qualified  
that  objective  HE  needs  are  lower  compared  to  the  rest  of  Iraq.      
Former  KRG  Minister  of  HE  Dlawer  Ala’Aldeen  embarked  on  an  ambitious  strategy  
to  reform  HE  (KRG  2011).  Central  to  the  vision  is  decentralisation,  private  HE,  focus  
on  research,  postgraduate  training  abroad,  and  international  cooperation.  At  the  IIE  
conference   in   2011   it   was   observed   that   there   was   notable   hostility   towards   the  
notion  that  the  KRG  represented  a  model  for  the  rest  of  Iraq;  a  position  explained  by  
historical  enmities  between  the  regions.  However,  it  should  also  be  noted  that  many  
Iraqi   academics   at   the   conference   were   impressed   with   KRG   vision   which   was  
contrasted  with  the  weakness  of  vision  in  Iraqi  HE.  However,  a  more  fundamental  
difference  was  noted  by  one  participant  who  argued  that  the  KRG  universities  were  
building  a  HE  system  anew  and   therefore  could   innovate  with  new  models  while  
the   Iraqi   HE   system   had   a   much   longer   history   and   as   a   result   was   more  
constrained  by  institutional  inheritance  and  path  dependency.224  Contrastingly,  the  
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  There	  are	  now	  six	  public	  universities,	  four	  private	  universities,	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  two	  public	  technical	  colleges.	  




Minister  in  interview  held  that  stability  was  the  major  difference  but  that  the  KRG  
model   remained   applicable   due   to   the   shared   history   of   centralised   HE  
governance.225  The  inclusion  of  international  cooperation  alongside  decentralisation  





Internationalisation  has   been   a   central   aim  of   successive   Iraqi  HE   administrations  
and   in   particular   after   2008   emerged   as   a   growing   opportunity   for   global   HE  
providers.  Cross-­‐‑border  HE,  university  partnerships,  scholarship  programmes  and  
other  means  are  held  to  redress  damaging  legacies  of  long  isolation  under  sanctions  
(USAID   2004;   O’Malley   2010).   Furthermore,   it   is   theorised   that   creating   and  
maintaining  international  linkages  is  a  critical  means  of  circulating  advanced  skills  
and  knowledge  crucial  to  driving  post-­‐‑war  recovery  and  economic  growth.  
  
An   emergent   theme   from   interviews   was   support   for   international   cooperation  
between   Iraqi   and   foreign   universities.   International   university   partnerships   are  
theorised   to   contribute   towards   domestic   HE   capacity-­‐‑building   by   providing  
opportunities   for   knowledge   transfer,226   valuable   complementarities   including  
specialist   training,   and   advice   on   developing   mechanisms   including   peer-­‐‑review  
and   quality   assurance   systems.   In   the   words   of   a   former   Minister   of   HE,   ‘the  
shortest   way   to   rehabilitate   and   develop   Iraqi   higher   education   is   through  
integrating   the   sector   in   the   international   arena   of   higher   education   through  
partnerships’  (Al-­‐‑Bakaa  2013).    
  
The   partnership   model,   it   was   seen   earlier,   was   adopted   in   the   USAID-­‐‑HEAD  
programme,   criticised   for   allocating   significant   funds   on   specialised   partnerships  
while   there   were   much   more   pressing   needs.   In   addition,   the   programme   was  
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  Professor	  of	  Clinical	  
Microbiology	  at	  Nottingham	  University	  -­‐	  Nottingham,	  UK.	  07/2013	  
226	  Former	  Professor	  of	  Engineering,	  Al-­‐Mustansiriya	  University	  –	  Amman,	  Jordan	  02/2012	  
288	  
	  
found   to   be   inappropriately   timed,   faced   large   security   obstacles,   and   largely  
benefitted  US  universities.  However,   it  was   cancelled   after   one   year.   Spurr   (2007)  
writes   that   ‘these   projects,   if   not   stillborn,   were   left   unfinished,   the   participants  
thwarted,   the   Iraqi   recipients   and   partners   left   high   and   dry’.   Furthermore,   one  
participant   held   that   ‘most   partnerships   were  more   like   treaties   on   some   aspects  
than  genuine  cooperation’.227  
  
While   security   obstacles   continued   to   pose   a   major   obstacle   to   university  
partnerships,  this  form  of  cooperation  accelerated  around  2008  with  security  gains.  
Iraqi  HE  was   increasingly  viewed   as   an   opportunity   for   investment   rather   than   a  
tragic   story   and   partnerships   with   Western   universities   increased   greatly   (Labi  
2010b).  For  example,  the  British  Universities  Iraq  Consortium  (BUIC)  facilitates  Iraqi  
universities  to  link  with  UK  HEIs  to  gain  from  training,  capacity-­‐‑building,  technical  
assistance,  collaborative  research  projects,  and  post-­‐‑graduate  education.  
  
University  partnership  programmes   typically   eschew  conventional   terminology  of  
aid   relationships   such  as  donor/recipient.  For  example,   the  US  State  Department’s  
US-­‐‑Iraq   University   Linkages   Program   stresses   ‘the   importance   of   bilateral  
collaboration   in   the   field   of   higher   education’   (US   Embassy   2010).   Many  
participants   underlined   the   importance   of   equal   partnerships.   This   may   be  
explained   as   due   to   increased   sensitivity   to   sovereignty   issues   after   what   many  
termed  the  humiliation  of  occupation.    
  
Interestingly,  regional  cooperation  with  universities  in  neighbouring  states  was  not  
a   popular   option   amongst   participants.  While   some   donors   and  NGOs   argue   for  
benefits  of  regional  university  partnerships  in  cost-­‐‑cutting,  cultural  familiarity  and  
relevance,  several  participants  held  that  regional  universities  cannot  offer  much  to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Iraqi   universities.228   Rather,   establishing   partnerships   with   Western   universities,  
primarily   in   the   UK,   USA,   or   Germany   was   favoured   to   revitalise   academic  
standards  and  quality.    
  
While   partnerships   did   emerge   as   a   theme,   participants   did   not   support   this  
opportunity  as  strongly  as  will  be  seen  in  the  Libya  case  in  chapter  eight.  This  may  
be  explained  as  due  to  the  above-­‐‑noted  security  obstacles  in  addition  to  the  myriad  
internal   challenges   facing   the  HE   sector   such   as   rebuilding   critical   infrastructure,  
the  need   for   reconciliation,   and   the  breakdown   in  governance   that   to   some  extent  
led   to   prioritisation   of   addressing   domestic   HEIs   before   seeking   to   link   with  
external  universities.    
  
Another  major  aspect  of   internationalisation   is  overseas   scholarships.  Since  2003  a  
range   of   schemes   offered   scholarships   to   Iraqi   students   for   study   abroad,   for  
example,   in   2003   the   Fulbright   Scholarship   Program   for   Iraq   was   re-­‐‑instated  
fourteen   years   after   it   was   halted   with   twenty   students   and   visiting   scholars  
awarded  in  the  first  year  (CPA  2003).  As  can  be  seen  below,  Iraqi  students  studying  
abroad   dropped   by   approximately   1,000   during   2003-­‐‑2004   while   increasing  
annually  during  2004-­‐‑2008.  Lifting  sanctions  enabled  students  to  travel  abroad  more  
freely  and  by  2005  the  number  abroad  exceeded  pre-­‐‑war  levels.  Many  participants  
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While   it  has   just  been  noted   that   there  was   enthusiasm,   although  not  unanimous,  
for  partnerships,  it  should  be  stated  that  scholarship  programmes  received  stronger  
support.230   Iraq  has  a   long   tradition  of  scholarships  and  many  participants   framed  
their   support   for   post-­‐‑war   scholarship   programmes   as   a   revival   of   this   tradition  
which  was  halted  by  wars  and  sanctions.  Support  for  partnerships  was  softened  by  
conditions  in  Iraq;  by  contrast  Iraq’s  chaotic  environment  strengthened  support  for  
scholarships  as  a  way  to  gain  graduates  with  advanced  skills  and  knowledge  away  
from  the  devastated  domestic  HE  system.  
  
Despite   the  widespread   enthusiasm   for   scholarships   as   an   opportunity   there  was  
considerable  criticism  of  planning  and  implementation  of  scholarship  programmes.  
Firstly,   several   participants   noted   that   immediately   after   invasion   scholarships  
awarded   by   foreign  donors  were   predominantly   in   the   disciplines   of   Information  
Technology,   administration,   and   economics.231   Prioritisation   of   these   subjects   over  
science,  engineering,  and  technology  has  been  explained  by  the  type  of  externally-­‐‑
led  reconstruction  intervention  envisioning  free  enterprise  and  commercial  activity  
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as   recovery-­‐‑drivers.   However,   after   2004   under   Iraqi   leadership   government  
scholarship   programmes   favoured   engineering,   science,   and   technology.232  
Similarly,   Fattah   (2004)   notes   that   during   2003-­‐‑2004   scholarship   awards   became  
‘thoroughly  politicized’.  She  states,  ‘blame  must  lie  in  the  confusion  inherent  in  the  
HE   sector   itself;   in   the   misplacement   of   priorities   and   the   mis-­‐‑identification   of  
suitable   sectors   of   the   university   that   could   benefit   from   such   programs’.   This  
finding   highlights   the   broader   problem   of   external   rather   than   Iraqi   priorities  
driving  post-­‐‑war  recovery  efforts  under  occupation.    
  
The  former  Minister  of  HE  held  that  increasing  postgraduate  scholarship  funding  to  
$100   million   annually   was   one   of   the   first   steps   taken   in   2004   after   the   formal  
transfer  of  sovereignty.233  A  shift  in  HE  revitalisation  strategy  came  with  launch  of  
the  Iraq  Education  Initiative  (IEI)  and  a  $54  million  allocation  to  send  300  students  
abroad  to  complete  Masters  and  Doctorates.  On  the  25th  July  2009  it  was  announced  
that  $1  billion  would  be  allocated  to  fund  50,000  students  over  a  five-­‐‑year  period  to  
study   abroad   at   predominantly   US   and   UK   universities.   Students   are   legally  
required  to  return  to  Iraq  upon  degree  completion.  It  is  theorised  that  returnees  will  
rebuild  Iraq’s  ‘knowledge  infrastructure’  and  contribute  to  long-­‐‑term  recovery.    
  
However,  investing  $1  billion  in  scholarships  may  be  a  socially  sub-­‐‑optimal  strategy  
when   vast  HE   system  needs   are   considered.   Iraq’s   universities   remain   in   need   of  
capital   investment   to   rebuild   vital   infrastructure   and   capacities.   HE   budgets   are  
predominantly   current   rather   than   capital   expenditure.   It   would   be   more  
sustainable  and  maximize  long-­‐‑term  developmental   impact   if  a  greater  proportion  
of  funds  went  to  rebuilding  domestic  HE  through  rebuilding  physical  infrastructure  
including  laboratories  and  dormitories.  It  may  be  concluded  that  GOI  allocation  of  
HE   funds   prioritises   overseas   scholarships   ahead   of   physical   rebuilding.   While  
many  press  reports   focus  on   IEI’s  phase  one  a   little-­‐‑noted  phase   two  has  reported  
aims  of  transforming  and  modernising  the  whole  Iraqi  education  system.    
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  Former	  Lecturer	  at	  Anbar	  University	  and	  advisor	  to	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  Amman,	  Jordan	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The  scheme  is  implemented  by  the  Higher  Committee  for  Education  Development  
in  Iraq,  a  sub-­‐‑grouping  within  the  Prime  Minister’s  Office.234  It  may  be  argued  that  
the  choice  not   to  run   the  project  directly   through   the  MoHE-­‐‑I   represents  a  missed  
opportunity   for   capacity-­‐‑building.  A  whole-­‐‑of-­‐‑government   approach   involving  all  
relevant   ministries   in   reconstruction   projects   offers   a   good   strategy   for  
strengthening  national  institutions  and  coordination.  Moreover,  several  participants  
held   that   transfer   of   scholarship   administration   is   best   explained   as   a   strategy   of  
utilising  scholarship  awards  to  bolster  the  PM’s  legitimacy  and  patronage;235  as  one  
participant  stated,  ‘Maliki  uses  his  office  and  resources  just  for  giving  reputation’.236  
This   is   further   supported   by   the   transfer   of   appointing   cultural   attaches   from   the  
MoHE-­‐‑I  to  the  PM.237  
  
Zuhair  Humadi  stated  that   the  IEI   ‘could  surmount  sectarian  tensions.  Candidates  
for   study   abroad   would   be   picked   from   each   province   according   to   their   grade  
levels,  not  by  sect’  (Rosenbery  2009).  However,  it  has  been  argued  that  the  selection  
process   is   not  meritocratic   and   that   political   allegiance   and   sectarian   identity   are  
relevant   factors   (Adriaensens   2009).   This   is   held   to   reinforce   Sunni-­‐‑Shiite   conflict  
creating  divisions  and  further  polarisation  within  universities.  It  has  been  suggested  
that   candidates   are   assessed   largely   on   the   basis   of   the   selection   committee  
consultation   and   that   the   need   to   achieve   ‘ethno-­‐‑sectarian   balance’   takes   priority  
over  selection  on  merit.238  Other  participants  held  that  rather  than  aim  at  communal  
balance   the   Shiite-­‐‑led   government   favoured   Shiite   students   for   scholarships.239  
While  this  sensitive  issue  was  difficult  to  explore  and  claims  could  not  be  verified,  
rather  than  contribute  to  conflict  transformation  a  particularistic  system  of  granting  
scholarships  would  intensify  divisions  within  HE  and  Iraqi  society.      
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  Employee	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  Professor,	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  Former	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  for	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  Affairs,	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Furthermore,  several  participants  strongly  held  that  scholarship  programmes  risked  
perpetuating   highly-­‐‑skilled  migration.   One   participant   stated   that   the   security   of  
100  million  ID240,  designed  to  ensure  scholarship  contract  compliance,  provides  high  
likelihood   of   return.241   However,   it   has   been   doubted   that   compliance   can   be  
enforced  because  pursuing  students  who  choose  to  remain  abroad  requires  lengthy  
and   expensive   international   litigation.242   Additionally,   students   can   buy-­‐‑out   their  
securities.   Dr  Qais   Al-­‐‑Awqati,   an   Iraqi   professor   at   Columbia  University   in  New  
York,   noted   the   risk   that   the   experience   of   his   generation   is   repeated  with  many  
students   emigrating   overseas   (Redden   2009).   Several   participants   held   that   Iraq’s  
post-­‐‑war  environment   severely   limited   the  possibility  of   return;  one   claiming   that  
‘they   won’t   return   to   barbaric   behaviour’243   while   another   stated   that   ‘it   is  
impossible   to  go  back   to   Iraq  with  no  electricity  or   security’.244  These  doubts   raise  
the   possibility   that   IEI   will   have   unintended   consequences   of   deepening   ‘brain  
drain’  thus  further  depleting  Iraq’s  human  capital.  This  last  point  leads  to  the  final  
opportunity  to  be  considered;  ‘brain  gain’.    
  
6.4.4. Brain  Drain  and  Gain  
  
Displacement  of  highly-­‐‑skilled  workers  and  academics  since  2003  is  considered  by  
many  participants  to  be  a  major  explanation  for  the  perceived  failure  of  post-­‐‑conflict  
HE.   Initial   civil   society   and   donor   assistance   to  HE   reportedly   led   to  many   Iraqi  
expatriates   and   exiles  planning   their   return   to   Iraqi  universities   (CSIS   2004,   p.71).  
However,   rather   than   a   ‘brain   gain’   Iraq   experienced   a   ‘brain   drain’   from  
universities   and   highly-­‐‑skilled   sectors.   Thousands   fled   to   neighbouring   countries  
and   beyond,   in   particular   since   2006.   One   report   states   that   1315   MA   and   PhD  
holders  left  during  March  2003-­‐‑March  2004;  8%  of  the  total  15,500  academics  (Janabi  
2004).   Some  universities  were  worse   affected   than   others;   the   former  President   of  
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the  University   of   Basra   estimated   that   30-­‐‑40%  of   academics   left   that   institution.245  
This   is   part   of   a   wider   process   of   highly-­‐‑skilled   migration   as   over   40%   of  
professionals   emigrated   during   2003-­‐‑2007,   across   all   sectors   including   academia  
(Behner  2007).    
  
The   majority   of   participants   in   this   study   were   displaced   Iraqi   scholars   and  
therefore   represent   a   strong   sample   for   investigating   this   issue.   Testimony   from  
interviewees   includes   death   threats,   attempted   assassinations,   and   sectarian  
discrimination   as   reasons   for   leaving   Iraq.  Major   ‘push’   factors   therefore   include  
violence  against  academics,  an  insecure  environment,  and  sectarianism.  Others  held  
that   deterioration   of   Iraqi  HE   created   poor  working   conditions  while   Jordan   and  
Syria   provided   greater   economic   opportunities;   the   major   reported   ‘pull’   factor.  
However,   while   neighbouring   countries   offered   better   economic   opportunities  
during   2005-­‐‑2008,   the   period   of   highest   displacement   from   Iraq,   the   increase   in  
salaries  in  Iraqi  universities  combined  with  worsening  opportunities  in  Jordan  and  
Syria   led   to   these   countries   offering   deteriorating   economic   conditions.   Crucially  
however,   the   majority   of   participants   held   that   despite   less   attractive   economic  
conditions  they  planned  not  to  return;  a  finding  that  supports  the  greater  weight  of  
security-­‐‑related  ‘push’  factors  than  economic  ‘pull  factors’.    
  
Despite  these  obstacles  to  encouraging  return,  Iraq’s  displaced  talent  is  considered  
one   of   its   most   important   resources   for   future   post-­‐‑war   recovery.   As   Saadaoui  
claimed   ‘the   best   people   are   now   expatriates,   the   level   of   those   within   Iraqi  
universities   now   is   not   representative’.246   In   the  words   of   another   participant   ‘the  
Iraqis  abroad  can   lead  development’.247  Universities  struggled  to  replace  displaced  
staff.   The   importance   of   displaced   academics   is   indicated   by  plans   announced   by  
the  MoHE-­‐‑I   in   2009,   after   improvements   in   security,   to   attract   Iraqi   scientists   and  
academics  to  return  (Kami  2009).    
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While  some  academics  returned  during  2009-­‐‑2012,  approximately  70  during  2010,248  
this  represents  a  small  proportion  of  total  displaced  academics.  This  is  explained  in  
part   by   the   above-­‐‑noted   ‘push   factors’   of   insecurity   and   sectarianism   that   remain  
unresolved.   Furthermore,   several   participants   criticised   the   attempts   to   attract  
returnees   as   insufficient.   For   example,   it   was   argued   that   during   the   1970s   and  
1980s  the  government  offered  strong  incentives  to  attract  returnees  from  Iraq’s  first  
wave  of   ‘brain  drain’   including   tax-­‐‑free   cars,   land   to  build  houses,   and   fully-­‐‑paid  
conferences  held  in  Iraq.249  However,  this  also  suggests  that  with  stronger  incentives  
economic   return   factors   could   stimulate   return,   in   particular   as   the   post-­‐‑Arab  
Spring  context   leads   to  worsening  material   conditions   in  Syria,  Egypt,   Jordan  and  
other  neighbouring  states.    
  
The  recognition  of  the  potential  for  displaced  Iraqi  scholars  to  contribute  to  HE  and  
recovery  in  Iraq  is  present  in  the  Scholar  Rescue  Fund  (SRF)  for  Iraq  statement  that  
it:  
  
Hopes  to  contribute  to  the  preservation  of  Iraq’s  vital  intellectual  capital  and  ensure  
that,  when  conditions  permit,   these  scholars  will  be  able   to  return  home  to  rebuild  
their  once  flourishing  academic  communities.  
  
The   rationale   of   the   SRF   programme   is   that   unemployed   and   under-­‐‑employed  
displaced   Iraqi   academics   suffer   deskilling   and   therefore   decrease   in   value   as   a  
potential  resource  for  rebuilding  Iraqi  academia.  The  SRF  therefore  places  grantees  
at  host   institutions,  mostly   in  neighbouring  Arab  states  but  also   the  UK  and  other  
countries,   where   they   receive   an   annual   stipend   of   $26,000   and   are   required   to  
produce  an  original  research  paper  on  any  topic.  An  SRF  paper  recognises  that  this  
support   while   preserving   a   vital   component   of   Iraq’s   intellectual   resources   also  
risks  de-­‐‑incentivising  return  (Miller,  Riendeau  &  Rosen  2013).    
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Personal   involvement   in   a   joint   PRDU/SRF   initiative   to   support   displaced   SRF  
scholars   in   connecting   their   research   to   reconstruction   of   Iraqi   HE   constitutes  
participant   observation   for   this   study.   The   project   rationale   was   that   gearing  
recipients’  research  towards  Iraqi  HE  would  enable  better  contribution  to  recovery  
upon   their   return.   Furthermore,   the   SRF   supported   various   initiatives   to   link  
displaced   Iraqi   scholars  with   universities   in   Iraq.   For   instance,   displaced   scholars  
circulated  research  papers,  remotely  supervised  theses,  and  recorded  video  lectures  
sent  on  DVD  which  benefitted  2,500  students  (Miller,  Riendeau  &  Rosen  2013).  This  
type  of  innovative  programme  fosters  positive  inside/outside  linkages,  draws  on  the  
knowledge  of   the   Iraqi   context  held  by   its  displaced  scholars,  and  strengthens   the  





This   chapter   analysed   post-­‐‑war  HE   reconstruction   in   terms   of  major   obstacles   to  
rebuilding  HE,  Iraqi  HE’s  contribution  to  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery,  and  opportunities  
for  future  development.  Throughout,  wide-­‐‑ranging  primary  and  secondary  sources  
have   been   drawn   upon,  with   an   emphasis   on   reflecting   perspectives   of   key   Iraqi  
actors.  A  central  conclusion  is  that  reconstruction  of  Iraqi  HE  should  be  judged  to  be  
poor.   On   balance,   HE   in   post-­‐‑war   Iraq   made   a   low   contribution   to   post-­‐‑conflict  
recovery,   and   in   some   ways   had   a   negative   impact   on   recovery.   While   the  
contribution   to   short-­‐‑term   stabilisation   and   physical   reconstruction   was   mixed,  
Iraqi   HE   made   low   contribution   to   statebuilding   and   economic   recovery   while  
negatively  contributing  to  conflict  transformation.    
Common  explanations   for   the  poor   record  of  post-­‐‑war   Iraqi  HE  are  high   levels  of  
insecurity   and   violence   against   academics.   Furthermore,   it   has   been   seen   that  
universities  came  to  reflect  the  wider  protracted  conflict  in  the  ‘post’-­‐‑conflict  period  
and   promoted   division   rather   than   national   unity.   However,   in   addition   to  
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insecurity,   instability,  and  conflict  this  chapter  has  found  other  significant  features  
shaping   the   post-­‐‑war   environment   of   Iraqi   HE   including   low   quality,   weak  
governance,   a   lack   of   strategy   and   vision,   missed   opportunity   to   integrate   Iraqi  
universities   with   reconstruction   goals,   and   the   struggle   to   adapt   to   the   new  
economic  context.  Finally,  a  range  of  options  for  overcoming  these  challenges  were  
analysed.   It   was   found   that   return   of   displaced   Iraqi   academics   and  
internationalisation  received  widespread  support  as  options  while  decentralisation  
received   strong   but   qualified   support   while   private   HE   was   widely   viewed   by  
participants  as  a  negative  trend.  As  will  be  seen  in  the  next  two  chapters,  while  Iraq  
in   some  ways   represents   a   unique   case,  many   of   the  mechanisms,   dynamics,   and  
processes  analysed  in  this  chapter  are  also  present   in  the  case  of  HE  and  post-­‐‑war  

















LIBYAN  HIGHER  EDUCATION:  DEVELOPMENTAL  ROLE  AND  




The  purpose  of   this   chapter   is   to  analyse   two  major   contextual   issues   shaping   the  
post-­‐‑war  environment  of  HE  in  Libya.  The  first  is  HE’s  role  in  development  in  pre-­‐‑
war  Libya  and  the  second  is  the  impact  of  the  2011  civil  war  on  HE.  The  chapter  will  
begin  by  analysing  HE’s  developmental  contribution  from  its  emergence  through  to  
its   immediate  pre-­‐‑war   status.  Next,   a  brief  discussion  of  key  dynamics  and   issues  
relating  to  the  2011  civil  war  and  Libya’s  post-­‐‑conflict  transition  will  provide  crucial  
contextualisation   for   the   following   section   and   chapter   eight.   Finally,   the   chapter  
will   analyse   war’s   impact   on   HE   capacity,   needs,   and   distortions   thus   directly  
responding   to   RQ2.   First   however,   HE’s   role   in   Libya’s   development   will   be  
explored.    
  
7.1. Libyan  Higher  Education  and  Development  
  
In  this  section  the  developmental  contribution  of  Libyan  HE  will  be  analysed.  This  
is   important   to   understanding   the   post-­‐‑war   context   in   which   HE   operated.  
Throughout,  a  number  of  themes,  dynamics,  and  factors  held  to  constrain  or  enable  
post-­‐‑war  recovery  outcomes  in  chapter  eight  will  be  described.  The  main  question  
addressed   is;   to  what  extent  did  HE  contribute   to  Libyan  development?  To  begin,  
HE’s   contribution   to   state  emergence,   economic   transformation,  and  social   change  
will  be  reviewed.  After  that,  factors  limiting  pre-­‐‑war  HE’s  developmental  role  will  
be   analysed   including   weak   research   capacity,   politicisation,   and   governance  
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obstacles.   The   material   is   based   on   interviews   with   Libyan   academics   and  
postgraduate  students  and  a  review  of  academic  and  policy  literature.    
  
  
7.1.1. Emergence    
  
To  begin,  HE  had  no  major  role  in  pre-­‐‑colonial  Libyan  society.  It  was  not  until  late  
Ottoman   rule   (1835-­‐‑1911)   that   ‘modern   education   in   Libya   may   be   said   to   have  
begun’  (Deeb  &  Deeb  1982,  p.20).  Local  educational  initiative  was  prevented  under  
Italian  colonial  rule  (Carey  &  Carey  1961).  Initially,  colonial  administration  aimed  to  
‘Italianise’   locals   and   primary   schooling   was   a   principal   means   of   achieving   this  
end,   with   advanced   education   ruled-­‐‑out   for   fear   of   equipping   locals   with  
‘intellectual  arms’   (Pretelli   2011).  A   legacy  of   colonial   rule,  at   independence  Libya  
had   ‘no  preparation  for  statehood  and  pathetically   few  trained  people   to  guide   its  
new  economic  and  governmental  life’  (Carey  &  Carey  1961).  Furthermore,  through  
war  and  resistance  Libya  ‘lost-­‐‑through  combat,  famine,  and  emigration-­‐‑perhaps  as  
much   as   half   their   population,   including   much   of   the   educated   elite’   (Anderson  
1984).   In   1949,   two   years   prior   to   independence,   Libya   had   90%   illiteracy  with   a  
mere  20  university  graduates  (FS  1959).    
  
Establishing  a  national  university  was  driven  firstly  by  severe  shortages  of  highly-­‐‑
trained  workers  that  entailed  dependence  of  state  institutions  on  foreign  personnel  
and   secondly,   an   acute   need   for   teachers   in   rapidly   expanding   schools   (FS   1959;  
Shammas   1962;  Mogassbi   1984,   p.92).   Plans   for   establishing   a   university   began   in  
the   early   1950s   with   technical   and   financial   assistance   from   Egypt   based   on   the  
Egyptian  model  (Zarrugh  1973,  p.304;  Qubain  1966,  p.417).  The  University  of  Libya,  
established   in   1955   in  Benghazi,   began   classes   in   1956  with   a  College  of  Arts   and  
Education  (Landau  1997).  A  College  of  Sciences  opened  in  Tripoli  in  1957  (FS  1959);  
its   location  designed  to  place  science  students   in  Libya’s   industrial  centre   (Qubain  




Many  Libyan   academics  hold   that   1955  until   the  mid-­‐‑1970s  was  Libya’s   strongest  
HE   period   due   to   the   number   of   Libyans   educated   abroad,   basis   in   the   British  
system,   and   strong   rules   and   regulations.250  However,  Qubain   (1966,   p.421)   states  
that   after   ten   years   the  University   of   Libya   ‘is   still   in   a   chaotic   state’   and   ‘almost  
every   facet   of   the   university   requires   drastic   improvement   and   strengthening’  
including  high  reliance  on  expatriate  faculty  and  high  staff  turnover.  Furthermore,  
the   University   of   Libya   was   not   afforded   great   autonomy   under   the   Monarchy  
(Zarrugh   1973,   p.308).   Yet   while   political   parties   were   banned,   students   were  
politically   active   (Matar   2006).   In   summary,   while   facing   problems   common   to  
emerging  HE   systems   across   the   developing  world,  HE  played   an   important   role  
equipping   the   state   and   economy   with   skilled   graduates   after   colonial   rule   and  




Libyan   HE   underwent   rapid   expansion,   in   particular   during   the   late   1960s   and  
1970s.  After  Qaddafi’s   1969   coup   enrolment   increased   from  3,000   to   8,200   in   1972  
(First   1975,   p.185).   During   1970-­‐‑80   the   system   expanded   from   one   to   eleven  
universities   and   from   four   to   fifteen   technical   colleges   (Elzalitni   2008,   p.45).  
Mogassbi  classifies  1953-­‐‑73  as  the  early  period  of  HE  development  and  1973-­‐‑1983  as  
the   era   of   reorganisation   with   diversification   of   institutional   types   and   large  
enrolment  growth  (Mogassbi  1984,  p.92)  as  detailed   in   the  1973  development  plan  
(Elbadri  1984,  p.127).  
  
Several  reasons  explain  HE  expansion.  Expansion  in  the  1970s  was  partly  driven  by  
skilled  manpower   needs   across   all   economic   sectors   (Qubain   1966,   p.430).   In   the  
words   of   First,   ‘manpower   remains   the   straw   that   could   break   the   back   of   the  
government'ʹs   development   plans’   (cited   in   Sankari   1981).  Oil’s   discovery   enabled  
ambitious  development  plans  requiring  many  skilled  workers;  during  1964-­‐‑69  there  
was  a  projected  need  for  21,998  graduates  (Otman  &  Karlberg  2007,  p.98).  Later,  an  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250	  Interviews	  with	  Libyan	  academics	  and	  postgraduate	  students	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estimated  300,000  technicians  were  required  during  1976-­‐‑1980  while   less   than  10%  
of   that   total   was   enrolled   in   relevant   programmes   (Zubi   1992).   Pre-­‐‑oil   HE   was  
geared   to  administrative  and  clerical   tasks  neglecting   technical  education   (Deeb  &  
Deeb   1982,   p.31).   New   economic   needs   required   focus   on   scientific   and   applied  
disciplines   (Sankari   1981).   Relatedly,  HE   expansion   sought   to   reduce   dependence  
on   expatriate   foreign   labour   (Vandewalle   2006,   p.112);   a   major   structural   labour  
market  flaw  (Zubi  1992).    
  
Furthermore,  Libya,   like  many  oil-­‐‑rich   states,   responded   to   social  demand   for  HE  
through   rapid   expansion.   Demand   was   driven   by   a   baby-­‐‑boom   and   population  
doubling   in   fifteen  years.  Additionally,  degrees  are   a  highly  desirable   social  good  
and  minimum  requirement   for  many  public   sector   jobs.  The   revolutionary   regime  
accrued  legitimacy  through  expanding  HE  opportunities  to  new  social  classes.  From  
this   section   it   is   clear   that  HE  played   an   important   role   in  Libya’s   transformation  
from   a   small   and   poor   country   to   a   major   oil-­‐‑exporting   economy   by   providing  
skilled  manpower,  despite  the  sector’s  limitations  in  making  Libya  self-­‐‑sufficient  in  
human  capital  requirements.    
  
  
7.1.3. Developmental  Achievements  
  
In   the   above   two   sections   the   developmental   contribution   of   HE   to   Libya’s  
emergence  as  a  state  and  economic  transformation  were  analysed.  This  section  will  
now  provide  a  more  general  analysis  of  the  main  positive  roles  of  HE  in  supporting  
development  in  Libya.  The  expansion  process  described  above  continued  from  the  
1970s   until   the   2000s   leading   to   considerable   enrolment   growth.   An   oft-­‐‑cited  
indicator  of  Libyan  HE  success,   it  possesses   the  highest   tertiary  enrolment  ratio   in  
Africa  with   approximately   54%  of   the   relevant   age   cohort   enrolled   in   2002,  while  
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Arab  states  averaged  22%  in  2009.251  The  table  below  shows  high  tertiary  enrolment  
for  1999-­‐‑2003.    
  
Table  9.252  Tertiary  education  (ISCED  5  and  6)  Enrolment  
Category   1999   2000   2001   2002   2003  
Tertiary  
Enrolment   308474   290060   324603   359146   375028  
Percentage  
Female   48.62484   48.62477   50.16374   51.40639   51.38843  
  
  
Libya’s  population  is  approximately  6.294  million  (est.  2008)253  and  tertiary  students  
constitute   approximately   10%   of   that   number;   a   significant   proportion   making  
Libyan   students   an   important   group.   Overall,   during   1955-­‐‑2010   eighteen   public  
universities254   were   established   and   are   either   general   or   specialist   institutions  
(TEMPUS  2011).  Additionally,   in  2009  there  were  16  public  high  technical  colleges  
and   63   high   vocational   institutions.   From   these   statistics   it   is   clear   that   Libya  
possesses  a  quantitatively  well-­‐‑developed  HE  system.    
Another   facet   of   Libya’s   educational   achievements   is   universal   and   free   public  
education   at   all   levels.   Generous   student   stipends,   accommodation,   food,   books,  
and   travel   expenses   have   been   available.   Free   HE   led   to   high   enrolment   rates  
supporting   a   social   compact   between   the  post-­‐‑colonial   state   and   citizens   enabling  
middle-­‐‑class   expansion   through   university   education   and   state   employment.  
Further,  Libya  historically  allocated  relatively  high  levels  of  public  funds  to  HE.  In  
1999   68.6%   of   educational   expenditure   was   allocated   to   publicly-­‐‑owned   tertiary  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251	  UNESCO	  Institute	  for	  Statistics.	  Country	  Profile:	  Libya;	  Education.	  Data	  accessed	  12th	  October	  
2011.	  Available	  online	  at:	  
http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=121&IF_Language=eng&
BR_Country=4340&BR_Region=40525	  	  
252	  UNESCO	  Institute	  for	  Statistics.	  UN	  Data.	  Data	  accessed	  12th	  October	  2011.	  Available	  online	  at:	  
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=UNESCO&f=series%3aE_56	  	  
253	  UN	  Data.	  Available	  online	  at:	  	  
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Libyan%20Arab%20Jamahiriya	  	  
254	  Several	  figures	  for	  the	  exact	  number	  of	  universities	  can	  be	  found	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education;   high   by   international   standards.255   HE   was   partially   liberalised   in   the  
1990s  with  more  than  five  private  HEIs  opened  during  1997-­‐‑2000.  
HE   had   far-­‐‑reaching   impacts   on   Libyan   society,   driving   significant   social   change.  
For   example,   HE   affected   tribalism,   an   important   social   force   in   Libya   (Tarhoni  
2011).   Urbanisation   and   educational   expansion   weakened   tribalism   over   time  
through   a   large   and   expanding   urban   middle   class   (Ahmida   2012).   Vandewalle  
(2006,  p.69)  writes  that  ‘as  young  university  graduates  entered  the  different  levels  of  
the   country’s   burgeoning   bureaucracies,   they   brought   with   them   an   individual  
professionalism  that  often  transcended  tribal  interests  or  affiliation’.    
Research   played   an   important   nationbuilding   role.   Anderson   (1986,   p.288)  writes  
that   ‘the   dearth   of   educated   Libyans   at   independence  meant   that   few   of   the   first  
generation  of  educated  Libyans  could  be  spared  for  scholarly  endeavors;  it  was  only  
in  the  1970s  that  significant  numbers  of  Libyans  turned  their  attention  to  the  history  
and   sociology   of   their   country’.   This   new   generation   produced   valuable   research  
challenging   Western   perceptions   of   Libya   (Anderson   1984).   Qaddafi   encouraged  
research   providing   new   historical   interpretations   and   evidence   for   long-­‐‑standing  
Libyan   traditions   of   resistance   to   imperialism.   Anderson   (1986,   p.292)   notes   that  
while  problematic,  serious  Libyan  scholarship  increased.    
  
Furthermore,  Libyan  HE  is  relatively   inclusive  regionally,  with  good  provision  for  
the  Amazigh  minority,  women,  and  rural  populations.   It  has  been  argued  that   the  
Qaddafi  regime’s  commitment  to  female  education  was  significant  in  transforming  
gender  roles  (Arabsheibani  &  Manfor  2002).  Gender  equity  is  high  in  absolute  terms  
with   over   50%   female   tertiary   enrolment   in   2001;   a   large   increase   since   15.8%  
enrolment   in   1976-­‐‑1977   (Shaw   1981).   Moreover,   female   students   constitute  
approximately   80%   of   social   science   and   humanities   students   (Ahmida   2012).  Al-­‐‑
Nouri   (1995)   holds   that   Libyan  universities   significantly   impacted   social   attitudes  
and  behaviour  and  thereby  ‘accelerated  women’s  socio-­‐‑cultural  liberation’.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Libya’s  large  student  population  is  served  by  many  universities  possessing  branch  
campuses   in   nearby   towns   and   cities.   Consequently,   most   students   attend  
university   in   their   town,   city,   or   region   of   origin.   This   is   held   to   have   supported  
Qaddafi’s   localist   decentralised   societal   model.   Another   reason   for   campus  
proliferation  is  the  Qaddafi  regime’s  commitment  to  female  education.  Inclusion  of  
women,  like  other  regional  countries,  faces  cultural  barriers  as  families  do  not  want  
daughters  living  alone  in  new  cities.  Tarhoni  (2011  p.46)  writes  that  ‘sharp  increase  
and   spread   of   universities   in   rural   areas   in   Libya   has   definitely   been   in  women’s  
favour,   allowing   them   to   achieve   their   educational   ambitions   within   local  
environments  not  far  from  their  family’.    
  
However,  proliferation  dispersed  HE  capacity   thinly,  negatively   impacting  quality  
as   many   branch   campuses   are   small,   poorly   staffed,   and   under-­‐‑equipped;  
‘resembling  secondary  schools  rather   than  universities’.  Furthermore,  proliferation  
is   also   explained   as   regime   patronage   to   enhance   state   legitimacy.   Qaddafi  
reportedly  often  visited  villages  where  he  responded  to  local  requests  for  HE.  Many  
participants  also  offered  a  biopolitical  explanation;   that  proliferation  was   intended  
to   prevent   diverse   students   from   mixing   on   campuses   and   developing   unified  
identities  and  social  networks  capable  of  supporting  collective  action  and  coherent  
political   opposition.   Rather,   local   HE   reproduces   particularistic   and   localised  
identities  unthreatening   to   the   regime.  Despite   apparent   tension  between  political  
and   educational   policies,   both   interpretations   of   campus  proliferation   are   valid;   it  
served  developmental  and  political  functions.    
Government-­‐‑funded   overseas   scholarships   made   major   developmental  
contributions;   during   the   1960s   and   1970s   scholarship   recipients   constituted   vital  
high-­‐‑level   human   resources   that   drove   development   and   HE   expansion   upon  
return.   Isolation   saw   scholarships   reduced   and   destinations   shifted   to   the   Soviet  
bloc.  The  programme  was  re-­‐‑invigorated  with  Libya’s  détente  in  the  early  2000s  and  
some   estimates   placed   overseas   students   at   14,000   in   2012.   This   is   held   to   signal  
Libya’s   commitment   to  building  a   skills  base  necessary   for  a  knowledge  economy  
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(Spencer  2010).  However,   scholarship  programmes   faced  several  obstacles.  Firstly,  
selection  was  partly  based  on  particularistic  criteria  such  as  tribe  or  regime  loyalty.  
Second,   some   recipients   remained   abroad   thus   constituting   ‘brain   drain’.   Finally,  
early  2000s  scholarship  expansion  was  held  to  be  linked  to  enhancing  Saif  al-­‐‑Islam’s  
legitimacy   as   a   future   leader   through   his   personal   scholarship   fund.   In   sum,  
scholarship   schemes   made   positive   developmental   contributions   although   faced  
obstacles   related   to   the   dual   purposes   of   furthering   regime   security   and   political  
goals.  
From   this   section   it   can   be   seen   that   Libyan   HE   played   an   important   role   in  
increasing   social   mobility,   promoting   gender   equality,   forming   national   identity,  
and   driving   social   change.   However,   the   last   two   examples   of   scholarships   and  
campus   proliferation   suggest   that   developmental   contribution   was   limited   by  
various  obstacles.  The  next  section  will  explore  these  obstacles  in  greater  depth,   in  




7.1.4. Developmental  Obstacles  
  
In   this   section   factors   hindering   Libyan  HE’s   developmental   contribution  will   be  
analysed.  It  is  argued  that  economic  and  political  factors  including  low  relevance  to  
industry  and  increasing  politicisation  under  the  radical  Jamahiriya  experiment  were  
major   obstacles.   This   consideration   of   internal   factors   will   be   followed   in   section  
7.1.5.   by   analysis   of   isolation  under   sanctions,   an   external   factor  with  detrimental  
consequences,  and  Libya’s  détente  with  the  international  community  during  which  
HE  played  a  role  in  ambitious  pre-­‐‑war  development  plans.  First  however,  economic  






7.1.4.1. Economic  Factors  
  
A  main   structural  weakness   limiting  HE’s   contribution   to   Libyan   development   is  
low  relevance  to  economic  and  industrial  needs  (TEMPUS  2011).  TVET  is  held  to  be  
overly-­‐‑theoretical  with  low  practical  and  problem-­‐‑solving  focus  (TGN/Mercy  Corps  
2011;  Triki  et  al  2010).  This  mirrors  the  Arab  state  HE  pattern  of  disconnection  from  
market   requirements   (Bashshur   2010).   Low   relevance   is   related   to   focusing   on  
quantity   rather   than   quality   (Playfoot   2011).   Zubi   (1992)   argues   rapid   expansion  
without   attention   to   quality   explains   poor   HE-­‐‑labour   market   calibration   in  
particular   in   high-­‐‑level   manpower   in   specialised   fields   necessary   for   industrial  
development.   Social   science   and   humanities   students   are   over-­‐‑supplied   with  
shortages   of   engineering   and   technology   graduates   thus   exacerbating   graduate  
unemployment  and  creating  reliance  on  foreign  labour  in  technical  jobs  in  oil,  high-­‐‑
technology,  and  construction  sectors  (Rafik  et  al  2008).    
  
Libyan  HE  has  very   low   collaboration  with   industry   (TEMPUS  2011).   It  was   seen  
earlier  that  Iraqi  HE  collaborated  successfully  with  industry  to  mutual  advantage.256  
However,   Libya’s   domestic   industry   and   productive   sectors   were   much   weaker  
than  Iraq’s  with  fewer  opportunities  for  cooperation  and  integration.  Furthermore,  
firms  and  agencies   in  Libya  have   low   trust   in  domestic  HE  with   foreign  expertise  
imported.257  While  some  exceptions  include  engineering258  and  medicine259  faculties  
at  two  leading  universities,  university-­‐‑industry  cooperation  is  in  general  low.    
  
Low   integration   of   HE   and   economic   needs   is   also   related   to   weak   research  
capacity.   Poor   laboratory   and   library   facilities,260   low   incentives   for   research,   and  
low   linkages  with   other   institutions  were   all   cited   as   obstacles   to   research.  Many  
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  See	  section	  5.1.2.	  	  
257	   Dr	   Usama	   Al-­‐Hadi,	   Head,	   Department	   of	   Architecture	   and	   Urban	   Planning,	   Tripoli	   University	   -­‐	  
Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
258	   Dr	   Hadi	   Omran	   Tumi,	   Head,	   Civil	   Engineering	   Department,	   Tripoli	   University	   -­‐	   Tripoli,	   Libya	  
10/2012	  
259	  Dr	  Abdulatif,	  Director,	  International	  Cooperation	  Office,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
260	   Dr	   Abdulbasit	   Abuazza,	   Professor	   and,	   Department	   of	   Physics	   and	   Head	   of	   Examination	   and	  
Study,	  Faculty	  of	  Science,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	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interviewees  noted  that  research  is  highly  theoretical  and  irrelevant  to  local  social,  
technical  and  economic  problems.  Further,   it  was  argued  that  research  has  little  or  
no  impact  and  is  simply  filed  away  and  forgotten.  An  indicator  of  this  is  the  decline  
in   the   number   of   biomedical   publications   due   in   part   to   ‘absence   of   a   research  
culture’  and  migration  of  expatriate  faculty  (Benamer  et  al  2009).  
  
Social   expectation   that   degrees   are   necessary   for   high   social   esteem   led   to   many  
unqualified   or   under-­‐‑qualified   applicants   entering   universities,   negatively  
impacting   academic   standards   (Zarrugh   1973,   p.324).   Another   factor,   teacher-­‐‑led  
pedagogical  approaches  have  been  held   to   limit   independent  and  critical   thinking  
skills.  In  the  early  1970s  the  University  of  Libya’s  teaching  was  criticised  because  ‘it  
fails   to   develop   in   the   students   the   power   of   independent   thought   and   balanced  
judgement’   (Zarrugh   1973,   p.323).   An   interviewee   stated,   teachers   were   ‘like  
postmen  delivering  information  to  students’.261    
  
Highly-­‐‑skilled  migration   also   limits   HE’s   developmental   contribution   with  many  
thousands  of  Libyan  professionals  living  abroad  in  particular  in  the  USA,  UK,  and  
the   Gulf.   A   major   factor   leading   to   migration   is   better   economic   and   career  
opportunities   abroad;   what   one   Libyan   described   as   a   country   that   is   anti-­‐‑
meritocratic   and   does   not   reward   talent.262   Other   factors   include   seizure   of  
individual   assets   and   bank   accounts   in   1981   and   the   ‘defeat   of   the   technocrats  
within   the   ruling   elite’   (Anderson   1986,   p.265).   HE  was   affected   as  many   faculty  
members  migrated  while  many  scholarship  recipients  remained  overseas.  Another  
factor  is  political  repression,  in  particular  since  the  mid-­‐‑1970s  and  the  Jamahiriya’s  
establishment.   This   influence   of   political   repression   illustrates   the   wider  
significance  of  political   factors  affecting   the  developmental  contribution  of   the  HE  
sector,  which  is  the  subject  of  the  next  section.    
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  Dr	  Abdulatif,	  Director,	  International	  Cooperation	  Office,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
262	  Libyan	  postgraduate	  student	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  former	  lecturer	  in	  Libyan	  universities.	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7.1.4.2. Political  Factors    
  
Between   Qaddafi’s   1969   coup   and   the   mid-­‐‑1970s   the   regime   was   in   a   period   of  
consolidation   and   in   search   of   direction.   Qaddafi   was   a   young   leader,   close   to  
students  and  to  a  degree  dependent  upon  them.  Obeidi  (2001,  p.64)  in  her  study  of  
Libyan   university   students   writes   that   ‘they   are   an   important   stratum   within  
society,   leading   the   regime   to  pay   attention   to   them’.   1975   saw  publication  of   the  
Green   Book’s   first   volume   and   intensification   of   Qaddafi’s   ideological   project.  
Before  1976  university  students  ‘remained  sceptical  of  and  relatively  untouched  by’  
Qaddafi’s   ideas   (Blundy   &   Lycett   1987,   p.139).   Students   at   Tripoli   and   Benghazi  
universities  were  therefore  considered  the  regime’s  largest  threat.263    
  
During  mid-­‐‑1970s  political  contestations  student  protest  intensified.  Zarrugh  (1973,  
p.326)   writes   that   ‘a   spirit   of   general   riot   and   rebellion   has   spread   among   large  
sections   of   the   university   students’.   The   regime   moved   to   control   students   and  
universities   in   a   deepening   of   revolutionary   emphasis.   In   1975   escalating   unrest  
triggered   large-­‐‑scale   student   arrests   (Vandewalle   2006,   p.100).   Peaceful   student  
demonstrations   in  early  1976   led   to  mass  demonstrations  on  April   7th   followed  by  
violent  clampdowns.  One  year  later  on  the  7th  April  1977  gallows  were  installed  at  
Al-­‐‑Fateh   University   and   Benghazi’s   main   square   where   students   charged   with  
participating   in   1976   protests   were   hanged   (Joffe   1988).   During   1977-­‐‑1984   many  
leading  student  opposition  members  were  arrested  and  executed.    
  
Repression   increased   as   the   regime   sought   to   eliminate   ‘reactionary’   students  
(Blundy   &   Lycett   1987,   p.139).   Control   was   maintained   in   several   ways.   First,  
Revolutionary   Committees   were   established   at   faculty-­‐‑level   to   police   campuses,  
gather   intelligence,   and   organise  Green   Book   events   (St   John   2011,   p.63).   Second,  
leadership   and   administrative   appointments   were   increasingly   dependent   on  
regime   loyalty.   Third,   curricula   adapted   to   ‘reflect   the   political   reality   of   the  
Jamahiriyya’  based  on  the  Green  Book.  Finally,  in  1979  military  training  was  made  
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  Interviews	  with	  Libyan	  academics	  and	  students	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compulsory   for   students   at   all   educational   levels  which  militarised  HE   (Monastiri  
1995,  pp.71-­‐‑73;  St   John  2011,  p.63).  These  events  significantly  affected  HE.  Student  
political  activity  was  almost  eliminated  and  university  autonomy  greatly   reduced.  
Increased  politicisation  marked   the  beginning  of  what   the  overwhelming  majority  
of  interviewees  held  to  be  erosion  of  academic  standards.    
Further   factors   impeding  HE   and   development   are   governance-­‐‑related.   To   begin,  
long-­‐‑term   strategic   planning   and   financial   management   were   very   weak.   Libyan  
state   institutions  were  weak   across  most   sectors   including  HE   (Vandewalle   2011).  
Rule   was   highly   personalised   with   changes   in   direction   accompanying   each  
Minister.  Furthermore,  many  significant   changes  were   introduced   ‘at   the  whim  of  
Qaddafi’.   Several   analysts   emphasise   Qaddafi’s   personalised   rule   (Hinnebusch  
1984;  Harris  1986,  p.43;  Entelis  2008,  p.174).  Several  interviewees  held  that  Qaddafi  
made   arbitrary   changes   to   university   regulation   ‘from   a   tent   in   the   desert’.   For  
example,   in   one   academic   year   5,000   students   were   admitted   to   study   medicine  
while   capacity  was  much   lower   leading   to   severe  problems.  Medicine   is  a  highly-­‐‑
desired   degree   and   the  move  may   be   explained   as   patronage  without   regard   for  
academic  standards.  
  
Continuous   shifts   in   HE   governance   are   held   to   have   been   an   obstacle   to  
development.264  The  number  of  universities  changed  frequently  due  to  mergers  and  
separations.   Additionally,   universities   were   affected   by   changing   sub-­‐‑national  
governance   as   shifts   in   administrative   units   subjected   universities   to   different  
regional   authorities.   One   explanation   for   unstable   university   governance   is   weak  
strategic  planning  and  Ministerial   changes.  However,  many  participants  held   that  
regular   changes  were   intended   to  keep   faculty   focused  on   immediate  demands  of  
learning   and   re-­‐‑learning   administrative   and   bureaucratic   rules   rather   than  
organising  collectively  and  constituting  a  regime  threat.  One  respondent  explained  
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  interviewees	  identified	  continuous	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  as	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  major	  weakness	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that  ‘if  you  have  rats  in  a  bag,  if  you  keep  it  stable  they  will  make  a  hole  and  get  out  
but  if  you  shake  it  they  won’t  get  time  to  think  and  make  a  hole’.265    
To   conclude,   analysis   should   recognise   Libyan  HE’s   developmental   contributions  
while   identifying   limitations   stemming   not   only   from  political   rationales   but   also  
structural  weaknesses   in   industrial   coordination.   These   internal   dynamics  were   a  
major  reason  for  Libyan  HE’s  erosion  from  the  1980s  until  the  early  2000s.  However,  
as  will   be   seen   in   the  next   section,   external   factors  were  a  major   stress  on   the  HE  
system  under  sanctions  and  also  an  enabler  of  reform  in  the  mid-­‐‑2000s.    
  
7.1.5. Isolation  and  Re-­‐‑connection  
  
By  the  1980s  Libya  transitioned  from  elite  to  mass  HE.  However,  the  1980s  brought  
new   challenges   to   HE.   International   sanctions   negatively   impacted   Libyan   HE  
which   became   more   isolated   from   the   international   academic   community.  
Recruitment   of   overseas   staff   became   difficult   while   travel   to   conferences   and  
academic  activities   abroad  were   restricted   (Ahmad  &  Gao  2004),   and   total  Libyan  
students   abroad   declined   rapidly   after   1982.   Furthermore,  Arabisation   of  HE   and  
ban   on   English   in   1986   occurred   in   the   context   of   isolation   and   regime  
radicalisation.   The   symbolic   move   away   from   association   with   imperial   powers  
placed  political  over  educational  needs.  Prior  to  this  English  teaching  was  relatively  
strong   and   many   staff   received   post-­‐‑graduate   degrees   from   English-­‐‑speaking  
countries.   Arabisation   and   sanctions   severely   depleted   Libya’s   language   skills;  
many  participants  view  this  legacy  as  a  major  obstacle  to  Libyan  HE  and  research.  
Simultaneously   to   sanctions,   Libya   experienced   severe   economic   crisis   caused   in  
part  by  Libya’s  falling  oil  market-­‐‑share.  While  HE  continued  expanding,  operating  
budgets  were  insufficient,  particularly  during  1986-­‐‑96.    
Following   Libya’s   early   2000s   emergence   from   sanctions   and   isolation   HE  was   a  
major   sector   of   international   cooperation   and   domestic   economic   reforms.   The  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Libyan   government   in   2006   stated   a   goal   of   creating   a   knowledge   economy  with  
massive   investment   pledged   in   communications,   scientific,   and   educational  
systems.  In  2005  the  ban  on  teaching  English  language  was  officially  ended  after  19  
years.  A  plan  to  invest  $6  billion  in  HE  and  build  25  new  campuses  was  launched.  
Several   scholarship   schemes   were   established   sending   thousands   of   students  
abroad,   mostly   for   postgraduate   degrees.   It   was   stated   that   Libya   would   be  
transformed   into   an   ‘Educational   Hub   of   Excellence’   and   a   ‘multiversity  
environment’   incorporating   foreign   universities   in   a   model   similar   to   Dubai   or  
Qatar.  Moreover,   universities  would   be   functionally   integrated   into   a   network   of  
Science  Parks  in  Economic  Free  Zones  (UK  International  Unit  2010).    
  
From  interviews,  a  range  of  views  emerged  on  these  reforms.  Some  viewed  reforms  
as   economically   necessary   yet   halted   by   the   2011   uprising  while   others   held   that  
‘knowledge  economy’  discourse  was  employed  as  a  smokescreen  to  create  domestic  
and   international   regime   legitimacy.   Furthermore,   a   more   nuanced   position  
explained   that   reforms  were   championed  by  well-­‐‑meaning   reformist   elements   yet  
faced   many   obstacles,   in   particular   resistance   by   conservative   old   generation  
power-­‐‑holders   within   the   regime.   Furthermore,   these   reformists   led   by   Saif   Al-­‐‑
Islam   formed   a   group   including   ‘intellectuals   and   academics’   from   Garyounis  
University   in   Benghazi   and   the   Economic   Development   Board   that   discussed  
political  reforms  and  ‘began  to  create  the  impression  that  an  autonomous  space  for  
political   action   could  be   created   and  permanent   change   in   the   repressive  political  




In  this  section  Libyan  HE’s  developmental  contribution  has  been  analysed.  In  sum,  
HE  made   significant   contributions   to   social   change   and   development   in  widened  
access,   social  mobility,  and  gender  equity.  However,  pre-­‐‑war  HE  suffered  various  
weaknesses   including   weak   HE-­‐‑industry   linkages,   governance   challenges,   and  
politicisation.   Furthermore,   Qaddafi’s   foreign   policy   led   to   international   isolation  
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with  severe  long-­‐‑term  impacts.  Yet  HE  was  a  key  sector  in  ambitious  development  
programmes   from   the   mid-­‐‑2000s   and   largescale   investment   was   planned.   These  
initiatives  were   however   halted   by   civil  war   in   early   2011,   a  major   turning-­‐‑point  
that  will  now  be  examined.    
  
7.2. 17th  February  Revolution  and  Civil  War  
  
Historic   overthrows   of   Presidents   Ben   Ali   and   Mubarak,   in   Tunisia   and   Egypt  
respectively,   emboldened   Libyan   protests   in   February   2011.   At   first,   protests  
followed   other   ‘Arab   Spring’   countries   with   demands   focused   on   better   material  
conditions   including   housing,   social   services,   and   jobs   (St   John   2012,   p.283).  
However,  Libya  contrasted  with  Tunisia  and  Egypt  in  the  regime’s  brutal  response,  
with  many  protestors  killed  (Alaaldin  2012),  after  which  demands  shifted  to  regime  
change  and  on  17th  February  a  ‘Day  of  Rage’  was  called  for.    
An   uprising266   began   with   rapid   mobilisation   driven   by   defected   army   officers  
leading   largely  untrained  young  men  with  rudimentary  weapons.  Benghazi   fell   to  
rebels  quickly  followed  by  other  eastern  cities  including  Baida  and  Tobruk.  In  April  
2011   the   Libyan   army   advanced   to   Benghazi’s   outskirts   after   pushing  most   rebel  
forces   into   the   city.   International   diplomatic   and  media   attention   focused   on   the  
imminent  possibility   of   loyalist   forces   attacking  Benghazi’s   civilians   in   retribution  
for  their  uprising.  Led  by  President  Sarkozy,  Prime  Minister  Cameron  and  Qatar  a  
diplomatic   frenzy   constructed   an   international   coalition   willing   to   intervene  
militarily   invoking   the   Responsibility   to   Protect   (R2P)   doctrine.   Resolution   1973  
proposing   a   ‘No-­‐‑Fly-­‐‑Zone’   was   put   to   the   UN   Security   Council.   Anticipating  
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  The	  term	  uprising	  is	  preferred	  to	  revolution.	  As	  Pack	  (2013)	  states	  ‘both	  terms	  imply	  a	  complete	  
rejection	  of	  the	  old	  order	  and	  a	  spontaneous	  rebellion	  against	  it,	  but	  “revolution”	  tends	  to	  imply	  the	  
creation	   of	   a	   new	   power	   structure	   buttressed	   by	   an	   alternative	   ideological	   framework,	   while	  
“uprising”	   is	  a	  more	  ambivalent	  term,	  suggesting	  an	  upheaval	   that	  does	  not	  necessarily	  have	  clear	  
goals	   of	   a	   defined	   leadership’.	   However,	   many	   participants	   referred	   to	   ‘revolution’	   and	   the	   two	  
terms	  will	  be	  used	  throughout	  chapter	  seven	  and	  eight,	  in	  particular	  ‘revolution’	  will	  be	  used	  when	  
discussing	  the	  testimony	  and	  views	  of	  participants.	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Russian   and   Chinese   resistance   assurances   were   made,   both   countries   abstained  
and  Resolution  1973  passed.    
NATO  mission   Operation   Unified   Protector   began   targeting   Libyan  military   and  
state   installations.   Poorly   equipped   and   under-­‐‑trained   rebels   received   arms   and  
training   from  outside  powers,   notably  Qatar   and  France.   The   six-­‐‑month   civil  war  
involved  many   battles   over   individual   towns,   in   some   cases   the   same   settlement  
passing   between   rebel   and   army   control  multiple   times.  Considerable   destruction  
and   damage   to   physical   infrastructure   occurred   in   several   locations   including  
Misrata,  Sirte,  Bani  Walid,  and  Zawiya.  An  estimated  30,000  people  died  while  GDP  
fell  approximately  60%  in  2011  as  oil  production  collapsed  (ARB  2012).  Tripoli   fell  
to   rebels   in  August  with  Qaddafi   killed   on  October   20th   2011  marking   a   symbolic  
and  psychological  end  to  war.  Intervention  was  interpreted  by  Russia,  China,  Brazil  
and  others  as  over-­‐‑reaching  Resolution  1973  and  constituting  regime  change.  
7.3.   Post-­‐‑conflict  Transition  
  
The   National   Transitional   Council   (NTC),   established   as   an   opposition   political  
movement  in  February  2011,  formed  the  transitional  government  until  August  2012.  
The   NTC,   while   possessing   high   international   legitimacy,   had   less   legitimacy  
domestically  and  struggled   to  exert  authority   throughout  continual  political   crises  
in  a  complex  post-­‐‑conflict  environment.  A  transitional  timetable  promised  July  2012  
national   assembly   elections   and   constitution-­‐‑making;   two   principal   means   of   re-­‐‑
establishing  legitimate  political  authority.  International  agencies  and  states  adopted  
a   ‘light   footprint’   approach   with   the   NTC   possessing   ‘ownership’   of   post-­‐‑war  
policy;   a   necessity   given   concerns  with   its   ‘fragile   legitimacy’   and   need   to   not   be  
perceived   as   another   Iraq   (Chivvis   et   al   2012).   Ahmed   Jehani,   Minister   of  
Infrastructure   and   Reconstruction   set   out   a   vision   of   a   ‘Libyan-­‐‑led’   recovery  
process,   stating   to   outside   actors   ‘we   will   lead,   and   if   you   are   willing,   you   will  
support  us’  (cited  in  Omestad  2011).  
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Libya   faced   multiple   post-­‐‑conflict   challenges.   Security   was   the   single   highest  
priority.  Local  tribal  and  ethnic  violence,  particularly  in  Fezzan,  led  to  hundreds  of  
deaths,   and   deepened   instability.   Salafist   groups   carried   out   many   attacks,  
including   bulldozing   Sufi   Mosques   and   assassination   attempts   on   UK   and   US  
diplomatic   missions   (ICG   2012b).   Violent   clashes   occurred   in   various   towns   and  
cities   in   particular   Tripoli.  During  war  militias   formed   to   combat   the   regime   as   a  
common   enemy,   mobilising   around   narrow   geographic   categories,   for   example,  
city,   neighbourhood,   or   even   street-­‐‑by-­‐‑street.   Militias   perceived   themselves   to  
possess  ‘revolutionary  legitimacy’  but  not  the  new  Libyan  army.  The  Libyan  army  
could   not   directly   control   militias   and   brigades.   Consequently,   many   were  
incorporated   into   ad   hoc   security   and   armed   force   groups   in   a   fluid   and   loose  
arrangement  albeit  that  enhanced  security  (McQuinn  2012).    
Economic  stabilisation  initially  required  unfreezing  former  regime  assets  seized  by  
foreign   financial   institutions.   Further,   rebuilding   damaged   oil   facilities   was   an  
immediate  priority  and  judged  an  overall  success  with  oil  exports  resuming  after  six  
months,  well   ahead   of   schedule.  Additionally,   rebuilding   damaged   infrastructure  
including   transport,   education,   and   health  was   considered   a  major   reconstruction  
priority.  Humanitarian  needs  constituted  another  immediate  challenge.  There  were  
100,000-­‐‑150,000   IDPs   during   late   September   2011   (IDMC   2011).   While   many  
returned   home   some   groups   remained   displaced   for   example,   Tawerghans   and  
some  black  African  migrants.  Furthermore,  treating  the  war-­‐‑wounded  was  a  serious  
public  health  challenge.    
A  major  task  was  creating  functioning  state  institutions,  after  they  were  essentially  
hollowed-­‐‑out  by  Qaddafi’s  idiosyncratic  and  highly-­‐‑personalised  rule  (Vandewalle  
2006).   This   challenge  was   complicated   by   centre-­‐‑periphery   relations  with  war   re-­‐‑
awakening  and  intensifying  East-­‐‑West  divisions  (Paoletti  2011;  Pack  2013).  The  2011  
uprising   began   in   Benghazi   spreading   outwards.   Many   Easterners   felt   politically  
and   economically   marginalised   and   demanded   material   improvements.   Many  
powerful  NTC  members  hailed  from  the  east  prompting  observers  to  claim  that  the  
region   was   politically   dominant   while   the   west   militarily   dominant.   By   contrast,  
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many  easterners  were  aggrieved  at  perceived  low  allocation  of  parliamentary  seats  
and  calls  grew  for  regional  autonomy.267    
Relatedly,   civil   society   development  was   a   commonly   acknowledged   goal.  Under  
Qaddafi   independent   civic   associations   were   non-­‐‑existent.   During   and   after   war  
many   independent   organisations,   media   outlets,   and   community   associations  
formed  with   great   enthusiasm   under   a  more   pluralistic   environment   (IRIN   2011;  
Chatham  House  2012).  Further,  there  was  relatively  strong  international  willingness  
to   support   emerging   civil   society   which   was   perceived   as   crucial   to   overcoming  
legacies  of  dictatorship  (Foundation  for  the  Future  2011).  From  this  brief  review  it  is  
clear  that  transitional  authorities  faced  a  wide  range  of  post-­‐‑war  challenges.  In  the  
next  section  the  impact  of  these  challenges  and  dynamics  on  the  Libyan  HE  sector  
will  be  the  subject  of  examination.    
  
7.4. Impact  of  the  2011  Civil  War  on  Libyan  higher  education  
  
In  this  section,  impacts  of  war  on  Libyan  HE  will  be  assessed  utilising  the  capacity,  
needs,  and  distortions  framework  outlined  in  chapter  two  to  answer  RQ2.  The  six-­‐‑
month   2011   Libyan   civil   war   led   to   an   estimated   30,000   killed   and   widespread  
infrastructural   damage.   Despite   this,   conflict   in   Libya   had   significantly   weaker  
impact   on  HE   in   comparison   to   the   2003   Iraq  war.   Rather,   war   and   uprising   are  
more  widely-­‐‑perceived   in   Libya   as   an   opportunity   to   develop   a  HE   system   long  
held  back  under  Qaddafi’s  rule.    
7.4.1.   Capacity  
  
Libya’s   HE   system   is   quantitatively   well   developed   with   the   highest   tertiary  
enrolment   ratio   in   Africa   and   several   hundred   thousand   students   serving   a  
population  of  6.3  million.  Given  the  suppression  of  independent  institutions  under  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267	  Observations	  and	  conversations	  with	  a	  range	  of	  persons	  in	  Benghazi	  and	  Baida	  indicate	  that	  there	  
is	  considerable	  support	  for	  federalism	  and	  regionalism	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Qaddafi,   the   HE   sector   constituted   arguably   the   country’s   most   advanced  
institutional   capacity   after   the   war.   In   this   section   the   extent   to   which   civil   war  
eroded  or  distorted  this  capacity  will  be  analysed.    
7.4.1.1.   Physical  Capacity    
  
Substantial  physical  damage  to  HEIs  directly  resulting  from  fighting  was  limited  to  
towns   and   cities   at   the   frequently   shifting   combat   frontline.   For   example,   the  
campus  in  Brega  was  used  by  loyalist  forces  and  rebels  attempted  to  wrest  control  
during  fighting  in  April  2011.  Misrata  University  and  Sirte  University  experienced  
high  and  significant  damage  to  infrastructure  and  facilities.  Al-­‐‑Batahady  University  
in  Sirte  was  on  the  frontline  and  used  as  a  loyalist  forces  base.  Both  the  old  campus  
and   new   campus,   which   was   mid-­‐‑construction,   were   damaged   during   fighting  
(AFP  2011).  On  7th  October  2011  tank  rounds  destroyed  a  bookstore,  computers,  and  
student   records   plus   ‘extensive   damage’   to   two   lecture   halls   and   a   guesthouse  
(AOAV  2012).   Similarly,   in  Misrata,   the  Medical  Technology  Faculty  was   severely  
damaged  with  over   90%  of  buildings  damaged  or  destroyed  during   fighting  after  
occupation   by   loyalist   forces   for   two   weeks.268   The   frontline   moved   to   nearby  
Science,   Pharmacy,   and   Medicine   faculties   causing   significant   but   less   extensive  
damage   estimated   at   around   70%   of   infrastructure.269   Other   universities  
withstanding  significant  war-­‐‑damage  include  campuses  in  Bani  Walid  and  Zawiya.    
Another   war-­‐‑related   factor   affecting   physical   capacity   was   temporary   campus  
occupation  by  loyalist  or  rebel   forces,   for  example,   in  Tripoli  and  Zawiya.  Looting  
and   vandalism   occurred   at   HEIs   occupied   by   armed   forces,   for   example,   the  
university  in  Bani  Walid  was  reportedly  severely  looted  (Zurutuza  2011).  Moreover,  
at   Misrata   University   many   facilities   were   vandalised   and   expensive   equipment  
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   Based	   on	   interviews	   at	   the	   Medical	   Technology	   Faculty	   and	   site	   observations	   conducted	   in	  
Misrata	  in	  November	  2012	  
269	  Joint	  interview,	  Deans	  of	  Science	  and	  Medicine,	  Misrata	  University	  -­‐	  Misrata,	  Libya	  11/2012	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left270;   an   indicator   that   looting   was   retributive   rather   than   economically  
motivated.271    
Furthermore,  looting  was  reported  at  other  HEIs  not  on  frontlines  or  occupied,  for  
example,   at   the   Al-­‐‑Shati   Language   and   Training   Centre   in   Tripoli   (Detrie   2011).  
During   the  war   faculty  members  met   to   coordinate   response   to   looting  with   staff  
and   students   protecting   some   facilities.272   Moreover,   in   the   post-­‐‑war   security  
vacuum,   looting   and   vandalism   persisted   with   many   reported   incidents.   The  
MoHE-­‐‑L  provided  both  Misrata  University  and  Omar  Mukhtar  University  money  
to   replace   looted   goods.   Moreover,   interviewees   at   both   universities   noted   that  
facilities  and  equipment  were  thus  improved  on  pre-­‐‑war  levels.    
NATO’s  ‘No  Fly  Zone’  included  bombing  of  strategic  infrastructural  targets  and  led  
to  minimal   civilian   casualties.   Targets   included  defence,   intelligence,   and   security  
apparatuses  and  no  educational   facilities  were  hit  according   to  official   statements.  
However,   several   claims   have   been   made   that   the   NATO   bombing   campaign  
affected   HEIs.   A   report   that   NATO   bombed   the   7th   October   University   branch  
campus   in   Bani   Walid   is   made   by   IPS   based   on   interviews   conducted   there  
(Zurutuza   2011).   It   suggests   that   rumours   of   Musa   Ibrahim,   Qaddafi’s  
spokesperson,  sleeping  at  the  campus  were  the  reason  for  the  claimed  strike.    
Furthermore,   it   is   claimed   that   a   NATO   bomb   destroyed   a   Tripoli   University  
campus  B  classroom;  McKinney  (2011)  describes  ‘widespread  structural  damage  to  
many   of   the   buildings,   all   of   the   windows   blown   out   in   every   one   of   the   eight  
auditoriums.  Doors  blown  off  their  hinges.  Library  in  a  shambles.  Books  and  debris  
everywhere.   The   campus   mosque   was   damaged.   Glass   heaped   up   in   piles’.  
McKinney  (2011)  and  others  (Press  TV  2011)  argue  that  this  constitutes  evidence  of  
aggressive   NATO   action   against   civilian   targets   contradicting   Western   media  
representations   of   NATO’s   campaign   as   restricted   to   military   targets.   Two  
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  Manager,	  Reconstruction	  Office,	  Misrata	  University	  -­‐	  Misrata,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
271	  At	  Omar	  Mukhtar	  University	  branch	  campus	  in	  Guba	  computers	  and	  cars	  were	  stolen.	  Some	  cars	  
were	   returned	   after	   war.	   Dr	   Ibrahim	   El-­‐Ghariani,	   President,	   Omar	   Al-­‐Mukhtar	   University	   -­‐	   Baida,	  
Libya	  11/2012	  
272	  Dr	  Ahmed	  Al-­‐Atrash,	  former	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  
Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	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competing  explanations  have  been  offered.  First,  a  NATO  strike  missed   its  nearby  
intended  military  target.  This  explanation  is  supported  by  the  building’s  proximity  
to  several  large  military  sites.  Campus  B  suffered  minor  infrastructural  damage  due  
to  impact  of  strikes  against  targets  less  than  1km  away.  However,  a  greater  number  
of  staff273  and  students  contended  that  loyalist  forces  staged  the  incident  at  night  to  
de-­‐‑legitimise  NATO  through  media   reports   (e.g.  Press  TV  2011).  Site  observations  
support   this  explanation  based  on  neat  damage  to  the  building’s  outer-­‐‑facing  wall  
that  suggests  manual  force  was  used.274  
In   sum,   despite   the   above   examples   of   physical   effects   of   war   on  HEIs,   physical  
capacity   of   HE  was   not   a  major   casualty   of   conflict.  Most   campus   facilities   were  
unaffected  by  fighting  although  several  affected  HEIs  were  severely  damaged,  with  
some  estimates  placing  the  percentage  of  campuses  partially  damaged  or  destroyed  
by   fighting   at   5%   of   national   HE   capacity.   This   is   a   marked   contrast   to   the   84%  
damage  to  Iraqi  HE  described  in  the  previous  chapter.    
7.4.1.2. Human  Capacity  
  
War   and   uprising   impacted   Libyan   HE’s   human   capacity.   Human   resources  
capacity  was   under-­‐‑pressure   before   2011  with   very   high   teacher-­‐‑to-­‐‑student   ratios  
with   classes   of   over   100   students   in   crowded   faculties.   Faculty   members   and  
administrative   staff   were   held   to   lack   many   managerial,   financial,   and   technical  
capabilities   requiring   sustained   capacity-­‐‑building   and   training.275   War   placed  
additional  strain  on  this  situation  and  in  2012  the  MoHE-­‐‑L  requested  1,147  Egyptian  
faculty  members  to  meet  staffing  shortages  for  the  2012-­‐‑2013  academic  year  (Libya  
Herald  2012b).  
After  war  some  Professors  and  faculty  members  active   in  supporting  the  previous  
regime  were   blacklisted   and  unable   to   return   to   universities.  Additionally,   others  
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  For	  example,	  Dr	  Sobhi,	  Vice-­‐Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Languages,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
274	  See	  Appendix	  D	  Photo	  C	  




chose   to   flee   the   country   or   stay   at   home.   In   contrast   to   Iraq,   where   de-­‐‑
Baathification  removed  many  academic  staff,  fewer  faculty  were  removed.276  Rather,  
official  policy  was  to  remove  only  those  known  to  have  ordered  violence  or  to  have  
‘stolen  Libyan  money’.  Thus  post-­‐‑Qaddafi  lustration  had  only  a  minor  impact  upon  
HE  teaching  capacity.    
Temporary  displacement  of  some  Libyan  faculty  members  occurred  in  particular  in  
frontline  areas.  Furthermore,  after  war  many  Libyans  living  abroad  including  exiles  
returned  in  a  process  of  ‘brain  gain’.  During  the  war  most  foreign  academic  staff  left  
Libya   and  many   did   not   return   creating   a   relatively  minor   personnel   shortage   in  
some   universities.   Moreover,   many   Libyan   faculty   members   and   in   particular  
students   viewed   this   positively   specifying   that   Libyan   or   Arabic-­‐‑speaking   staff  
could  replace  poor  quality  South  Asian  teachers  with  poor  English  skills.  
During  war  many   students   plus   some   faculty  members  mobilised   in  militias   and  
brigades.   A  much   greater   number   of   students   than   faculty  members  were   killed.  
There   are   no   precise   statistics   on   students   killed   nationwide.   However,   combat  
participation   of   students   was   extremely   high   compared   to   other   conflict-­‐‑affected  
countries.   In   Misrata,   students   comprise   41%   of   Revolutionary   Brigades;   the  
greatest  single  background  of  members  followed  by  private  sector  workers  at  38%  
and   public   sector   employees   at   11%   (McQuinn   2012).   In   towns   and   cities   with  
similar  recruitment  patterns  death-­‐‑tolls  amongst  students  should  be  expected  to  be  
high.  Death-­‐‑tolls  for  staff  and  students  include  95  at  Misrata  University,277  over  100  
at  Benghazi  University  (Golovnina  2011),  and  35  at  Zawiya  University.278      
In  many  university   faculties  visited   it  was  observed   that  commemorative  displays  
for  students  killed  in  the  war  were  given  prominent  position  at  faculty  or  university  
entrances.   One   display   outside   Zawiya   University   consisted   of   photos   of  
approximately  35  deceased  students  although  with  one  photo  cut-­‐‑out.279  A  Professor  
explained   that   the   student   was   later   found   to   be   pro-­‐‑Qaddafi.   This   illustrates   a  
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  No	  reliable	  estimates	  available	  
277	  Misrata	  University	  pamphlet	  containing	  photos	  of	  all	  95	  deceased	  members	  of	  the	  university.	  	  
278	  Observation	  of	  display	  outside	  Zawiya	  University	  administration	  building.	  Zawiya,	  Libya	  12/2012	  
279	  See	  Appendix	  D	  Photo	  G	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problem   in   counting   of   official   statistics;   loyalist   fighters   and   students   may   be  
excluded  from  death-­‐‑tolls.      
In   sum,   war’s   impact   on   Libyan   HE’s   human   capacity   is   low   compared   to   Iraq.  
Moreover,   many   participants   viewed   the   post-­‐‑war   moment   as   an   opportunity   to  
invest   in   human   resources   and   training,   uphold   meritocratic   appointments,   and  
benefit  from  returnees  with  high  skills  and  expertise  thus  strengthening  rather  than  
weakening  the  human  capacity  of  HEIs.    
  
7.4.1.3. Institutional  Capacity  
  
Civil   war   directly   affected   institutional   capacity   of   HE   through   vandalism   of  
records   and   archives   at   various   campuses.   One   explanation   is   that   university  
officials  destroyed  records  of   their  corrupt  practices  that  may  have  been  subject   to  
legal   action   in   the   post-­‐‑war   period.280   It   should   be   noted   that   Libyan  HE’s   dense  
bureaucracy   operates   with   paper-­‐‑based   rather   than   electronic   administrative   and  
documentation   systems.   Consequently,   many   HEIs   struggled   with   this   loss   of  
institutional  memory.  However,  protection  provided  by  staff  and  students  is  held  to  
have  limited  the  extent  of  damage  to  folders  and  files.281    
Vandewalle   (2006)   describes   how   Qaddafi’s   regime   produced   highly-­‐‑distorted  
national   institutions   leaving   the   post-­‐‑Qaddafi   state   with   a   major   challenge   of  
building   effective   institutions.   The  MoHE-­‐‑L   faced   this   task   of   institution-­‐‑building  
after   experiencing   war-­‐‑related   impacts   including   displacement   from   its   main  
premises   and   collapse   of   national-­‐‑level   governance.  While  most  MoHE-­‐‑L   officials  
reported   that   civil   war   produced   low   impacts   on   institutional   capacity,   greater  
challenges   emerged   in   the   complex  post-­‐‑war   environment.  Moreover,   ‘revolution’  
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  Dr	  Ahmed	  Al-­‐Atrash,	  former	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  
Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
281	  Dr	  Tarek	  Basher	  Jdeidi,	  Head,	  Department	  of	  Zoology,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	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was  viewed  as  an  opportunity  to  construct  the  MoHE-­‐‑L  on  more  solid  institutional  
foundations.    
At   the   university-­‐‑level,   new   post-­‐‑war   needs   and   challenges   placed   additional  
burden  on  institutional  capacity.  This  observation  is  supported  by  site-­‐‑observations  
and  interviews  with  administrative  staff  at  various  HEIs  that  reported  disruption  to  
enrolment,   changed   attitude   of   students,   and   the   insecure   post-­‐‑war   context   as  
making  their  job  more  difficult  by  placing  competing  demands  on  limited  time  and  
resources.  
Another   impact   on   institutional   capacity   was   disruption,   cancellation,   and  
distortion  of  various  HE  capacity-­‐‑building  programmes.  For   example,   a  UNESCO  
programme   to   improve   information   technology   with   nationwide   coverage   in   ten  
universities   was   halted   in   February   2011   and   resumed   in   late   2012   with   limited  
coverage  in  three  universities.282  Notwithstanding  these  effects,  overall  institutional  
capacity   suffered   little   in   comparison   to   Iraq.   Moreover,   a   clear   majority   of  
participants   held   that   very   little   had   changed   in   HEIs   due   to   war   in   terms   of  
administration,   management,   or   institutional   change.   However,   one   area   where  
change   was   recognised   was   increased   needs,   the   incidence   of   which   will   be  
addressed  now.    
  
7.4.2. Post-­‐‑war  Needs  
  
From   fieldwork   data,   a   generalised   set   of   HE   needs   can   be   stated.   Security   was  
frequently   cited   as   the   number   one   need   facing   Libya   and   the   HE   security  
environment  was  generally  perceived  as  positive  despite  some  problems  including  
students  carrying  weapons  and  low  power  of  campus  security  guards.283  Alongside  
security,   most   participants   described   common   unmet   educational   needs.   These  
needs   are   not   necessarily   conflict-­‐‑related   although   ‘revolution’   presented   a   first  
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  Head,	  Computer	  Science	  Department,	  Omar	  Mukhtar	  University	  -­‐	  Baida,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
283	  See	  section	  8.3.1.1.	  for	  analysis	  of	  security	  as	  a	  factor	  affecting	  post-­‐war	  Libyan	  HE	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opportunity   for   many   Libyans   to   openly   express   their   needs   and   critique   their  
material  and  educational  conditions.    
The   need   for   physical   infrastructure   and   facilities  was   very   commonly   expressed;  
additional   laboratories,   classrooms,   and   lecture   theatres   were   necessary   to  
overcome   insufficient   space   and   resultant   over-­‐‑crowding.284   Further,   a   commonly  
expressed  need  was  for  basic  services,  amenities,  and  activities  as  many  campuses  
are   lacking   in   cafes,   bookshops,   toilets,285   social   spaces,   and   car   parks.   It   was  
commonly   noted   that   many   campus   buildings   were   secondary   school   buildings  
utilised   as  universities   and   therefore   inadequate   for  HE.   Furthermore,   out-­‐‑of-­‐‑date  
and  inadequate  libraries  and  very  weak  internet  and  communications  infrastructure  
were  widely-­‐‑cited.  
In  sum,  participants  viewed  Libya’s  HEIs  as  not  meeting  the  criteria  of  ‘university’  
as  defined  by  international  standards.  In  the  words  of  one  senior  academic,  ‘we  feel  
we   are   not   a   university   and  want   to  match   the   experience   of   higher   education   in  
other   countries’.286   It   was   commonly   held   that   universities   should   be   social,  
educational,  sporting,  and  service-­‐‑providing  institutions.287    
Beyond  these  ‘bread  and  butter’  issues,  psycho-­‐‑social  needs  were  held  to  constitute  
a  neglected  problem.288  Many  students  and  staff  were  exposed  to   traumatic  events  
during   the  war   and  many   are   suffering   long-­‐‑term   consequences.   For   example,   in  
Misrata   it   is   reported   that   suicide   rates   increased   sharply,  many   youth   turned   to  
drugs  and  alcohol  to  cope  with  stress  and  trauma,  and  21,000  residents  are  classified  
as   in   need   of   psychological   assistance.289   Furthermore,   student   behavioural   and  
attitudinal   change   altered   student-­‐‑staff   relations   and   posed   an   obstacle   to  
maintaining   order   on   campus.   Moreover,   psycho-­‐‑social   needs   can   also   be  
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  For	  example,	  the	  President	  of	  Omar	  Mukhtar	  University	  stated	  that	  greater	  physical	  facilities	  and	  
space	   were	   the	   two	  main	   priorities	   of	   his	   university.	   Dr	   Ibrahim	   El-­‐Ghariani,	   President,	   Omar	   Al-­‐
Mukhtar	  University	  -­‐	  Baida,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
285	  Many	  participants	  emphasised	  lack	  of	  toilet	  facilities,	  especially	  for	  female	  students,	  often	  forced	  
to	  leave	  campus	  to	  use	  toilets	  
286	  Dr	  Taher,	  former	  Head,	  Department	  of	  Physics,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  	  
287	  For	  example	  Dr	  Abdulatif,	  Director,	   International	  Cooperation	  Office,	  Tripoli	  University	   -­‐	  Tripoli,	  
Libya	  10/2012.	  Also,	  Dr	  Taher,	  former	  Head,	  Department	  of	  Physics,	  Tripoli	  University.	  
288	  See	  section	  8.1.1.	  
289	  Joint	  interview,	  Dr	  Khaled	  and	  Dr	  Ali,	  EDB	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	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considered  a  major  distortion  to  post-­‐‑war  HE,  the  wider  dynamic  of  which  will  be  




During   the   civil   war   while   Qaddafi’s   regime   maintained   control   of   Tripoli   and  
Western  towns  and  cities  universities  were  ordered  to  ‘act  as  normal  as  possible’  to  
maintain   order   and   control.   Approximately   150   security   and   intelligence   officials  
were   dispatched   to   Tripoli   University   to   control   the   campus.290   The   regime  
pressurised  faculty  members  to  continue  operating  universities291  and  in  turn  some  
faculty   members   pressurised   students   to   attend,   for   example,   by   threatening  
cancelled   credits   for   non-­‐‑attendance.292   Several   faculty   members   explained   the  
difficulty   of  maintaining   a   professional   and   diplomatic   approach   to   students   in   a  
highly-­‐‑charged  and  politicised  atmosphere.293    
Several   participants   reported   that   prior   to   Tripoli’s   liberation   Qaddafi   issued   an  
order  effectively  awarding  over  4,000  students  in  Tripoli  scores  of  over  90%  on  high  
school  leaving  certificates.294  This  entitled  enrolment  on  socially-­‐‑prestigious  degrees,  
primarily  medicine   and   engineering.  When   universities   began   the   2012   academic  
year   4,000   first-­‐‑year   students   enrolled   at   Tripoli   University’s   Engineering   Faculty  
alone,   placing   enormous   burden   on   a   university   already   operating   over-­‐‑capacity.  
The  move  should  be  explained  as  an  attempt  to  purchase  loyalty  of  young  Libyans  
and  highlights  HE’s  importance  to  regime  legitimation.  Similarly,  scholarships  were  
offered   for  master’s   degrees   overseas   for   attending   pro-­‐‑Qaddafi   rallies   in   Tripoli.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290	  Dr	  Abdulmonim	  Alaswad,	  former	  Dean,	  IT	  Faculty,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012.	  It	  is	  
also	  noted	  that	  17	  people	  were	  found	  dead	  locked	  in	  a	  container	  at	  Tripoli	  University	  
291	   Dr	   Hadi	   Omran	   Tumi,	   Head,	   Civil	   Engineering	   Department,	   Tripoli	   University	   -­‐	   Tripoli,	   Libya	  
10/2012	  
292	  Obaidat,	  higher	  education	  consultant	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  12/2012	  
293	   Joint	   interview,	   two	   faculty	  members,	   Department	   of	   Physics,	   Tripoli	   University	   -­‐	   Tripoli,	   Libya	  
10/2012	  
294	  Dr	  Ahmed	  Al-­‐Atrash,	  former	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science,	  Tripoli	  University.	  
Tripoli,	   Libya	   10/2012.	   Dr	   Usama	  Al-­‐Hadi,	   Head,	   Department	   of	   Architecture	   and	  Urban	   Planning,	  
Tripoli,	  conducted	  in	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
324	  
	  
After  the  war,  the  MoHE-­‐‑L  working  under  Qaddafi-­‐‑era  laws  and  regulations  were  
obliged   to   honour   these   scholarships   creating   political   controversy   and   violating  
meritocratic  principles.  
War   created  uneven  disruption   to  HE.  HEIs   in  Eastern   cities   including  Baida   and  
Tobruk  closed  early  in  2011  while  HEIs  in  Tripoli  continued  operating  until  August  
2011.  However,  many   students   boycotted  university   classes   in  Tripoli  during  war  
and   the   university   was   operating   below   capacity   (Elalem   2011).   Furthermore,  
nationwide  many  male  students  were  recruited  to  militias  and  brigades  so  missed  
study.   Additionally,   students   living   in   war-­‐‑affected   areas   often   could   not   travel  
safely   to   their   HEIs.   Consequently,   HEIs   faced   major   logistical   problems   with  
students   completing   varying   numbers   of   semesters.295   Emergency   semesters  were  
held  during  summer  and  students  completing  a  spring  semester  were  instructed  to  
wait  at  home  until  most  students  had  caught-­‐‑up.296      
War-­‐‑induced   population  movements   also   distorted  HE.   Young   people   from  war-­‐‑
affected   areas   including   Tawergha,   Bani   Walid,   and   Sirte   enrolled   at   Tripoli  
University  in  2011  and  2012  leading  to  further  over-­‐‑crowding  and  resource  burdens.  
Post-­‐‑war  Libya  was  marked  by  enmities  between  residents  of  competing  towns  and  
cities   that   affected   approximately   5,000   students’   ability   to   move   freely.297   One  
prominent  example,  around  250  students   from  Tawergha  were  unable   to  continue  
studies   or   enrol   at   nearby   Misrata   University   due   to   intense   animosity   over  
accusations   of   war-­‐‑time   atrocities   in   Misrata.   Another   dynamic,   some   students  
recruited  by  Qaddafi’s  army  were  unable   to  attend  university   in   their  hometowns  
due  to  threats.    
Moreover,   war’s   greatest   distortion   was   indirect;   the   opportunity   cost   of   halting  
campus   construction,   described   as   ‘the   world'ʹs   largest   university   building  
programme’   (Evans  2009).  Tripoli  University  alone   in   late  2012  had  nearly  500,000  
square  metres  of  incomplete  construction  projects  with  approximately  150,000  more  
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  Dr	  Ibrahim	  Saleh,	  Deputy	  Minister,	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
296	  Assistant	  to	  Deputy	  Minister,	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
297	  Director	  of	  Universities,	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  12/2012	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than   90%   complete.298   All   campuses   visited   for   this   study   had   incomplete  
infrastructure   and   facilities   with   foreign   contractors   not   returning   due   to   the  
insecure   post-­‐‑war   environment   and   lengthy   contract   renegotiations.299   Given   that  
physical  facilities  and  space  are  a  major  need,  programme  completion  was  widely-­‐‑
expected   to   have   substantial   impact   on   HEIs   by   alleviating   massive   pressure   on  
space  and  providing  modern  facilities.  For  example,  Mohamed  Mashena,  temporary  
President   of   Tripoli   University,   held   that   restarting   campus   construction  was   the  




This  section  has  reviewed  the  Libyan  civil  war’s  impact  on  HE  in  terms  of  capacity,  
needs,  and  distortions.  In  comparison  to  Iraq  where  conflict  had  a  severe  and  direct  
physical   impact   across   the   entire   HE   system,   Libyan   HE   was   affected   more  
unevenly  with  some  areas  suffering  war-­‐‑related  physical  damage  while  many  HEIs  
experienced   few   major   direct   impacts.   However,   war   had   a   number   of   indirect  
impacts   including  halting  campus  construction  and  contributing  to  attitudinal  and  
behavioural  changes  of  students.  
When   asked   ‘what   has   changed   in   the  HE   sector   since   the  war   and   revolution   in  
Libya?’  a  surprisingly  large  number  of  participants  held  that  nothing  had  changed.  
The  majority  of  these  participants,  when  probed,  were  revealed  to  have  understood  
‘change’   as   referring   to   physical,   institutional,   or   educational   aspects   of   HE   and  
conceded  that  when  the  psychological  dimension  was  included  there  was  an  abrupt  
and   significant   change   in   student   attitudes   and   the   environment   which   now  
enabled   academic   freedom.   While   acknowledging   this   psychological   impact   of  
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conflict,   the  widespread  perception   that   not  much  had   changed   in  HE  due   to   the  
uprising  and  war  must  dampen  any  estimation  of  war’s  impact.    
The  finding  that  the  2011  civil  war  had  a  relatively  low  impact  on  the  sector  would  
suggest  that  at  the  outset  of  Libya’s  post-­‐‑conflict  transition  the  prognosis  for  Libyan  
HE   to   make   a   major   positive   impact   on   reconstruction   and   recovery   would   be  
positive.   In   the   next   chapter   the   extent   to   which   this   positive   prognosis   was  























This   chapter   presents   a   case-­‐‑study   of   HE   and   post-­‐‑war   recovery   after   the   2011  
Libyan  civil  war.   In   the  previous  chapter,   impacts  of  war  and  post-­‐‑war   instability  
on  HE  were  assessed  in  terms  of  capacity,  needs,  and  distortions.  In  what  follows,  
taking  this  impact  analysis  as  a  starting  point,  the  story  of  Libya’s  post-­‐‑war  higher  
education   trajectory   will   be   told   in   three   sections   each   directly   responding   to   a  
research  question.    
To   begin,   post-­‐‑war   efforts   to   rehabilitate   Libyan  HE  will   be   analysed   in   terms   of  
physical   rebuilding   and   psycho-­‐‑social   programming.   Secondly,   in   a   section  
designed  to  address  RQ3,  the  extent  to  which  Libyan  HE  contributed  towards  post-­‐‑
conflict  recovery  and  transition  will  be  assessed.  Then,  to  address  RQ4,  features  of  
the  post-­‐‑war  environment  mediating  the  HE-­‐‑recovery  relationship  will  be  analysed.  
Finally,   options   facing   Libyan  HE  will   be   analysed,   exploring   the   perspectives   of  
key  actors.    
In  contrast  to  the  Iraq  case  where  interview  data  was  cross-­‐‑referenced  with  various  
published   and   unpublished   written   sources   throughout   this   chapter   relies   more  
exclusively  on  the  dataset  generated  from  fieldwork.  This  is  because  of  the  paucity  
of   research   on   Libyan  HE   and   also   due   to   the   early   stage   of   Libya’s   post-­‐‑conflict  
transition.   Data   from   interviews   and   focus   groups   with   Libyan   academics,  
university   administration,   students,   policy-­‐‑makers,   and   politicians   in   addition   to  
observations  at  Libyan  HEIs  are  utilised  in  this  chapter.301    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




8.1. Post-­‐‑war  Reconstruction  of  Higher  Education  
  
To  begin,   rebuilding  of  Libyan  HE  will  be  analysed.  As  was  seen  earlier,  physical  
damage  to  HEIs  was  uneven  with  few  campuses  affected  badly.  For  this  reason  this  
section   is  much   shorter   than   the   corresponding   section   in   chapter   six  on   Iraqi  HE  
where   reconstruction   of   the   sector   was   a   more   significant   dynamic.   However,  
rebuilding   of   Libyan   HEIs   does   reveal   some   interesting   findings.   Reconstruction  
and   rehabilitation   was   funded   by   an   emergency   budget   with   responsibility   for  
implementing   rebuilding   projects   delegated   to   individual   universities.302   Post-­‐‑war  
rebuilding  of  Libyan  HEIs  damaged  during  war  will  now  be  analysed  principally  
through  the  case  of  Misrata.      
Misrata  University  can  be  considered  a  successful  case  of  post-­‐‑war  rebuilding.  The  
extent  of  damage  at   the  Science  and  Pharmacy  faculties  and  dormitories  was  70%,  
90%,  and  90%  respectively  while  minor  damage  occurred  in  various  other  faculties.  
It  was  reported  that  80%  of  damaged  infrastructure  and  facilities  were  rehabilitated  
within  one  year  from  October  2011.  However,  two  Deans  at  Misrata  University  held  
that   the  majority   of   recovery   efforts  were   refurbishment   and   rehabilitation   rather  
than   rebuilding.   They   explain   that   campus   buildings   received   foundational  
structural   damage   yet   work   completed   was   a   short-­‐‑term   and   not   long-­‐‑term  
solution.303   Despite   this   limitation,   all   interviewees   considered   overall   rebuilding  
and   rehabilitation   successful.   Rebuilding   was   contracted   to   Libyan   companies  
because   foreign   contractors   were   held   to   be   too   expensive   and   unable   to   deliver  
swift  reconstruction.304    
In   late   2011   the  MoHE-­‐‑L  allocated  $4  million   to  Misrata  University   for   rebuilding  
based   on   a   needs   assessment.   However,   the   director   of   reconstruction   held   this  
amount   insufficient   to  meet   rebuilding   needs.   Furthermore,   funds  were   allocated  
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  Manager	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   Reconstruction,	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conditional   upon   exclusive   use   in   rebuilding   damaged   infrastructure   yet   the  
university  spent  the  money  also  on  new  PCs  and  other  supplies  ‘because  you  can’t  
just   rebuild   buildings   and   stay   and   watch’.305   Support   from   local   businesses   and  
civil   society   was   held   to   be   critical   in   enabling   fast   and   effective   rebuilding.306  
Misrata   is  a  relatively  wealthy  port  city  with  strong   industry  and  many  Misratans  
operate   import/export   businesses   thus   enabling   fast   procurement.   The   university  
appealed   to   local   business   to   donate   equipment   or   offer   below-­‐‑market   rates   on  
supplies.   It   was   further   held   that   Misrata’s   high   social   cohesion   ensured   local  
business   and   civil   society   goodwill.307   The  Dean   of  Medicine   held   that   rebuilding  
was  successful  because  people  were  happy  to  participate  in  the  process.308      
Also   in   Misrata,   the   Faculty   of   Medical   Technology   is   located   beside   Misrata  
University   yet   administered   by   the   MoHE-­‐‑L.   While   Misrata   University   faculties  
rebuilt  effectively  the  Medical  Technology  Faculty  remained  in  a  dire  physical  state  
in  late  2012.  Given  their  similarities,  differences  in  rebuilding  outcomes  can  best  be  
explained  by  the  above-­‐‑noted  social  cohesion  and  business  goodwill.  Given  that  the  
Faculty   was   not   part   of   Misrata   University   it   received   no   local   assistance.  
Furthermore,  Misrata  had  a   level  of  de   facto   autonomy   from   the  Libyan  state  with  
the  powerful  Misrata  Council  directing  city-­‐‑wide  reconstruction.  Misrata  University  
possessed   high   autonomy   in   determining  where   funds  would   be   spent.  After   the  
MoHE-­‐‑L  disbursed  funds  no  monitoring,  evaluation,  or  communication  was  carried  
out.   In   contrast,   the   Faculty   of   Medical   Technology   was   highly   constrained   by  
bureaucratic   obstacles   under   the  MoHE-­‐‑L.   Further,   a   Faculty   official   held   that   no  
additional   financial   support   was   received   and   that   rebuilding   would   have   been  
much  more  effective  had  the  Faculty  been  incorporated  into  Misrata  University.309    
A  similar  experience  of  relatively  autonomous  recovery  was  reported  in  Brega  and  
Sirte  where   fast   reconstruction  was   enabled   by   ‘dynamic   local   leaders’   in   coastal  
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  members	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  that	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  Misrata	  is	  considered	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  ‘country	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  of	  one	  participant.	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cities  outside  Tripoli  (Economist  2012).  This  was  supported  by  the  Deputy  Minister  
who   stated   that   Sirte   University   had   been   the  most   successful   case   of   rebuilding  
with  the  new  university  campus  complex  rated  the  best  nationally.310  The  President  
of   Sirte   University   noted   that   rebuilding   funds   were   provided   by   the   MoHE-­‐‑L  
without  problems  (Economist  2012).  This  was  held  to  be  a  positive  step  given  fears  
that  the  city  would  be  punished  for  its  role  as  Qaddafi’s  support-­‐‑base.    
8.1.1. Psycho-­‐‑social  assistance  
  
An   emergent   theme   from   interview   data   was   that   psycho-­‐‑social   programming   is  
one  dimension  of  post-­‐‑war  HE  assistance  generally  recognised  to  be  inadequate.  For  
example,   a  MoHE-­‐‑L  official   admitted   that   in  psycho-­‐‑social   assistance   the  Ministry  
‘could  have  done  more’.311  This  problem  is  acute  in  areas  that  were  heavily  affected  
by  fighting,  for  example,  at  Azzaytuna  University  near  Bani  Walid  a  lecturer  listed  
that  ‘students  and  staff  were  terrified  during  fighting’  as  the  most  severe  impact  of  
conflict.312  As  the  Head  of  Pharmacy  at  Misrata  University  argued,  physical  impacts  
of  war  can  be  addressed  relatively  easily  but  psychological  effects  are  much  harder  
to  overcome.313    
A   MoHE-­‐‑L   official   stated   that   the   greatest   challenge   in   delivering   psycho-­‐‑social  
assistance   is   that   ‘students  do  not  come  to  you’.314  This   is   reflected  by  the  Dean  of  
Science  at  Zawiya  University  who  described  the  difficulty  in  convincing  students  to  
first  admit  that  they  had  a  problem  and  then  to  voluntarily  speak  to  counsellors  or  
experts.315  He  held  that  changed  attitudes  of  students  was  the  largest  problem  facing  
his   faculty,   no   assistance   was   offered,   and   that   outside   expertise   was   required  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310	  Dr	  Ibrahim	  Saleh,	  Deputy	  Minister	  for	  Scientific	  Research,	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
311	  Assistant	  to	  Deputy	  Minister,	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  12/2012	  
312	  Dr	  Aboubaker,	  Assistant,	  Dean	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science,	  Azzaytuna	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  
Libya	  10/2012	  
313	  Head,	  Department	  of	  Pharmacy,	  Misrata	  University	  -­‐	  Misrata,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
314	  Assistant	  to	  Deputy	  Minister,	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  12/2012	  
315	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Science,	  Zawiya	  University	  -­‐	  Zawiya,	  Libya	  12/2012	  
331	  
	  
because  many  solutions  were  attempted  without  success.316  He  identified  a  cultural  
barrier   to   admitting   psycho-­‐‑social   problems   as   shame   and   social   stigmatism   at  
being  perceived  as  weak  or  defective.  One   case  where   some  positive   results  were  
reported  is  Omar  Mukhtar  University  (OMU)  in  Baida  where  staff  were  instructed  
to   be   patient   with   students   and   more   participative   teaching   was   encouraged   in  
order   to   change   the   attitudes   and   behaviour   of   students.317  While   this   section   has  
briefly  analysed  the  assistance  to  the  war-­‐‑affected  aspects  of  Libya’s  HE  system  the  
next   section  will   turn   from   rebuilding   of  HE   to   analyse   the   contribution   that   the  
sector  made  to  Libya’s  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery.    
  
8.2.   Higher  education  in  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery  
  
We  have  120,000  students  and  about  5,000  teaching  staff,  in  a  country  of  6  million.  This  
will  tell  you  how  vital  this  structure  is.  This  place  could  be  the  nucleus  of  a  rebuilt  country  
The  above  quote  from  Faisel  Krekshi  (quoted  in  Fordham  2011),  Tripoli  University’s  
first  post-­‐‑war  President,  highlights  the  optimism  that  existed  after  the  2011  uprising  
about   HE’s   potential   to   contribute   towards   post-­‐‑war   recovery.   In   describing   the  
university  as  a   ‘nucleus’   it  also  reflects   the  central  argument  of   this   thesis;  HE  has  
the  potential  to  be  a  strategic  pillar  of  recovery.    
In  this  section  HE’s  contribution  to  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery  will  be  addressed  through  
an   evaluation   of   initial   outcomes   and   perspectives   of   key   actors   on   HE’s   role   in  
conflict   prevention   and   stabilisation,   democratisation   and   civil   society  
development,   economic   recovery,   reconciliation,   and   statebuilding.   To   begin,   the  
sector’s  contribution  to  short-­‐‑term  stabilisation  will  be  addressed  before  proceeding  
to  consider  longer-­‐‑term  issues.    
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8.2.1. Conflict  Prevention  and  Stabilisation  
  
Libya’s   large   student   and   youth   population   was   viewed   as   a   potential   source   of  
destabilisation  yet  also  as  an  important  means  of  achieving  stability  through  giving  
positive   direction   to   energies   of   youth.318   In   the   immediate   post-­‐‑war   period   in  
October   2011   the  MoHE-­‐‑L   set   a   single   priority   of   restarting  HEIs.319   The   rationale  
was  directly   linked  to  stabilisation;  by  getting  young  people  and  existing  students  
back  into  classrooms  the  pool  of  militia  and  brigade  recruitment  would  be  reduced  
and   there  would   be   less   fighting,   localised   conflict,   riots,   crime   and   other   similar  
destabilising  phenomena.  As  the  Deputy  Minister  for  Scientific  Research  stated,  ‘as  
long  as   the  students  are  at   the  university,  no  problem   in   the  street,  no  problem  at  
home’.320    
For  example,  Omar  Al-­‐‑Mukhtar  University’s  council  decided  in  November  2011  to  
re-­‐‑open  the  university  because  ‘students  were  free  in  the  street,  free  in  the  war  and  
with   free   time,   creating   a   problem   for   the   security   situation’.321   Registration   fees  
were  waived   to  encourage  student   return  without  placing  undue  burden  on   them  
while  staff  were  instructed  to  be  patient  with  students.  Also,  lectures  were  given  on  
how   to   build   a   New   Libya   in   which   students   could   freely   share   opinions   in   an  
attempt  to  change  attitudes  and  return  a  sense  of  normalcy.    
Re-­‐‑opening   universities   after   war-­‐‑related   delays   was   a   major   logistical   challenge  
requiring   substantial   administrative   and   ministerial   resources   at   the   expense   of  
pursuing  other  strategies  for  rebuilding  the  sector.  While  it  is  impossible  to  test  the  
counter-­‐‑factual   claim   that   greater   instability   would   have   resulted   from   higher  
presence   of   easily  mobilised   young  men   if   HE   had   not   re-­‐‑opened   swiftly,   it   was  
contended   by   many   participants   that   HE   was   effective   in   the   immediate   task   of  
returning  a  sense  of  normalcy  and  positively  channelling  youth  energy.  
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  Dr	  Ahmad	  Al-­‐Atrash,	  former	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  
Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
319	  Assistant	  to	  Deputy	  Minister,	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  12/2012	  
320	  Dr	  Ibrahim	  Saleh,	  Deputy	  Minister,	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
321	  Dr	  Ibrahim	  El-­‐Ghariani.	  President,	  Omar	  Al-­‐Mukhtar	  University	  -­‐	  Baida,	  Libya	  11/2012	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By  autumn  2011  after  many  universities  re-­‐‑opened  typical  media  reports  described  
campus   atmosphere   as   highly   positive   and   optimistic   about   HE’s   potential  
contribution  to  post-­‐‑war  recovery  (Fordham  2011).  Moreover,  the  attitude  of  many  
students   shifted   from   pre-­‐‑revolution   passivity   to   positive,   empowered,   and  
energetic.322   Attitudinal   and   behavioural   change   occurred   as   students   and   staff  
enjoyed  new   freedoms   to   speak  and  associate,   an   ethos  of  volunteerism  emerged,  
and   students   felt   emboldened   by   revolution   to   organise   collectively   and   make  
demands.   At   the   beginning   of   transition   both   students   and   staff   were  
overwhelmingly   positive   about   changes   that   had   occurred.   Faculty   members  
welcomed   change   in   students   from   apathy   to   a   proactive   attitude  while   students  
perceived  the  opportunity  to  enact  a  revolution  inside  HE.    
However,  on  the  other  hand  faculty  members  reported  negative  changes  in  student  
attitude   and   behaviour   including   frequently   confronting   staff   aggressively,  
protesting  over  minor  issues,  and  non-­‐‑compliance  with  rules.  In  particular,  students  
that   had   fought   in   the   war   were   widely-­‐‑reported   to   have   undergone   significant  
psychological   change.323   Meanwhile,   students   grew   increasingly   frustrated   at   the  
slow  pace   of   change  within  HE   and   the   initial   optimism   of   revolutionary   change  
waned.   While   many   staff   viewed   students   as   having   ‘misunderstood   their  
freedoms’324   and  misjudged  HE  as   a   sector   apt   for   revolutionary   change,   students  
frequently   viewed   the   unchanged   ‘management’   of   universities   as   maintaining  
Qaddafi-­‐‑era  HE  and  usurping  the  revolution’s  potential.    
While  channelling  youth  energy  into  HE  and  off  the  streets  was  a  success  in  terms  
of  stabilisation  the  emergence  of  collective  student  agency  expressed  in  the  form  of  
demonstrations,   protests   and   the   new   proactive   student   attitude   was   a   driver   of  
campus   instability.   Several   faculty   members   described   emergence   of   illegal  
activities  on  campus  including  drug-­‐‑dealing,  prostitution,  and  widespread  carrying  
of   arms   that   could   not   be   controlled   by   campus   security.   At   a   Tripoli   University  
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   This	   observation	   is	   based	   on	   interviews	   with	   faculty	   members	   and	   students,	   supported	   by	  
numerous	  media	  reports.	  
323	  Dr	  Fathi	  Al	  Arabi,	  Consultant	  to	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  




engineering   exam   students   rioted   after   a   small   section   reportedly   objected   to  
difficult   questions.325   Several   Professors   at   Benghazi   University   complained   that  
little  to  no  progress  was  made  in  day-­‐‑to-­‐‑day  work  due  to  almost  constant  protesting  
by  students.326    
Furthermore,   with   very   few   recreational   spaces   available   for   young   people   HEIs  
experienced   the   new   trend   of   non-­‐‑students   coming   to   campuses   to   socialise  with  
negative   effects   on   campus   atmosphere   and   security.327   However,   it   may   be  
suggested  that  given  the  lack  of  recreational  spaces  for  young  people  the  utilisation  
of  campuses  for  social  purposes  had  a  stabilising  effect  as  those  non-­‐‑students  were  
concentrated   on   campuses   rather   than   the   streets   where   they   may   constitute   a  
greater  security  risk.      
Interviews   revealed   competing   claims   over   how   universities   dealt   with   student  
unrest  and  incidents  on  campus.  On  the  one  hand,  the  temporary  Tripoli  University  
President  explained  that  university  leadership  met  student  grievances  and  protests  
with   dialogue.   Similarly,   the   President   of   Omar   Mukhtar   University   held   that  
‘convincing   students   we   are   all   in   the   same   boat’   was   critical   in   responding   to  
protests  and  further  that  his  personal  intervention  was  necessary  to  diffuse  protests  
at  Derna  and  Tobruk  campuses.328  A  contrasting  method  was  revealed  by  the  Dean  
of   Science   at   Zawiya   University   who   stated   that   university   management   at   that  
university  ‘buried  their  heads  in  the  sand’  while  students  protested  as  there  was  no  
better   option   available   than   to   ignore   them.   Another   similar   example,   a   Dean   at  
Omar  Mukhtar  University  removed   the  door  handle   to   the  outside  of  his  office   to  
prevent  people   entering.329  One  participant   criticised  Tripoli  University   leadership  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325	   Dr	   Usama	   Al-­‐Hadi,	   Head,	   Department	   of	   Architecture	   and	   Urban	   Planning,	   Tripoli	   University	   -­‐	  
Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012.	  
326	  Director,	  Quality	  Assurance,	  Benghazi	  University	  -­‐	  Benghazi,	  Libya	  11/2012.	  Further,	  a	  field	  visit	  to	  
Benghazi	   University	   was	   undertaken	   on	   two	   days	   during	   which	   students	   protested	   outside	   the	  
Administration	  building	  putting	  the	  campus	  in	  gridlock	  with	  no	  classes	  or	  lectures	  delivered.	  	  
327	  This	  point	  is	  based	  on	  both	  interviews	  with	  staff	  and	  students	  and	  also	  site	  observations	  at	  Tripoli	  
University	  where	  many	  non-­‐students	  utilised	  the	  campus	  as	  a	  recreational	  space	  
328	  Dr	  Ibrahim	  El-­‐Ghariani.	  President,	  Omar	  Al-­‐Mukhtar	  University	  -­‐	  Baida,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
329	   Former	   head,	   Student	   Union,	   Faculty	   of	   Engineering,	   Omar	   Mukhtar	   University	   -­‐	   Baida,	   Libya	  
11/2012.	  It	  was	  reported	  that	  the	  Dean	  did	  not	  listen	  to	  student	  protests	  and	  demands	  although	  he	  
was	  replaced	  in	  late	  2012	  by	  a	  more	  responsive	  Dean	  who	  engaged	  students	  in	  dialogue.	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for  operating  in  a  ‘firefighting  mode’  and  employing  ‘conflict  management’  tactics,  
holding   that   student   unrest   and   problems   were   responded   to   merely   to   defuse  
situations  without  attempting  to  transform  issues  underlying  continual  upheaval.330    
It   is   clear   from   these   examples   that   a   range   of   approaches   to   student-­‐‑faculty  
relations  were  adopted.  In  many  faculties  and  departments  relatively  young  Deans  
and  HODs  were  appointed  based  on  the  theory  that  they  would  communicate  with  
students   more   effectively   and   have   greater   moral   legitimacy   in   a   difficult  
environment   thus   helping   to   stabilise   the   situation.   An   instructive   comparison   is  
between   the  Architecture  Department   and  Computer  Engineering  Departments  of  
Tripoli   University   where   this   approach   was   adopted.   While   the   young   head   of  
Architecture  was  widely-­‐‑viewed  as  very  successful  in  building  good  relations  with  
students331   the   Computer   Engineering   department   was   reportedly   ‘almost   a  
student-­‐‑run   department’   and   highly   chaotic,   leading   to   the  HOD’s   resignation.332  
This  comparison  illustrates  the  trial-­‐‑and-­‐‑error  approach  adopted  out  of  necessity  in  
a   context   in   which   university   leaders   confronted   new   challenges   without  
knowledge  of  how  similar  situations  were  addressed  in  other  cases.    
A  final  fact  to  be  considered  in  terms  of  stabilisation,  the  MoHE-­‐‑L  announced  that  it  
would  provide  monthly  stipends  of  70  dinars  to  all  students.333  It  was  reported  that  
in  June  2013  the  stipend  increased  to  220  dinars.334  This  move  should  be  explained  
as   an   attempt   to   reduce   youth   grievances   and   enhance   the   transitional  
government’s   legitimacy.   In   sum,   it   can   be   stated   that   Libyan   universities   were  
relatively   successful   in   achieving   limited   goals   of   stabilisation   and   conflict  
prevention  although  at  the  cost  of  neglecting  long-­‐‑term  issues  that  could  have  been  
addressed.  A  further  manner  through  which  Libyan  HE  contributed  to  stabilisation  
was  in  DDR,  which  will  be  considered  next.    
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  Dr	  Sami	  Khashkusha,	  Professor	  Department	  of	  Political	  Science	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  
11/2012	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  Dr	  Mohamed	  Mashena,	  Temporary	  President,	  Tripoli	  University	  and	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Engineering,	  
Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
332	  Obaidat,	  higher	  education	  consultant	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  12/2012	  
333	  Head,	  Training	  Department,	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  12/2012	  




8.2.1.1.   DDR  
  
A  major  and  unique  way  in  which  HE  was  geared  towards  post-­‐‑war  recovery  was  
through   formal   DDR   programming.  When   fieldwork  was   conducted   in   late   2012  
HE’s  role  in  DDR  was  limited  although  many  participants  held  that  the  sector  had  
potential  as  an  effective  aspect  of  DDR  and  several  participants  described  various  
plans   underway   to   send   young   former   combatants   abroad.   Pack   and   Barfi   (2012)  
hold  that  the  part-­‐‑time,  non-­‐‑institutional  and  regionalised  nature  of  militias  renders  
forcible  demobilisation  problematic  and   recommend  vocational   training  as  part  of  
DDR.  
In   the   DDR   programme   administered   by   the   MoE,   MoHE-­‐‑L,   and   the   Warriors  
Commission,   of   approximately   30,000   places   for   training   or   study   abroad   around  
2,000   were   reserved   for   university-­‐‑level   education   with   most   opportunities   in  
TVET.335   Several   interviewees   held   that   sending   ‘revolutionaries’   abroad   for  
education  and   training  would   ‘open   the  minds’  of  young  people   to  other   cultures  
with  a  demilitarising  effect.336    
In   April   2013   it   was   announced   that   18,000   degree-­‐‑holding   Thuwar   or  
revolutionaries  would   be   sent   abroad   to   study   for  Masters   and  PhD  degrees   in   a  
programme   administered   by   the   Warriors   Affairs   Commission.   According   to  
Waleed  (2013)  5,000  would  be  sent  in  2013,  4,000  in  2014,  and  4,500  in  both  2015  and  
2016.   This   programme   is   unique   as   it   represents   by   a   very   significant  margin   the  
largest  DDR  programme  in  any  country  administered  through  HE  opportunities.    
However,   various   criticisms   can   be  made   of   this   programme.   First,   several   high-­‐‑
level   participants  made   the   claim   that   ex-­‐‑militia   and   brigade  members   should   be  
sent   abroad   to  pursue   studies   to   quickly   reduce   levels   of   potentially  destabilising  
men   on   the   streets.   As   such,   a   major   policy   rationale   appears   to   be   purchasing  
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  Head,	  Training	  Department,	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  12/2012	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  Dr	  Khaled	  and	  Dr	  Ali,	  EDB	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
337	  
	  
stability.  Programme   timing  was  however  criticised   for  amounting   to   ‘a  mentality  
of   buying   rage   of   students   by   sending   outside’   that   would   not   solve   basic  
educational   challenges   including   stabilisation   and   resolving   internal   conflicts,  
which  deserved  priority.337    
While   it   should   be   acknowledged   that   this   is   a   potential   positive   programme  
outcome,   given   the   vast   expenditure   and   opportunity   cost   involved   it   should   be  
concluded   that   the   programme   cannot   be   well-­‐‑planned   and   strategically   aligned  
with   HE,   DDR,   and   human   capital   frameworks.   The   programme   should   be  
expected  to  run  at  very  high  cost  that  could  alternatively  be  invested  in  developing  
graduate  education  inside  Libya.  This  type  of  investment  in  self-­‐‑sufficient  capacity  
may   represent   a  more   socially-­‐‑optimal   resource   allocation   than   a   hastily-­‐‑planned  
programme   likely   to   run   over-­‐‑cost   and   deepen   ‘brain   drain’.   Furthermore,   the  
programme   has   been   criticised   for   targeting   only   Thuwar   and   excluding   female  
students338   and  non-­‐‑combatants   thus  dividing  Libyan  society   rather   than  having  a  
unifying   effect.339  Another   area   in  which  HE   contributed   to   recovery  was   in   relief  
and  reconstruction  efforts,  which  will  be  examined  now.    
8.2.2. Relief  and  Reconstruction  
  
HE   played   a   role   during   the   war   and   its   aftermath   in   humanitarian   response.  
Benghazi   University   campus   dormitories   were   used   to   house   displaced   persons,  
mainly   IDPs   from   Brega   and   Ajdabiya   (Dziadosz   2011).   Omar   Al-­‐‑Mukhtar  
University’s  President  held  that  during  the  war  his  university  in  Baida  was  one  of  
the   only   public   places   where   local   civil   society   actors   providing   relief   and  
emergency   assistance   could   meet   and   speak   freely.   He   notes   that   groups   met   to  
coordinate  giving  ‘tools’  and  clothes  to  ‘refugees’,  providing  food  to  poor  families,  
and  sharing  information  on  missing  persons,  stating  that  ‘it  was  like  a  control-­‐‑room  
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  Obaidat,	  higher	  education	  consultant	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  12/2012	  
338	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  scholarship	  recipients	  are	  male	  due	  to	  socio-­‐cultural	  constraints	  on	  sending	  
female	  family	  members	  abroad	  alone	  
339	  Dr	  Fathi	  Al-­‐Arabi,	  consultant	  to	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	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in  the  university’.340  Furthermore,  it  was  reported  that  many  students  volunteered  at  
hospitals  in  the  East  of  Libya.341  
Beyond   relief   efforts,   there   was   low   utilisation   of   HE   expertise   and   capacity   in  
reconstruction  projects.  It  was  seen  that  pre-­‐‑war  Iraqi  HE  cooperated  with  industry,  
government  and  military  sectors  while  post-­‐‑war  collapse  of  universities,  industries,  
and  the  state  prevented  these  cooperative  linkages.342  In  Libya  by  contrast,  post-­‐‑war  
HE   capacity   did   not   collapse   yet   Libyan   academic   expertise   was   not   widely-­‐‑
employed   in   rebuilding.   However,   it   should   be   qualified   that   post-­‐‑war  
reconstruction  under  the  NTC  was  slow  due  to  the  government’s  transitional  nature  
and  that  therefore  opportunities  for  university  participation  were  less  than  in  Iraq.  
Moreover,   engineering   faculties  at  Tripoli  University  and  Benghazi  University  are  
relatively  well   positioned   to   contribute   to   reconstruction   and   faculty  members   at  
both  institutions  expect  to  do  so.343    
A  consultancy  office  at  each  university  coordinates  university-­‐‑industry  cooperation.  
However,   consultancy   does   not   offer   a   significant   revenue   stream   for   Libyan  
universities.   Some   engineering   faculty  members   in   Tripoli,  Misrata   and   Benghazi  
undertook   consultancy   work   on   reconstruction   projects   although   in   a   private  
capacity   rather   than   through   the   university.344   In   the   Department   of   Architecture  
and  Urban  Planning  at  Tripoli  University  most  offers  of  consultancy  work  were  said  
to   be   on   a   pro-­‐‑bono   basis   offering   ‘no   financial   or   even   moral   compensation’.  
Several   participants   identified   mistrust   as   at   the   root   of   the   problem;   foreign  
companies  operating   in  Libya  rely  on  foreign  consultants  while  Libyan  companies  
do   not   trust   domestic   universities.345   Even   the   large-­‐‑scale   campus   construction  
programme   underway   years   before   the   uprising   was   contracted   to   foreign  
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   Dr	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   Omran	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   Head,	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   Tripoli	   University	   -­‐	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10/2012.	  Mohamed	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  President,	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University	  -­‐	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  11/2012	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companies  on  a  design-­‐‑and-­‐‑build  basis  with  no  involvement  of  Libyan  universities  
in  project  design  or  planning,  which  was  a  cause  of  division  and  controversy.346    
However,   it   should   be   qualified   that   university   expertise   was   utilised   in   various  
transitional   tasks.   The   Consultation   and   Support   Group   (CSG),   a   group   of   250  
Libyan   academics,   advised   the   NTC   on   policy   development,   developing   two  
influential  documents  adopted  by   the  NTC,   ‘A  Vision  of  a  Democratic  Libya’  and  
the  ‘Proposed  Road  Map’  (Hope  2011).  The  CSG  advised  on  constitutional  drafting,  
disarmament  and  armed  forces  reform,  ‘an  early  election,  reconciliation,  addressing  
crimes  against  humanity,  and  restarting  the  economy’.  In  addition,  a  committee  of  
University  Professors  has  been  established  to  assess  needs  for  rewriting  curriculum  
in  primary  and  secondary  schools  (Golovnina  2011).  
There   were   also   some   attempts   to   incorporate   courses   and   educational   content  
relevant  to  new  transitional  needs.  One  example,  the  Engineering  Faculty  at  Tripoli  
University  adapted  an  existing  course  on  restoration  and  rehabilitation  of  buildings  
towards   rebuilding   war-­‐‑damaged   infrastructure.   However,   similar   examples   of  
courses   on   reconstruction   could   not   be   identified   at   other   universities.   Another  
example   is   the   Translation   Department   at   Tripoli   University   where   a   course   on  
transitional   terminology  was   introduced  to  produce  graduates  capable  of  working  
for   government   bodies,   media,   NGOs,   or   international   agencies   dealing   with  
transitional  issues.347  While  these  are  examples  of  adaptation  to  post-­‐‑conflict  needs  
these  are  exceptional  cases  rather  than  indicative  of  a  general  trend.    
Furthermore,   utilisation   of   Libyan  HE   to   provide   research   on   conflict-­‐‑related   and  
post-­‐‑conflict  issues  was  low.  This  is  explained  by  the  research  system  which  despite  
the  vast  HE  system   is  poor  due   to   chronic  underfunding  and  marginalisation.  An  
anecdotal   account   holds   that   on   a   trip   to   Tunisia   Qaddafi   was   asked   how  much  
Libya  spends  on  research  to  which  he  replied  ‘nothing’.348  One  contrary  example  of  
such  research  is  the  survey  produced  by  Benghazi  University  and  Oxford  Research  
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International.   Another   example,   engineering   faculty   at   Zawiya   University   were  
active  in  a  committee  on  reconstruction  of  damaged  buildings  and  infrastructure  in  
Zawiya  city  and  were  organising  a  conference  on  rebuilding.349    
In   sum,   while   HE   research   and   consultancy   capacity   was   in   part   utilised   in  
reconstruction  and  recovery  processes  the  overall  contribution  is  low.  Furthermore,  
there  is  a  widespread  understanding  amongst  participants  that  greater  involvement  
of   Libya’s   academic   expertise   in   reconstruction   projects   could   have   multiple  
benefits   including   reducing   contractors’   costs,   additional   revenue   streams,  
supplying   in-­‐‑depth   contextual   knowledge  on  Libya,   and   capacity  development   of  
HEIs.  Another  area   in  which  Libyan  HE  had  the  potential   to  contribute   towards  a  
major   goal   of   transition   was   in   democratisation   and   civil   society   development,  
which  will  be  considered  next.    
8.2.3. Democratisation  and  Civil  Society  Development  
  
A   major   goal   of   Libya’s   post-­‐‑conflict   transition   is   from   authoritarianism   to  
democracy.   HE   capacity   in   various   ways   supported   democratisation   processes  
although   faced   various   obstacles.   For   example,   student   volunteerism   was   high  
during   July   2012   elections;   a   vital   transitional   moment.   Additionally,   academics  
worked   as   consultants   in   the   constitutional   drafting   process.   Furthermore,   HE   is  
seen  to  have  potential  to  deepen  democratisation  through  ICT  education  in  support  
of  e-­‐‑democracy  (Jones  et  al  2012).      
Pre-­‐‑war   curricula   did   not   cover   democratic   ideas   and   practice,   human   rights,   or  
civil  society  and  Libyan’s  were  estimated  to  have  low  knowledge  of  these  areas  due  
to   isolation   under   sanctions   (Anderson   2013,   p.231).   However,   highly-­‐‑educated  
Libyans,   in   particular   those   educated   overseas,  were  more   exposed   to   democracy  
and  therefore  HE  was  viewed  as  an  important  means  of  supporting  democratisation  
through   civic   education,   public   outreach,   and   civil   society   development.350   Public  
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lectures   and   conferences   provided   civic   education   on   concepts   including  
democracy,  elections,  and  citizenship  aimed  at  both  students  and  the  public,  which  
improved   university-­‐‑society   relations.   For   example,   a   Democratic   Centre   was  
established  at  Omar  Mukhtar  University   and  public   lectures  were  held  at  Zawiya  
University’s  city-­‐‑centre  campus.  
Following   Qaddafi’s   long   suppression   of   independent   associations   many   civil  
society  organisations  emerged  post-­‐‑uprising.  HE  contributed   towards   civil   society  
development  through  both  independent  student  initiative  and  university  or  faculty-­‐‑
level   programmes.   During   the   war   many   students   were   active   in   newly-­‐‑formed  
NGOs   and   charitable   groups,   for   example,   the   Al-­‐‑Mukhtar   Group   in   Baida  
distributed   aid   to  poor   families   in   the  East.351   Students   and   staff   nationwide  were  
proactive  in  leading  campus  clean-­‐‑up  campaigns  and  refurbishing  classrooms,352  for  
example,  rehabilitating  the  badly  damaged  Sirte  University.  
During   the   first   few  post-­‐‑war  months   enthusiasm   for  participation   in   civil   society  
activities  was  very  high  although  students  lacked  practical  knowledge  and  skills  of  
what   to   do   and   how   to   do   it.353   At   the   faculty-­‐‑level,   organisation   of   independent  
student   unions   for   each   faculty   was   permitted,   the   first   reportedly   at   Benghazi  
Medical  College  (Essul  2013).  In  some  cases  faculty  elections  were  followed  months  
later   by   elections   for   university-­‐‑wide   student   unions.354   Similarly,   students   were  
permitted   to   organise   official   campus-­‐‑based   student   organisations   and   societies.  
Furthermore,   in   several   cases   students   were   permitted   to   participate   in   faculty  
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meetings.355   However,   it   was   noted   that   by   late   2012   enthusiasm   and   euphoria  
waned  and  it  was  ‘difficult  to  get  ten  people’  at  a  civil  society  event.356  
It   should   be   noted   that   some   faculty   members   were   concerned   with   potentially  
destabilising   impacts   of   student   collective   action   and   political   organisation.   At  
Tripoli   University   student   organisations   and   societies   were   asked   to   sign   a  
document  declaring   that   their  activities  did  not  have  a  political  dimension.   It  was  
held   that   this   move   would   ensure   ‘political   and   foreign   agendas’   would   not  
infiltrate   campus   and   that   university   leadership   aware   of   instability   in   Iraqi  
universities  did  not  want   ‘the  university   to  become  a  political   arena’.357  However,  
this   official   position   was   criticised   as   unenforceable   because   it   is   impossible   to  
isolate  political  from  social  activity.358  Furthermore,  it  was  held  that  Libyan  students  
were  relatively  unpoliticised  compared  to  Egyptian  and  Tunisian  students;  a  result  
of  the  previous  regime’s  efforts  to  sanitise  and  depoliticise  the  student  body.    
The  Tripoli  University  Programme  for  Rebuilding  Libya  (TUPRL)  was  launched  at  
Tripoli  University  in  September  2011  and  was  the  most  ambitious  attempt  to  utilise  
HE   for   democratisation   and   civil   society   development.   The   programme   director  
explained  that  it  was  initiated  as  soon  as  Tripoli  University  re-­‐‑opened  in  September  
2011   and   advanced   explicitly   liberal   goals   of   promoting   democratic   culture   and  
democratisation   through   a   training-­‐‑of-­‐‑trainers   programme   that   when   scaled-­‐‑up  
would   build   a   nationwide   network   of   civic   educators.   Furthermore,   it   was  
envisaged   that   the   university  would   play   a   lead   role   in   galvanising   civil   society,  
stabilising   Libya,   and   contributing   to   successful   transition.   TUPRL’s   vision   was  
much  larger  with  greater  public  outreach  and  communication  planned,  for  example,  
through  textbooks  and  cartoons  for  school  children.    
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Several   senior   Professors,   a   secretariat,   and   student   volunteers   maintained   the  
programme   which   received   full   backing   from   university   President   Dr   Faisel  
Krekshi.  TUPRL’s  budget  was  around   five  million  dinars  and   received  pledges  of  
further   financial   assistance.   It   was   claimed   that   the   programme   successfully  
reached-­‐‑out   to   international   partners   including   the  US   Embassy   and  UNDP  with  
the  director   stating   that   ‘we  did  a  very  good   job  of  marketing  ourselves’   in  a   few  
months,  for  example,  by  hosting  Secretary  of  State  Hillary  Clinton,  Alain  Juppe,  and  
a  civil  society  fair  with  the  Middle  East  Democratic  Initiative.359    
On  24th  December  2011  the  programme  was  transferred  from  Tripoli  University   to  
the   Ministry   of   Planning   excluding   the   university   from   the   programme   and  
effectively   ending   it.360   The   director   held   that   the   newly-­‐‑incumbent  Minister   and  
Deputy  Minister  of  HE   rejected  TUPRL’s   ideological   aims.  First,   it   is   claimed   that  
new   Ministers   were   conservative   Islamists   uncomfortable   with   civil   society  
concepts   and   the   rapid   pace   of   social   change   advocated   by   TUPRL.   Several  
participants  described  how  the  programme’s  opponents  likened  civil  society  to  ‘an  
alien  object’  that  ‘would  be  rejected  by  the  Libyan  body’.  Secondly,  it  is  claimed  that  
there   was   high   suspicion   that   the   programme   would   function   as   a   platform   for  
penetration  of  Libya  by  foreign  agendas  masquerading  as  international  civil  society  
actors.    
TUPRL’s   director   damningly   criticised   the   cancellation   and   held   that   no   similar  
programmes  were   initiated  after   that   leading  to  him  and  likeminded  colleagues  to  
conclude   that   little   change   had   been   made   to   HE   after   the   uprising.   Another  
Professor   involved   in   organising   civil   society   initiatives   at   Tripoli   University  
similarly  explained  that  TURPL’s  cancellation  was  a  cause  of  enormous  frustration  
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and   derailed   civil   society   initiatives’   momentum.361   When   asked   why   the  
programme  was  cancelled  she  responded  that:  
We   have   the   revolution   but   also   an   anti-­‐‑revolution   –   some   people   are   not   happy  
about   the   flow   of   the   tide.   People   from   the   40   years   or   so   under   the   controlling  
regime,  they  employed  so  many  people  –  it  was  a  very  heavy  system  –  it  is  not  easy  
to  eradicate.  They  don’t  easily  accept  big  change.  
Many   faculty  members   held   that   under   Faisel   Krekshi,   the   proactive   and   liberal-­‐‑
minded   first   post-­‐‑Qaddafi   Tripoli  University   President,   a   strong  university   vision  
supported  civil   society   initiatives  and  explicitly   linked  HE   to  democratisation  and  
statebuilding.  However,  leadership  change  came  about  with  Dr  Krekshi  offering  his  
resignation  after  six  months.  The  change  to  more  conservative  leadership  was  held  
to  have  been  detrimental  to  university  civil  society  initiatives  as  the  next  President,  
Dr  Medani,   was   described   as   a   top   physician   and   septuagenarian   Professor  who  
represented  an  older  generation  less  supportive  of  new  or  innovative  programmes  
and   preferring   a   slower   pace   of   change.   The   case   of   TUPRL   illustrates   the  
considerable  enthusiasm  for  democratisation  and  civil  society  development  yet  also  
the   obstacles   to   utilising   HE   towards   these   transitional   goals   in   post-­‐‑war   Libya.  
Another   long-­‐‑term   transitional   goal   toward  which  HE   struggled   to  make   a  major  
early  contribution  was  economic  recovery,  which  will  be  considered  next.    
8.2.4. Economic  Recovery  
  
Regarding   Libya’s   long-­‐‑term   economic   recovery   it   is   too   early   to   judge   HE’s  
contribution.  This  section  will  therefore  review  some  key  debates  and  discourses  on  
HE   and   economic   recovery   in   Libya.   These   are   diversification,   human   capital,  
building  a  knowledge  economy,  relevance,  and  technical  and  vocational  education.  
Firstly,  a  consensus  holds  that  diversification  is  crucial  to  Libya’s  economic  vision  to  
reduce   oil-­‐‑dependence,   redress   unemployment,   and   stimulate   productive   sectors.  
Sectors  frequently  identified  as  suitable  included  renewable  energy  (especially  solar  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




energy),362   tourism,363   agriculture,   and   water.   The   vast   majority   of   participants  
viewed  HE  and  in  particular  TVET  as  vital  to  supporting  diversification.364    
A   strong  emergent   theme  was   that  highly-­‐‑skilled  human  capital  will  be   critical   to  
economic   recovery.  As   El-­‐‑Gamaty   states,   the   ‘most   important   resource   that   Libya  
has   is   its   human   capital’,   constituted   by   highly-­‐‑skilled   returnees,   professionals,  
academics,   and   thousands   of   post-­‐‑graduate   students   overseas.365   It   is   commonly  
held   that   Libya   is   a   rich   oil-­‐‑exporting   country  with   enormous   economic   potential  
due  to  strategic  location  straddling  Europe  and  Africa,  the  Mediterranean’s  longest  
coastline,  rich  archaeological  heritage,  and  small  population.  Many  argue  that  given  
these   strong   initial   conditions   long-­‐‑term   economic   prospects   are   very   good   if  
security   is  provided  and  human  resources  developed.  As  a  principal   institution   in  
the  human  capital  formation  process  HE  is  held  to  have  a  major  role  in  this  vision  of  
economic  recovery.  
Another   theme,   many   participants   viewed   building   a   knowledge   economy   as   a  
major   rationale   for   investment   in   Libya’s   economic   recovery.   Libya’s   highly-­‐‑
educated  population  and  wealth  were  commonly  held  to  be  good  initial  conditions  
for  embarking  on  a  development  path  led  by  information  technology,  science,  and  
innovation.   Investing   in   domestic  HE   and   research   capacity   to   provide   skills   and  
knowledge   to   support   this  model  was   viewed   as   necessary   by   some  participants.  
For  example,  it  was  held  that  universities  could  function  as  business  incubators  and  
should  be   functionally   integrated  with   industry   through  science  parks  to   form  the  
basis   of   a   national   innovation   system.366   Furthermore,   it  was   commonly   held   that  
international  university  partnerships  and   research   collaborations  would  be   crucial  
to   circulating   knowledge   and   strengthening   research   capacity   to   support  
knowledge-­‐‑led  development  models.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362	  Dr	  Ibrahim	  Saleh,	  Deputy	  Minister,	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
363	   Dr	   Tarek	   Basher	   Jdeidi,	   Head	   of	   the	   Department	   of	   Zoology,	   Tripoli	   University	   –	   Tripoli,	   Libya	  
10/2012	   ;	  Ahmad	  Emrage,	  President	  of	   the	  Libyan	  Student	  Society	  of	   the	  University	  of	   Leicester	  –	  
Leicester,	  UK	  03/2012	  
364	  Guma	  El-­‐Gamaty,	  founder,	  Taghyeer	  Party	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
365	  Guma	  El-­‐Gamaty,	  founder,	  Taghyeer	  Party	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
366	  Dr	  Fathi	  Al	  Arabi,	  Consultant	  to	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
346	  
	  
It   should   be   qualified   that   the   vast   majority   of   participants   saw   this   knowledge  
economy   model   as   a   long-­‐‑term   aim   and   recognised   that   implementation   faced  
many  challenges.  Moreover,  a  small  number  of  participants  rejected  this  economic  
vision;  for  example,  it  was  held  that  Libya’s  small  size  and  economic  structure  entail  
structural  dependency  as  an  end-­‐‑user  of  research  and  knowledge  and  that  it  would  
therefore   be   a   waste   of   resources   to   invest   in   national   research   and   innovation  
systems.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  from  2006  official  state  policy  was  to  invest  in  
HE   and   knowledge   economy   development.   Participants   were   divided   on   the  
counter-­‐‑factual   claim   as   to   impact   this   policy   would   have   had   if   the   war   and  
uprising   had   not   occurred.   Some   held   that   the   plans   would   have   had   a   large  
positive  impact,  others  that  impact  would  be  substantial   in  some  areas  but  limited  
by  lack  of  academic  freedom  and  presence  of  corruption,  while  others  insisted  that  
plans  were  merely  rhetorical  and  would  not  have  been  implemented  by  the  former  
regime.      
Relevance   also   emerged   as   a   theme;   it   was   held   that  HE   should   connect   to   local  
social  and  developmental  needs.  For  example,  Pack  and  Elmaazi   (2013)  argue  that  
the   University   of   Sebha   in   collaboration  with  Western   universities   should   play   a  
leading  role  in  knowledge  transfer  to  develop  the  solar  energy  sector  in  the  under-­‐‑
developed   Fezzan   region   and   that   the   university   could   become   a   ‘centre   of  
excellence  in  the  Sahel  region  and  node  in  triggering  regional  development’.  Omar  
Mukhtar  University  is  also  held  to  have  adapted  to  local  developmental  challenges  
by  placing  agricultural  extension  at  the  centre  of  its  expansion  plans  in  Libya’s  most  
fertile  region  and  hosting  several  conferences  and  workshops  on  environmental  and  
agricultural  issues.    
HE   was   also   viewed   as   important   to   supporting   economic   transition   through  
providing   relevant   skills   including   entrepreneurship,   SMEs,   and   private   sector  
development.  For  example,  it  was  argued  that  entrepreneurship  and  business  skills  
should  be   integrated   into  all  courses  and  not  only  business  and  economics  related  
subjects.367  At  an  Agriculture  Faculty  students  were  required   to  run  small   start-­‐‑up  
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agricultural   initiatives;   a   project   intended   to   support   transition   from   a   socialist   to  
liberal-­‐‑market   economy.368   Another   example,   the   NGO   SPARK   held   a   Benghazi  
International  Summer  University  in  cooperation  with  Benghazi  University  in  June-­‐‑
July   2012   to   disseminate   ‘key   concepts   of   entrepreneurship   and   business  
management’  to  its  84  mostly  student  participants  (SPARK  2012).    
There  was  a  consensus  that  Libyan  HE  needed  to  change  to  produce  skills  relevant  
to   labour   market   needs   as   it   is   overwhelmingly   theoretical   and   provides   low  
practical   skills   and   knowledge.369   In   2012   a   faculty-­‐‑level   review  was   underway   to  
evaluate   curricula   changes   to   adapt   to   changing   economic,   social   and   market  
requirements.   In   some   faculties,   for   example,   engineering   at   Tripoli   University,  
curriculum   review  was   undertaken   through   consultation   with   firms   operating   in  
Libya.   Another   example,   the   private   Refak   University   issued   a   survey   to   Libyan  
firms  and  government  agencies  for  market  needs  assessment.370    
Furthermore,   there   was   general   recognition   that   this   structural   weakness  
significantly  contributed  towards  high  graduate  unemployment.  A  major  economic  
recovery   goal   was   reducing   unemployment,   over   30%   in   2012,   and   graduate  
unemployment,   through   stimulating   productive   sectors   and   diversification.   If  
achieved,  this  would  provide  a  ‘peace  dividend’  and  enable  youth  to  participate  in  
reconstruction   thus   transforming   a   major   grievance   common   to   ‘Arab   Spring’  
countries   and   contributing   towards   stabilisation.371   Aligning   curricula   with  
economic  needs  was  in  this  context  advocated  to  reduce  unemployment  and  given  
high   priority,   for   example,   it   was   Tripoli   University’s   second   priority.372  
Furthermore,   it   was   held   that   professional   skills   training   must   be   improved   to  
increase  graduate  employability.373  Relatively  few  obstacles  should  be  anticipated  in  
increasing  HE   relevance  because   reforms   serve   the   interests  of  HEIs,  government,  
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private   industry,   and   students   while   there   is   region-­‐‑wide   recognition   of   the  
problem.374  However,  a   related  yet  more  problematic   issue   is  prioritising   technical  
tertiary  education.    
Before  war  and  uprising   there  was   recognition   that  Libya   required  more  practical  
and  technical  skills  to  supply  the  domestic  labour  market.  A  long-­‐‑standing  trend  is  
for   high   reliance   on   foreign   labour   with   very   high   dependence   in   technical   and  
vocational  sectors.  Before  2011  there  were  1.5  million  Tunisian,  Egyptian,  and  other  
nationality  technicians  and  other  workers  (St  John  2013,  p.104)  with  a  Libyan  labour  
force  of  1.6  million.375  A  renewed  focus  on  TVET  was  recommended  to  redress  this  
imbalance  through  a  process  of  labour  force  ‘Libyanisation’.    
Post-­‐‑war  rationales  for  increased  focus  on  TVET  were  strengthened  for  two  primary  
reasons.   First,   TVET   holds   potential   to   reduce   youth   unemployment.   Imbalanced  
tertiary  enrolments  saw  many  graduates  in  fields  including  medicine  or  engineering  
not  absorbed  by  labour  markets.  Increased  technical  tertiary  enrolment  and  quality  
could   reduce   unemployment   by   supplying   skilled   labour   to   sectors   with   labour  
shortages   and   those   with   high   growth   potential   including   agricultural   and  
industrial   sectors   expected   to  drive  diversification.  For   this   reason,   it  was  widely-­‐‑
held  that  technical  tertiary  education  has  greater  potential  than  university  education  
in   reducing   youth   unemployment   and   thus   enhancing   long-­‐‑term   prospects   for  
stability  and  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery.  
The   second   rationale   is   that   skills   and   competencies   provided   by  TVET   are  more  
relevant   to   needs   of   societies   undergoing   post-­‐‑conflict   transitions   than   academic  
education.   It   was   commonly   stated   in   interviews   that   rebuilding   Libya   requires  
engineers   and   technicians   rather   than   academics.376   A   quick   transfer   of   students,  
resources,  and  policy  priority  from  universities  to  technical  institutes  was  therefore  
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recommended  to  provide  quality  technicians  that  could  play  a  role  in  reconstruction  
projects.377    
That  HE  should  have  greater  technical  emphasis  emerged  strongly  from  fieldwork  
and   is   relatively   uncontroversial.   However,   large   obstacles   to   focusing   on   TVET  
were   identified.   The   lower   social   value   placed   upon   technical   education   than  
university   degrees   was   held   to   limit   TVET’s   potential.   It   is   argued   that   because  
careers   in  medicine  and  engineering  are  held  in  high  esteem  parents  will  continue  
to  choose  to  enrol  their  children  in  academic  degrees  rather  than  TVET.378  Another  
obstacle   is   strict   pay-­‐‑scales   based   on   grading   related   to   educational   level   used   in  
public   sector   employment.   Technical   institute   graduates   often   must   work   for   12  
years  to  reach  entry  pay-­‐‑levels  of  new  university  graduates.  Altering  this  economic  
incentive   structure   to   reward   TVET   is   a   necessary   condition   for   attracting   good  
candidates,  for  example,  through  private  sector  development.379    
In  sum  it  can  be  concluded  that  Libyan  HE  at   the  outset  of  post-­‐‑conflict   transition  
made  low  contribution  to  the  long-­‐‑term  task  of  economic  recovery  as  curricula  was  
largely   irrelevant   to   economic   needs   and   the   system   was   unbalanced   towards  
academic  education.  However,  research  was  conducted  early  in  transition  and  there  
were   indicators   that   the   long-­‐‑term   prognosis   for   HE   to   contribute   to   economic  
recovery   was   strong,   in   particular   the   curricula   review   process   undertaken   at  
various   universities   and   widespread   support   for   diversification   and   knowledge-­‐‑
driven   development.   Another   long-­‐‑term   transitional   goal   where   Libyan   HE   was  
found  to  have  a  limited  contribution  was  in  statebuilding,  which  is  analysed  next.    
8.2.5. Statebuilding    
  
A  major   task   facing  post-­‐‑conflict  Libya  was   statebuilding   in  a   context  where   state  
capacity  had  long  been  inhibited  and  national   institutions  virtually  collapsed  (Sisk  
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2013,  p.viii).  To  begin,  HE’s  contribution  to  two  major  aspects  of  statebuilding  will  
be  addressed;  legitimacy  and  capacity.    
Establishing   legitimate   institutions   is  a  central  statebuilding  task  and  HE  played  a  
role  in  legitimising  the  post-­‐‑Qaddafi  state.  Elite  actors  in  Libya’s  political  transition  
used  academic  credentials  to  enhance  their  legitimacy  in  the  eyes  of  both  domestic  
and  international  audiences.  Three  of  Libya’s  four  post-­‐‑war  Prime  Ministers  possess  
PhDs;  Jibril,  Tarhouni,  and  El-­‐‑Keib.  Prime  Minister  Zeidan’s  proposed  cabinet  list  of  
34   nominee   ministers   contained   14   PhDs,   and   22   with   at   least   Masters   degrees  
(Libya   Herald   2012a).   Academic   credentials   of   NTC   members,   in   particular  
positions   at   foreign   universities,   were   often   reported   in  Western   media   with   the  
effect   of   building   confidence   in   the   NTC’s   technocratic   competence   in   Western  
diplomatic   capitals.   Almost   all   Libyan   academics   interviewed   had   greater  
confidence   in   the  NTC  by   virtue   of   its   academic   credentials,   although   some  were  
critical   of   dominance   by   returnees.   While   academic   credentials   accrued   some  
legitimacy   from   foreign   and   domestic   elites   no   evidence   suggests   an   effect   upon  
popular  domestic  legitimacy.    
HE   was   widely   viewed   by   participants   as   important   for   capacity-­‐‑building   in  
national  institutions.380  As  Lazar  (2012)  reports,  ‘almost  every  Ministry  that  we  met  
with  spoke  about  the  importance  of  sending  students  abroad  for  higher  education’.  
Libyan   and   overseas   universities   were   to   provide   training   for   government  
employees.  Ministries  were  permitted  to  run  their  own  training  programmes  for  up  
to   six   months   while   all   applications   for   government   staff   to   enrol   on   degree  
programmes   abroad   were   administered   by   the  MoHE-­‐‑L.   Ministry   of   Health   was  
first   priority   and  MoE   second   in   rewarding   scholarships   for   post-­‐‑graduate   study  
abroad.   International   opportunities   including   educational   exchange,   scholarships,  
and   university   partnerships   were   viewed   as   important   means   of   supporting  
statebuilding   and   capacity-­‐‑building.   For   example,   Chivvis   et   al   (2012)   argue   that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380	  Mohamed	  Mashena,	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Engineering,	  Tripoli	  University	  –	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012;	  Dr	  
Ibrahim	   Saleh,	   Deputy	   Minister,	   MoHE-­‐L.	   Tripoli,	   Libya	   11/2012;	   Head,	   Department	   of	   Training,	  
MoHE-­‐L	   -­‐	   Tripoli,	   Libya	  12/2012;	  Majda	  Elferjani,	   PhD	  Candidate,	   School	  of	   the	  Built	   Environment,	  
University	  of	  Salford	  -­‐	  Salford,	  UK	  05/2012	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research   collaborations   and   partnerships  with  Western   universities   could   provide  
high-­‐‑level  human  capital  and  skills  necessary  for  effective  statebuilding  and  public  
administration.   It   should  be  noted   that   international  HE  was   involved   in  pre-­‐‑war  
capacity-­‐‑building,  notably  through  the  now  infamous  London  School  of  Economics  
(LSE)  programme.    
However,  these  theorised  links  between  future  post-­‐‑graduate  returnees  and  training  
current   civil-­‐‑service   personnel   through   international   education   do   not   have   an  
immediate  measureable   impact  on  statebuilding  outcomes.  Rather,  domestic  HE  is  
more   strongly   linked   to   state   and   capacity-­‐‑building   in   the   short-­‐‑term.   On   HE’s  
contribution   to   statebuilding   it   is   worth   quoting   Guma   El-­‐‑Gamaty,381   who   states  
that:  
Many  young  graduates   in  Libya  have   taken  a  very   active   role   in   the   revolution,  not  
just   militarily,   but   in   all   other   aspects   of   the   revolution   like   media,   civil   society,  
humanitarian  work  and  so  on,   and  a   lot   of   them  are  becoming  political   activists   and  
engaging   fully   with   political   transitions   and   with   the   process   of   democratisation,  
however,  when  it  comes  to  specific  expertise  and  specific  skills  to  do  with  management,  
leadership,   with   statebuilding   and   with   rebuilding   Libya   on   a   strong   institutional  
basis  we  find  that  higher  education  and  postgraduate  education  has  not  really  given  us  
in   Libya   the   required   skill   levels   that  we   need   and   this   is   partly   related   to   the   poor  
quality  of  education.  
Several   participants   held   that   research   capacity   in   HE,   think-­‐‑tanks,   and   other  
knowledge-­‐‑producing   institutions   is   vital   to   functioning   of  modern   states   such   as  
the  UK  or  Germany  and   therefore   that  Libya   should   follow  a   similar  model   in   its  
statebuilding   strategy.  Moreover,  many   interviewees   held   that   research  weakness  
entailed   that   present   contribution   to   statebuilding   and   policy-­‐‑making  was   low.382  
However,  similarly  to  the  quote  above,  the  former  Minister  of  Reconstruction  held  
that  the  theorised  synergistic  HE-­‐‑statebuilding  relationship  in  which  HE  contributes  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381	  Guma	  El-­‐Gamaty,	  founder,	  Taghyeer	  Party	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
382	   For	   example,	   Guma	   El-­‐Gamaty	   held	   that	   Libyan	   universities	   were	   not	   acting	   as	   experts	   for	  
government	   institutions	   due	   to	   the	   low	   quality	   HE.	   Guma	   El-­‐Gamaty,	   founder,	   Taghyeer	   Party	   -­‐	  
Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	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to   capacity-­‐‑building   and   a   stronger   state   in   turn   offers   better   resources   and  
opportunities  for  HE  would  not  work  in  Libya  due  to  very  low  HE  quality.383  
HE   was   also   viewed   as   critical   to   providing   the   leadership   required   to   ensure   a  
successful   transition   and   effective   statebuilding   process.384   However,   the   Qaddafi  
regime  targeted  potential  leaders  and  charismatic  figures  that  constituted  a  threat  to  
the   regime.   As   Pignon   (2012)   argues,   to   achieve   the   goals   of   stabilisation   and  
democratisation  ‘Libya  needs  capable,  legitimate  leaders  and  technocrats’  yet  ‘lacks  
both   the   HE   system   and   the   network   of   institutions   that   allows   such   leaders   to  
emerge’.    
Another   core   statebuilding   challenge  was   establishing   rule   of   law   in   a   context   of  
weak  state  authority.  It  was  seen  in  chapter  three  that  legal  education  is  theorised  to  
be   an   important   yet   often   over-­‐‑looked   aspect   of   post-­‐‑conflict   rule   of   law   reforms.  
An  International  Legal  Assistance  Consortium  (ILAC  2013)  assessment  of  the  Rule  
of  Law  in  post-­‐‑war  Libya  found  that  legal  education  suffered  from  challenges  that  
limited  its  contribution  to  rebuilding  legal  and  judicial  systems.  Law  faculties  were  
over-­‐‑crowded  yet  the  discipline  had  much  lower  social  prestige  than  engineering  or  
medicine  and  therefore  received  lower  quality  students.385  Teaching  was  described  
as   highly   theoretical   with   no   clinical   approaches   except   at   Tripoli   University.  
Furthermore,   presence   of   Qaddafi-­‐‑era   personnel   in   key   positions   was   held   to  
constitute   a   university   environment   that   was   ‘not   particularly   reform   oriented’,  
especially   older   generation   Professors   slow   to   adapt   to   changes;   an   obstacle   to  
introducing   new   approaches   to   legal   education   such   as   clinic-­‐‑based   learning.  
Moreover,   one  participant  held   that   the   challenge  of   adapting   law   faculties   to   the  
new  legal  and  transitional  context  was  made  more  difficult  due  to  neglect  of   legal  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383	  Ahmed	  Jehani,	  former	  Minister	  of	  Reconstruction	  -­‐	  Benghazi,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
384	  Guma	  El-­‐Gamaty,	  founder,	  Taghyeer	  Party	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
385	  Several	  participants	  noted	  that	  law	  was	  held	  in	  higher	  esteem	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  when	  
Libya	  had	  a	  relatively	  strong	  regional	  reputation	  for	  legal	  education.	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education  under   the  previous   regime   that  governed   through   force  and   fear   rather  
than  the  law.386    
From   this   section   it   can   be   seen   that   over   the   long-­‐‑term   there   is   relatively   strong  
enthusiasm   for   linking  HE   to   state   and   capacity-­‐‑building  objectives  backed  up  by  
political   will   but   that   the   effects   of   this   will   have   some   lag-­‐‑time.   Meanwhile,  
domestic   HE   is   characterised   by   low   relevance   to   transitional   goals,   which   will  
require  significant  reform  to  ensure  that  the  sector  makes  a  positive  contribution  to  
institution   building   by   providing   high-­‐‑level   human   capital,   leadership,   and  
research.   An   area   where   HE   made   an   important   impact   on   transition   early   on  
without   the   significant   lag-­‐‑time   experienced   in   the   field   of   statebuilding   is  
transitional  justice  which  is  considered  now.    
8.2.6. Transitional  Justice  and  Reconciliation  
  
In   terms   of   transitional   justice,   a   challenge   facing  HE  was   transforming   a   system  
forged  under  Qaddafi’s  ideological  apparatus.  University  names  reflecting  Qaddafi-­‐‑
era   ideology  were   renamed  offering   a   symbolic   break  with   the  past,   for   example,  
Al-­‐‑Fateh  University,  named  after  Qaddafi’s  1969  Al-­‐‑Fateh  revolution,  was  renamed  
Tripoli   University   while   the   7th   April   University,   named   after   the   date   of   1976  
student  hangings,  was  renamed  Zawiya  University.    
Similarly,   removing   Jamahiriyya   studies,   a   module   on   the   Green   Book,   was   an  
important  early  priority.387  In  the  Language  faculty  at  Tripoli  University  the  course  
was  replaced  with  a  module  on  Libyan  history  intended  to  provide  generalist  and  
civics   education.   In   interview,   the   lecturer   that   designed   the   course   explained   it  
would  not  address  modern  Libyan  history  as   that  would  be   too  controversial  and  
divisive  when  covering  Qaddafi’s  rule.388  However,  efforts  to  replace  the  module  on  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386	  Dr	  Ahmed	  Al-­‐Atrash,	  former	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  
Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
387	   Students	   were	   dissatisfied	   because	   credits	   accumulated	   from	   completion	   of	   the	   course	   were	  
cancelled	  requiring	  new	  subjects	  to	  be	  taken	  
388	  Thuraya	  Al-­‐Wifati,	  Lecturer,	  Translation	  Department,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	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a   coordinated   nationwide   scale   were   impacted   by   the   TUPRL’s   termination   as   it  
planned  to  design  civic  education  modules  in  replacement.389    
Another  transitional   justice  challenge  was  the  fate  of  Qaddafi-­‐‑era  personnel.  Libya  
consciously   avoided  perceived  mistakes   of   Iraq’s   de-­‐‑Baathification,   a  major   factor  
leading   to   post-­‐‑2003   HE   problems.   Rather,   the   Qaddafi   regime   ‘old   guard’   were  
incorporated   into   the   new   state   to   ensure   stability,   although   at   the   cost   of  
delegitimising  the  state  in  the  eyes  of  revolutionary  actors,  and  according  to  Pelham  
(2012),  actually  increasing  post-­‐‑Qaddafi  instability.    
In  HEIs,  official  policy  stated  that  only  officials  who  participated  in  violence  against  
Libyans   or   who   were   known   to   have   stolen   public   funds   were   removed.390  
Additionally,  a  number  left  Libya  during  or  after  the  war.   It   is  difficult   to  provide  
accurate   numbers   of   personnel   removed   for   association   with   the   former   regime  
although   the   number   is   likely   in   the   low   hundreds   rather   than   thousands.   One  
example,  Omar  Mukhtar  University’s  President  estimated  that  ‘five  to  seven’  OMU  
faculty  members  chose  not  to  return  ‘because  they  could  not  face  students’  based  on  
common   knowledge   of   their   role   in   the   former   regime.391   Furthermore,   students  
were   proactive   in   pressurising   faculty  members   that   threatened   students   or  were  
strongly  supportive  of  the  Qaddafi  regime  during  the  war.392    
An  emergent   theme  was   that   faculty  members  approved   the  cautious  approach   to  
lustration   to   a   greater   extent   than   students.  One   academic   explained   that  most   of  
those   associated   with   the   old   regime   would   be   given   chances   to   contribute   to  
building  a  New  Libya.  Furthermore,  a  common  position  was  that  the  issue  should  
be   framed  as  one  of  qualifications  not   loyalty;  unmeritocratic  appointments   led   to  
many   under-­‐‑qualified   and   incompetent   faculty   members   and   other   staff   who  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389	  Dr	  Sami	  Khashkusha,	  Professor,	  Department	  of	  Political	  Science,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  
11/2012	  
390	   Mohamed	   Mashena,	   President,	   Tripoli	   University	   and	   Dean,	   Faculty	   of	   Engineering,	   Tripoli	  
University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
391	  Dr	  Ibrahim	  El-­‐Ghariani,	  President,	  Omar	  Al-­‐Mukhtar	  University	  -­‐	  Baida,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
392	  Anonymous	  higher	  education	  consultant	   -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  12/2012.	  He	  explained	  that	  his	  son	  and	  
his	   son’s	   friends	   planned	   to	   threaten	   lecturers	   at	   Tripoli	   University	   to	   force	   them	   to	   leave.	   In	  
response	  he	  persuaded	  them	  that	  staff	  simply	  followed	  orders	  and	  the	  regime	  could	  easily	  identify	  
non-­‐compliant	   staff	   so	   the	   students	   should	   be	   more	   forgiving	   to	   faculty.	   While	   in	   this	   case	   the	  
students	  accepted	  this	  logic	  numerous	  interviewees	  stated	  that	  similar	  instances	  occurred	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should  be  removed  regardless  of  their  ‘loyalties’.  However,  many  students  expected  
greater   change   in   personnel   and   cite   maintenance   of   ‘Qaddafi’s   people’   in   their  
positions  as  evidence  that  ‘nothing  has  changed’.  It  should  be  noted  that  a  Dean  at  
Tripoli   University   explained   that   difficulties   in   removing   faculty   members   arose  
from   lack   of   strong   evidence   and   the   requirement   that   individuals   openly   accuse  
others  leading  to  what  he  described  as  a  ‘dirty  game’.393    
On   reconciliation   and   peacebuilding,   HE   can   be   said   to   have   made   a   low  
contribution   to  mediating   the   identity  bases  of   conflict   in  post-­‐‑war  Libya.  As  was  
seen   in   the   previous   chapter,   HE   expansion   was   accompanied   by   nationwide  
campus   proliferation.394   Proliferation   was   widely-­‐‑held   to   constitute   a   strategy   of  
separating   Libyans   to   delimit   possibilities   of   collective   action   and   mobilisation  
against  the  former  regime.  It  was  observed  that  the  Arabic  word  for  university  Jamia  
literally  means  ‘it  gathers’  but  that  Qaddafi’s  universities  divided.395  Whether  or  not  
this   interpretation   is   accepted,   it   remains   a   fact   that   most   HEIs   have   relatively  
homogenous  regional  and  social  profiles,  for  example,  it  is  estimated  that  over  95%  
of   Khoms  University   students   are   from  Khoms   and   the   surrounding   area.   Given  
that   regional   and   local   identities   constitute   underlying   societal   divisions   and  
enmities   that   drove   conflict   in   post-­‐‑war   Libya,   it   follows   that   regionally  
homogenised  HEIs  do  not   function  as  arenas   in  which  students  mix  and  associate  
with  ‘the  other’  in  terms  of  ethnic,  religious,  or  regional  background.    
Exceptions   to   this   pattern   are   universities   in   Tripoli   and   Benghazi,   the   two  main  
cities,  where   students   from   across   Libya   are   enrolled.  However,   it   still   should   be  
qualified   that   a   rule   restricted   students   to   registering   at   HEIs   proximate   to   their  
registered  place   of   residence   so  while  Tripoli  University   and  Benghazi  University  
are  less  homogenous  than  Zawiya  University  or  Gharyan  University,  they  are  much  
less  mixed  than  other  national  universities,  for  instance,  Cairo  University.  Another  
counter-­‐‑example   is   Omar   Mukhtar   University   where   students   are   accepted   from  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393	  Dr	  Ahmed	  Al-­‐Atrash,	  former	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  
Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
394	  See	  section	  7.1.3.	  	  
395	  Dr	  Abdulmonim	  Alaswad,	  former	  Dean,	  IT	  Faculty,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	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across   Libya   because   its   veterinary   science,   environment,   and   agriculture  
specialisms  are  not  offered  elsewhere.396  The  diversity  of  its  student  body  was  held  
to  be  a  positive  resource  in  stabilising  the  campus  following  war  because  students  
shared   ideas   and   cultures   in   a   new   atmosphere   of   participation   and   proactive  
campus   life.  However,   it  must   be   qualified   that   data   on   social   profiles   of   Libyan  
students   was   not   available   when   requested   from   the  MoHE-­‐‑L   and   the   argument  
here  should  be  treated  as  a  generalisation.  Furthermore,  while  this  type  of  effect  on  
conflict  transformation  was  not  a  strong  theme  in  interviews  it  should  be  expected  




In  this  section  HE’s  contribution  to  Libya’s  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery  has  been  analysed  
across   six  dimensions   of   recovery;   conflict   prevention   and   stabilisation,   relief   and  
reconstruction,   economic   recovery,   democratisation   and   civil   society   building,  
statebuilding,  and  transitional   justice  and  reconciliation.  The  central  finding  is  that  
the   HE   sector’s   short-­‐‑term   responsive   capacity   to   tasks   of   conflict   prevention,  
stabilisation,  and  relief  was  relatively  strong  while  contribution  to   long-­‐‑term  tasks  
of   reconstruction   and   statebuilding   was   more   limited.   However,   it   should   be  
qualified  that  research  was  conducted  at  an  early  stage  and  found  relatively  strong  
recognition  of   links  between  HE  and  recovery  which  leads  to  a  prediction  that  the  
long-­‐‑term   prospects   of  HE   playing   an   important   role   in   recovery   are   good   if   the  
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  Dr	  Ibrahim	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  President,	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8.3. Post-­‐‑war  Environment  of  Higher  Education  
  
In   the   above   section   HE’s   contribution   to   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   was   analysed  
according  to  its  impact  across  a  number  of  key  recovery  tasks.  It  was  seen  that  HE  
effectively   functioned   as   an   agent   of   stabilisation   although   it   was   not   strongly  
incorporated   into   statebuilding   or   transitional   policy-­‐‑making.   In   this   section   the  
features   of   the   post-­‐‑war   environment   that   influenced   the   above   outcome   will   be  
analysed   to  provide  an  explanation   that   identifies  mechanisms  and  processes   that  
hinder   or   enable   HE   in   contributing   to   recovery.   Conjunctural   features   will   be  
analysed   followed   by   educational,   institutional,   structural,   and   external   features.  
Findings  of  this  section  form  part  of  the  answer  to  RQ4.  
  
8.3.1. Conjunctural  Features  
  
To  begin,  conjunctural  features,  which  were  found  to  be  the  most  decisive  influence  
in  post-­‐‑war  Iraq,397  will  be  analysed.  It  will  be  seen  that  while  security  was  less  of  an  
obstacle   compared   to   Iraq,   instability   was   a   major   constraint   on   the   potential   of  
post-­‐‑war  HE  contributing  to  recovery.    
8.3.1.1. Security    
  
Security  is  a  significant  factor  shaping  post-­‐‑war  Libyan  HE.  Most  participants  held  
that   the   security   context   nationally   was   ‘chaotic’   and   provided   a   negative  
environment   for   HE.   During   the   first   six   post-­‐‑war   months   in   particular,   militia  
members   and   students   openly   carried   guns   on   some   campuses.   While   campus  
security   was   widely   stated   to   have   improved   after   six   months   many   students  
reportedly  carried  concealed  weapons  and  security  incidents  continued.  As  will  be  
seen  in  the  next  section,  a  major  impact  of  insecurity  combined  with  instability  was  
that   faculty   members   and   MoHE-­‐‑L   officials   felt   limited   in   their   options   in  
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addressing  HE  due   to  availability  of  weapons,  breakdown   in   rule  of   law,  and   the  
climate  of  fear  characteristic  of  the  post-­‐‑war  environment.398    
Campus  security  in  some  cities  remained  poor  long  after  war,  for  example,  several  
participants   reported   new   social   ills   on   campus   including   drug-­‐‑dealing   and  
prostitution.   However,   security   guards   were   generally   unable   to   act;399   a   Dean  
explained   that   armed   security   would   trigger   an   arms   race   due   to   weapons  
availability   thus   leading   to   a  worsened   problem.400   Campus   gates  were   generally  
open   with   no   security   checks;   when   a   security   incident   involving   students   with  
grenades  occurred  gates  were  closed  and  it  took  approximately  three  hours  to  leave  
or  enter  the  university.401  In  June  2013  Tripoli  University  students  planned  a  strike  
protesting   worsening   campus   security   including   an   assault   on   a   female   student  
(Tombokti  2013).  Furthermore,  looting  continued,  for  example,  delaying  the  autumn  
2012  term  start  at  Omar  Mukhtar  University402  while  Tripoli  University  offices  were  
found   trashed   after   each   vacation.403   Dormitories   for   250   students   and   50   staff  
members   were   even   occupied   by   ‘criminals’   at   Omar   Mukhtar   University   with  
security   forces   unable   to   enforce   evictions.404   However,   several   participants   were  
‘proud’   that   no   fatalities   occurred   on   any   campus   and   in   comparison   with   Iraq  
security  should  be  considered  high.    
Several   programmes   or   projects   were   postponed,   cancelled   or   amended   due   to  
insecurity.   As   seen   earlier,   a  massive   campus   infrastructure   building   programme  
initiated   in   the   mid-­‐‑2000s   was   postponed   leaving   many   buildings   partially  
completed   and   some   over   90%   completed.   The   vast  majority   of   contractors   were  
foreign  and  did  not  return  due  to  the  perception  that  Libya  was  highly-­‐‑insecure.  In  
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399	   The	   former	   head	   of	   the	   Engineering	   Student	   Union	   at	   Omar	  Mukhtar	   University	   claimed	   that	  
‘security	   guards	   don’t	   do	   anything,	   they	   just	   sit’.	   Former	   Head,	   Student	   Union,	   Faculty	   of	  
Engineering,	  Omar	  Mukhtar	  University	  -­‐	  Baida,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
400	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Science,	  Zawiya	  University	  -­‐	  Zawiya,	  Libya	  12/2012	  
401	   Dr	   Usama	   Al-­‐Hadi,	   Head,	   Department	   of	   Architecture	   and	   Urban	   Planning,	   Tripoli	   University	   -­‐	  
Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
402	  Head,	  Department	  of	  Computer	  Science,	  Omar	  Mukhtar	  University	  -­‐	  Baida,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
403	   Dr	   Usama	   Al-­‐Hadi,	   Head,	   Department	   of	   Architecture	   and	   Urban	   Planning,	   Tripoli	   University	   -­‐	  
Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
404	  Dr	  Ibrahim	  El-­‐Ghariani,	  President,	  Omar	  Al-­‐Mukhtar	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addition,   a   UNESCO   IT   programme   was   scaled-­‐‑down   and   plans   to   establish   a  
research   and   policy   unit   at   Benghazi   University   supported   by   Oxford   Research  
International  were  cancelled  due  to  security  concerns.    
However,  some  participants  held  that  a  large  gap  existed  between  objective  security  
levels   and   the   media-­‐‑driven   perception   that   Libya   was   highly   insecure.   In   their  
view,  media  reports  focusing  on  localised  violent  episodes,   in  particular  the  attack  
on  the  US  Consulate  in  Benghazi,  are  a  major  obstacle  to  progress  in  rebuilding  HE  
and   attracting   investment.   A   Dean   cognizant   of   this   problem   stated   that   he  
appealed   to   his   students   that   ‘one   bullet   doesn’t   cost   one   dollar   but   billions   of  
dollars’.405   From   this   perspective,   despite   media   images   of   Libya   beset   by  militia  
violence,   localised  conflict  and  the  absence  of   the  rule  of   law,   insecurity  was  not  a  
major   obstacle   to   daily   operations   of   HE;   rather,   insecurity   constrained   the  
construction  programme   and   the   space   available   to   enact   reforms   and   changes   to  
the  sector.    
Protracted  conflict  in  the  ‘post’-­‐‑conflict  period  caused  disruption  to  some  HEIs,  for  
example,  during  the  siege  of  Bani  Walid  in  November  2012  Misrata  University  was  
closed   because   a   high   proportion   of   Misratan   brigades   leading   the   siege   were  
students,   while   the   Bani   Walid   campus   was   closed   due   to   bombardment,   and  
Azzaytuna  University  was  closed  due  to   its  proximity.  However,  protracted  social  
conflicts  were  not  found  to  significantly  affect  HE  directly.  While  localised  fighting,  
for   example   in  Fezzan,  was   a  major  national   security   concern   there  was  very   low  
direct   impact   on   HE   while   societal   divisions,   for   example   ethnic,   regional,   or  
religious   differences,   were   not   reflected   in   high   levels   of   campus-­‐‑level   conflict,  
contrary  to  the  Iraq  case.  However,  these  conflicts  produced  indirect  effects  on  HE  
by  driving  post-­‐‑war   instability;  a  major  dynamic  constraining  the  post-­‐‑war  role  of  
Libyan  HE  that  will  be  addressed  in  the  next  section.    
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8.3.1.2. Stability  and  Order  
  
Many  participants  held  that  stability  was  a  necessary  condition  for  progress  in  HE.  
Various   sources   of   instability   were   identified.   First,   breakdown   in   rule   of   law,  
weapons   availability,   and   weakness   of   security   forces   contributed   to   general  
instability   shaping   the   context   of   HE.   Also,   violent   groups,   in   particular   radical  
Salafists,   were   held   to   have   destabilised   Libya   and   to   be   ‘holding   back   the  
university’.406  Within  HE  leadership  changes  were  held  to  be  highly  destabilising,407  
for  example,  Tripoli  University  had  three  Presidents  in  little  over  a  year  while  short-­‐‑
terms  in  office  of  the  NTC  led  to  regular  MoHE-­‐‑L  personnel  changes.  Furthermore,  
student   protests,   campus   insecurity,   and   everyday   problems   over-­‐‑burdening  
capacity  are  all  held  to  have  led  to  institutional  instability  in  HEIs.    
A   main   effect   of   instability   was   held   to   be   that   decision-­‐‑making   became   highly  
constrained.408  Social  pressure  exerted  by  students   in  an   insecure  context  was  held  
to   significantly   constrain  policy-­‐‑space   available   to   the  MoHE-­‐‑L.  HE   is   a   powerful  
positional   good   in   Libya   with   high   social   status   conferred   upon   graduates   of  
prestige   colleges   including   medicine   and   engineering   or   overseas   scholarship  
recipients.  A  MoHE-­‐‑L  official   explained   that  during   the   first   ten  post-­‐‑war  months  
insecurity  and  student  demands  ‘had  a  big,  big  influence  on  all  decisions’.409  Many  
young  people  came  to  the  Ministry  daily  to  demand  education  or  training  and  some  
even  carried  weapons,   severely  disrupting   the  Ministry  and  endangering  staff.  As  
one   academic   explained,   MoHE-­‐‑L   officials   ‘were   in   danger   from   many   different  
aspects’.410  Some  policy  options  including  introducing  small  tuition  fees  for  students  
were  viewed  as   impossible   to   implement   in   this   context   ‘because   it  would   lead   to  
another  revolution’.    
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  Dr	  Sami	  Khashkusha,	  Professor,	  Department	  of	  Political	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  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  
11/2012	  
407	  Dr	  Taher,	  former	  Head	  of	  Physics,	  Tripoli	  University	  –	  10/2012	  
408	   Dr	  Mohamed	  Amer,	   Head,	   Chemical	   Engineering	  Department,	   Tripoli	   University	   -­‐	   Tripoli,	   Libya	  
10/2012	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  Head,	  Department	  of	  Training,	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	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  12/2012	  
410	  Dr	  Tarek	  Basher	  Jdeidi,	  Head,	  Department	  of	  Zoology,	  Tripoli	  University	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  Tripoli,	  Libya	  12/2012	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Options   available   at   university-­‐‑level   were   also   perceived   to   be   limited   by   social  
pressure,   instability,  and  insecurity.  Libya’s   large  student  body  regained  collective  
agency  after  the  uprising  and  protests  occurred  over  issues  including  better  campus  
conditions,  improved  teaching,  and  student  rights.  Protests  disrupted  HE  and  some  
faculty   reported   cancelling   reforms   or   changes   due   to   student   action.   Students  
reportedly   pressurised   universities   for   many   reasons   including   removal   of   ‘bad  
staff’,  cancellation  of  exams,  and  rescheduling  lectures.411  Furthermore,   it  was  held  
that   students   possessed   weapons   and   some   attempted   to   ‘take   their   rights   by  
arms’.412   Many   faculty   members   linked   instability   to   attitudinal   and   behavioural  
change   in   students,   in   particular   those   that   fought   during   war,   who   were   more  
confident,   aggressive,   and   confrontational.   Student-­‐‑faculty   relations,   hierarchical  
and   rigid   before   the  war,  were   being   contested   and   re-­‐‑negotiated   posing   another  
source  of  instability.    
Faculty  members  were   curtailed   in   their   ability   to   remove   students  and  also   staff.  
For   example,   a   Dean   held   that   expelling   under-­‐‑performing   ‘permanent’   students  
was  impossible  because  it  was  ‘too  risky’413  while  ‘ghost  staff’  could  not  be  fired  due  
to  risks  of  retribution  from  families.  One  Dean  when  asked  if  student  pressure  had  
curtailed  the  ability   to  enact   faculty-­‐‑level  change  replied  that   ‘it  almost  eliminated  
it,   it  cancelled  anything  that  you  think  is  right  for  the  students,  but  they  think  it  is  
not  right’.414    
It  was  seen  above   that   the  post-­‐‑war  environment  brought  many  new  needs   in  HE  
that   compounded   pre-­‐‑existing   needs.   Furthermore,   distortions   necessitated  
adaptation   by  HEIs.   An   emergent   theme  was   that  meeting   increased   educational  
needs,   including   re-­‐‑writing   curricula   and   registering   students,  was   intensified   by  
additional  burdens  of  coping  with  transitional  problems  including  regular  student  
protest   and   refurbishing  damaged  buildings,   and  dominated  day-­‐‑to-­‐‑day   activities  
of   faculty  members  and  administrative  staff.  For  example,   the  President  of  Tripoli  
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  Obaidat,	  higher	  education	  consultant.	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  12/2012	  
412	  Dr	  Abdulatif,	  Director,	  International	  Cooperation	  Office,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012.	  
413	  Dr	  Ahmed	  Al-­‐Atrash,	  former	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  
Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
414	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Science,	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  University	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  Libya	  12/2012	  
362	  
	  
University   argued   that   students   unaccustomed   to   protesting   overstepped   a  
reasonable   level   at   a   time   the   institution  was   trying   to   solve   everyday   problems.  
Furthermore,   implementing  HE   rules   and   procedures   in   an   unstable   context  was  
held  to  be  very  difficult.415  
A  significant  number  of  participants  held  that  these  everyday  short-­‐‑term  day-­‐‑to-­‐‑day  
issues   and   logistical   and   practical   problems   were   an   obstacle   to   more   proactive  
responses  to  transitional  challenges  and  contributing  to  post-­‐‑war  recovery  through  
programmes,   activities,   and   medium-­‐‑term   to   long-­‐‑term   strategic   planning.   Most  
participants  viewed  this  negatively,  holding  that  myriad  problems  in  the  post-­‐‑war  
environment  limited  their  capacity  to  impact  upon  ‘building  a  New  Libya’  despite  
strong   enthusiasm   and   will.   However,   a   smaller   number   held   that   short-­‐‑term  
strategizing   is  appropriate   for  managing  HEIs  during   the  early   stages  of  post-­‐‑war  
recovery.416   These   everyday   obstacles   can   also   be   viewed   as   constraining   the  
freedoms   of   Libyan   academics,   a   point   that   connects   with   the   focus   of   the   next  
section  on  academic  freedom.    
  
8.3.1.3. Academic  Freedom  and  Autonomy  
  
To   begin,   a   clear   majority   of   participants   felt   Qaddafi’s   fall   offered   a   major  
opportunity   to   ensure   academic   freedom.   Rights   to   freely   research   and   publish,  
organise   independently   of   the   state,   and   to   criticise   the   regime   were   previously  
denied.  HEIs  during  2011-­‐‑2012  operated  largely  under  Qaddafi-­‐‑era  regulations  with  
no  new  legal  protections  for  academic  freedom.  The  institutional  aspect  of  academic  
freedom  was  therefore  not  secured;  rather,  freedom  was  gained  through  breakdown  
of   the   repressive   state   apparatus.   A   clear   majority   of   participants   felt   that   they  
experienced  academic  freedom  with  the  ability  to  teach  and  research  any  topic  and  
speak  independently.  However,  a  small  number  held  that  while  under  Qaddafi  you  
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   Dr	  Mohamed	  Amer,	   Head,	   Chemical	   Engineering	  Department,	   Tripoli	   University	   -­‐	   Tripoli,	   Libya	  
10/2012	  




could  criticise  anything  but  his  regime  after  his  fall  academics  were  free  to  criticise  
anything  but  the  February  17th  Revolution  and  ‘revolutionaries’.417    
The   new   atmosphere   of   freedom  was   widely-­‐‑held   to   have   enabled   students   and  
faculty  members  to  participate  much  more  in  humanitarian,  civil  society,  and  media  
spheres  than  would  have  been  the  case  if  loyalist  forces  had  been  outright  victors  in  
the  civil  war.  As  one  interviewee  stated,  there  was  the  ‘smell  of  freedom’  on  campus  
and   ‘freedom   could   be   seen   in   the   students’   faces’.418   However,   many   faculty  
members   held   that   students   had   ‘misunderstood   their   freedoms’,   for   example   by  
intimidating  staff  and  protesting  over  minor  issues,  thus  constituting  an  obstacle  to  
maintaining  order  and  stability.    
It   should   be   qualified   that   the   approach   adopted   in   this   case-­‐‑study   of   relying  
primarily  on  interviews  and  focus  groups  poses  limitations  in  addressing  this  issue.  
If  it  is  supposed  that  the  above-­‐‑outlined  contrary  position  is  true,  that  academics  are  
not  free  to  criticise  the  ‘revolution’,  then  it  follows  that  self-­‐‑reports  of  those  claiming  
that   full   academic   freedom   is   present   are   of   reduced   value.   However,   this  
possibility  is  weakened  by  the  fact  that  a  large  number  of  participants  did  criticise  
the   NTC’s   ‘revolutionary’   leadership   for   achieving   little   in   their   first   year   and  
‘revolutionary’  armed  actors  for  perpetuating  security  problems.    
Despite   this   qualification,   the   perceived  presence   of   academic   freedom  or   at   least  
the  presence  of  conditions  upon  which  academic  freedom  could  be  established  were  
widely-­‐‑held   to   be   favourable   initial   conditions   for   HE   contributing   to   long-­‐‑term  
recovery.   To   investigate   this   point,   participants   were   asked   the   counter-­‐‑factual  
question,  ‘what  would  the  prospects  of  the  HE  sector  contributing  to  development  
in  Libya  be  had  Qaddafi   remained   in  power?’  The  most   common   responses  were  
that   nothing  would   change,   the   situation  would   get   worse,   or   that   there  may   be  
material  progress  but   that   it  would  be  meaningless  without   freedom.  The  concern  
with  academic   freedom   in   relation   to   teaching  and  research   links   to   the   subject  of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417	  Two	  participants	  made	  this	  case	  forcefully	  and	  both	  requested	  anonymity	  
418	  Dr	  Abdulatif,	  Director,	  International	  Cooperation	  Office,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	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the   next   section,   the   educational   dimension   of   the   post-­‐‑war   environment   shaping  
Libyan  HE.    
  
8.3.2. Educational  Features  
  
It   was   seen   above   that   conjunctural   aspects   of   the   post-­‐‑war   environment,   in  
particular   instability,  were  a  major   influence  on  HE.   It  will  be   seen   in   this   section  
that  educational  features  were  also  significant,  in  particular  the  constraints  that  low  




Access   influenced   the   HE-­‐‑recovery   relationship   in   both   positive   and   negative  
directions.   In   short-­‐‑term   stabilisation   and   conflict   prevention,   where   HE   was  
effective,   high   enrolment   constituted   an   asset   in   that   the   system   possessed  
considerable   absorptive   capacity   towards   the   young   university-­‐‑age   population.  
However,   on   improving   quality   and   linking   HE   to   long-­‐‑term   goals   of   economic  
recovery  and  statebuilding  high  access  was  widely-­‐‑considered  an  obstacle.419  It  was  
seen  in  chapter  seven  that  a  distortion  of  the  2011  civil  war  was  increased  enrolment  
in  various   faculties   in  order   to  purchase   loyalty   to   the   former  regime.   In   the  post-­‐‑
war   environment   in   which   universities   faced   many   challenges   the   additional  
burden  of  teaching  very  large  numbers  of  students  in  adequate  facilities  was  widely  
cited  as  a  major  obstacle.420  
The  majority  of  participants  held   that   enrolment  was   too  high  and  HEIs  operated  
above  maximum  capacity  while  a  minority  viewed  the  very  high  enrolment  ratio  as  
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   For	   example	   an	   assistant	   to	  Dr	   Fathi	   Akkari	   stated	   that	   high	   student	   numbers	  was	   the	   biggest	  
problem	  facing	  post-­‐war	  higher	  education	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  12/2012	  
420	  Dr	  Abdulmonim	  Alaswad,	   former	  Dean,	   IT	  Faculty,	  Tripoli	  University	   -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012;	  Dr	  
Hussain	   Zurganer,	   Department	   of	   Economy,	   Tripoli	   University	   –	   Tripoli,	   Libya	   10/2012;	   Dr	   Milad	  
Taher,	  Director	  of	  the	  Planning	  and	  Development	  Department,	  MOHE-­‐L	  –	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012;	  Dr	  
Khalid	  Karmaji,	  Dean	  of	  Engineering,	  Zawiya	  University	  –	  Zawiya,	  Libya	  12/2012	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a   positive   resource.  Many  participants,   in   particular  HE   consultants   and  Ministry  
officials,   identified   a   pressing   need   to   consolidate   the   sector   by   reducing   the  
number   of   institutions.421   It   is   commonly   argued   that   Libya’s   approximate   six  
million   population   does   not   need   400,000   students   across   13   universities.   While  
some  held  that  there  should  be  only  three  ‘national’  universities  in  Tripoli,  Benghazi  
and   Sebha,   a   more   common   position   was   that   there   should   be   six   to   eight  
universities.  It  was  recommended  that  large  scientific  and  technical  faculties  should  
be  consolidated  to  gain  economies  of  scale  on  expensive  equipment,422  for  example,  
Omar  Mukhtar  University’s   three  medicine   faculties   in  Baida,  Derna,   and  Tobruk  
should  be  centralised  in  one  location.423    
However,  as  will  be  seen  in  section  8.3.4,  the  unstable  post-­‐‑war  context  and  the  role  
of  HE  expansion  in  legitimation  strategies  of  the  former  regime  combined  to  place  a  
structural   barrier   to   rationalisation   of   the   HE   sector.   While   Libyan   HE   is  
quantitatively  strong  this  does  not  guarantee  equitable  distribution  of  opportunities  
in  the  sector,  a  dynamic  which  is  explored  next.    
8.3.2.2. Equity  
  
There  was   less  concern  with  equity  than  access  as  an   influence  upon  post-­‐‑war  HE  
although   equity   issues   were   raised.   Firstly,   minority   rights   were   noted.   Several  
participants   held   that   all   minority   groups   historically   had   equal   access   and   that  
therefore   equity   concerns   were   not   a   challenge   facing   post-­‐‑war   HE   policy.424  
However,  several  reports   indicate  that  Tebu  and  other  minorities   in  the  south  face  
obstacles   to   HE   participation   (Stocker   2013).   The   post-­‐‑uprising   environment   was  
viewed   as   an   opportunity   to   gain   rights   by  minority   groups.   For   example,   before  
2011   Arabic   was   the   exclusive   language   of   instruction.   After   war,   Amazigh   was  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421	   Dr	   Fathi	   Al-­‐Arabi,	   consultant	   to	  MoHE-­‐L	   -­‐	   Tripoli,	   Libya	   11/2012;	  Mohamed	   Yaseen,	   Registrar,	  
Medicine	  Faculty,	  Omar	  Mukhtar	  University.	  Baida,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
422	  Dr	  Salh	  Buzwaik,	  Head,	  Planning	  Council,	  Gharyan	  and	  Professor,	  University	  of	  the	  Jabal	  Al-­‐Gharb	  
-­‐	  Gharyan,	  Libya	  12/2012	  
423	  Dr	  Ibrahim	  El-­‐Ghariani,	  President,	  Omar	  Al-­‐Mukhtar	  University	  -­‐	  Baida,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
424	  For	  example,	  Guma	  El-­‐Gamaty,	  founder,	  Taghyeer	  Party	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	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freely  spoken  amongst  students425  and  it  was  reported  that  in  the  West  educational  
institutions  began   to   teach   in  Amazigh.426  This   indicates   that  post-­‐‑war  HE  became  
more  inclusive  enabling  the  largest  minority  group  to  feel  a  ‘peace  dividend’.    
Another  major  concern  is  gender  equity.  In  absolute  terms  female  students  are  well  
represented.  In  many  faculties  female  students  constitute  70-­‐‑80%  of  total  enrolment  
except   in   engineering   subjects   (ILAC   2013).   However,   the   proportion   of   female  
students   from   rural   areas   studying   in   the   top   national   universities   in   Tripoli   and  
Benghazi   or   receiving   scholarships   to   study   abroad   is   much   lower   than   male  
students  due  to  social  norms  that  young  women  should  not   live  alone  in  cities   far  
from  their  hometown  or  abroad.  Given  the  strategic  priority  placed  on  scholarships  
to   develop   post-­‐‑war  HE   this  may   be   expected   to   perpetuate   gender   inequality   in  
access   to   prestigious   scholarships   and   therefore   the   best   prospects   for   career  
advancement   upon   return.   However,   in   comparison   to   Tunisia,   where   the   2011  
revolution  was  followed  by  intense  public  debate  and  contest  over  gender  relations  
in  HE  focusing  on  Islamic  dress  codes,  gender  equity  was  much  less  politicised.      
Moreover,   equity   concerns   emerged   over   scholarships   with   several   interviewees  
holding  that  disproportionate  numbers  were  awarded  to  students  from  hometowns  
of   officials   managing   the   programme.   This   perception   of   regional   particularism  
contributes  to  place-­‐‑based  enmities  and  animosities  that  were  a  major  cause  of  post-­‐‑
conflict  division  and  instability.  Furthermore,  it  was  claimed  that  those  loyal  to  the  
Muslim   Brotherhood   and   Salafist   groups   were   given   preference.427   It   should   be  
qualified  that  this  constituted  continuity  with  pre-­‐‑war  favouring  of  regime  loyalists  
and  Qaddafa   tribe  members.   Furthermore,   these   claims  were   strongly   rejected   by  
MoHE-­‐‑L  officials  and  could  not  be  independently  verified.    
However,  despite   the  above  three  equity  concerns,   it  did  not  emerge  strongly  as  a  
theme   and   should   not   be   considered   a   major   influence   upon   the   HE-­‐‑recovery  
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  Graffiti	  and	  wall	  art	  at	  Tripoli	  University	   included	  much	  Amazigh	  art	  which	  was	  interpreted	  as	  a	  
newly	  confident	  statement	  of	  identity	  enabled	  by	  the	  new	  campus	  environment	  
426	  Deputy	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Arts,	  former	  Head,	  Department	  of	  Psychology,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  
Libya	  11/2012	  




relationship.   Moreover,   class-­‐‑based   equity   concerns   were   not   a   theme   from  
interviews.   Concerns   with   inequality   based   on   income   did   however   arise   over  
possibilities  of  introducing  user-­‐‑fees  in  public  HEIs  and  private  HE  expansion  with  
a   widespread   view   that   universal   free   public   HE   effectively   promoted   social  
mobility.   Moreover,   it   was   held   that   Qaddafi   recruited   poor   and   disadvantaged  
youth   from   rural   areas  by  offering  HE  opportunities   in   the   expectation   that   those  
with   less  would   offer   greater   loyalty.428  While   equity   did   not   emerge   as   a   strong  
theme,   another   educational   that   did   emerge   strongly   was   quality,   which   will   be  
addressed  now.    
8.3.2.3. Quality  
  
The  most  basic  HE-­‐‑recovery  linkage  is  through  delivery  of  good  quality  education,  
training,  and   research.  Many  participants  agreed   that  poor  quality  HE   limited   the  
sector’s   contribution   to   stabilisation  or   reconstruction.  However,   there  are  various  
dimensions  of  quality  with  each  mediating  the  HE-­‐‑recovery  relationship  differently.  
Highly  theoretical  and  insufficiently  practical  pedagogical  approaches  were  held  to  
limit   transmission   of   applied   skills   that   would   best   support   reconstruction   and  
recovery.   There   was   some   recognition   that   more   student-­‐‑led   and   participative  
learning  would  improve  quality  although  over-­‐‑stretched  capacity  due  to  large  class-­‐‑
sizes  and  lack  of  staff  training  were  held  to  be  obstacles  to  reforms  in  this  direction.  
Moreover,   pedagogy  was   also   framed   as   an   issue   for   stabilisation   in   that   ‘boring  
education’  constituted  a  youth  grievance  that  should  be  addressed.429    
Low  research  quality  was  held  to  severely  limit  HE’s  contribution  to  recovery.  Poor  
facilities,  high  teaching  workloads,   low  incentives,  weak  English  language  skills,430  
and  lack  of  university-­‐‑industry  linkages  were  commonly  cited  as  indicators  of  weak  
research   capacity.   A   related   dimension   of   quality   constraining   the   gearing   of  HE  
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  Dr	  Sami	  Khashkusha,	  Professor,	  Department	  of	  Political	  Science,	  Tripoli	  University.	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  
11/2012	  
429	  Two	  officials	  at	  EDB.	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
430	  For	  example,	  Dr	  Ghanuni	  held	  that	  poor	  English	  language	  skills	  was	  the	  greatest	  challenge	  facing	  
efforts	  to	   improve	  research	  quality.	  Dr	  Ahmed	  Murad	  Ghanuni,	  Coordinator,	  Faculty	  of	  Agriculture	  
and	  International	  Cooperation	  Office,	  Tripoli	  University.	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	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towards   recovery   and   transition  was   low   relevance   of  HE   and   research   to   social,  
economic,   and   development   needs.431   However,   Libyan   postgraduates   overseas  
were  widely-­‐‑viewed  as  a  major  resource  in  that  many  were  pursuing  topics  related  
to  Libya’s  development  and  would  therefore  have  major  impacts  on  relevance  upon  
their  return.    
Two  strongly  contrasting  views  on  post-­‐‑war  Libyan  HE  hold  on  the  one  hand  that  
minor   technical   fixes   are   required   to   ensure   that   the   sector   is   healthy   and  
contributes  to  recovery  while  on  the  other  hand  it  was  held  that  HE  quality  was  so  
low  it  could  not  make  any  positive  contribution.  The  first  perspective  was  defended  
by   the   former  Dean   of   Science   at   Tripoli  University,  who  held   that   his   university  
delivered   courses   comparable   to   universities   worldwide   and   was   very   close   to  
standards   set   under   the   Bologna   Process.   Several   participants   held   that   the   basic  
teaching   quality   was   good   citing   as   indicators   strong   teaching   staff   educated   at  
Western   universities   and   success   of   Libyan   graduates   pursuing   postgraduate  
education   abroad.432   It   was   conceded   that   research   capacity   was   not   as   strong   as  
teaching   and   that   cooperation   between   Libyan   HEIs,   domestic   industry,   and  
international  universities  would  strengthen  research.433      
The   second   perspective   was   offered   by   Ahmed   Jehani,   former   Minister   for  
Reconstruction,  who   argued   forcefully   that   Libyan   universities  were   corroded   by  
Qaddafi’s  rule.434  He  contended  that  the  thesis  that  HE  could  play  an  important  role  
in  reconstruction  was  valid  but  that  Libya  was  an  exceptional  case  due  to  systemic  
distortion  arising  from  Qaddafi’s  defective  state-­‐‑building  strategies.  He  argued  that  
Qaddafi  massively  over-­‐‑expanded  HE  to  ‘pretend  we  are  a  developed  country’  and  
gave  opportunities  almost  solely  based  on  loyalty  leading  to  the  ‘contamination’  of  
most   incumbent   faculty   members.   Rather   than   minor   technical   improvements,   it  
was   proposed   that  HE   required   a   ‘complete   system   transformation’.  When   asked  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
431	  Dr	  Sobhi,	  Vice-­‐Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Languages,	  Tripoli	  University.	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
432	   Dr	   Mohamed	   Amer,	   Head,	   Chemical	   Engineering	   Department,	   Tripoli	   University.	   Tripoli,	   Libya	  
10/2012.	  
433	   Dr	   Aboubaker	   Swehli,	   Department	   of	   Zoology	   and	   International	   Cooperation	   Office,	   Tripoli	  
University.	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
434	  Ahmed	  Jehani,	  former	  Minister	  of	  Reconstruction.	  Benghazi,	  Libya	  11/2012	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what   reforms  were   required,  he   replied   ‘don’t   start   from   the  premise   that   there   is  
something  to  be  made  out  of   this  higher  education’.  This  position  of  starting  from  
scratch  is  a  polar  opposite  of  the  view  that  minor  fixes  would  be  adequate.    
A   more   balanced   perspective   can   be   defended   in   which   neither   pole   of   minor  
technical   fixes   or   complete   system   transformation   would   be   recommended   to  
achieve   quality.   Introducing   quality   assurance   mechanisms   is   official   HE   policy  
although  several  participants  doubted  the  effectiveness  of  this  model  or  the  scale  of  
its   implementation.   Rather   than   focus   on   quality   assurance   many   participants  
viewed   reviewing435   and   training   faculty   members,436   updating   curricula,   and  
ensuring   meritocratic   appointments   as   the   best   means   of   improving   teaching  
quality.  Regarding   research  quality,   investing  massively   in   research   infrastructure  
and   facilities,   establishing   a   grant-­‐‑awarding   body,   incentivising   research   and  
publication,   and   cooperation  with  private   industry  were   all   commonly   suggested.  
Further,  a  cross-­‐‑cutting  issue  is  that  consolidating  existing  quantitative  HE  capacity  
would   reverse   the   trade-­‐‑off   between   quantity   and   quality   made   during   rapid  
system  expansion.  These  concerns  with  the  impact  of  HE  policy  options  on  quality  
connect  with  the  subject  of  the  next  section,  the  institutional  dimension  of  the  post-­‐‑
war   environment   in   terms   of   its   enabling   or   constraining   affect   upon   the   HE-­‐‑
recovery  relationship.    
  
8.3.3. Institutional  Features  
  
In   this   section   institutional   features   shaping   national-­‐‑level  HE  policy-­‐‑making   and  
university-­‐‑level   governance  will   be   analysed   including   governance,   capacity,   and  
leadership.  A  key  task  is  to  analyse  perceived  constraints  upon  HE  actors’  agency  to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435	   Dr	   Fathi	   Al-­‐Arabi	   recommended	   reviewing	   all	   faculty	   members	   to	   assess	   teaching	   quality	   and	  
replacing	   staff	   that	   did	   not	   meet	   minimum	   standards.	   Dr	   Fathi	   Al-­‐Arabi,	   consultant	   to	   MoHE-­‐L	   -­‐	  
Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
436	  Majda	  Elferjani,	  PhD	  Candidate,	  School	  of	  the	  Built	  Environment,	  University	  of	  Salford	  -­‐	  Salford,	  




reform  HE   and  utilise  HE   capacity   towards   recovery.   To   begin,   strategy   for   post-­‐‑
war  HE  reform  and  recovery  will  be  examined.    
8.3.3.1. Strategy  
  
To  start  with,  Libya  should  be  classified  as  possessing  strong   ‘ownership’  of  post-­‐‑
war  reconstruction  policy.  International  agencies  and  foreign  states  adopted  a  ‘light  
footprint’   approach   as   Libya’s   transitional   authorities   were   concerned   with   their  
already  fragile   legitimacy  and  worked  to  avoid  perceptions  of   foreign   interference  
or   influence   (Chivvis  et  al  2012).  Moreover,  Libya   is  a   rich  country  not  dependent  
on   foreign   aid   and   attendant   conditionalities.   Furthermore,   a   related  point   is   that  
several  participants  held   that   there   is   a   great  deal   of  political  will   to   support   and  
reform  HE.437  
However,  NTC  priorities   for  post-­‐‑conflict  Libya  were  overwhelmingly   focused  on  
achieving  domestic  security  and  re-­‐‑establishing  rule  of  law.  HE  was  a  relatively  low  
priority  in  overall  stabilisation  and  reconstruction  strategy.  Prioritisation  of  various  
sectors   is   reflected   in   the   March   2012   budget   in   which   1.1   billion   dinars   were  
allocated   to   the   MoHE-­‐‑L.   This   is   roughly   one-­‐‑quarter   of   the   4.6   billion   to   the  
Ministry   of   Education  while   the  Ministry   of  Defence   received   four   billion   (Zaptia  
2012).    
Many   academics   interviewed   claimed   that   HE’s   contribution   to   post-­‐‑conflict  
recovery   was   limited   by   low   prioritisation   and   low   funding   of   HE.   It   should   be  
qualified  that  the  1.1  billion  dinars  is  the  highest  HE  budget  in  Libyan  history  and  
roughly  three-­‐‑times  the  2010  budget  of  300-­‐‑400  million  dinars.  However,  while  the  
budget  was  high  many  participants  reported  large  delays  in  disbursal.  Furthermore,  
in   nearly   all   HEIs   the   university   budget   was   allocated   almost   entirely   to   current  
spending  with  negligible  capital   investment  budget.  One  Professor  described  how  
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   Guma	   El-­‐Gamaty,	   founder,	   Taghyeer	   Party	   -­‐	   Tripoli,	   Libya	   10/2012.	   Also,	  Mohamed	  Mashena,	  




he  had  1,000  dinars  at  his  disposal  for  one  academic  year  and  that  staff  and  students  
donated  to  fund  activities,  workshops,  and  events.  
The   MoHE-­‐‑L’s   first   post-­‐‑war   goal   war   was   re-­‐‑starting   the   HE   system;   a   major  
logistical   challenge   given   uneven   disruption   to   HE.   Contributing   to   stability   by  
getting  students  off  the  streets  and  back  into  HE  was  the  main  objective  behind  the  
drive   to   resume   studies.   Second,   connecting   internationally   through   scholarships  
and  partnerships  was  viewed  as  an  important  area  of  strategic  focus.  Another  area  
was  to  draft  and  pass  a  new  HE  law  addressing  decentralisation,  pay-­‐‑scales,  career  
progression,  hiring,  and  strategic  planning.438  
Various  criticisms  of  MoHE-­‐‑L  strategy  have  been  made.  First,   it   is  argued  that   the  
MoHE-­‐‑L   ‘mixed   priorities’   by   pursuing   scholarships,   partnerships,   curricula  
reform,  and  other  ‘long-­‐‑term’  reforms  while  the  pressing  issue  of  resolving  conflicts  
went  unaddressed.439  It  is  held  that  failure  to  resolve  internal  conflicts,  for  instance  a  
clear  chain-­‐‑of-­‐‑command  and  university-­‐‑state  relations,  prevented  post-­‐‑war  progress  
and  stability  within  universities.  Second,  a  strong  emergent  theme  from  interviews  
was   that   the  Ministry   had   no   clear   strategy.440   For   example,   it   was   held   that   the  
MoHE-­‐‑L   ‘did   nothing’   despite   high   expectations   of   change.441   Third,   HE   policy  
under  the  NTC  was  criticised  for  operating  in  a  closed  process  that  failed  to  consult  
or   include   stakeholders.442   While   some   of   these   shortcomings   in   strategy   can   be  
explained  in  reference  to  poor  strategic  planning  and  instability  the  low  capacity  of  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438	  Mohamed	  Mashena,	   Temporary	   President,	   Tripoli	  University	   and	  Dean,	   Faculty	   of	   Engineering,	  
Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
439	  Obaidat,	  higher	  education	  consultant	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  12/2012	  
440	  For	  example,	  Dr	  Sami	  Khashkusha,	  Professor,	  Department	  of	  Political	  Science,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  
Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
441	  Dr	  Fathi	  Al	  Arabi,	  Consultant	  to	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
442	  Obaidat,	  higher	  education	  consultant	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  12/2012	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8.3.3.2. State  and  Ministerial  Capacity  
  
A  primary  constraint  on  post-­‐‑war  HE  was  low  MoHE-­‐‑L  and  state  capacity.  Under  
Qaddafi   the   General   People’s   Committee   for   Higher   Education   (GPC)   was  
responsible  for  HE.  It  was  seen  earlier  that  policy  in  this  period  fluctuated  with  each  
ministerial  appointment,  strategic  planning  was  weak,  and  sudden  decisions  were  
made   personally   by   Qaddafi   causing   numerous   contradictions   and   distortions.443  
After  Tripoli’s  fall  and  the  NTC’s  establishment  the  GPC  became  the  new  MoHE-­‐‑L.  
The   Ministry   was   under   the   Minister   of   Education’s   stewardship   until   Naeem  
Ghariani’s   inauguration   as  Minister   of   HE   on   the   24th   November   2011   as   part   of  
Abdurrahim  El-­‐‑Keib’s  government.    
The   MoHE-­‐‑L   was   held   to   be   limited   by   physical   capacity.   In   the   first   post-­‐‑war  
months  the  Ministry  had  no  dedicated  premises  after  which  it  moved  to  a  location  
on   the   outskirts   of   Tripoli   with   poor   facilities.   An   indicator   of   limited   policy  
implementation  capacity,   it  was  reported   that  official  policy   is   that  all  universities  
should  have  a  quality  assurance  office  yet  Azzaytuna  University  did  not  have  one  
in   late  2012.444  Outside  of  Tripoli   it  was  commonly  reported   that   the  Ministry  had  
poor  communications  and  relationships  with  individual  universities.445  The  Head  of  
Planning  described  the  impact  of  these  factors  on  his  work,  stating  that  ‘we  weren’t  
stabilised   at   all.   It’s   in   a   mess,   a   firefighting   approach,   you   cannot   consider   it  
planning,  you  cannot  do  anything’.446    
A  MoHE-­‐‑L   official   held   that   the   largest   obstacle   to   the   Ministry   in   the   post-­‐‑war  
period   was   employee   quality.447   The   head   of   training   argued   that   the   Ministry’s  
human  resources  were  poor  and  urgently  required  comprehensive  staff  training.448  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
443	  See	  section	  7.1.4.2.	  	  
444	  Dr	  Aboubaker,	  Assistant	  to	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science,	  Azzaytuna	  University	  
-­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
445	  Dr	  Mohamed	  Al	  Asfar,	  Media	  Department,	  Azzaytuna	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
446	   Dr	   Milad	   Taher,	   Director,	   Planning	   and	   Development	   Department,	   MoHE-­‐L	   -­‐	   Tripoli,	   Libya	  
11/2012	  
447	   Dr	   Milad	   Taher,	   Director,	   Planning	   and	   Development	   Department,	   MoHE-­‐L	   -­‐	   Tripoli,	   Libya	  
11/2012	  
448	  Head,	  Department	  of	  Training,	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	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He  stated  that  the  Ministry  in  2012  employed  around  300  while  100  were  required.  
Of   the   300   staff   an   estimated   50%   never   or   very   rarely   attended   work.   It   was  
explained   that   ‘ghost   workers’   could   not   be   fired   due   to   complex   bureaucratic  
procedures.   Furthermore,   the   transitional   environment   constrained   ability   to   fire  
workers  because  weapons  prevalence  meant  that  families  of  affected  workers  could  
respond   violently   and   threaten   Ministry   officials.   He   said   that   ‘because   of   the  
security   side   you   cannot   do   anything’.   Furthermore,   low   wages   at   the   MoHE-­‐‑L  
were   held   to   prevent   attraction   of   the   most   qualified   candidates.449   The   limited  
capacity  of   the  Ministry   constrained   the  quality  of  governance  of   the  HE  sector,   a  
closely  inter-­‐‑connected  dynamic  that  will  now  be  examined.    
8.3.3.3. Governance  
  
Various   aspects   of   HE   governance   were   widely   viewed   by   participants   as  
significantly   affecting   the   HE-­‐‑recovery   relationship.   Firstly,   many   students   and  
academic   staff   identified   corruption   as   a   major   problem   facing   HE.450   Under  
Qaddafi’s   regime   corruption   was   widespread   including   in   HE   (Eljarh   2012).   A  
frequently   cited   example   is   that   the   large-­‐‑scale   campus   construction   programme  
and   $6   billion  HE   investment   initiative   launched   in   2006  was   incomplete   in   2011  
due   to  delays   caused  by   corruption.   Several   participants  described   an   entrenched  
‘culture  of  corruption’.451  Furthermore,  it  was  held  that  the  vast  majority  of  officials  
retained  their  positions  after  the  war,  with  no  systemic  change,  and  that  corruption  
continued   at   pre-­‐‑war   levels.   While   corruption   was   widely-­‐‑perceived   as   a   major  
obstacle   it   should   be   qualified   that   the   issue   was   sensitive   to   approach   during  
fieldwork.      
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
449	   Dr	   Milad	   Taher,	   Director,	   Planning	   and	   Development	   Department,	   MoHE-­‐L	   -­‐	   Tripoli,	   Libya	  
11/2012	  
450	  For	  example,	  Ahmed	  Jehani,	  former	  Minister	  of	  Reconstruction	  -­‐	  Benghazi,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
451	  Dr	  Ahmad	  Al-­‐Atrash	  explained	  that	  the	  culture	  of	  corruption	  was	  very	  deep	  and	  that	  officials	  not	  
benefitting	   from	   holding	   public	   office	   were	   looked	   down	   on	   as	   ‘unable	   to	   help	   themselves’.	   Dr	  
Ahmed	   Al-­‐Atrash,	   former	   Dean,	   Faculty	   of	   Economics	   and	   Political	   Science,	   Tripoli	   University	   -­‐	  
Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	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Another  factor,  the  short  office  term  length  of  Libya’s  transitional  government  was  
frequently  cited  as  a  reason  for  perceived  low  integration  of  HE  with  reconstruction  
strategy.  Many  participants  held  that  there  was  no  strategy  because  the  government  
only  held  office  for  one  year  during  which  it  was  impossible  to  analyse  a  sector  and  
implement   policies.   Furthermore,   HE   policy   was   held   to   only   be   weakly  
institutionalised  with  each  new  Ministerial  team  largely  replacing  previous  policies  
leading  to  high  discontinuity.452        
Leadership   is   a   major   aspect   of   post-­‐‑conflict   governance   identified   in   chapter  
three453   and   emerged   as   a   very   strong   theme   from   interview   data.   The   strong  
presence  of  formerly  exiled  or  diaspora  Libyans  in  transitional  authorities  is  viewed  
as   bolstering   the   NTC’s   legitimacy   by   many  Western   observers   and   states   while  
within   Libya   there   has   been   both   support   for   and   criticism   of   ‘outsiders’   in  
government.   Minister   of   HE   Naeem   Ghariani   and   Deputy  Minister   Fathi   Akkari  
spent  most  of  their  professional  careers  abroad.  Some  participants  held  that  this  fact  
limited  the  Ministerial   team’s  ability   to  effectively   lead  while  others  argued  that   it  
had  a  positive  impact.    
Firstly,   it   is   argued   that   the   Ministerial   team   entered   office   without   adequate  
knowledge   of   Libyan   HE.454   In   a   country   where   it   is   held   that   relationships   and  
personal   contacts  are  paramount   in  getting   things  done,  appointing  outsiders  was  
held  to  be  very  limiting;  as  one  academic  explained  of  the  Minister  ‘maybe  he  knew  
hundreds  of  individuals  in  Libyan  universities,  but  Libyan  academics  would  know  
thousands  upon  thousands’.  Crucially,   the  Deputy  Minister   for  Scientific  Research  
argued  the  appointments  were  not  optimal   for  running  the  Ministry.  He  spent  his  
professional   career   in  Libyan  universities   and  noted   that  Dr  Naeem  and  Dr   Fathi  
relied  on  his  knowledge  and  intimacy  with  Libya’s  context   to  work  effectively.  As  
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  A	  participant	  held	  that	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  suffered	  documentation	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  from	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Dr	  Usama	  Al-­‐Hadi,	  Head,	  Department	  of	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  University	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  See	  section	  3.3.2.2.	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   This	   is	   anecdotally	   illustrated	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  author	   received	  an	  email	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   the	   incoming	  
minister	  requesting	  sources	  on	  Libya	  HE	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  to	  an	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  published	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  the	  author	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recovery	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one  academic  argued,  Libya  is  a  complex  society  and  you  cannot  simply  appoint  an  
‘American  who  lives  in  Washington’  as  Minister.455    
Another   effect   of   appointing   outsiders   may   be   held   to   be   increased   attention   to  
internationalisation   over   domestic   reform.   Ministers   with   many   social   and  
professional   connections   in   the   US   or   UK   are   more   comfortable   arranging  
international   partnership   agreements   or   scholarship   programmes   than   planning  
changes  to  admissions,  curriculum,  or  pedagogic  aspects  of  Libya’s  HEIs.  However,  
in   interviews   with   Ministry   officials   this   argument   was   rejected;   rather   it   was  
argued   that   outsider   status   enabled   easier   communication   and   connections   with  
international  partners   although   the  Ministry’s  main   focus  was   internal.  Moreover,  
some   participants   were   highly   positive   about   Ministers   who   had   worked  
extensively   abroad,   holding   that   knowledge,   best-­‐‑practices,   and   contacts   from  
outside  would   help   develop  HE.   These   debates   on  Ministerial   leadership   connect  
with  the  subject  of  the  next  section  on  university-­‐‑level  governance.    
8.3.3.4. University  Governance  and  Leadership  
  
A  large  number  of  participants  viewed  bureaucratic  procedures  as  a  major  obstacle  
to   effective   functioning   of   HEIs.   Highly-­‐‑centralised   financial   management   and  
procurement  with  lengthy  procedures  for  purchasing  small  items  was  widely-­‐‑cited  
as   a   grievance   and   held   to   slow   replacing   and   rehabilitating   equipment   and  
facilities   damaged,   looted,   or   destroyed   during   war.   One   HOD   noted   that   his  
department  did  not  even  have  ten  dinars  to  spend  independently  and  further  that  a  
list   of   required   items   sent   to   the  university  President  was   later   found   to  have  not  
been  delivered.456    
In   this   context   centralised   university   governance   was   held   to   constrain  
departmental   and   faculty   capacity   to   adapt   to   new   post-­‐‑war   challenges   and  
opportunities.   Similarly,   large-­‐‑scale   programmes   and   international   cooperation  
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were  centrally-­‐‑controlled  by  university  administration.  One  Professor  reported  that  
he  was   disciplined   by   university   administration   for   simply  making   email   contact  
with   an   academic   in   Germany   about   potential   research   collaboration.   Moreover,  
bureaucracy  was  also   identified  as  a  major  problem,   for  example,   the  President  of  
Omar   Mukhtar   University   stated   that   the   President   and   not   the   financial  
department  should  control  university  affairs.457      
University   leadership   was   also   held   to   be   a   major   factor   influencing   HE’s  
contribution  to  recovery  and  transitional  goals.  Earlier  it  was  seen  that  the  change  of  
Tripoli  University’s  President  from  a  reformist  liberal-­‐‑minded  to  more  conservative  
older-­‐‑generation   figure   slowed   the  pace  of   civil   society   initiatives.   It   is   clear   from  
this   example   that   leadership   strongly   influences   the   vision   implemented   in   each  
university  and  therefore  the  manner  in  which  universities  contribute  to  recovery.    
Furthermore,   regular   leadership   changes   caused   internal   political   conflict  
destabilising   to   the   institution.   After   controversy   surrounding   Dr   Krekshi’s  
removal/resignation   a   political   schism   reportedly   emerged  with   approximately   15  
Deans   considered   ‘pro-­‐‑Faisel’   while   five   backed   Dr   Medani.   In   November   2012  
while   fieldwork  was   conducted,  Dr  Medani  was   ‘on  vacation’   in  America  while  a  
‘temporary  President’  Dr  Mohamed  Mashena  assumed  his  duties   after   allegations  
were   made   that   Dr   Medani   advocated   for   the   Qaddafi   regime   to   diplomats   in  
foreign   capitals   during   the   Libyan   civil   war,   leading   to   counter-­‐‑allegations   and  
rendering   the   issue   highly   sensitive.   Notwithstanding   the   validity   of   the   above  
claims,  they  raise  the  wider  issue  of  political  and  ideological  conflict  as  a  barrier  to  
HE  contributing  to  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery.    
Management   was   also   held   to   be   a   major   obstacle   to   post-­‐‑war   HE.   Many  
participants  held  that  administrative  and  leadership  positions  were  frequently  held  
by   under-­‐‑qualified   staff   who   often   gained   positions   due   to   loyalty   to   the   former  
regime.  Further,   it  was  held  that   ‘the  system’  had  become  distorted  and  corrupted  
by  years  of  mismanagement,  corruption,  centralisation,  and  nepotism.  This  class  of  
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officials  were  described  in  particular  by  younger  faculty  members  as  conservative,  
resistant   to   change,   and   an   obstacle   to   innovative   programmes   and   adaptation  
towards   new   transitional   challenges.   Moreover,   amongst   students   the   primary  
explanation   for   perceived   failure   of   the   ‘revolution’   to   be   enacted   in   HE   is   ‘bad  
management’  and  maintenance  of  ‘Qaddafi’s  people’.    
A   focus  group  with  HODs  and  Deans   in  an   IT  Faculty   revealed   that   these   faculty  
members   in   strategic   positions   felt   very   positive   about   their   collective   capacity   to  
change   the  educational  and  organisational  character  of   their   faculty  although  they  
were  less  optimistic  about  other  faculties.458  It  was  held  that  because  the  Faculty  was  
only   several   years   old   and   the   participants   were   relatively   young   (35-­‐‑50)   having  
recently  completed  postgraduate  training  abroad  they  would  be  able  to  implement  
new  ideas  and  innovations  without  meeting  resistance  of  older  senior  Professors  in  
large   faculties   including  science  where   the   ‘old  mentality’  was  deeply  entrenched.  
The   finding   that   mentality   was   significant   relates   to   the   psychological   and  
conceptual  obstacles  to  the  HE-­‐‑recovery  relationship  analysed  in  the  next  section.    
8.3.3.5. Policy  Influences  
  
It  is  argued  here  that  low  utilisation  of  HE  for  recovery  may  be  explained  in  part  by  
the   ‘normal   development’   conceptualisation   of   the   task   facing   Libya   detected  
amongst   some   Ministry   officials   and   planners.   One   explanation   for   ‘normal  
development’  framing  of  policy  is  that  MoHE-­‐‑L  and  university  officials  do  not  have  
expertise  on  how  challenges  of  recovery  and  transition  are  addressed  in  other  post-­‐‑
conflict  contexts.459  The  Dean  of  Engineering  at  Tripoli  University  held  that  the  only  
instance   of   outside   expertise   consulting   on   HE   in   post-­‐‑conflict   transitions   at   the  
university-­‐‑level  was  a  one-­‐‑day  workshop  held  in  Tripoli  led  by  the  United  Nations  
Development  Programme  (UNDP).  
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Another   explanation   for   ‘normal   development’   conceptualisation   is   that   policy-­‐‑
making   is  highly   centralised   in  Tripoli  which  was  not   severely  affected  by  war   in  
comparison   to   areas   including  Misrata,  Ajdabiya,  Zawiya,   or   Sirte   thus  distorting  
the   reality   facing   post-­‐‑war   Libya.   It   may   be   argued   that   with   policy-­‐‑makers  
centralised   in   Tripoli   the   experience   of   conflict-­‐‑affected   areas   is   distant   and  
therefore   not   central   to   policy   concerns   which   are   framed   as   much   in   terms   of  
‘normal   development’   as   recovery.   Two   participants   employed   by   the   EDB,   both  
from  Misrata,  stated  that  ‘80%  of  people,  including  most  of  our  colleagues,  have  not  
seen  what  we  have   seen’  with  Tripoli   having  no   real  war-­‐‑related  problems  while  
Misrata   experienced   guns,   tanks   and   bombs.   It   is   argued   that   consequently,  
innovative   thinking   on   linking  HE   capacity   to   conflict-­‐‑related   challenges  was   not  
common   in   Tripoli.   The   two   participants   stated   that   they   were   a   minor   voice   in  
proposing  programmes  in  areas  including  using  HE  opportunities  for  DDR  in  areas  
including  Misrata  and  Zintan.    
A   ‘normal  development’   conceptualisation  may  also  be  held   to  be  present   in  EDB  
and   MoHE-­‐‑L   policy-­‐‑transfer   and   lesson-­‐‑learning   activities.   This   statement   is  
supported  by  the  fact  that  Singaporean  HE  was  studied  as  a  model  applicable  to  the  
Libyan   context   by   both   the   MoHE-­‐‑L   and   the   EDB.   A   Libyan   delegation   visited  
Singapore  in  2012  to  learn  about  the  model  and  meetings  discussing  Singapore  were  
held  in  Libya  while  fieldwork  was  conducted.  Singapore  offers  an  attractive  model  
for   developing   countries   in   many   respects,   and   given   HE’s   contribution   to   the  
country’s   developmental   state   (Gopinathan   2007)   it   accords  with   the   argument   of  
this   thesis.   However,   there   are   limits   to   the   Singaporean  model’s   applicability   to  
Libya   in   that   it   emerged   in   a   context   of   high   social   order   maintained   by   strong  
authoritarian  governance;  two  features  not  present  in  post-­‐‑war  Libya.    
It  should  be  qualified  that  a  ‘normal  development’  framing  may  be  argued  to  be  a  
legitimate   approach   to   policy   and   strategy   because   reconstruction   is   in   essence   a  
developmental  task  and  Libya’s  post-­‐‑war  environment  is  more  stable  than  Somalia,  
Iraq,   or   Afghanistan.   Furthermore,   the   ‘normal   development’   argument   is  
controversial   and   would   be   refuted   by   most   policy-­‐‑makers   in   Tripoli.   However,  
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interviews   with   Ministry   officials   and   HE   planners   revealed   very   low   levels   of  
lesson-­‐‑learning   and   comparison   with   experiences   of   other   post-­‐‑war   contexts.   A  
qualified  conclusion  can  be  drawn  that  a   ‘normal  development’  perspective,  while  
not  a  decisive  obstacle  to  HE,  represents  a  conceptual  obstacle  to  maximising  HE’s  
recovery   potential.   A   further   set   of   obstacles   that   will   now   be   considered   are  
structural   features   of   the   post-­‐‑war   environment   affecting   the   HE-­‐‑recovery  
relationship.    
  
8.3.4. Structural  Factors  
  
While   the   above   section   identified   a   number   of   significant   institutional   factors  
including  governance  and  strategy  that  shaped  post-­‐‑war  Libyan  HE  this  section  will  
consider  several  aspects  of  the  structural  context  in  which  the  sector  operated.    
To  begin,   culture   is   a   structural   factor  widely-­‐‑perceived   to   constrain  Libya’s  post-­‐‑
war   HE   reform   efforts.   Several   aspects   of   Libyan   culture   were   identified   as  
obstacles.   Firstly,   social   status   is   a  major   cultural   barrier.   It   was   seen   earlier   that  
priority   afforded   to   academic   over   technical   education   was   viewed   as   a   major  
barrier   to   economy   recovery.460   Furthermore,   within   academic   education   parents  
had   strong  preferences   for  medicine   and  engineering   leading   to  over-­‐‑subscription  
in  these  disciplines  and  a  large  number  of  ‘permanent  students’.461  This  credentialist  
culture  was  held  to  be  deeply  embedded  in  parent  and  student  worldviews  and  was  
predicted   to   require   several   generations   to   change.462   Second,   in   transition   from   a  
socialist  state  to  a  market-­‐‑driven  society  a  culture  of  state-­‐‑dependency  was  held  to  
be   a  major   obstacle.   It  was  held   that   due   to   state   employment   guarantees   and   an  
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over-­‐‑sized  public  workforce  HE   employees   lacked  motivation   and  delivered   very  
low  productivity.463    
Furthermore,  maintenance  of  what  was  referred  to  as  a  ‘Qaddafi-­‐‑era  mentality’  was  
held  to  be  a  major  barrier  to  harnessing  HE  towards  recovery.  Several  participants  
held   that   revolution   could   remove   Qaddafi   but   changing   the   culture   he   shaped  
would   take   much   longer.   Negative   aspects   of   academic   culture   cited   include  
suspicion  of  outsiders,  resistance  to  change,  and  corruption.  Wasta  or  the  culture  of  
particularism,  nepotism  and  favouritism  was  held  to  be  deeply  embedded464  which  
posed   an   obstacle   to   implementing   principles   of   fairness   and   to   redressing   youth  
exclusion  and  marginalisation  held  to  be  a  major  instability-­‐‑driver.  Moreover,  while  
a  closed-­‐‑minded  and  suspicious  attitude  hostile  to  outsiders  borne  of  isolation  and  
repression   was   held   to   be   an   obstacle   to   international   cooperation,   Libya   was  
contrastingly  described  as  an  open  Mediterranean  society  that  had  interacted  with  
other  cultures  for  thousands  of  years.465        
High   expectations  were   also   identified   as   a   structural   obstacle   to  HE   in   recovery.  
Students  are  typically  held  by  faculty  members  to  have  expected  all  aspects  of  HE  to  
change   quickly   post-­‐‑uprising466   and   to   be   impatient   with   the   actual   pace   of  
change.467   Faculty   members,   by   contrast,   were   more   measured   about   the   pace   of  
change   holding   that   an   incremental   process   is   appropriate   in   HE   systems   not  
comparable  to  political  systems.  Failure  of  the  first  two  post-­‐‑uprising  years  to  meet  
student   expectations   led   to   general   disillusionment   and   loss   of   initial   optimism  
which  problematised  student-­‐‑faculty  relations.    
Historical  path  dependency   constituted   the  dimension  of   the   structural   context   of  
post-­‐‑war   Libyan   HE   that   most   decisively   shaped   the   sector’s   contribution   to  
recovery.   Post-­‐‑war   HE   faced   numerous   distortions   and   contradictions   caused   by  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
463	  Dr	  Salh	  Buzwaik,	  Head,	  Planning	  Council,	  Gharyan	  and	  Professor,	  University	  of	  the	  Jabal	  Al-­‐Gharb	  
-­‐	  Gharyan,	  Libya	  12/2012	  
464	  Dr	  Salh	  Buzwaik,	  Head,	  Planning	  Council,	  Gharyan	  and	  Professor,	  University	  of	  the	  Jabal	  Al-­‐Gharb	  
-­‐	  Gharyan,	  Libya	  12/2012	  
465	  Guma	  El-­‐Gamaty,	  founder,	  Taghyeer	  Party	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	  
466	   Dr	  Mohamed	  Amer,	   Head,	   Chemical	   Engineering	  Department,	   Tripoli	   University	   -­‐	   Tripoli,	   Libya	  
10/2012.	  
467	  Dr	  Zekia	  Deeb,	  Head,	  Translation	  Department,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012.	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Qaddafi’s   rentierist   state-­‐‑building   process,   however,   the   power   of   the   MoHE-­‐‑L,  
government   or   individual   universities   to   pursue   some   reform   pathways   was  
seriously  curtailed  by  features  of  Libya’s  transitional  context.   It  has  been  seen  that  
Qaddafi   used   HE   expansion   as   a   form   of   patronage   intended   to   enhance   state  
legitimacy,  for  example  through  constructing  branch  campuses  in  small  towns  and  
villages.   Similar   distortions   include   large   numbers   of   students   enrolled   in  
disciplines   such   as   medicine   and   engineering   leading   to   high   graduate  
unemployment   and   the   problem  of   ‘permanent   students’   that   cannot   be   removed  
even  after  failing  classes  for  many  years.    
A   strong   attempt   by   Libya’s   transitional   authorities   at   redressing   these  
contradictions   through   restructuring,   reform,   and   organisational   change   would  
harm   the   transitional   government’s   fragile   legitimacy   and   risk   having   a  
destabilising   impact.   Removing   campus   buildings   from   poor   rural   villages   that  
view   their   university   building   as   a   hard   won   right   would   risk   turning   residents  
against   the   state   which   would   threaten   the   primary   statebuilding   challenge   of  
security   provision.   As   argued   by   several   Ministry   officials,   attempts   at   reducing  
enrolment  or  closing  branch  campuses  were  made  impossible  due  to  the  absence  of  
the  rule  of  law  and  possibility  of  violent  reprisals.468  Given  that  these  are  among  the  
changes   that   in   theory  would   enable  HE   to  make   a  more  positive   contribution   to  
recovery,   it   can   be   stated   that   HE’s   contribution   to   recovery   is   constrained   by   a  
structural   context   that   is   a   path-­‐‑dependent   legacy   of   Qaddafi’s   state   legitimation  
strategy;   what   will   be   labelled   here   as   the   rationalisation   versus   legitimacy   trap.  
Another  set  of  features,  which  may  also  be  considered  structural  in  that  they  refer  to  
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  Head,	  Department	  of	  Training,	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012;	  Dr	  Milad	  Taher,	  Director,	  Planning	  
and	   Development	   Department,	   MoHE-­‐L	   -­‐	   Tripoli,	   Libya	   11/2012.	   Also,	   Dr	   Ibrahim	   Saleh,	   Deputy	  
Minister,	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	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8.3.5. External  Features  
  
While   in   contrast   to   Iraq   HE   in   post-­‐‑war   Libya   did   not   require   large-­‐‑scale  
rebuilding,   external   interest   in   the   sector   was   high.   Post-­‐‑war   donor   and  
international  agency   support   took  various   forms,  principally   funding   scholarships  
and  supporting  university  partnerships.  The  European  Union’s  strategic  response  to  
the  ‘Arab  Spring’  focused  on  the  ‘3  Ms’;  money,  mobility  and  markets  (EU  2011).  A  
‘major  expansion  of  university  scholarships  and  exchanges’  was  an  officially-­‐‑stated  
means  of  facilitating  increased  mobility.  Expanding  Erasmus  Mundus  scholarships  
for   Arab   Spring   countries   included   large   increases   for   Libyans.   Similarly,   the   US  
renewed  the  Fulbright  Libya  programme  and  doubled  student  numbers.    
The  US   State  Department   and  US   Embassy   strongly   supported   Libyan  HE   at   the  
outset  of  transition.  Secretary  of  State  Hilary  Clinton  (2011)  gave  a  speech  at  Tripoli  
University  expressing  her  governments  support  for  ‘rule  of  law,  respect  for  human  
rights,   trade   and   investment,   and   the   importance   of   civil   society,   academic  
institutions,   and   learning’   in   Libya.   She   committed   to   increasing   US-­‐‑Libya  
educational   exchange   by   doubling   Libyan   student   numbers   in   the   USA   and  
restarting   the  national   Fulbright  Program.   Similar   statements  were  made   again   in  
August  2012  when  Ambassador  Chris  Stevens  remarked  that  ‘our  government  and  
our  embassy  in  Tripoli  are  committed  at  the  very  highest  level  to  the  transformation  
of   higher   education   in   Libya   and   supporting   the   development   of   strong   ties  
between  educational  communities  in  Libya  and  the  United  States’  (IIE  2012b).    
In  May  2012  a  U.S.-­‐‑Libya  Higher  Education  Task  Force  was  established  ‘to  expand  
educational  exchanges  and  cooperation’.  The  Task  Force  and  Fulbright  scholarships  
are  classified  as  ‘people-­‐‑to-­‐‑people  programming  and  exchanges’;  a  prominent  form  
of   US   assistance   to   Libya   (State   Department   2012).   In   US   government   press  
statements  official  HE  cooperation   is   regularly   referred   to  alongside  assistance   for  
war-­‐‑wounded,  technical  advice  on  transition,  and  security  cooperation  as  principal  
US  contributions  to  post-­‐‑conflict  Libya  (for  example,  Burns  2012).    
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It  is  clear  that  the  US  placed  much  greater  emphasis  on  HE  to  support  post-­‐‑conflict  
transition,   at   least   in   symbolic   and   rhetorical   political   commitment,   than   in   Iraq,  
Afghanistan,  and  many  other  post-­‐‑conflict  countries.  It  should  now  be  asked,  why  
has  the  US  supported  HE  in  transitional  Libya?    
The   first   explanation   is   that   the   US   was   committed   to   successful   post-­‐‑conflict  
transition   and   viewed   HE   as   one   means   of   achieving   this   goal.   This   view   was  
expressed  by  Samantha  Power  who  stated  that  President  Obama  viewed  long-­‐‑term  
success   of   Libya’s   stabilisation   and   transition   as   strongly   linked   to   ‘educational  
foundations’   and   HE,   emphasising   strong   backing   for   US-­‐‑Libya   international  
university  partnerships  (IIE  2012a).  This  explanation  in  part  amounts  to  reading  the  
motivations   of  US   policy   from   its   official   position   and   statements.  However,   two  
other   interest-­‐‑based   explanations   can   be   offered;   economic   interest   and   political  
influence.    
Regarding   economic   rationale,   it   can   be   argued   that   the   US   government,  
educational  agents,  and  universities  view  post-­‐‑conflict  Libya  as  a  fertile  market  for  
American  HEIs.  Rather  than  viewing  Libya  through  a  humanitarian  or  post-­‐‑conflict  
lens   the   country   was   widely-­‐‑perceived   as   a   ‘business   bonanza’;   a   dynamic   also  
experienced  by  Kuwait   following   the  1990   invasion  by   Iraq.  This   fact   is   explained  
by   perceived   abundance   of  money   due   to   high   oil   revenues  which  would   enable  
substantial   easy   profits.   Furthermore,   HE   assistance   was   viewed   as   creating  
goodwill   intended   to   ease   signing   of   oil   contracts.469  With   international   education  
growing  as  a  highly  profitable  and  exportable  venture  in  the  2000s,  further  opening  
of  Libya  to  outside  investment  was  viewed  as  a  major  opportunity.    
This  perspective  is  reflected  in  a  Chronicle  of  Higher  Education  article  entitled  ‘Fall  
of  Libyan  Regime  Brings  New  Opportunities   for  American  Universities’   (Wheeler  
2012)  which  begins:  
The  images  of  Libya  that  linger  in  many  minds  are  of  tanks,  black  smoke  rising  from  
buildings,   and  militia  members   brandishing   submachine   guns.   But   for   academics,  
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  Dr	  Abdulatif,	  Director,	  International	  Cooperation	  Office,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012.	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those  images  may  soon  be  replaced  by  one  of  a  Libyan  campus  with  a  big  "ʺopen  for  
business"ʺ  banner.  
Another   imputed   motive   for   US   interest   is   projecting   political   influence   or   ‘soft  
power’.470   It   is   theorised   that   soft   power   is   accrued   through   HE   cooperation   by  
establishing  US-­‐‑Libyan  university   linkages,  promoting  US  models  of  HE   in  Libya,  
and   supporting   academic   exchanges   such   as   student   scholarships   and   Visiting  
Scholar   programmes   bringing   effects   including   enhanced   image   of   America,  
familiarity   with   American   values,   and   a   Libyan   elite   with   strong   personal   and  
professional  relationships  with  the  US.  It  can  be  argued  that  the  US  viewed  stability  
of   Libya   and   the   broader   region   as   geo-­‐‑strategically   important   and   therefore  
invested  greater  resources  in  promoting  HE  cooperation  as  a  means  of  ‘soft  power’  
to  act  as  an  agent  of  long-­‐‑term  stabilisation.    
Interviews  with   Libyan   academics   revealed   that   a  moderate   number   agreed  with  
the   economic-­‐‑interest   interpretation   of   US   motives.   However,   a   greater   number  
explained  intentions  as  primarily  political;  for  example,  it  was  argued  that  the  US  is  
trying   to   show   America’s   positive   face   to   create   good   regional   relationships.471  
Moreover,   several   participants   viewed   any   self-­‐‑interested   motives   of   the   US   or  
other  international  partners  as  legitimate  and  mutually  beneficial  to  Libya  and  her  
partners.472  This  analysis  of  external  relations  connects  with  one  of  the  major  themes  
addressed   at   the   end   of   the   next   section;   the   opportunities   afforded   by   the  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
470	  See	  section	  3.4.3.	  for	  general	  discussion	  of	  soft	  power	  and	  HE	  	  
471	   Dr	   Aboubaker	   Swehli,	   Department	   of	   Zoology	   and	   International	   Cooperation	   Office,	   Tripoli	  
University	   -­‐	   Tripoli,	   Libya	  10/2012;	  Dr	   Sami	  Khashkusha,	  Professor	  Department	  of	  Political	   Science	  
Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
472	  Dr	  Abdulatif,	  Director,	  International	  Cooperation	  Office,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  10/2012	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8.4.   Options  and  Opportunities  for  Higher  Education  
  
In   this   section,  HE   policy   options   and   opportunities  will   be   analysed   in   terms   of  
Libyan  stakeholder  perspectives.  Analysis  will   focus  on  theorised  linkages  posited  
by   Libyan   faculty   members,   ministry   officials,   and   students   between   various  
options  and  recovery.  The  findings  presented  in  this  section  are  in  direct  relation  to  
RQ5.  Options   can   be   broadly   categorised   as   either   internal   (domestic)   or   external  
(international).   First,   debates   on   internal   options   will   be   reviewed   followed   by  
external  opportunities.    
  
8.4.1. Internal  Opportunities  
  
In   this   section   major   domestic   opportunities   facing   post-­‐‑war   Libyan   HE   will   be  
analysed;   private   HE,   decentralisation,   elite   universities,   and   leveraging   greater  
private   sector   investment.   To   begin,   the   possibilities   of   expanding   private  
universities  and  of  privatising  the  existing  public  HE  system  will  be  examined.    
Establishing  private  universities  received  limited  and  qualified  support  plus  strong  
rejection.   There  was   near   universal   recognition   amongst   participants   that   existing  
private   HE   quality   was   poor.473   In   evaluation   of   a   private   university   engineering  
faculty  one  in  100  students  passed  an  assessment  test.474  A  common  stipulation  was  
that   thorough   review  and  evaluation  of  private  HEIs  must  be  conducted  and   that  
the   sector   should   be   more   strongly   regulated   by   the   MoHE-­‐‑L   before   further  
expansion   to   ensure   standards   are   adhered   to   therefore   guaranteeing   quality.475  
Furthermore,  many  held   that   private  providers  privileged  profit   over   quality   and  
that   therefore   new   private   HEIs   should   be   not-­‐‑for-­‐‑profit.   With   these   provisos,  
approximately  half  of  participants  saw  constructive  roles   for  private  HE  provision  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
473	  An	  exception	  was	  Dr	  Mustafa	  Alfalani,	  President	  of	  Refak	  University,	  a	  private	  university	  in	  Tripoli	  
474	   Dr	   Hadi	   Omran	   Tumi,	   Head,	   Civil	   Engineering	   Department,	   Tripoli	   University	   -­‐	   Tripoli,	   Libya	  
10/2012	  
475	   Mohamed	   Mashena,	   President,	   Tripoli	   University	   and	   Dean,	   Faculty	   of	   Engineering,	   Tripoli	  
University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	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and  envisaged  benefits  of   a  more  diversified   system  which   could   relieve  pressure  
on   an   over-­‐‑burdened   public   sector,   provide   competition,   and   respond   more  
dynamically  to  market  needs.  However,  many  participants  rejected  private  HE,  for  
example,   it   was   held   that   Libya   ‘does   not   have   millionaires’   and   that   private  
provision  would  exclude  poor  students.476    
Another  option  is  for  public  HE  to  move  towards  a  marketised  model  by  charging  
fees.  There  was  some  support   for  fees   to   increase  financial   independence  from  the  
state   thereby   supporting   greater   autonomy.   Furthermore,   it   was   held   that   fee-­‐‑
paying   students   ‘would   feel   the   value   of   education’.477  However,   opposition   held  
that   fees  violated   traditions   of   free   and  universal  public   education.   It  was   argued  
that  Libya  is  rich,  can  afford  free  education,  and  moreover  that  fees  were  unfeasible  
during   unstable   transition   ‘because   students   will   not   accept   it’.478   Furthermore,  
public-­‐‑private   partnerships   received   some   limited   support.   Refak   University’s  
President,  a  private  university,  held  that  financial  autonomy  offered  his  institution  
no  advantages  and  was  receptive  to  public-­‐‑private  partnerships.479    
Many   participants   held   public   goods   conceptions   of   HE   in   which   public   HE  
provision  better  supplied  teaching  and  research  connected  to  social,  economic,  and  
developmental  needs.  Private  HE  was  viewed  as  favouring  teaching  a  narrow  set  of  
disciplines   and   neglecting   research   completely.   For   example,   it   was   held   that  
private   universities   should   be   strongly   regulated   ‘to   make   them   positive   and  
fruitful   for   the   country’.480   There   was   therefore   a   general   sense   that   public   HEIs  
could  contribute  more  strongly  towards  recovery  and  development.      
Several   influential   individuals   in   Libyan   HE   proposed   building   a   new   elite  
university  with  very  high  academic  standards  and  low  enrolment.  It  was  theorised  
the  university  would  provide  high-­‐‑level  skills  and  knowledge  critical   to   long-­‐‑term  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
476	  Deputy	  Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Arts,	  former	  Head,	  Department	  of	  Psychology,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  
Libya	  11/2012	  
477	   Dr	   Milad	   Taher,	   Director,	   Planning	   and	   Development	   Department,	   MoHE-­‐L	   -­‐	   Tripoli,	   Libya	  
11/2012.	  Also,	  Dr	  Ibrahim	  El-­‐Ghariani,	  President,	  Omar	  Al-­‐Mukhtar	  University	  -­‐	  Baida,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
478	  Dr	  Sobhi,	  Vice-­‐Dean,	  Faculty	  of	  Languages,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  
479	  Dr	  Mustafa	  Alfalani,	  President,	  Refak	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	  Libya	  11/2012	  




state   and   institution   building.   For   some   participants   this   position   was   explicitly  
motivated   by   acknowledgement   that   Tripoli   and   Benghazi   universities   were   so  
large   and   their   problems   so   intractable   that   transformation   to   elite   status   would  
take   several   generations.481   By   contrast,   entry   of   small   elite   universities   was  
predicted   to   provide   competition   to   Benghazi   and   Tripoli   universities   leading   to  
raised  standards.482    
While   this   option   is   focused   on   internal   capacity   several   suggestions   were  made  
that  international  cooperation  would  be  vital  to  establishing  an  elite  institution  in  a  
short-­‐‑time.   Moreover,   it   was   also   suggested   that   the   new   institution   incorporate  
branch  campuses  of  global  universities  in  a  model  similar  to  the  UAE  or  Education  
City   in   Qatar.483   This   possibility   would   breakdown   the   division   between   internal  
and   external   opportunities.   However,   it   was   contended   that   the   branch   campus  
model  was  not  feasible  or  appropriate  in  the  short-­‐‑term  due  to  post-­‐‑war  challenges  
and  need  to  fundamentally  re-­‐‑structure  domestic  HE.484    
Another   major   option   is   granting   greater   independence   to   HEIs.   Libyan   HE   has  
historically  been  highly  centralised  under  the  MoHE-­‐‑L.  Several  arguments  for  post-­‐‑
war  decentralisation  of  HE  governance  have  been  advanced.  First,  decentralisation  
is  defended  for  practical  and  logistical  reasons;  it  is  held  that  given  Libya’s  vast  size  
and   low   population   centralised   administration   in   Tripoli   necessitates   frequent  
travelling   to   the   capital   that   would   be   more   efficient   if   administration   were  
devolved   to   federal   bodies   in   Tripoli,   Benghazi   and   Sebha,   or   alternatively   in  
individual   cities   or   universities.   Second,   a   developmental   localist   argument   holds  
that   decentralised   and   autonomous  HE  would   adapt   to   become  more   relevant   to  
local   social   and   economic   needs.485   Third,   centralisation   is   identified   by   many  
participants   as   perpetuating   dense   bureaucracy   that   is   an   obstacle   to   running  
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   President,	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   University	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   Faculty	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HEIs.486   Fourth,   and   relatedly,   centralisation   is   held   to   stifle   creativity   and  
innovation  while   it   is   predicted   that  decentralisation  would   enable  universities   to  
develop  their  own  identity  through  setting  priorities,  expenditure,  and  curricula.487    
However,  a  centralist  position  was  also  defended  by  participants.  It  was  argued  that  
individual   universities   have   insufficient   capacity   for   self-­‐‑governance   and   that  
Ministerial   control  was   therefore   necessary,   at   least   in   the   short-­‐‑term   to  medium-­‐‑
term.488  Moreover,  HE  decentralisation   is   perceived   to   be   connected  with   calls   for  
federalism;   a   highly-­‐‑politicised   issue   in   a   context   where   East/West   relations  
remained   a   major   unresolved   issue   in   post-­‐‑war   Libyan   politics.   Centralist-­‐‑
nationalist  positions  therefore  rejected  HE  decentralisation  for  dividing  rather  than  
unifying  Libya  and  therefore  perpetuating  instability  and  conflict-­‐‑risk.489    
All  MoHE-­‐‑L   staff   interviewed   stated   that  HE   should   be   decentralised   and   that   at  
least  in  statute  Libyan  HEIs  were  autonomous.  For  example,  it  was  held  that  Libyan  
HEIs   have   their   own   statutes   and   the   MoHE-­‐‑L   ‘just   monitors   faults   or  
complaints’.490  The  Deputy  Minister  argued  that   the  Ministry’s  vision  was  to  cease  
governing  directly.  He  said  that  he  hoped  the  MoHE-­‐‑L  would  ‘demolish  itself,  with  
just  a  few  offices  to  evaluate  education  and  that’s  it  –  we  don’t  want  to  intervene’.491  
However,   in   contrast,   the   majority   of   faculty   members   reported   no   post-­‐‑war  
changes  in  centralisation.  Moreover,  it  was  argued  that  while  centralisation  caused  
implementation  problems  under   the  previous  regime,   since   the  uprising  problems  
worsened   because   of   need   to   clarify   roles   and   responsibilities   as   various  
stakeholders   negotiated   and   contested   their   roles   in   a   complex   and   unstable  
transitional   environment.492   Decentralisation   is   reportedly   central   to   the   new   HE  
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  Tarek	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  Dr	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  Director,	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  Assistant	  to	  Deputy	  Minister,	  MoHE-­‐L	  -­‐	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  Dr	  Ibrahim	  Saleh,	  Deputy	  Minister,	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  11/2012	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  education	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law  which   intended   to   bring   clarity   and   definition   to   stakeholder   roles   and   offer  
greater  autonomy  to  HEIs.493  
A   further  option   is  maximising  potential   contributions  of   international   companies  
and   industry   to  Libyan  HE.  Most  promisingly,   the  Government  of  Libya  could  be  
encouraged  to  lobby  oil  and  gas  companies  to  invest  more  in  engineering,  geology,  
and  related  scientific  and  technological  disciplines.  It  was  argued  that  oil  companies  
had   moral   obligations   to   invest   in   environmental   research.494   Furthermore,   there  
was  general  support  for  the  notion  that  university  consultancy  and  applied  research  
on  behalf  of  firms  and  international  agencies  working  in  Libya  should  be  promoted  
by  universities  and  the  MoHE-­‐‑L.  For  example,  a  Professor  of  Chemical  Engineering  
held  that  most  international  oil  and  gas  companies  did  not  even  have  a  small  office  
to  communicate  and  cooperate  with  local  organisations  yet  Libyan  universities  are  
strongly  positioned  to  advise  and  assist.495  Relatedly,  there  was  widespread  support  
for  a  nationalist  position  requiring  firms  to  make  greater  use  of  domestic  high-­‐‑level  
manpower.   It   was   argued   that   the   Libyan   Engineers   Guild   did   not   apply   strong  
restrictions  on  use  of  Libyan  labour  relative  to  other  countries.496  In  particular  it  was  
held   that   providing   greater   opportunities   to   a   younger   generation   would   reduce  
graduate   unemployment   thus   mitigating   a   major   grievance   and   supporting  
stabilisation.    
The  greater  utilisation  of  international  companies  operating  in  Libya  and  the  branch  
campus  model,  both  analysed   in   this  section,  are  options   that  do  not  neatly   fit   the  
internal/external   divide   and   should   be   considered   alongside   the   argument   of   the  
next  section  that  international  opportunities  offer  a  major  option  for  harnessing  the  
capacity  of  Libyan  HE  towards  recovery  and  transition.    
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  Dr	  Aboubaker	  Swehli,	  Department	  of	  Zoology,	  Tripoli	  University	  -­‐	  Tripoli,	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  10/2012	  
495	   Dr	  Mohamed	  Amer,	   Head,	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  Department,	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496	   Dr	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8.4.2. International  Opportunities  
  
A  strong   emergent   theme   from   interviews  was   that   internationalisation  of  Libyan  
HE  would  have  strong  positive  impacts  on  the  sector  and  enable  it   to  play  greater  
roles   in  recovery.  Libya   is  similar   to   Iraq  where  sanctions  and   ‘pariah  state’  status  
isolated   academia.   Many   participants,   in   particular   older   generations,   held   that  
legacies   of   isolation   must   be   overcome   through   international   cooperation   and  
educational   exchange.  Moreover,   greater   connection   and   openness   is   viewed   as   a  
necessity  due  to  changes  in  the  global  economy  and  society.    
Academic  cooperation  through  university  partnerships  between  Libyan  and  foreign  
HEIs   was   the   most   commonly   suggested   opportunity   by   participants.   It   was  
expected   that   foreign   institutions  would   provide   advanced   knowledge,   expertise,  
skills,   and   resources   that   are   critically   important   to   HE   capacity   development.  
Partnerships   were   viewed   as   having   potential   to   support   programmes   in   the  
academic   core   of   teaching   and   research.   More   specifically   it   was   held   that   joint  
programmes  would  enable  development  of  Libya’s  weak  graduate  education497  and  
support   ongoing   reviewing   and   updating   of   curricula   to   meet   economic   and  
transitional   needs.498   Furthermore,   international   partnerships   and   research  
collaborations  were  central  to  strategies  for  improving  Tripoli  University’s  research  
capacity.499      
The   IIE   hosted   events   in   2011   and   2012   on   Libyan  HE   and   transition   that   raised  
awareness   of   the   issue.   A   ‘key   theme’   of   an   IIE   roundtable   in   2011   was   that  
‘emphasis  was  placed  on  the  urgent  need  for  collaboration  between  U.S.  and  Libyan  
faculty  with  regards   to  curriculum  development,  capacity-­‐‑building,   infrastructure-­‐‑
support,   and   faculty   exchanges’   (IIE   2011).   It   is   stipulated   that   ‘these   new  
relationships  must  be  based  on  partnerships  rather  than  assistance-­‐‑based’.  A  similar  
emphasis   on   partnership   is  made   by  Wheeler   (2012)  who  writes   that   ‘Libyan   oil,  
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and  the  cash  that  comes  with  it,  means  that  Libya  and  the  United  States  could  work  
as  partners,  not  as  one  country  doling  out  resources  to  the  other’.    
Interviews   with   Libyan   academics   revealed   strong   support   for   this   partnership  
model   although   accompanied   by   some   sceptical   voices.   A   very   common   position  
was  that  Libya  had  money  and  needed  expertise  rather  than  aid.  As  one  interviewee  
stated,  ‘Libyans  don’t  need  your  money,  they  need  your  smile’.500  Many  academics  
held   that   university   partnerships   and   academic   exchange   should   be   pursued   in  
collaborative   relationships.   Furthermore,   it   was   argued   that   while   university  
partnerships   recommenced   in   the   mid-­‐‑2000s   international   partners   were   still  
viewed   with   suspicion   as   potential   spies   and   that   revolution   enabled   forging  
partnerships   with   a   more   positive   vision   and   relationship.501   The   majority   of  
participants   favoured  US,   UK,   or  Western   European   universities   on   the   rationale  
that   as   the   most   advanced   they   will   have   largest   impact.   A   minority   supported  
regional  collaboration,  for  example,  with  Egyptian,  Tunisian,  or  Jordanian  HEIs.502    
However,   some  doubted   the  collaborative  model’s   feasibility  predicting   that  more  
conventional  donor-­‐‑recipient  relationships  would  prevail.  It  was  argued  that  while  
Libya   may   have   large   oil   receipts   many   universities   have   low   financial  
independence   and   allocate   nearly   all   spending   on   current   expenditure.   Foreign  
assistance   for   new   programmes   would   therefore   be   initiated   with   large  
discrepancies  in  resource  levels  provided  by  each  ‘partner’,  expertise  of  academics,  
their   academic   and   social   capital,   and   therefore  power   to  define   and  benefit   from  
the   relationship.   Furthermore,   the   role   of   outside   expertise   in   leading   reform   and  
capacity  development  was  criticised  on  the  basis  that  outsiders  do  not  understand  
Libya’s   context   and   that   the   system   should   be   built   from   the   inside.503  
Notwithstanding   these   objections,   a   strong   consensus   held   that   international  
academic  exchange  and  collaboration  represented  a  major  opportunity  for  HE.      
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Increasing   overseas   scholarships  was   another   policy   option   receiving   very   strong  
support   from   participants.   It   was   commonly   held   that   postgraduate   students  
abroad   were   a   major   resource   that   could   drive   Libya’s   recovery   and   transition.  
Various   reasons   were   cited   including   bringing   experiences   of   foreign   university  
systems  to  inform  Libyan  reforms,  circulation  of  cutting-­‐‑edge  knowledge,  research  
training,   language   skills,   forging   trans-­‐‑border   relationships   that   would   enable  
international  cooperation,  and  initiating  cultural  change.504  Furthermore,  it  was  held  
that   domestic   graduate   HE   capacity   was   weak   and   that   therefore   overseas  
scholarship  programmes  were  necessary.    
Libyan   postgraduate   students   in   the   UK   interviewed   for   the   pre-­‐‑study   offered  
strong  support  for  this  option.  A  significant  majority  argued  that  the  approximately  
14,000   Libyan   students   abroad   in   2011   would   have   major   positive   impacts   on  
domestic  HE  and  all  other  social  and  economic  sectors  upon  return.  Many  held  that  
postgraduate  education  in  global  research  universities,  very  often  on  topics  related  
to   Libya,   would   enable   returnees   to   conduct   socially   and   economically   relevant  
research  thus  improving  integration  of  HE  and  developmental  needs.      
It   should   be   qualified   that   it   is   not   surprising   that   postgraduates   exhibit   self-­‐‑
understanding   that   they  will   positively   impact   development.  However,  while   the  
majority   were   positive   other   postgraduates   offered   opposing   analyses.   A   PhD  
student   in   Business   Management   held   that   PhD   holder   returnees   would   be  
incorporated  back   into  a  deeply-­‐‑entrenched   institutional  culture  valuing  hierarchy  
and   disregarding   research.505   He   argued   that   many   incumbent   Libyan   faculty  
members   who   received   PhDs   abroad   had   forgotten   what   they   learned   in   the  
struggle  to  survive  with  little  to  no  opportunities  to  exercise  their  research  skills  and  
he  predicted  that  this  trend  would  continue  unless  there  was  major  institutional  and  
cultural  transformation  in  HE.    
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Furthermore,   the   Deputy   Minister   for   Scientific   Research   argued   that   too   many  
scholarships  were  awarded  for  study  abroad  and  that  spending  priority  should  be  
placed   on   establishing   graduate   schools   domestically.   He   reasoned   that  
postgraduates   educated   in   Libya   would   focus   research   on   solving   internal   social  
problems  including  health  and  education  while  those  educated  abroad  would  lack  
this  focus.506    
It  should  be  qualified  that  in  addressing  opportunities  during  interviews  there  is  a  
risk   that   participants   would   perceive   that   opportunities   could   be   gained   from  
research  establishing  need  for  various  options  that  are  in  their  interests.  In  the  case  
of   university  partnerships   this   is   a   real   risk   because   for   academics   in  Libya,   as   in  
many   other   developing   countries,   participation   in   university   partnerships   offers  
benefits  of  additional  resources  and  accrued  academic  and  social  capital.  The  same  
argument   applies   for   scholarships   for   study   abroad;   financial   backing   during  
postgraduate  degree  plus  additional   social   status  afforded   to  graduates  of   foreign  
universities  could  lead  Libyan  academics  and  students  hopeful  of  travelling  abroad  
to  treat  the  interview  as  an  opportunity  for  self-­‐‑interested  advocacy.    
In  fact,  Ahmed  Jehani,  former  Minister  of  Reconstruction,  held  that  these  arguments  
apply  directly  to  Libyan  HE.  He  suggested  that  Professors  in  Tripoli  and  other  cities  
would  offer  unrealistically  positive  evaluations  of  Libyan  HE  and  frame  the  issue  of  
opportunities  in  the  terms  that  international  cooperation,  in  particular  partnerships  
and  scholarships,  would  be  sufficient  to  develop  HE.507  He  interpreted  their  motives  
as  largely  self-­‐‑interested  and  deriving  from  the  common  desire  in  Libya  to  study  or  
travel   abroad.  While   these   considerations  may   be   valid   it   should   be   noted   that   a  
very   wide   cross-­‐‑section   of   participants   including   those   that   were   not   seeking  
international  opportunities  offered  strong  support  for  this  option,  for  example,  very  
senior  Professors  that  were  close  to  retirement.      
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8.5.   Conclusion  
  
In  this  chapter  post-­‐‑war  Libyan  HE  has  been  analysed  in  terms  of  HE’s  contribution  
to  recovery.  Libyan  HE  at  the  outset  of  transition  had  strong  potential  to  contribute  
towards  post-­‐‑war  recovery.  The  initial  conditions  were  good;  along  with  low  impact  
of   conflict  Libya  possessed  ample   financial   resources,  high  enrolment,  meaningful  
‘ownership’,  relative  social  homogeneity,  and  high  external  interest.  It  was  seen  that  
the  sector  made  several   important  contributions   to  short-­‐‑term  transitional  goals  of  
conflict   prevention,   stabilisation   and   DDR   that   constitute   relatively   positive  
recovery   outcomes.   However,   it   was   also   seen   that   HE’s   role   in   physical  
reconstruction,   statebuilding,   economic   recovery,   and   reconciliation   was   more  
limited.    
Analysis  of  the  features  of  the  post-­‐‑war  environment  shaping  Libyan  HE  identified  
instability,   weak   governance,   low   capacity,   and   poor   quality  HE   as   the   principal  
influences   that   explain   the   low   contribution   towards   long-­‐‑term   reconstruction  
goals.   Finally,   opportunities   available   to   the   sector   were   analysed   and   limited  
decentralisation   and   forms   of   international   cooperation   were   found   to   have  
potential  to  overcome  some  of  the  above-­‐‑noted  obstacles  and  harness  HE’s  capacity  
towards   long-­‐‑term   recovery   and  development.   Finally,   it   should   be   qualified   that  
this  analysis  was  conducted  only  several  years   into  Libya’s  post-­‐‑conflict   transition  
and   that   the   country’s  prognosis   for  utilising  HE   towards   recovery  over   the   long-­‐‑













In  this  chapter  a  comparative  analysis  of  the  two  case-­‐‑studies  of  HE  in  post-­‐‑war  Iraq  
and  Libya  will   be   offered.   To   begin,   the   broad   comparative   findings   of   the   thesis  
will  be  discussed   followed  by   three  sections   that  address  RQs   three,   four  and  five  
respectively.   Finally,   the   conclusion   will   explore   several   comparative   findings  
including   the   significance   of   trade-­‐‑offs   and   the   temporal   context   in   which   Iraq  
served  as  a  learning  experience  for  Libya.  
The  central  hypothesis  tested  in  this  thesis  is  stated  below:  
Higher   education   is   a  neglected  dimension  of   post-­‐‑conflict   reconstruction   that   can  
make  a  significant  positive  contribution  in  driving  and  energising  post-­‐‑war  recovery  
processes  
To   explore   the   hypothesis   a   comparative   most   likely/least   likely   case-­‐‑study  
approach   was   adopted   for   the   empirical   analysis.   A   most-­‐‑similar   strategy   was  
employed  in  which  cases  exhibit  similarities  across  a  wide  number  of  variables  and  
dissimilarity   on   two   crucial   variables.   Confirming   the   validity   of   a   hypothesis   on  
the  basis  of  a  single  most-­‐‑likely  case  provides  moderate  support  while  confirmation  
via  a  least-­‐‑likely  case  offers  strong  support  for  the  hypothesis.  Based  on  this  design  
Libya  was  considered  a  most  likely  case  for  confirming  the  main  hypothesis  while  
Iraq  was  deemed  a  least  likely  case.    
The  research  demonstrated  that  Iraq  and  Libya  share  many  similar  features  in  their  
historical,   developmental,   and   political   profiles.508   Both   countries   experienced  
highly-­‐‑personalised   rule   by   single   strongmen   dictators   over   a   long   period   that  
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relied   on   similar   ideological   variants   of   Arab  Nationalism.   Both   countries   are   oil  
exporters   and   considered   rentier   states.   Furthermore,   Iraq   and   Libya   were   both  
labelled  ‘pariah  states’  and  excluded  from  the  ‘international  community’  for  varying  
reasons.  HE  in  both  countries  is  quantitatively  well  developed  with  high  enrolment  
ratios  and  a   large  number  of   institutions.   It   should  be  qualified   that  Libya’s  social  
composition   is   much   more   homogenous   than   Iraq’s   diverse   ethnic   and   sectarian  
makeup.    
Despite   these   historical   similarities   the   HE   systems   of   Iraq   and   Libya   emerged  
differently  in  their  respective  post-­‐‑war  periods.  This  is  primarily  due  to  two  major  
reasons.   First,   the   differential   impact   of   conflict   on   the   two   countries;   Iraqi  
universities  were  decimated  by   the   conflict   leaving  very   low  capacity  and  sowing  
divisions  into  the  social  fabric  of  academic  life  while  in  Libya  conflict’s  impact  was  
much   lower.   Second,   the   type   of   post-­‐‑conflict   response   to   the   challenge   of  
reconstruction   and   HE   rebuilding   differed;   while   Libya   experienced   a   rapid  
restoration   of   sovereignty,   relative   security,   and   support   for  HE   at   the   end  of   the  
war,   Iraq  was   under   occupation  with   a   reconstruction   strategy   that   de-­‐‑prioritised  
the  HE   sector.   This   broad   comparison   establishes   the   context   for   the   comparative  
analysis  of  the  functions,  challenges,  and  opportunities  in  post-­‐‑war  Iraqi  and  Libyan  
HE  that  will  now  be  presented.    
  
9.1.   Contribution  to  Recovery  
  
In  this  section  the  contribution  of  Iraqi  and  Libyan  HE  to  post-­‐‑war  recovery  will  be  
compared   in   terms  of   stabilisation,  physical   and   sectoral   reconstruction,   economic  
recovery,  statebuilding,  democratisation,  conflict  transformation,  and  reconciliation.  
The   case-­‐‑study   findings   that   will   now   be   considered   emerged   out   of   a   research  
design  aimed  at  answering  the  below  research  question.    
RQ3:   What   functions   can   higher   education   perform   in   contributing   towards  
effective  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery?  
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To   begin,   in   the   domain   of   stabilisation   and   conflict   prevention  HE   in   Libya  was  
found   to  be   a   strong   success  while   Iraqi  HE  played  a  mixed   role.509  While  Libyan  
HEIs   re-­‐‑opened   and   attracted   the   young   university-­‐‑age   population   off   the   streets  
and   into   education   Iraqi   HEIs   to   some   extent   performed   a   comparable   role.  
However,   Iraqi   universities   were   limited   in   their   absorptive   role   due   to   reduced  
capacity   and   high   insecurity   which   lowered   attendance   rates.   Furthermore,   the  
social   composition   of   potential   militia   and   insurgent   recruits   in   Iraq   consisted   of  
much   fewer   potential   university-­‐‑age   males   with   completed   secondary   education  
than   in  Libya  where  students  constituted  a  high  proportion  of  militia  and  brigade  
members.  Both  Iraq  and  Libya  were  able  to  perform  this  role  due  to  their  relatively  
high  enrolment  ratios  when  compared  to  other  post-­‐‑war  contexts.    
HE   in   neither   case   played   a   strong   role   in   reconstruction   processes   through  
consultancy  or  research.510  In  Iraq  this  is  principally  explained  by  the  destruction  of  
HE   capacity,   significant   ‘brain   drain’,   the   contracting   of   reconstruction   to   foreign  
firms  and  agencies   that  neglected   Iraq’s  expertise,  and  arguably  suspicion  of   Iraqi  
scientists  as  involved  in  WMD  programmes.  In  Libya  by  contrast,  capacity  was  not  
reduced  greatly  by  war  yet  research  capacity  was  under-­‐‑developed  while  domestic  
and  international  contractors  did  not  trust  Libyan  HEIs.    
Furthermore   Iraq,   unlike   Libya,   had   established   historical   HE-­‐‑industry-­‐‑military  
linkages.511  With   strong  early   support   to   rebuilding   the   sector  and  under  different  
environmental  conditions,  in  particular  greater  security,  this  experience  could  have  
enabled   adaptation   of   relevant   parts   of   Iraqi   HE   to   processes   of   rebuilding   and  
reconstruction.   While   this   contribution   would   not   have   been   decisive,   it   may   be  
expected   to   have   contributed   to   more   effective   reconstruction   through   providing  
local  expertise  that  would  be  cheaper  and  more  able  to  navigate  security  obstacles  
while  building   sustainable   local   skills   and   capacity   in   reconstruction.   It   should  be  
qualified   that   the   relatively   low   role   of   HE   in   Libya’s   reconstruction   is   partly  
explained   by   the   slow  progress   in   rebuilding.   Furthermore,   pockets   of   high   skills  
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and  expertise  within  Libyan  HE,  for  example  top  engineering  faculties,  are  expected  
to   play   a   much   greater   role   after   future   ‘take-­‐‑off’   of   the   post-­‐‑war   reconstruction  
process.  
In   neither   Iraq   nor   Libya   did   HE   play   a   significant   positive   role   in   contributing  
towards  economic  recovery.512  A  major  challenge  in  both  cases  was  low  relevance  of  
HE   curricula   to   economic   needs,   highly   theoretical   content,   and   insufficient   focus  
on  technical  education  that  could  supply  reconstruction-­‐‑relevant  skills.  This  finding  
reflects   the   literature   review   in   chapter   one   that   identified   these   challenges   as  
common  to  nearly  all  Arab  state  HE  systems.513  It  should  be  qualified  that  Iraqi  HE  
struggled   to  make  an   impact  on  economic   recovery  due   to   the  economic   collapse,  
lack   of   development   vision,   and   myriad   challenges   characterising   the   post-­‐‑war  
environment.   Similarly,  while  Libyan  HE  was   found   to   be   irrelevant   to   industrial  
and  developmental  needs  there  was  wide  recognition  of  the  problem  and  high-­‐‑level  
will  to  review  curricula.    
In  both  Iraq  and  Libya  reforms  ensuring  greater  relevance  of  HE  to  economic  needs,  
enhancing   technical   education,   and   strengthening   university-­‐‑industry   linkages  
were   viewed   as   important   to   increasing   HE’s   potential   to   support   economic  
recovery   through   economic   growth,   diversification,   and   employment   generation.  
However,   a   major   difference   was   that   in   Libya,   unlike   in   Iraq,   a   knowledge-­‐‑
economy   discourse   was   prevalent   in   which   HE   had   the   potential   to   have   a  
transformative   impact   on   post-­‐‑war   economic   development.   This   difference   is  
explained  by  the  greater  challenges  that  beset  Iraq,  in  particular  protracted  conflict,  
unresolved   political   disputes,   and   fragile   institutions   that   render   this   prospect   an  
unattainable  goal  in  the  medium-­‐‑term.    
In   terms   of   statebuilding   both   cases  were   found   to  make   a   low   contribution.514   It  
was  seen  that  Iraqi  HE  was  not  connected  with  the  task  of  statebuilding  which  took  
place   in   the   context   of   state   collapse   and   the   fragmentation   of   power   across   the  
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country.  In  Libya  it  was  also  found  that  the  contribution  to  statebuilding  was  low;  
the  sector  was  limited  by  poor  quality  HE  and  weak  research  capacity.  Moreover,  a  
key   theme   that  emerged   from  the   Iraq  case   is   that   the   low   investment   in  HE  after  
2003,  in  particular  in  core  skills  and  human  capital  necessary  for  functioning  states,  
was   a   major   missed   opportunity   to   make   long-­‐‑term   statebuilding   and   capacity-­‐‑
building  sustainable;  a  finding  that  confirms  the  positions  outlined  in  chapter  three  
such   as   Ghani   and   Lockhart   (2008).   Given   the   enormity   of   the   statebuilding  
challenge   facing   Libya   it   remains   to   be   seen   whether   the   sector   can   make   a  
significant  contribution.  However,  it  should  be  qualified  that  there  was  widespread  
recognition   amongst   participants   of   the   statebuilding   potential   of   the   sector,   in  
particular  through  overseas  training,  in  addition  to  some  political  will.    
In  both  cases  democratisation  was  a  formal  goal  of  transition  and  at  the  outset  of  the  
post-­‐‑war   period   there   was   optimism   regarding   the   potential   of   the   HE   sector   to  
contribute   towards   democratisation   processes.515   Students’   roles   in   driving   civil  
society  development  and  democratisation  through  organisations  and  activities,   the  
‘training  ground’  model  of  HE,  was  stronger  in  Libya  than  in  Iraq.  However,  both  
cases   highlight   that   the   contribution   of   student   activity   towards   political  
development  was   limited  by   the   fear  of  university  authorities   that   in   the  unstable  
post-­‐‑war   environment   student   organisations   would   be   penetrated   by   national  
political   parties   thus   leading   to   further   instability   on   campuses.   It   was   seen   that  
these  fears  were  actualised  in  Iraq  and  that  at  least  some  Libyan  university  officials  
sought   to   avoid   descent   into   the   conditions   experienced   in   Iraq   by   placing  
restrictions  on  the  political  nature  of  student  activity  on  campus.    
On   transitional   justice,   neither   Iraq   nor   Libya  managed   to   convert   the   process   of  
removing  the  former  regime’s  legacy  from  educational  content  into  an  opportunity  
to   connect   curricula   to   transitional   or   recovery   needs.516   However,   there   were  
proposals  to  do  so  in  both  cases,  with  liberal  visions  of  the  linkage  between  HE  and  
democratic  transition  forwarded  by  John  Agresto  in  Iraq  and  the  Tripoli  University  
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Programme   for   Rebuilding   Libya.   Furthermore,   the   lustration   process   was  
approached  differently  between  the  two  cases.  While   the  de-­‐‑Baathification  process  
was   rightly   much   criticised   for   eroding   HE   capacity517   the   minimal   approach   to  
removal   of  Qaddafi-­‐‑era   officials   from   their   posts   harmed   the   fragile   legitimacy   of  
the  transitional  government  and  university  authorities  which  intensified  instability  
on   Libyan   campuses.   Given   that   this   strategic   decision   was   informed   by   fear   of  
repeating  the  mistakes  of  de-­‐‑Baathification  in  Iraq  the  episode  highlights  that  there  
is   no   blueprint   solution   and   that   a   trade-­‐‑off   situation   should   be   approached  
contextually  and  carefully.    
Neither  case  demonstrated  an  overall  positive  role  in  the  mediation  of  conflict  in  the  
post-­‐‑war  period  while   Iraqi  HE  made  a  negative  contribution.518   In  Libya   this  was  
explained  by   the  pre-­‐‑war  pattern  of  HE  expansion  which  produced  high   regional  
homogeneity  in  the  social  composition  of  universities  while  in  Iraq  the  intensity  of  
protracted   conflict   and   sectarian   violence   engulfed   and  distorted   the   role   of  HEIs  
towards  sectarian  and  communal  division  after  which  they  perpetuated  rather  than  
transformed  the  social  bases  of  conflict.  However,  it  should  be  qualified  that  Libya  
was  not  beset  by  inter-­‐‑communal  conflict  that  unfolded  in  Iraq.  While  HE  was  not  a  
causative  factor  in  the  original  conflicts,  in  both  cases  the  sector  either  perpetuated  
or   intensified   enmities,   divisions,   and   conflicts   that   emerged   in   the   post-­‐‑war  
environment.  The  experience  of  both  cases   supports   the  argument   for  actions  and  
programmes   linking   HE   to   reconciliation   at   an   early   stage   during   post-­‐‑war  
transitions.    
  
9.2.   Post-­‐‑war  Environment  of  Higher  Education  
  
In  this  section  the  relative   importance  of   the  features  of   the  post-­‐‑war  environment  
affecting   the   HE-­‐‑recovery   relationship   will   be   analysed   through   a   comparative  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
517	  See	  section	  6.1.3	  
518	  See	  sections	  6.2.6,	  6.3.1.3,	  and	  8.2.6	  
401	  
	  
discussion   of   Iraq   and   Libya.   It   is  worth   recalling   the   research   question   that   this  
section  set  out  to  answer:  
RQ4:  What  features  of  the  post-­‐‑war  environment  influence  the  relationship  between  
higher  education  and  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery?  
To  begin,   conjunctural   features   of   security,   stability,   and   conflict  will   be   analysed  
and   are   found   to   be   very   significant.   It   will   be   seen   that   while   insecurity   and  
instability  are  widely  viewed   in  published  sources  as  being  highly  significant  and  
this   thesis   confirms   the   finding,   other   dimensions   should   also   be   considered,   for  
example,   educational,   institutional,   structural   and   external   features,  which   are   all  
addressed.    
  
9.2.1. Conjunctural  Features  
  
It  can  be  stated  that  in  both  cases  conjunctural  features  of  instability  and  insecurity  
were   found   to   be   strong   constraints   upon   the   HE-­‐‑recovery   relationship.   In   Iraq  
insecurity,   instability,   and   sectarian   conflict   were   unanimously   viewed   by  
participants  as  decisive   factors  while   in  Libya   there  was  consensus   that   instability  
was   a  major   factor   and   insecurity  was   also   significant.   This   finding   accords  with  
media   and   scholarly   accounts   of   post-­‐‑conflict   HE   that   tend   to   focus   on   violence,  
campus-­‐‑level  conflict,  and  politicisation  of  HE  issues.    
Security  was  revealed  by  both  cases  to  be  a  major  obstacle  to  effective  rebuilding  of  
HE.519   While   Iraq   showed   that   concrete   and   immediate   security   problems   were  
detrimental   to   recovery  outcomes,  Libya   illustrated   that  perceived  security   threats  
were  a  major  obstacle.  Iraq  was  among  the  most  insecure  contexts  globally  between  
2003   and  2010  while  by   contrast,  measured  by  numbers  of  deaths  post-­‐‑war  Libya  
was   much   more   secure.   However,   the   presence   of   militias   in   Libya,   the   US  
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Consulate   attack,   and   other   acts   of   political   violence   created   a   perception   of  
insecurity  via  global  media  that  was  out  of  proportion  to  the  reality  on  the  ground.    
It   should   be   qualified   that   there   were   real   security   problems   in   post-­‐‑war   Libya.  
However,   it   was   the   negative   perception   of   Libyan   security   that   detrimentally  
impacted   recovery   outcomes.   For   example,   it   was   seen   that   perceived   insecurity  
was   an   obstacle   to   foreign   companies   returning   to   Libya’s   campus   construction  
programme  even  though  there  were  no  attacks  on  campuses  and  the  many  foreign  
nationals  present  in  Tripoli  and  other  cities  in  Western  Libya.  This  finding  suggests  
that   it  does  not   require  high  absolute   levels  of   insecurity,   such  as   in   Iraq,   to  have  
major  detrimental  effects  on  post-­‐‑conflict  HE.    
Instability   and   lack   of   order  was   also   found   to   be   a   highly-­‐‑significant   variable   in  
both  cases  despite  the  much  higher  levels  of  instability  on  Iraqi  campuses.520  Many  
participants   in   both   cases   emphasised   the   difficulty   of   operating   a   HEI   under  
conditions   of   frequent   student   protests   and   harassment   of   faculty   members   and  
Ministry  officials.  Furthermore,   in   Iraq  politicisation  of   the  student  body  created  a  
highly-­‐‑divisive   atmosphere   with   violent   groups   empowered   at   the   expense   of  
university   authorities   which   placed   a   direct   constraint   upon   the   actions   of  
university   management,   for   example,   forcible   changes   to   examinations   and  
scheduling.   In   Libya   a   similar   dynamic   was   reported   in   which   university   and  
MoHE-­‐‑L  officials  felt  constrained  in  an  environment  of  multiple  threats  and  no  rule  
of   law.  However,   in  Libya  instability  was  manifested  less  directly  than  in  Iraq,   for  
example,  through  the  threat  of  violence  or  protests,  which  constrained  officials  who  
were  unaware  of  the  extent  of  the  policy  space  of  their  actions.521    
The  type  and  level  of  conflict  was  a  central  variable  that  explains  differing  outcomes  
across   the   two   cases.   Iraq’s  protracted   conflict   engulfed  universities   and  hindered  
all   aspects  of  HE   reconstruction.522  Meanwhile,   conflict  did  not   emerge  as   a  major  
theme   in   the  case  of  Libya.  The  country  was  not   free   from  divisive  social  conflicts  
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with   issues   of   East/West   divide   and   fighting   in   the   South   or   Fezzan   dominating  
post-­‐‑conflict  political  life.  However,  these  conflicts  did  not  directly  impact  upon  the  
operation  of   the  HE   sector.  Rather,   the   conflicts  were   a  major  driver  of   instability  
and   thus   had   an   indirect   impact   on   the   context   of   post-­‐‑conflict   HE   though   the  
above-­‐‑analysed   dynamic   of   instability.   Crucially,   the   low   direct   impact   of   these  
conflicts   on   Libyan   HE   enabled   the   sector   to   adopt   a   forward-­‐‑looking   stance  
focused   on   opportunities   for   development,   in   contrast   with   Iraq   where   issues   of  
ethno-­‐‑sectarian   division   and   the   need   for   reconciliation   frustrated  many   forms   of  
progress.   This   finding   highlights   the   centrality   that   must   be   placed   on   conflict-­‐‑
sensitive  HE  policy  and  campus-­‐‑level  reconciliation  in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts.    
Finally,   at   the   outset   of   both   Iraqi   and   Libyan   post-­‐‑conflict   transitions   there   was  
considerable   optimism   regarding   the   imminent   emergence   of   the   conditions   to  
support   academic   freedom.523   However,   while   in   both   cases   negative   academic  
freedom   existed   in   that   the   formal   barriers   of   state   repression   had   collapsed,   the  
rights   and   freedoms   of   faculty   members   and   students   were   not   deeply  
institutionalised.   In   Iraq   it   was   seen   that   myriad   daily   challenges   to   academic  
freedom   emerged   including   barriers   to   movement   and   the   fear   of   harassment,  
silencing,   and   violence.   Libya   by   contrast   offered   better   conditions   for   academic  
freedom  with  most  participants   reporting   that   they   felt   free   to   criticise   and   speak  
their  minds.  However,   academic   freedom   in   neither   case  was   decisive   in   shaping  
the  post-­‐‑conflict  role  of  HE.  In  Iraq  the  research  and  teaching  capacity  of  the  sector  
was   shattered   by   conflict   while   in   Libya   research   capacity   was   minimal   due   to  
decades  of  under-­‐‑investment.  Academic  freedom  should  however  be  expected  to  be  
a   major   issue   influencing   the   HE-­‐‑recovery   role,   either   through   its   presence   or  
absence,  in  other  post-­‐‑conflict  cases  where  HE  research  capacity  is  existent  and  the  
sector  maintains  a  strong  social  role,  for  example,  in  public  intellectual  leadership.      
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9.2.2. Educational  Features  
  
The  absolute  level  of  access  was  not  a  decisive  influence  in  either  case.524  Enrolment  
in  both  Iraq  and  Libya  was  high  in  the  pre-­‐‑conflict  period  and  also  the  post-­‐‑conflict  
phase.  Moreover,  Libya,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  Iraq,  shows  that  high  access  enabled  
HEIs   to   play   a   strong   absorptive   role   in   getting   young   people   off   the   streets   and  
back   into   classrooms   thus   strengthening   conflict   prevention   and   stabilisation.525  
However,  Libya  possessed  exceptionally  high  enrolment,  the  highest  in  Africa,  and  
many  participants  held  that  this  was  an  obstacle  to  a  rationalised  and  efficient  HE  
system.  While  a  similar  finding  was  expressed  by  a  minority  of  participants  in  Iraq  
it   should   be   considered   that   economic   efficiency   would   not   be   a   major   priority  
while  the  system  remained  deteriorated  with  little  capital  investment  and  campuses  
constituted  dangerous  spaces.    
While   access   was   not   a   decisive   factor,   the   cases   do   underline   the   fundamental  
importance  of  quality  over  quantity.526  If  this  point  seems  trivial  or  obviously  true  it  
remains   worth   stating   clearly.   Both   Iraq   and   Libya   were   found   to   have   had  
relatively  high  quality  by  regional  standards   in   their  pre-­‐‑war  HE  system  although  
this   was   eroded   by   various   factors   including   isolation   under   sanctions   and   the  
impact   of  war.527   Participants   in   both   cases   felt   strongly   that   low   quality  HE   had  
weakened  the  sector’s  capacity  to  contribute  effectively  to  post-­‐‑war  reconstruction.  
This  point  does  not  augur  well  for  the  prospects  of  HE  in  other  post-­‐‑conflict  cases;  
of  dozens  of  post-­‐‑war   reconstruction  cases   in   the  past   few  decades  countries  with  
higher  levels  of  HE  quality  than  Iraq  and  Libya  arguably  include  Lebanon,  Kosovo,  
and   Bosnia.   However,   Iraq   and   Libya   should   be   categorised   as   having   relatively  
high   quality   HE   system   in   the   universe   of   post-­‐‑conflict   cases   even   despite  
widespread   damage   to   Iraqi   HE,   for   example,   in   comparison   to   Afghanistan,  
Mozambique,  or  Sierra  Leone.    
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Unmet   educational   needs  were   present   in   both   cases   although   they  were   a  major  
issue   in   Iraq  while   less  prevalent   in  Libya.   In   terms  of  material  needs,  many   Iraqi  
HEIs   were   left   in   a   very   poor   condition   without   adequate   investment   in  
laboratories,   dormitories,   and   other   campus   facilities.528   Libya,   by   contrast,  
experienced   some   improvement   in  material   conditions   that   arguably  was   enabled  
by   the   post-­‐‑war   context   as   outdated   equipment   was   replaced.   What   both   cases  
forcefully   demonstrate   is   that   needs   tend   to   be   defined   in   material   terms   while  
neglecting  psycho-­‐‑social  needs  such  as  traumatised  staff  and  students  and  the  need  
for  reconciliation.529    
A  notable  finding  was  that  in  neither  case  did  equity  emerge  strongly  as  a  dynamic  
influencing   the   post-­‐‑war   role   of   HE.530   However,   from   the   standpoint   of   the  
literature   review   in   chapters   two   and   three   on   horizontal   inequalities,   ethnic  
mobilisation,   and   the  distribution  of  HE  opportunities   there   are   strong   theoretical  
bases   for  viewing  equity  as  a  major  dimension  of  post-­‐‑conflict  HE.531  This   finding  
must  therefore  be  explained.532  Firstly,  the  relatively  low  presence  of  equity  may  be  
explained   as   due   to   sample   bias,   for   example,   male   bias   that   leads   to   under-­‐‑
recognition   of   gender   exclusion.   This   was   found   to   be   a   limitation   of   the   study  
although  measures  were  adopted  to  explore  equity  in  terms  of  gender.533    
Secondly,   it   was   seen   that   both   Iraqi   and   Libyan   HE   systems   were   relatively  
equitable   in   the   pre-­‐‑conflict   period   in   terms   of   class,   gender,   and   ethnicity.  
Crucially,   in   neither   case   was   inequality   a  major   driver   of   conflict.   Both   regimes  
were   committed   to   women’s   education,   implemented   state   socialist   policies   that  
widened  access  to  the  poor,  and  did  not  systematically  exclude  minority  groups.534  
Both  countries  utilised  their  considerable  oil  wealth  in  a  rentier  model  that  enabled  
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relative  success  in  achieving  equitable  development  compared  to  other  post-­‐‑conflict  
states   that  are  typically  highly  resource  constrained.  It  can  therefore  be  stated  that  
the  two  cases  selected  do  not  allow  for  wide  generalisability  of  this  finding  to  other  
post-­‐‑conflict   cases   in   terms   of   equity   issues   due   to   their   unrepresentative  
particularity  as  rentier  states  with  high  distributive  largesse.    
However,  the  cases  do  reveal  some  interesting  comparative  findings  with  scope  for  
generalisability  to  Arab  region  cases.  In  the  post-­‐‑war  period,  the  first  equity  concern  
in  both  cases  was  the  greater  access  to  places  that  up  until  conflict  were  afforded  to  
supporters  of  the  previous  regimes.  Furthermore,  in  both  cases  scholarship  selection  
processes  were  charged  by  some  to  be  particularistic;  in  Iraq  to  Shiite  students  and  
supporters   of   Prime   Minister   Al-­‐‑Maliki   and   in   Libya   in   terms   of   place-­‐‑based  
allegiances   of   officials   in   charge.535   The   cases   reveal   that   even   where   repressive  
distributive   states  managed   to   lead   relatively   equitable   growth,   in   the   conflictual  
and   fragile   post-­‐‑conflict   environment   new   enmities   and   forms   of   inequality   may  
emerge  while  development  schemes  are  politicised.  This  finding  supports  the  need  
for   conflict-­‐‑sensitive  HE  policy   that   addresses  horizontal   inequalities   and   satisfies  
public  perceptions  of  fairness.    
  
9.2.3. Institutional  Features  
  
It   has   been   seen   that   in   the   small   literature   on   HE   and   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery  
conjunctural  features  of  insecurity,  conflict,  and  instability  are  widely  considered  to  
be   very   significant;   a   theoretical   finding   supported   by   empirical   results   of   this  
thesis.  It  was  also  seen  that  in  terms  of  the  educational  dimensions  of  the  post-­‐‑war  
environment   quality  was   found   to   be   a   very   significant   influence.   It  will   now   be  
shown   that   after   conjunctural   features   it   is   institutional   features   that   taken   as   a  
whole   can   be   considered   to   be   the   second   strongest   set   of   dynamics   shaping   the  
contribution  of  the  sector  to  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery.    
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Firstly,  weak  state  and  institutional  capacity  was  a  major  obstacle  affecting  HE  and  
recovery  in  both  cases.536   Iraq  was  much  more  strongly  affected  by  the  destruction  
of  physical  capacity  of  HE  ministries  during  conflict  than  Libya,  although  both  cases  
suffered   the   effects   on   institutional   memory   brought   about   by   looting   and  
destruction   of   records   in   a   paper-­‐‑based   administration   system.   Furthermore,   Iraq  
had  more  limited  financial  capacity  than  Libya  where  the  first  post-­‐‑war  budget  was  
much  larger  than  the  pre-­‐‑war  budget.    
Governance   emerged  more   strongly   from   both   cases   than   capacity.537   Leadership  
was  a  strong  emergent  theme  from  both  cases;  in  Iraq  particularistic  appointments  
to   key   positions  were   held   to   violate   a   technocratic   vision   of   governance   held   by  
participants.   In   Libya,   by   contrast,   Ministers   and   high   officials   were   lauded   by  
participants   for   their   technocratic   credentials   although  criticised  by   some   for   their  
status   as   ‘outsiders’   that   did   not   understand   the   Libyan   context.   HE   governance  
was   further   problematised   in   both   cases   due   to   issues   of   legitimacy;   in   Libya   the  
transitional  administration  possessed   fragile   legitimacy  due   to   inability   to  provide  
security  and  the  above-­‐‑noted  high  presence  of  ‘outsiders’  in  the  Cabinet.  However,  
Iraq’s  legitimacy  problem  was  worse  than  Libya’s  due  to  occupation  and  incapacity  
in   effective   service-­‐‑delivery   in   critical   areas,   in  particular   electricity.   In   both   cases  
issues   of   corruption,   nepotism,   and   anti-­‐‑meritocratic   appointments  within   the  HE  
sector   further   eroded   the   legitimacy   of   universities   and   Ministries   thus   further  
weakening  HE  sector  governance.  
In   terms   of   strategy,   it   should   first   be   noted   that   Iraq   did   not   possess   formal  
‘ownership’   of   HE   policy   and   strategy   until   the   transfer   of   sovereignty   to   the  
transitional  government   in   June  2004.538  By  contrast,  Libya’s  NTC  had   ‘ownership’  
of  HE  policy   from   the   outset   of   post-­‐‑conflict   transition.539  However,   in   both   cases  
there  were   de   facto   constraints   on   authentic   ‘ownership’.   In   Iraq   for   instance   the  
fragmented  governance  of  the  HE  sector,  low  authority  of  MoHE-­‐‑I,  and  interference  
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of  political  parties  greatly  reduced  the  extent  to  which  the  Ministry  could  be  said  to  
own  policy.  Similarly,  in  Libya  the  constraints  upon  the  Ministry  in  terms  of  armed  
militias   or   ‘revolutionaries’,   the   fear   of   violent   retribution,   and   the   rationalisation  
versus  legitimacy  trap  all  curtail  the  meaningfulness  of  ‘ownership’  in  that  context.    
An   emergent   theme   was   that   post-­‐‑war   insecurity   and   instability   led   to   the  
predominance  of  short-­‐‑term  thinking  and  day-­‐‑to-­‐‑day  survival  rather  than  long-­‐‑term  
strategising   on   how   to   rebuild   HE   which   limited   the   sector’s   contribution   to  
recovery.  This  was  generally  held  to  be  the  case  in  Libya  although  some  participants  
held   that   short-­‐‑termism  was  necessary   in   an  uncertain   transition.540   In   Iraq   it  was  
also   held   that   HE   policy   and   strategy   was   ‘event-­‐‑driven’   due   to   instability.541  
Furthermore,   in   both   cases   short   terms   in   office   of   governments   and   low  
institutionalisation   of   policy   led   to  HE   strategy   being  dependent   upon   individual  
Ministers  and  changing  regularly.    
A  finding  strongly  related  to  strategy,  both  cases  demonstrate  that  a  weak  or  absent  
vision  of  HE   is  detrimental   to   recovery  outcomes  although   the   Iraq   case  provides  
stronger   support   for   this   claim.542   In   Iraq   it   was   seen   that   a   broad   vision   of  
reconstruction  was  absent  which  problematised  HE  planning.  By  contrast,  in  Libya  
the   broad   contours   of   such   a   vision  were   present,   for   example,   on   diversification  
and   democratisation,   although   there  were   obstacles   to   translating   this   vision   into  
HE  strategy.  The  greater  degree  of  societal  conflict   in  post-­‐‑war  Iraq  prevented  key  
actors   from   coming   together   to   consider   the   sector’s   future.   Moreover,   if   such   a  
process  were  to  occur  it  is  unlikely  that  a  unified  vision  could  have  emerged  in  the  
divisive   post-­‐‑war   environment.   The   case   of   Libya   shows   that   even   without   this  
strong  constraint  of  high   levels  of  conflict  a  unified  vision  can  fail   to  emerge.  This  
finding  confirms   the   theoretical   importance  given   to  vision   in  chapter   three543  and  
highlights   the   need   for   inclusive   and   dialogic   processes   of   creating   visions   for  
recovery  in  other  post-­‐‑conflict  cases.  
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Political  factors  were  found  in  both  cases  to  exert  a  strong  influence  on  HE.  In  Iraq,  
the   politicisation   of   post-­‐‑war   HE   is   very   closely   related   to   the   issue   of  
sectarianism.544   Political   parties   had   strong   influence   on   universities   through  
student  groups  acting  as  proxies  on  campus.  In  Libya  the  penetration  of  campus  life  
by   parties   was   much   lower   due   to   the   under-­‐‑developed   political   sphere   that  
resulted  from  Qaddafi’s  rule.545  One  Professor,  it  was  seen,  lamented  the  absence  of  
politically  or  ideologically  minded  students.  However,  HE  in  Libya  was  affected  by  
political  dynamics  in  other  ways.  It  was  seen  that  a  broad  ideological  clash  between  
Islamism  and  liberalism  contributed  to  the  termination  of  an  ambitious  civil  society  
programme  at  Tripoli  University,  some  Qaddafi-­‐‑era  personnel  were  removed  from  
their  posts,  and  students  regularly  protested.    
A   further   influence   upon   HE   policy   was   the   conceptualisation   of   the   challenge  
facing  the  sector.  It  was  seen  that   in  Libya  many  framings  including  post-­‐‑socialist,  
post-­‐‑revolution,  Arab  Spring,  and  authoritarian  to  democratic  transitions  competed  
alongside   post-­‐‑war   recovery   in   shaping   the   direction   of   policy-­‐‑making.   In  
particular,  a  ‘normal  development’  conceptualisation  was  found  to  influence  policy-­‐‑
making  with  the  effect  of  constraining  the  extent   to  which  attention  and  resources  
were   focused   on   social   sectors   and   problems   related   to   recovery.546   In   Iraq   by  
contrast,   although   the   country  was   undergoing  multiple   transitions,   the   situation  
was  defined  predominantly  through  the  lens  of  post-­‐‑war  reconstruction.547    
  
9.2.4. Structural  Features  
  
Resource   levels   were   found   to   be   a   major   obstacle   to   HE’s   contribution   to   Iraqi  
reconstruction.548   While   rebuilding   Iraqi   HE   received   $8   million   plus   ad   hoc  
donations   in   the   first   post-­‐‑war   year   Libyan   HE   received   a   bumper   $1.4   billion  
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budget   reported   as   the   highest   in   the   sector’s   history.549   Beyond   resource   levels,  
HEIs   in   Iraq  struggled  with  high  current  expenditure  and   low  capital  expenditure  
which  prevented  effective   rebuilding  of   the  decimated  system.   In  Libya,  however,  
similarly   to   Iraq,   problems   with   bureaucratic   hurdles,   corruption,   and   slow  
disbursal   severely   hampered   effective   utilisation   of   funds.   Therefore,   it   can   be  
concluded  that  it  is  not  simply  the  level  of  resources  but  their  quality  and  modality  
of  distribution  that  also  affects  recovery  outcomes.    
Culture  was  also  held  to  be  an  obstacle  in  both  cases.550  In  particular,  Iraq  and  Libya  
reveal   that  Wasta   or   a   culture   of   nepotism   and   corruption   and   the   social   status  
afforded   to   academic   over   technical   education   were   cultural   barriers   to  HE   after  
war.   This   is   explained   by   the   cultural   and   social   similarities   shared   by   the   two  
countries.   However,   cultural   considerations   were   also   found   to   have   enabled  
effective   recovery   in   some   cases.   Social   cohesion   was   found   to   be   a   factor  
influencing  cases  of  successful  reconstruction  of  HEIs  in  both  Iraq  and  Libya.  Iraqi  
Kurdistan   in   the   1990s   saw   strong   ‘autonomous   recovery’   driven   by   nationalism  
while   Anbar   and   Mosul   since   2003   were   widely-­‐‑viewed   as   having   recovered  
relatively  well  in  part  due  to  strong  communal  bonds.  Similarly,  in  Libya  the  strong  
local   identity   and   community   combined  with   vibrant   a   vibrant   local   economy   in  
Misrata  was  seen  as  enabling  effective  autonomous  recovery.    
Historical   factors   were   important   as   constraints   imposed   by   path-­‐‑dependent  
trajectories   of  HE  development.   In   Iraq   it  was   seen   that   institutions   proved   to   be  
‘sticky’  as  externally-­‐‑led  reforms  mostly  failed  and  HE  reverted  back  to  pre-­‐‑conflict  
institutional   forms.551   In   Libya,   the   state   legitimation   strategy   employed   by   the  
Qaddafi   regime   created   a   binding   constraint   on   post-­‐‑war   policy   as   consolidating  
and   rationalising   widely-­‐‑dispersed   capacity   and   reducing   high   enrolment   would  
threaten  the  transitional  government’s  fragile  and  low  legitimacy.552  These  findings  
highlight   the   need   for   historical   and   institutional   analysis   of   the   trajectory   of  HE  
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and   development   in   other   post-­‐‑conflict   cases   to   fully   understand   the   structural  
context  and  therefore  the  scope  of  HE  policy.    
Historical   memory   was   also   found   to   be   an   influence   upon   the   evaluations   of  
recovery   efforts   made   by   Iraqi   and   Libyan   academics.   In   both   cases   historical  
experiences   of   HE   that   were   perceived   to   have   been   characterised   by   higher  
standards   than   those   that   marked   the   post-­‐‑war   system   influenced   the  
conceptualisation   of   the   visions   for   reconstruction   and   revitalisation   of   the   HE  
sector  held  by  participants.  It  could  be  argued  that  in  a  society  where  HE  is  widely-­‐‑
viewed   as   having   enjoyed   a   much   stronger   reputation   in   a   previous   historical  
period  within  living  memory,  for  example,  Iraq,  Iran,  Afghanistan,  or  Libya,  societal  
expectations   for  HE   are   inflated   based   on   this   collective  memory   of   former   glory  
and  therefore  a  modest  contribution  of  HE  to  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery  is  perceived  as  
negligible.  By  contrast,   in  a  society  with  a  very   low  base,   for  example,  Rwanda  or  
Mozambique,   low   expectations   can   lead  modest   contributions   to   be   perceived   as  
substantial.    
  
9.2.5. External  Features  
  
The   level   of   post-­‐‑war   external   HE   support   differed   markedly   between   Iraq   and  
Libya.   Iraq   did   not   receive   largescale   assistance   or   rebuilding   programmes,   with  
international   attention   to   the   sector   emerging   later   during   2008-­‐‑09.  Moreover,   the  
negative  influence  of  regional  states  interfering  with  Iraqi  politics  and  HE  emerged  
as  a   theme  equally  strongly  as  did   the  positive  opportunities  afforded  by  external  
sources.553  By   contrast,  Libyan  HE  received  high  profile   external  backing   from   the  
US   State   Department   and   was   viewed   as   a   significant   economic   opportunity   by  
international   HE   providers.554   This   situation   is   partly   explained   by   the   nature   of  
occupation   in   Iraq   with   low   international   support   that   would   legitimise   illegal  
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intervention,  the  better  security  climate  in  post-­‐‑war  Libya,  and  the  pre-­‐‑war  status  of  
Libya  as  an  emerging  international  education  market.    
However,  the  difference  can  also  be  explained  as  partly  due  to  historical  timing;  the  
experience  of  Iraqi  HE,  in  particular  killing  and  displacement  of  academics,  brought  
attention   to  HE   in   crisis   situations   through   the   IIE   and   others,  while  HE   became  
recognised  as  a  soft  power  resource  in  America’s  attempt  to  project  influence  in  the  
Middle  East.  The  Libyan  case  at  the  outset  of  its  post-­‐‑conflict  phase  benefitted  from  
the   geo-­‐‑strategic   importance   of   the   country   in   a   context   shaped   by   the   perceived  
need   to   shape   the   outcomes   of   Arab   Spring   transitions   and   therefore   Libyan  HE  
received   high   external   attention   relative   to   other   post-­‐‑conflict   cases.   However,   it  
should  be  qualified  that  the  initial  enthusiasm  for  the  sector  was  dampened  by  the  
August  2012  US  Embassy  attack  in  Benghazi,  worsening  security  in  Libya,  and  the  
shift  of  international  focus  towards  Syria.  It  can  be  predicted  that  in  future  post-­‐‑war  
situations  in  the  region,  such  as  Syria,  where  this  confluence  of  economic  and  geo-­‐‑
strategic  interest  combine,  international  attention  to  HE  will  be  even  greater.    
  
9.3. Comparative  Perspectives  on  Recovery  Options  
  
The  two  case-­‐‑studies  provided  rich  data  on  the  perspectives  of  key  actors  including  
academics  and  policy-­‐‑makers  regarding  the  options  for  HE  and  post-­‐‑war  recovery.  
This  section  will  analyse  findings  through  comparison  of  the  two  cases  with  a  focus  
on  major  points  of  similarity  and  difference.    
RQ5:  What  are  the  opportunities  and  challenges  associated  with  various  options  for  
higher  education  recovery  and  reform  in  post-­‐‑conflict  societies?  
Expansion   of   private   HE   and   the   privatisation   of   public   HE  were   not   viewed   as  
attractive  opportunities  for  development  in  Iraq  and  Libya.555  A  shared  tradition  of  
free   and   universal   public   HE   combined   with   negative   perception   of   the   limited  
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experience  of  private  provision  explains   lack  of  enthusiasm  for   this  option  in  both  
countries.  While  expansion  of  private  HE  outside  of  regulatory  authority  in  Iraq  led  
to   low   quality   for-­‐‑profit   HEIs   and   degree-­‐‑mills   this   dynamic   had   not   emerged  
strongly  in  Libya,  although  participants  were  anticipating  it.  
Both   cases   provide   strong   support   for   the   public   goods   conception   of   the   link  
between  HE  and  recovery.  An  emergent  theme  is  that  public  HE  can  better  provide  
research  relevant   to   social  and  developmental  needs,  a  broad  range  of  disciplines,  
and  a  commitment  to  academic  standards  rather  than  profit  in  a  manner  that  could  
make   a  major   contribution   to   long-­‐‑term   reconstruction.   This   finding   supports   the  
argument   that   in  post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   the  private  HE   sector   should  be   subject   to  
state   regulation.   However,   it   is   recognised   that   in   many   fragile   contexts   this   is  
problematic   and   in   section   10.2.3   some   recommendations   on   overcoming   this  
obstacle  are  proposed.    
Decentralisation  was  viewed  as  an  attractive  option  by  the  majority  of  participants  
in  both  Iraq  and  Libya,  two  countries  with  historically  centralised  HE  governance.556  
Moreover,   in   both   cases  Ministry   officials   held   that   government  policy   supported  
greater   decentralisation   while   faculty   members   described   little   actual   change   in  
post-­‐‑war  state-­‐‑university  relations.  However,  a  centralist  position  was  defended  in  
both   cases   with   the   decentralisation   debate   overlaid   by   political   issues   including  
centre-­‐‑periphery   relations,  unresolved  constitutional  options   including   federalism,  
and  nationalist  versus   regionalist   ideologies.  This  politicisation  of  decentralisation  
should  be  expected  to  emerge  in  HE  debate  in  other  cases  where  regional  enmities  
and  divisions  are  major  features  of  the  post-­‐‑conflict  environment.    
Furthermore,  the  collapse  of  regulatory  authority  in  Iraq  and  the  fragility  of  Libya’s  
post-­‐‑conflict   state   suggest   that   ‘centralisation   before   decentralisation’   strategies  
should  be  pursued  in  similar  contexts  to  ensure  that  HE  system  expansion  occurs  in  
accordance  with   national-­‐‑level   governance   frameworks.   If   this  were   followed   the  
dynamic   of   many   low   quality,   unregulated,   profit-­‐‑maximising   HEIs   could   be  
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  sections	  6.4.2	  and	  8.4.1	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limited  and  educational  resources  best  harnessed  towards  the  goals  of  recovery  and  
transition.    
Both  cases  show  a  general  tendency  to  gravitate  towards  international  opportunities  
rather   than  domestic   investment   in  HE   capacity.557   This   is   best   explained   by   long  
isolation   of   both   countries   from  global   academia   under   sanctions  which   followed  
strong   traditions   of   international   academic   exchange.558   Furthermore,   enthusiasm  
for   internationalisation   among   faculty   members   can   also   be   explained   by   the  
intellectual  and  social  capital  that  can  be  gained  from  participation  in  international  
exchanges  and  also  the  potential  of  scholarships  to  be  utilised  as  a  tool  of  patronage  
in  a  rentier  context.    
However,   it  was   noted   that   in   Libya   there  was   greater   enthusiasm   for   university  
partnerships  than  in  Iraq;  a  difference  explained  by  participants’  perception  of   the  
post-­‐‑war   environment,   which   in   Libya   was   optimistic   and   permissive   of  
international   cooperation   while   in   Iraq   the   myriad   difficult   challenges   including  
insecurity,   conflict,   and   state  weakness   dampened   to   some   extent   the   support   for  
this   option.   Rather,   it   was   seen   that   in   both   cases   support   for   scholarship  
programmes   was   extremely   high;   while   Iraqi   university   partnerships   were  
constrained  by  internal  conditions  in  Iraq  support  for  scholarship  programmes  was  
by   contrast   heightened   by   these   same   conditions   as   participants   viewed   it   as   a  
means  of  supplying  skills  and  knowledge  from  outside  the  troubled  country.    
Finally,  ‘brain  gain’  or  the  return  of  highly-­‐‑skilled  individuals  from  abroad  emerged  
as   a   major   opportunity.   Many   exiled   and   diaspora   Libyans   returned   to   take   up  
leadership  and  management  positions  in  post-­‐‑conflict  Libya;  participants  expressed  
pride  that  most  of  this  class  of  elite  exiles  were  the  products  of  Benghazi  and  Tripoli  
universities  in  the  1960s,  1970s  and  1980s.559  Iraq  by  contrast  experienced  a  massive  
‘brain  drain’   rather   than   ‘brain  gain’  which   further   eroded   the  human   capacity  of  
the   HE   sector   in   addition   to   the   wider   professional   class.560   Furthermore,   it   was  
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  See	  sections	  6.4.3	  and	  8.4.2	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  See	  sections	  5.2.2.	  and	  7.1.5	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  8.2.5	  and	  8.3.3.3	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  See	  section	  6.4.4	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found  that  displaced  Iraqi  academics  should  be  viewed  as  a  potential   resource   for  
Iraqi  recovery  and  that  programmes  in  this  area  should  be  further  supported.      
  
9.4.   Conclusion  
  
In  this  chapter  so  far  the  empirical  findings  of  the  two  cases  have  been  analysed  in  a  
comparative  manner.  One  major  comparative  conclusion  is  that  based  on  the  nature  
of  the  impact  of  conflict  and  type  of  post-­‐‑conflict  response,  concentrating  on  HE  in  
Libya  will  have  more  and  better  recovery  outcomes  than  in  Iraq.  In  Iraq  it  was  seen  
that  unresolved  social  and  political   conflicts   in   the  post-­‐‑war  period  were  crucially  
detrimental  to  the  recovery  outcomes  of  HE.  In  such  a  context  the  guiding  rationale  
for   any   response   to   HE   should   therefore   be   first   on   conflict,   reconciliation,   and  
healing   wounded   social   capital   and   later   on   human   capital,   research,   and  
knowledge.   Meanwhile,   in   Libya   the   low   impact   of   conflict   and   relatively   low  
number   of   conflict-­‐‑related   obstacles   in   the   post-­‐‑conflict   environment   render   an  
immediate   focus  on  human  capital,  economic  recovery,  and  development   to  be  an  
appropriate  response.    
This   is   borne   out   by   qualitative   evidence   based   on   interviews.  At   a   general   level,  
Iraqi  participants  focused  on  social  and  political  conflicts;  unresolved  issues  that  are  
a   major   obstacle   to   any   progress   in   harnessing   HE   to   reconstruction   goals.  
Contrastingly,   Libyan   participants   tended   to   dismiss   concerns   over   conflict   and  
adopted  a  positive   and   forward   looking  worldview   that   focused  on  opportunities  
and  prospects  for  development.  This  contrast  in  how  key  actors  in  the  respective  HE  
systems   interpret   the   situations   they   inhabit   revealing   the   very  different   stages   at  
which  the  countries  are  located.      
It  can  be  asked  whether  failure  of  the  post-­‐‑war  project  of  rebuilding  Iraq  could  have  
turned   out   differently.  While   some   hold   that  widespread   violence   and   insecurity  
was   an   inevitable   outcome   due   to   ‘primordial’   enmities  Dodge   (2007,   p.27)   holds  
that   there  was  nothing  necessary  about   the  post-­‐‑war   security   collapse.   It   is  worth  
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considering  a  counter-­‐‑factual  scenario  in  which  several  main  factors  that  were  held  
to  be  detrimental  to  the  HE-­‐‑recovery  relationship  are  removed.  In  this  scenario,  Iraq  
was   not   occupied   in   2003,   widespread   looting   did   not   occur,   and   an   inclusive  
political   agreement   creates   a   sovereign   government   with   broad   legitimacy   that  
leads   reconstruction   and   prevents   high   levels   of   insecurity,   instability,   and   inter-­‐‑
communal  conflict.  This  situation   is  closer   to  what   transpired   in  Libya   in   terms  of  
initial   conditions.   Yet   in   this   scenario   the   prospects   for  HE   contributing   to   Iraq’s  
reconstruction  can  be  held   to  be  better   than  Libyan  HEIs  contributing   to  post-­‐‑war  
recovery.   The   reasoning   behind   this   assertion   is   that   Iraq   possessed   a   more  
developed   pre-­‐‑war   research   capacity   and   universities   were   well   integrated   into  
military   industry   and   research,   an   institutional   linkage   that   could   have   been  
adapted  towards  rebuilding  and  reconstruction  needs.    
A   further   comparative   finding   not   explored   in   the   literature   review   is   that   the  
temporal   context   in  which   the   cases  occurred   in   some  ways  explains  HE-­‐‑recovery  
outcomes.   It   has   been   seen   that   the   two   cases   are   inter-­‐‑connected   in   that   Iraq   in  
some  ways  served  as  a  learning  experience  for  the  post-­‐‑war  response  in  Libya.  First,  
the  political  fallout  of  the  Iraq  invasion  made  direct  Western  intervention  in  Libya  
political  unfeasible  and  gave  rise  to  a   ‘post-­‐‑intervention’  scenario.  Consequently,  a  
‘light  footprint  approach’  was  adopted  in  which  Libyan  authorities  had  meaningful  
ownership   of   post-­‐‑war   policy.   Second,   the   failure   of   ‘hard   power’   in   Iraq   partly  
explains   the   shift   to   a   ‘soft   power’   approach   including   supporting   HE   to   project  
American  influence  in  the  Middle  East  which  led  to  US  political  support  for  Libyan  
HE.   Furthermore,   the   negative   experience   of   post-­‐‑war   Iraqi   HE   accelerated   the  
emergence  of   an   international  network  on  HE   in   crisis   that  and  prompted  greater  
awareness   globally   of   HE   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   areas.   Lastly,   limited   removal   of  
Qaddafi-­‐‑era   personnel   was   motivated   by   a   fear   of   repeating   the   pitfalls   of   de-­‐‑
Baathification.    
Finally,   another   comparative   conclusion   that   has   hitherto   not   been   considered   is  
that   in   many   aspects   of   the   HE-­‐‑recovery   relationship   trade-­‐‑offs   were   involved  
between   various   goals.   For   example,   democratisation   was   held   to   be   limited   by  
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stabilisation  with  political   activities  of   students   that   could   contribute   to   long-­‐‑term  
democratic   and   civic   organisation   skills   restricted   to   enhance   short-­‐‑term   stability.  
Similarly,   legitimacy   was   in   tension   with   rationalisation   as   HE   was   viewed   as   a  
side-­‐‑payment   to   enhance   fragile   state   legitimacy  while   a   rationalisation   of   public  
provision   would   have   increased   efficiency.   Other   trade-­‐‑offs   include   elite  
universities   versus   equitable   HE   opportunities   and   overseas   scholarships   versus  
internal   investment.   It   can  be  concluded   from   this   that   it   is   impossible   to  have  all  
good  things  at  once.  However,  not  all  trade-­‐‑offs  are  zero-­‐‑sum  games  and  innovative  























The   overarching   aim   of   this   thesis   has   been   to   investigate   the   under-­‐‑studied   yet  
arguably  important  role  of  HE  in  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery.  Analysis  proceeded  by  first  
establishing  a  theoretical  framework  based  on  an  analytical  understanding  of  HE’s  
role   in  development,  conflict,  and  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts.  Through  the  cases  of   Iraq  
and  Libya   the   impact  of  war  on  HE,   the   functions  of   the   sector   in   contributing   to  
recovery,   the   obstacles   to   the   post-­‐‑war   role   of   HE,   and   the   opportunities   and  
challenges   associated   with   various   recovery   options   were   investigated   and   the  
findings  analysed.      
The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  reflect  critically  on  the  present  study’s  contribution  and  
offer  recommendations.  To  start  with,  the  main  research  findings  will  be  considered  
in   terms   of   the   research   questions   and   hypotheses   in   order   to   state   the   central  
conclusions.   Next,   recommendations   will   be   made   on   methodological   and  
theoretical   grounds   in   addition   to   suggestions   for   future   research   on  HE   in   post-­‐‑
conflict  recovery.  The  central  purpose  of  recommendations  is  to  offer  a  framework  
for  action  on  the  role  of  HE  to  key  actors  in  post-­‐‑conflict  reconstruction.    
  
10.1. Central  Conclusion  
  
The  main  aim  of  the  thesis  is  to  conduct  exploratory  research  into  the  under-­‐‑studied  
area   of   HE   and   post-­‐‑conflict   reconstruction   and   recovery.   The   central   hypothesis  
and  research  question  in  this  thesis  are  as  follows:    
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Central   Hypothesis:   Higher   education   is   a   neglected   dimension   of   post-­‐‑conflict  
reconstruction   that   can   make   a   significant   positive   contribution   in   driving   and  
energising  post-­‐‑war  recovery  processes.    
Central  Question:  Why  should  post-­‐‑conflict  states  place  strategic  emphasis  on  the  
higher  education  sector  in  terms  of  post-­‐‑war  reconstruction  and  recovery  priorities?  
The  main  conclusion  of  the  thesis  is  that  HE  represents  a  potentially  major  capacity  
and   resource   that   should   be   leveraged   towards   the   goals   of   reconstruction   and  
recovery   in  post-­‐‑conflict   contexts.  While   the  case-­‐‑studies  of   Iraq  and  Libya  do  not  
provide  support  for  all  the  theorised  contributions  of  HE  to  recovery  they  do  offer  
overall  support   for   the  hypothesis.  Moreover,  HE  is  a  neglected  sector  of  recovery  
and   this   thesis   has   sought   to   provide   global   analysis   of   the   field.   Paraphrasing  
Hirschman’s   insight,  development   is   as  much  about  harnessing  existing   scattered,  
under-­‐‑utilised,   and  unrecognised   resources   and   capacity   than   about   creating   new  
inputs   (Brundenius,   Lundvall   &   Sutz   2009).   HE   in   this   sense   has   been   held   to  
constitute   such   a   neglected   yet   critical   pillar   for   long-­‐‑term   recovery   and  
development  in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts.    
A   major   conclusion   is   that   HE   in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   should   go   beyond   the  
provision   of   ‘good   normal   education’   to   connect   the   capacity   of   the   sector   to   the  
demands   of   recovery.   This   may   be   achieved   through   sector-­‐‑wide   programming,  
reforming  HE   governance,   and   ensuring   that   skills   and   knowledge   produced   are  
relevant  to  recovery.  In  this  sense  it  may  be  concluded  that  the  findings  of  the  thesis  
support  the  first  guiding  claim:  
Claim  One:  Higher   education   should   be   geared   towards   post-­‐‑war   recovery   at   an  
early   stage   rather   than   be   treated   as   a   stand-­‐‑alone,   long-­‐‑term   concern   to   be  
considered   once   the   transition   from   recovery   to   ‘normal   development’   has   been  
completed  
Proponents   of   the   more   limited   role   hold   that   expecting   universities   to   play   a  
proactive   role   in   reconstruction   risks   over-­‐‑burdening  HEIs  with  weak   capacity   to  
the   detriment   of   their   basic   functions.   Rather,   on   this   view   HE   can   produce   a  
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positive  impact  through  its  core  teaching  and  research  functions,  improving  quality,  
and   enhancing   access.   While   it   should   be   acknowledged   that   HE   or   any   other  
educational   sub-­‐‑sector   cannot   alone   be   expected   to   have   a   decisive   impact   on  
recovery   outcomes   it   has   been   argued   here   that   HE   represents   a   neglected   yet  
potentially   important  capacity   in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts   that  can  connect   to  a  wide-­‐‑
range  of   recovery   tasks  and  processes  and   that   this  potential   cannot  be  actualised  
through   adopting   a   ‘business-­‐‑as-­‐‑usual’   approach.   Rather,   bold   and   innovative  
thinking  on  how  to  link  HE  capacity  to  reconstruction,  recovery,  and  development  
is  required.    
The  argument  that  HE  should  be  geared  towards  serving  the  needs  and  challenges  
of   post-­‐‑war   reconstruction   and   development   may   be   compared   to   the  
developmental   university  model   that   sought   to   gear  HE   to   national   development  
goals.561   Similarly,   a   ‘Recovery   University’   would   be   strategically   aligned   with  
reconstruction  planning  to  maximise  the  social  impact  of  HEIs  on  recovery.  Rather  
than  conceive  of  this  model  narrowly  through  offering  courses  on  peace  and  conflict  
studies,   human   rights,   governance   and   related  disciplines   the   recovery  university  
model  would  harness  national  HE  capacities   towards   reconstruction  and  recovery  
by  adapting  curricula  and  content   to  new  economic  and  social  needs,  aligning  HE  
with   an   over-­‐‑arching   vision   of   reconstruction   and   long-­‐‑term   human   capital  
projections,   and   providing   expertise   and   knowledge   on   a   range   of   transitional  
concerns.  This  conclusion  which  emerged  as  a  major  theme  of  the  two  case-­‐‑studies  
provides   strong   support   for   the   second   guiding   claim   which   is   concerned   with  
building  core  national  capacities:    
Claim  Two:  Strategic   investments   in   higher   education   in   post-­‐‑conflict   countries  
can  make  a  major  contribution  to  building  core  national  capacities  critical  to   long-­‐‑
term  post-­‐‑war  reconstruction  and  development  
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It  was  seen  that  in  Iraq  the  failure  to  link  HE  to  critical  capacity-­‐‑building  tasks  at  an  
early   stage   was   a   major   missed   opportunity   that   could   have   had   a   significant  
impact  on  statebuilding562  while  it  remained  to  be  seen  if  Libyan  HE  could  perform  
a  major  long-­‐‑term  role  in  developing  national  capacities.563    
Another   conclusion   directly   related   to   these   considerations   with   capacity   and  
statebuilding  is  that  HE  should  be  mobilised  to  support  post-­‐‑conflict  reconstruction  
operations.  Barakat  and  Zyck  (2009)  argue  for  an  ‘integrated  directed  architecture  of  
recovery’   to   lead   the   reconstruction  process;   a   joined-­‐‑up   collaborative  governance  
network  with  national  authorities  leading  planning,  policy,  and  implementation  of  
reconstruction  work.   It   is   the   contention   here   that  HE,   in   particular   in   its   role   in  
capacity-­‐‑building,   knowledge   transfer   for   recovery,   and   human   capital   formation  
has   the  potential   support   the   institutional   and   capacity  development  necessary   to  
build  such  a  robust  national  governance  framework  for  reconstruction.    
  
RQ2:  What  is  the  impact  of  conflict  on  higher  education  institutions  and  systems?  
In   terms  of  RQ2,   the   impact  of  conflict  upon  HE  was   found  to  be  one  of   the  most  
significant  dynamics  shaping  the  post-­‐‑war  context  of  the  sector  and  for  this  reason  a  
thorough  conflict  analysis  should  inform  all  reconstruction  strategy  and  planning  in  
relation  to  HE.  In  particular,  the  failure  to  resolve  conflicts  in  post-­‐‑war  contexts  can  
engulf  HEIs  and  become  detrimental  to  their  operation  and  contribution  to  recovery  
and   society   at   large.564   This   finding   entails   a   major   conclusion   that   campus-­‐‑level  
reconciliation  work  may  often  be  a  necessary  first  step  in  creating  the  conditions  for  
healthy  post-­‐‑war  academic  development.    
Conflict  was   seen   to   vary   in   the   impact   it   has   upon  HE   systems;   there   is   a   large  
difference   between   short   inter-­‐‑state   wars   and   protracted   civil   conflicts   lasting   a  
generation   or   more.   In   the   latter   HE   can   become   warped   and   distorted   beyond  
recognition   or   cease   to   function   as   a   system.   Furthermore,   to   adequately   capture  
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  See	  section	  6.2.3.	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  See	  section	  8.2.5.	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  In	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  see	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  of	  sectarian	  conflict	  in	  post-­‐war	  Iraqi	  HE	  in	  sections	  6.2.6.	  and	  6.3.1.3.	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these   transformations   analysis   of   conflict’s   impact   must   go   beyond   direct  
observable  impacts  to  consider  indirect  impacts  and  distortions.    
A  major   conclusion   is   that   the   end   of   conflict   represents   a   unique   opportunity   to  
leverage   substantial   change   in   domestic   HE   systems.   Conflict   disrupts   normal  
patterns  and  trends  of  activity,  weakens  and  distorts  capacity,   increases  needs,  yet  
offers   opportunities   to   change   existing   ways   of   doing   things.565   If   the   chance   is  
taken,  HE   can   assist   recovery   and   support   long-­‐‑term  development.  However,   the  
opportunity   offered   by   the   post-­‐‑conflict   moment   has   often   been   perceived   as   a  
‘blank  slate’  enabling  planners  to  construct  model  HE  systems.566  However,  as  was  
clearly  seen  in  Iraq,  this  attitude  is  dangerous.  Rather,  existing  capacities  should  be  
recognised  as  foundations  upon  which  to  build  and  transform.    
RQ3:   What   functions   can   higher   education   perform   in   contributing   towards  
effective  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery?  
In  relation  to  RQ3  it  can  be  concluded  that  HE  can  contribute  to  a  range  of  recovery  
tasks.567   In   chapter   three   it  was   seen   that  HE   is   theorised   to   contribute   to   a  wide  
range   of   recovery   tasks   in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts;   conflict   prevention   and  
stabilisation,   physical   and   sectoral   reconstruction,   humanitarian   action,   economic  
recovery,   statebuilding,  nationbuilding,  conflict   transformation,   reconciliation,  and  
recovery-­‐‑related   research   and   knowledge.568  While   the   cases   support  HE’s   role   in  
contributing  to  all   the  above,   the  short-­‐‑term  capacity  of  HEIs  to  absorb  potentially  
destabilising   youth,   the   supply   of   highly-­‐‑skilled   graduates   in   areas   vital   to  
reconstruction   including   health   and   education,   integration   of   HE   into   long-­‐‑term  
sustainable   capacity   development,   and   the   developmental   role   of   HE   systems   in  
supporting  knowledge  and  innovation  led  economic  recovery  strategies  emerge  as  
the   domains   in   which   HE   has   the   most   potential   to   assist   effective   post-­‐‑conflict  
transitions.      
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
565	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  3.2	  
423	  
	  
Many   of   these   potential   contributions   are   over-­‐‑looked   and   under-­‐‑theorised   in  
academic  literature  which  is   lagging  behind  practice   in  the  emerging  field  of  post-­‐‑
war   HE   assistance.   Moreover,   the   connection   between   HE   and   recovery   is   not   a  
simple,  linear  relationship  relying  on  mono-­‐‑causal  mechanisms.569  Rather,  HE  offers  
positive  externalities  to  post-­‐‑conflict  societies,   including  institutional  development,  
enhanced   civic   values,   bridging  divided   communities,   and   its   role   as   a   ‘House   of  
Expertise’   that   connect  with  multiple   recovery  processes.  These   linkages  are  often  
indirect,  complex,  and  multi-­‐‑directional  which  renders  their  impact  hard  to  assess,  
for  example,  due  to  over-­‐‑determination  and  time  lags  of  effects.  Moreover,  it  can  be  
stated  that  HE-­‐‑recovery  linkages  are  non-­‐‑basic  and  this  is  one  reason  for  their  low  
recognition.   This   thesis   has   sought   to   identify   the   myriad   processes   and  
mechanisms   that   connect  HE   to   the   tasks   of   recovery   and   redress   this   significant  
gap.    
Another  major  conclusion  is  that  from  the  array  of  potential  functions  served  by  HE  
in   post-­‐‑conflict   settings   not   all  may   be   actualised   in   a   single   context.570   There   are  
inevitable   trade-­‐‑offs  and   tough  choices   in  HE  reform.  Policy-­‐‑makers  and  planners  
must   deliberate   whether   to   expand   access   or   restrict   places;   to   grant   individual  
freedom   for   students   or   allocate   enrolments   based   on   public   interest;   to   afford  
universities  a  high  degree  of  autonomy  or  maintain  centralised  regulatory  control;  
to   conserve   traditions   or   to   radically   reform.   Another   example   of   a   trade-­‐‑off   is  
between   a   concentration   on   rebuilding   a   core   of   elite   national   universities   or  
supporting  a  system-­‐‑wide  reconstruction  with  equitable  distribution  of  resources.    
In   reality   many   of   these   choices   may   not   entirely   rest   in   the   hands   of   public  
administrators,   particularly   in   fragile   states   with   breakdowns   in   systems   of  
governance.   Furthermore,   some   of   the   supposedly   dichotomous   trade-­‐‑offs   may  
upon   closer   inspection   reveal   themselves   to   be   illusory.  However,   the   concept   of  
trade-­‐‑offs   remains   analytically   useful   for   describing   and   evaluating   the   kinds   of  
choices  that  must  be  confront  in  the  majority  of  cases.    
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RQ4:  What  features  of  the  post-­‐‑war  environment  influence  the  relationship  between  
higher  education  and  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery?  
A   major   conclusion   to   draw   from   the   cases   in   relation   to   RQ4   is   that   HE   is  
constrained   in   making   a   major   contribution   to   reconstruction   and   recovery   by  
various  features  of   the  post-­‐‑conflict  environment.  The  cases  shed  light  on  the  type  
of   obstacles   that   typically   confront   HE,   inhibit   rebuilding,   derail   promising  
initiatives,  and  problematise  educational  provision.571    
Conjunctural   features   of   insecurity,   instability,   and   conflict   were   found   to   be   the  
largest  obstacles  and  affect  nearly  all  aspects  of  HE  functioning.  This  was   in  some  
ways  to  be  expected  and  accorded  with  the  literature  review.572  This  finding  can  be  
expected  to  have  relatively  wide  generalisability  as  the  three  features  are  present  to  
some   degree   in   all   post-­‐‑conflict   settings.   However,   a   major   conclusion   was   that  
other   features  beyond   insecurity   and   instability  were   also   found   to  be   significant.  
This   entails   that   analysis   of   HE   in   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   should   be   conducted   in  
reference  to  a  holistic  framework  that  can  capture  the  complex  dynamics,  barriers,  
and   opportunities   that   constitute   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts.   The  major   conclusions   in  
relation  to  these  other  sets  of  features  will  now  be  briefly  stated.    
Regarding  educational  features,  quality  was  found  to  be  centrally   important  while  
equity  and  access  were  not  critical  variables.  While  quality  should  be  expected  to  be  
important   in  many  cases  there   is   limited  generalisability  of   the  finding  that  equity  
and   access   have   relatively   low   weight.   This   is   because   the   two   cases   under  
consideration  were   high   access   systems   and   relatively   equitable   in   comparison   to  
typical  post-­‐‑conflict   cases.  However,   equity   remains  very   important   to   analysis  of  
post-­‐‑conflict  HE  and  is  discussed  in  more  depth  at  the  end  of  this  chapter.    
Institutional  features  were  found  to  be  significant  with  the  balance  of  public/private  
provision,  ‘ownership’,  vision,  and  state  capacity  confirmed  as  important  variables.  
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  3.3.1	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While  ‘ownership’  and  state  capacity  were  identified  in  the  literature  review573  and  
confirmed  as  important  features  in  the  case-­‐‑studies  it  was  the  presence  or  absence  of  
vision  and  strategy  for  HE  that  had  the  greatest  consensus  amongst  participants.574  
Post-­‐‑war   HE   is   also   shown   to   be   sensitive   to   political   variables   prompting   the  
conclusion   that   HE   is   not   autonomous   from   society   and   that   the   state   should  
balance  the  need  to  depoliticise  the  issue  of  HE  with  the  goal  of  protecting  academic  
freedom  while  not  suppressing  the  legitimate  and  sometimes  constructive  political  
energy  of  students  and  academic  staff.    
Structural  features  including  history  and  culture  were  seen  to  influence  the  context  
of  post-­‐‑war  HE  policy.  Furthermore,  path-­‐‑dependent  dynamics  of  HE  provision  can  
shape  expectations  of  youth  which  in  an  unstable  and  insecure  context  can  limit  the  
perceived  space  for  HE  reform  and  strategy.575  However,  the  context-­‐‑dependent  and  
idiosyncratic   character  of   issues   related   to   culture  and  history  problematise  broad  
comparison.  However,  within  the  restricted  class  of  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts  within  the  
Arab  world  and  the  wider  Middle  East   the  cultural,  social,  historical,  and  political  
similarities   increase   the   salience   of   the   research   findings.   Moreover,   dynamics  
including  the   legitimacy-­‐‑rationalisation  trade-­‐‑off  and  cultural  barriers   to   increased  
TVET  apply  also  to  non-­‐‑conflict  affected  but  transitional  contexts  in  the  region  such  
as  Tunisia,  Egypt,  or  Morocco.    
External   influences   can   shape   the   post-­‐‑war   environment   particularly   in  
opportunities   for   international  assistance  and  regional  cooperation  or  competition.  
The   scope   of   the   findings  may  however   be   limited   as   both   cases,   Iraq   and  Libya,  
represent   contexts   that   were   subject   to   high   levels   of   external   interest   and   geo-­‐‑
strategic   importance   that   may   not   be   considered   typical   of   post-­‐‑conflict   cases.576  
Notwithstanding  this,  an  important  conclusion  is  that  HE  in  post-­‐‑conflict  settings  is  
increasingly  viewed   through   the   lens  of   soft  power   and   should  be   expected   to  be  
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linked   more   thoroughly   to   the   political   rationales   of   donors   and   international  
agencies  in  the  post-­‐‑Arab  Spring  and  post-­‐‑Iraq  context.      
  
RQ5:  What  are  the  opportunities  and  challenges  associated  with  various  options  for  
higher  education  recovery  and  reform  in  post-­‐‑conflict  societies?  
It  has  been  seen  that  HE  was  a  very   low  priority   in  peacebuilding  missions  of   the  
1990s   and   that  while   it   remains   a   low  priority  overall   there   is  growing   interest   in  
and   support   to   the   sector   in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts.577   Privatisation   and  
internationalisation  are  two  common  trends  that  are  presented  as  opportunities  for  
HE  development.  Private  provision  is  advocated  for  offering  the  potential  to  expand  
capacity,   often   low   due   to   the   impact   of   conflict,   in   a   situation   of   low   public  
expenditure   due   to   the   numerous   competing   priorities   for   reconstruction  
spending.578  Moreover,  private  HE  may  be   thought   to   respond   to   economic  needs  
and   inject   dynamism   into   economic   recovery.   However,   it   has   been   seen   that  
private  HE  in  post-­‐‑war  societies  frequently  is  unregulated  and  emerges  due  to  state  
fragility,  low  quality,  and  faces  numerous  obstacles.    
The  third  guiding  claims  directly  addressed  these  concerns  with  private  and  public  
HE  provision  in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts.    
Claim  Three:  The  role  of  the  state  is  critical  in  mediating  the  relationship  between  
higher   education   and   successful   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   through   ensuring   that   the  
higher  education  sector  contributes  towards  the  public  good    
Both   cases   provide   strong   support   for   this   claim.579   It   was   seen   that   private  
providers   in   comparison   with   public   universities   do   not   fulfil   public   goods  
functions,  for  example,  research  on  issues  of  domestic  relevance  or  offering  a  range  
of  disciplines,  rather  they  concentrate  on  teaching  in  marketable  disciplines  leading  
to  duplication  and  over-­‐‑supply  of  graduates.  While  a  degree  of  private  provision  is  
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  See	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  8.4.1	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to  be  expected  in  most  post-­‐‑conflict  cases  much  more  attention  should  be  placed  on  
harnessing  the  sector’s  potential  to  contribute  towards  recovery  goals.    
Internationalisation   represents   a   main   form   of   HE   assistance   and   should   be  
expected   to   increase   over   the   coming   decades.   Scholarship   programmes,  
international  university  partnerships,  research  collaborations,  and  branch  campuses  
have   been   the   principal  modalities   of   the   emerging   international   HE   response   to  
fragile  conflict-­‐‑affected  contexts.580  Internationalisation  is  held  to  circulate  the  skills,  
knowledge,  expertise,  and  resources  required  to  build  the  sustainable  HE  capacity  
in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   that   could   enable   long-­‐‑term   recovery.581   Over   the  
immediate  term  cross-­‐‑border  education  contains  less  danger  than  private  provision;  
nevertheless   careful   consideration   of   how   to   align   forms   of   international  
cooperation   and   exchange  with   long-­‐‑term   development   is   required.   In   particular,  
forms   of   internationalisation   including   branch   campuses   and   research  
collaborations  should  be  evaluated   in   terms  of   relevance   to   local   social,   economic,  
and  developmental  needs.    
A  major  conclusion  is  that  in  considering  the  options  and  opportunities  available  for  
HE  in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts  key  actors  should  be  strategically  selective  and  aim  for  
coherence  with   recovery   objectives.582   In   particular   in   fragile   contexts  where   state  
authority  is  by  definition  weak  the  capacity  to  ensure  that  HE  provision  by  private  
and  foreign  providers  and  HE  assistance  and  partnerships  maximise  their  potential  
to   contribute   to  public  goods  and   the  wider   tasks  of  post-­‐‑war   recovery   is   limited.  
Moreover,  strategies  of  HE  revitalisation  should  build  from  existing  capacities  and  
strengths   rather   than   pursue   wholesale   transfer   of   HE   models   from   abroad.  
Proposals   and   recommendations   on   how   to   link   these   opportunities   to   recovery  
processes  are  offered  in  the  following  section.    
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To  advance  the  field  of  post-­‐‑conflict  HE  various  recommendations  can  be  made  in  
relation   to   the  study.  These  can  be  categorised  as  methodological,   theoretical,   and  
applied   or   practical   recommendations.   Rather   than   simply   listing  
recommendations,  a  discussion  will  follow  that  analyses  the  predicted  utility  of  the  
various  recommendations  in  light  of  the  conclusions  of  the  thesis.    
  
10.2.1. Methodological  Recommendations  
  
Based  on   the  experience  of   completing   this   thesis  a  major   theoretical   finding  with  
implications   for   methodology   is   that   the   HE-­‐‑recovery   relationship   should   be  
viewed   as   a   complex   and   multi-­‐‑dimensional   relationship   manifested   in   a   wide  
range  of  processes,  sectors,  and  activities.583  The  theoretical  framework  attempted  to  
analyse   the  mechanisms   through  which  HE   could   contribute   to   recovery  many  of  
which  are  classified  as  externalities  or  wider  social  benefits  of  HE   that  can   impact  
upon  the  multiple  facets  of  recovery.  Furthermore,  it  has  been  held  that  externalities  
of  HE  are  for  this  reason  difficult  to  measure  precisely  (Rizzo  2004),  despite  Tilak’s  
(2008)  observation   that  common-­‐‑sense  understandings  of   the  social  benefits  of  HE  
have   motivated   public   investment   in   advanced   learning   since   its   emergence   in  
ancient  civilisations.    
The  methodological   implication   for   future   researchers   is   that   innovative   ways   of  
recognising,  identifying,  and  measuring  the  non-­‐‑basic  and  non-­‐‑linear  contributions  
of  HE   to   recovery  must   be   developed.   This   thesis   has   attempted   to   develop   such  
means,   principally   through   the   theoretical   framework   in   chapter   three   that  
identified   the   theorised   functions   of   HE   and   the   comparative   methodology   that  
examined  two  case-­‐‑studies  intensively  in  terms  of  the  views  and  perspectives  of  key  
actors   from   within   the   two   cases   that   shed   light   on   the   complex   post-­‐‑conflict  
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environment   of  HE   in   its   relation   to   recovery.  However,   it   is   recognised   that   this  
approach   has   limitations   including   the   small   number   of   cases   considered   in   this  
study   which   weakens   the   generalisability   of   conclusions   and   the   constraints   on  
methodological   approaches   posed   by   the   challenging   post-­‐‑conflict   environments.  
For   this   reason,   if   a   complete   understanding   of   the   under-­‐‑studied   field   of   HE   in  
post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   is   to   be   reached   through   further   research   alternative  
methodological   approaches   and   techniques   must   be   employed   to   generate  
knowledge  of  the  field  from  multiple  perspectives.    
On   a   more   practical   note,   in   chapter   four   it   was   shown   that   there   are   several  
methodological   dilemmas   and   problems   typically   encountered   whilst   conducting  
fieldwork   in   post-­‐‑conflict   settings   including   issues   of   access,   trust,   fear,   and  
insecurity.  Based  upon   reflection  on   the   experience  of   fieldwork   for   this   thesis,   in  
particular   the   field  visit   to  Libya,   the   following   recommendations   are   intended   to  
contribute   to   the  small  but  growing  area  of  methodology   in  post-­‐‑conflict   recovery  
studies.    
v Trust:  It  was  seen  that  during  fieldwork  in  Libya  issues  of  trust  arose  due  to  
the  status  of   the   fieldwork  zone  as  a  post-­‐‑conflict   crisis-­‐‑ridden  context,   the  
culture  of  suspicion  borne  out  of  Qaddafi’s   repressive  state  apparatus,  and  
fears   of   espionage   following   the   August   2012   US   Embassy   Attack   in  
Benghazi.584  As  a   result   it  was  necessary   to  undertake  various  measures   to  
establish  trust  with  participants.  This  involved  formal  means  such  as  letters  
of   introduction   and   informal   means   including   mutual   contacts   who  
provided   an   introduction   to   participants   which   was   important   to  
participants   ‘opening-­‐‑up’,   in   particular   when   discussing   controversial   or  
political  issues.    
  
v Snowball   sampling:   Several   contributions   to   the   literature   on   conducting  
fieldwork  in  conflict-­‐‑affected  and  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts  recommend  utilising  
a  snowball  sampling  technique  to  overcome  some  of  the  obstacles  to  access  
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that  those  particular  types  of  settings  pose  (Cohen  &  Arieli  2011;  Clark  2006).  
The   experience   of   carrying-­‐‑out   research   for   this   thesis   suggests   that  
snowball   sampling   enabled   obstacles   to   access   and   availability   of  
participants  to  be  surmounted  in  both  the  cases  of  Iraq  and  Libya  and  in  this  
respect   supports   the   findings   of   others585   that   snowballing   represents   an  
effective  methodological  approach  to  sampling  in  post-­‐‑conflict  settings.    
  
v Flexibility:  The  Libyan  context  of  state   fragility,   localised  conflict,  protests,  
and   the   high   presence   of   non-­‐‑state   armed   groups   posed   some   logistical  
problems   to   fieldwork   plans.   This   necessitated   a   flexible   approach   to  
maximising   the   time   spent  during   the   field.   For   example,  during   a  visit   to  
Benghazi   University   student   protests   which   were   amongst   the   most  
disruptive   in   2012   shutdown   the   institution   rendering   planned   interviews  
that   day   impossible   to   complete.  However,   this   created   an   opportunity   to  
observe   the  protests   and  hold   informal   conversations  with   students  which  
provided  rich  insights  that  would  not  have  been  available  during  a  standard  
day   of   interviews.   Moreover,   in   chapter   four   it   was   explained   that  
limitations   in   access   to   Iraq   for   fieldwork   required   flexible   strategies  
including   utilising   displaced   scholars   as   a   sample   population   and   email  
interviews.  This  finding  supports  previous  research  holding  that  flexibility  is  
vital   to   effective   research   in   post-­‐‑conflict   zones   (Barakat   &   Ellis   1996;  
Goodhand  2000;  Deely  2005).  
  
v Personal  relationships:  It  is  recommended  that  researchers  pay  attention  to  
building   human   relationships   in   difficult   contexts   such   as   conflict-­‐‑affected  
and   post-­‐‑conflict   countries.   It   was   found   that   in   the   field   personal  
relationships   enabled   the   researcher   to  navigate   the  practical  difficulties  of  
fieldwork.  In  particular,  in  Libya,  having  a  close  confidante  enabled  security  
dangers  to  be  identified  thus  allowing  greater  ease  of  access.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




10.2.2. Theoretical  Recommendations  
  
This   thesis   has   been   exploratory   in   nature   and   concerned   with   theory-­‐‑building  
rather  than  theory-­‐‑testing.  This  is  due  first  to  the  lack  of  systematic  research  into  HE  
and  post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   and   the   fact   that  much   existing  work  does  not   adopt   a  
global   perspective.   Furthermore,   the   discipline   of   post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   studies   is  
an   emerging   field   and   there   are   relatively   few   attempts   at   broad   theorisation   of  
post-­‐‑conflict   recovery   (Barakat   &   Zyck   2009).   A   major   output   of   the   thesis   is  
therefore  an  original  and  early  theorisation  that  advances  understanding  of  the  HE-­‐‑
recovery   relationship.   The   major   theoretical   recommendation   is   therefore   that  
viewing  HE  as   a  potential  pillar  of   recovery  advances  our  understanding  of  post-­‐‑
war   reconstruction   by   recognising   the   significantly   under-­‐‑utilised   resource   of  HE  
capacity.    
Beyond   this   increased   understanding,   a   number   of   novel   theoretical   insights   into  
HE  and  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery  are  offered  below.    
v Developmentalism:   A   significant   element   of   the   theoretical   framework  
advanced  in  this  thesis  was  the  advanced  understanding  of  the  role  of  HE  in  
development.  Due  to  constraints  of  space  chapter  one  could  only  provide  a  
broad  narrative  and  analysis  of  development  in  relation  to  HE.586  However,  
it   is   recommended   that   study   of   HE   in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   views   the  
subject   at   least   in   part   through   the   concepts   and   tools   offered   by  
development   theory,   for   instance,   the   role   of   HE   in   driving   post-­‐‑war  
economic  recovery  and  improving  institutional  quality.    
  
v Contextual   Understanding:   Analysis   of   post-­‐‑conflict   peacebuilding   and  
recovery  cases  requires  an  in-­‐‑depth  understanding  of  local  contextual  issues  
(Berdal   2009),   a   finding   that   applies   equally   to   HE’s   role   in   post-­‐‑conflict  
settings.   In   particular   it   has   been   seen   that   the   role   of   conflict,   culture,  
history,  and  politics  shape  the  post-­‐‑conflict  environment  in  powerful  ways.  
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Moreover,  understanding   this   context   is  vital   for   external   intervention  and  
assistance  to  be  effective  in  rebuilding  damaged  HE  systems,  in  particular  in  
recognising  and  working  with  existing  capacity.      
  
v Human   capital   to   capabilities:  While  HE   has   been   held   to   function   as   an  
important   means   of   re-­‐‑pooling   depleted   post-­‐‑war   human   capital   stocks,  
narrow  economistic  human  capital  theory  cannot  capture  the  scope  of  HE’s  
potential   contribution   to   development   in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts.587   Rather,  
theories  of  HE  in  terms  of  creating  the  conditions  enabling  the  enhancement  
of   human   capabilities   (Tilak   2002a;   Walker   2010;   Mehrotra   2005)   better  
reflect  the  sector’s  holistic  and  multi-­‐‑dimensional  potential.588    
  
  
10.2.3. Applied  Recommendations  and  Agenda  for  Action  
  
Improving  practice  in  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery  processes  in  relation  to  HE  is  an  aim  of  
the   study   and   for   this   end   a   range   of   recommendations   can   be  made.   Reflecting  
globally  on  lessons  learned  and  best-­‐‑practice  from  a  wide  range  of  cases  should  be  
expected   to   greatly   assist   policy-­‐‑makers   in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts.   However,   it   is  
acknowledged   that   responses  must  be  adapted  and   tailored   to   fit   the   specific   and  
idiosyncratic   features  of   the  context   in  which   they  are   implemented.   In   this   spirit,  
the   following   recommendations   are   not   prescriptive   one-­‐‑size-­‐‑fits-­‐‑all   recipes   for  
success,   rather   they   should   be   taken   as   a   contribution   to   a   reflective   process   of  
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To  executive  bodies  and  reconstruction  planners  
v Increased   and   timely   funding   for   HE   reconstruction.   It   is   important   to  
lobby  for  increased  funding  to  the  HE  sector  at  an  early  stage.589  Over  time  
alternative  funding  sources  can  be  generated;  however  short-­‐‑term  needs  of  
rebuilding   damaged   HEIs   may   require   emergency   budgets   and   capital  
investment.  Other  financing  options  should  be  pursued,  for  example,  user-­‐‑
fees  could  be  introduced  in  the  medium-­‐‑term  to  long-­‐‑term  when  supporting  
institutions  such  as  banking  and  insurance  are  in  place  to  mitigate  negative  
equity  and  access  effects.  The  case  for  HE  reconstruction  should  be  made  as  
early  as  possible  and  preferably  as  part  of  any  early  needs  assessment.  
  
v Whole-­‐‑of-­‐‑government   approach.   A   central   argument   of   the   thesis   is   that  
HE  connected  with  many  sectors  of  recovery.  To  harness  the  potential  of  the  
HE      sector   for   these   various   sectors   it   is   recommended   to   integrate  
Ministries  of  Higher  Education,  Planning,  Science  and  Technology,  Labour,  
Finance,   Education,   and   other   relevant   line   ministries   into   a   joined-­‐‑up  
governance   framework.   Furthermore,   Ministries   could   produce   a   joint  
human  capital/resources  plan  and  offer  clear  guidance  to  the  HE  system  on  
priority  areas  for  enrolments,  internal  investment,  and  scholarships.  
  
v Higher   Education   Council.   At   the   beginning   of   transition   a   Higher  
Education  Council  with   strong  executive  backing  should  be   formed  under  
joint  stewardship  of  the  MoHE  and  Ministry  of  Planning  or  Reconstruction,  
or   another   body   responsible   for   reconstruction   planning.   Establishing   a  
council   would   enable   the   policy-­‐‑coherence   of   HE   with   reconstruction  
priorities   and   activities   that   are   crucially   supported  by  high   level  political  
will.  The  council  should  form  a  draft  charter  to  form  a  provisional  basis  for  
a   national   vision   for   HE.   To   ensure   the   legitimacy   of   the   Council   its  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




membership   should   be   inclusive   and   representative   of   all   major   social,  
political  and  religious  groups.    
  
v National   Vision.   It   has   been   seen   that   weak   vision   was   a   major   limiting  
factor   in   post-­‐‑conflict   HE.590   It   is   therefore   recommended   that   national  
bodies   take   action   to   develop   a   national   vision   and   strategy   for   HE.   It   is  
advised  that  the  process  of  arriving  at  a  vision  is  almost  as  important  as  the  
product   of   that   process.   For   this   reason   the   process   should   form   an   open  
and   participatory   consultation   including   all   relevant   stakeholders.   Such   a  
process   could   bridge   divisions   within   the   academic   community   and  
coalesce  it  around  recovery  goals  thus  reducing  future  resistance  to  reforms  
by  faculty  members.    
  
v Focus  on  capacity-­‐‑building.  A  major  argument  of  this  thesis  is  that  HE  has  
the  potential  to  be  an  important  sector  in  capacity-­‐‑building  efforts  which  are  
central   to   post-­‐‑conflict   reconstruction.591   An   assessment   of   capacity   in   all  
ministries   and   agencies   should   be   conducted   to   identify   how   HE   can  
support   capacity-­‐‑building   at   the   national-­‐‑level.   Furthermore,   scholarship  
programmes   in   specialisms   not   available   domestically   and   investment   in  
domestic  HE  capacity  in  disciplines  supplying  core  state  functions  including  
law,  public  administration,  and  economics  could  make  a  major  contribution  
to  civil  service  modernisation  and  professionalisation.  These  disciplines  and  
focuses  are  widely  applicable  to  the  task  of  statebuilding  and  could  form  the  
core   of   a   transitional   HE   recovery   strategy   until   the   Higher   Education  
Council   develops   longer-­‐‑term   projections   on   HE   priorities   as   part   of   a  
national  vision  and  strategy  for  the  sector.    
  
v Plan   During   Conflict.   In   the   aftermath   of   WWII   the   enormous   task   of  
rebuilding   in   many   countries   included   a   strong   role   for   HE.   In   fact,  
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planning   for   the  reconstruction  of  HE   in  defeated  Germany  (Phillips  1986)  
and   its   role   in   the  UK   and  US   (Hook   1942)  was   taking  place   years   before  
victory   was   inevitable.   Waiting   for   the   bullets   to   stop   may   represent   a  
missed  opportunity  to  consider  the   long-­‐‑term  basis   for  HE,  a  complex  and  
multi-­‐‑dimensional   system,   in   its   integration   with   post-­‐‑war   planning.  
Moreover,   it   should  be  recognised  that  scholar  rescue  schemes  such  as   the  
Scholar  Rescue  Fund  afford  an  opportunity  to  international  actors  to  engage  
in  ‘during  the  conflict’  brainstorming  and  planning  with  displaced  scholars  
for  post-­‐‑conflict  HE.  
  
To  Ministries  of  Higher  Education  and  relevant  national  bodies  
v ‘Get  Your  House   in  Order’.  At   the  start  of  any   transition,  Ministries  must  
look   thoroughly   at   internal   restructuring,   capacity   needs,   and   governance  
issues   –   or   simply   to   ‘get   your   house   in   order’.   Furthermore,   Ministries  
should   address   these   issues   at   the   university-­‐‑level.   In   particular,   political  
will   is   needed   to   ensure   transparency   and   integrity   mechanisms   are  
implemented   and   to   overcome   complex   domestic   political   economies   that  
pose  an  obstacle  to  reform.    
  
v Policy  Transfer.  Consider  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  various  models  
and  policies   of  HE   as   a   step   in  post-­‐‑conflict   policy-­‐‑making.  While  models  
including  the  UAE,  Qatar,  Singapore,  and  the  USA  are  popular  post-­‐‑conflict  
countries   are   advised   to   look   beyond   these   normal   development   contexts  
and   consider   the   lessons   learned   from   other   post-­‐‑conflict   and   fragile  
states.592  While  there  is  no  one-­‐‑size-­‐‑fits-­‐‑all  blueprint  careful  consideration  of  
past   lessons,   when   contextualised   and   systematically   compared,   can  
improve  HE  policy.  It  is  recommended  that  Ministries  of  Higher  Education  
establish   a   unit   for   policy-­‐‑transfer.   Moreover,   twinning   with   foreign  
institutions   could   aid   the   development   of   recovery   planning   and   strategy  
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  See	  sections	  3.3.2.4	  and	  8.3.3.5	  for	  analysis	  of	  policy	  and	  institutional	  transfer	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  HE	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through   inputs   of   expertise,   resources,   and   knowledge   from   outside   the  
country.    
  
v Establish   a   Reconstruction   Consultancy   Office.   To   harness   existing   HE  
capacity   in   the   rebuilding   and   reconstruction   process   an   outreach   office  
should   be   established   in  major   universities   or   a   central  ministry.  A   list   of  
experts   could   be   collated   and   distributed   to   companies,   government  
agencies,  NGOs,  and  international  bodies  working  in  transitional  activities.  
Benefits  would   include   greater   use   of   national   expertise   in   reconstruction  
thus   stimulating   employment,   strengthening   ownership,   and   inputs   by  
actors  with  deep  contextual  understanding  of   their  society.593  Furthermore,  
greater  use  of  university-­‐‑based  personnel   in   reconstruction  projects  would  
provide  an  additional  source  of   income  which  could  enable  universities   to  
achieve   greater   autonomy   from   the   state   where   finances   were   previously  
dependent   on   public   sources.   Moreover,   participation   in   reconstruction  
activities  would  strengthen  HE  capacity  and  stimulate  new  knowledge  and  
research  into  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery.    
  
v Public-­‐‑private   partnerships.   Where   state   capacity   is   weak   and   unable   to  
effectively   regulate   expansion   of   private   universities   the   government   can  
provide   an   initial   financial   allocation   to   private   institutions   in   order   that  
they   comply   with   a   minimum   level   of   government   regulations   such   as  
capping   student   fees   to  meet   equity   objectives,   and   following   national   or  
existing  curricula.  This  arrangement  would  be  based  on  an  agreement  that  
the   university   will   transition   from   private   status   to   a   public-­‐‑private  
partnership  in  the  medium-­‐‑term.594  This  option  would  enable  fast  expansion  
based   on   the   typical   high   demand   for   HE   in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   and  
mitigate  at  least  some  of  the  contradictions  and  distortions  of  rapid  private  
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  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  utilisation	  of	  domestic	  HE	  capacity	  in	  reconstruction	  and	  recovery	  processes	  
see	  sections	  3.2.2,	  6.2.2,	  and	  8.2.2	  
594	   See	   section	   8.4.1	   where	   it	   was	   seen	   that	   a	   President	   of	   a	   private	   university	   in	   Libya	   gave	  
unqualified	  support	  to	  the	  potential	  of	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	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sector   expansion   seen   in   many   post-­‐‑conflict   settings.   While   it   may   be  
questioned   whether   the   state   has   the   institutional   capacity   to   enforce  
compliance,  this  is  not  the  central  issue,  because  it  is  an  incentive  or  carrot,  
not   a   stick.  More   relevant   is   that   to  be   effective   there  must  be  a  degree  of  
confidence  that  the  state  will  improve  its  capacity,  honour  its  commitment,  
and  that  war  will  not  break  out.    
  
v Encourage  not-­‐‑for-­‐‑profit  HEIs.  In  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts  where  private  HEIs  
emerge   outside   of   state   regulatory   authority   the   tendency   of   new  
institutions   to   be   for-­‐‑profit   institutions   that   make   low   developmental  
contribution595   could   be   ameliorated   if   assistance   was   offered   to   private  
HEIs   in   linking  with   diaspora   and   local   individuals   and   foundations   that  
could  provide  grants  or  endowments.  National  authorities  could  in  this  way  
provide   complementarities   including   communications,   networks,   and  
legitimacy   that  have   the  potential   to   incentivise   for-­‐‑profit   universities   and  
colleges   to  become  not-­‐‑for-­‐‑profit  HEIs.  This  could  have  a  major   impact  on  
the   trajectory   of   private   HE   expansion   and   increase   the   public   goods  
function   of   these   HEIs   thereby   having   a   greater   impact   on   long-­‐‑term  
recovery  and  development.    
  
v Elite  universities.   To   some  degree   it   is   advisable   to   concentrate   resources  
on   the   strengthening   or   establishment   of   elite   universities.596   In   any   HE  
system   there   is   a  differentiation  of   types   of   institution  with   large   research  
universities  constituting  a  relatively  low  proportion.  In  post-­‐‑conflict  settings  
the  ideal  of  a  research  university  is  often  far  from  the  reality  of  universities.  
However,   the   theorised   benefits   of   HE   to   the   core   tasks   of   post-­‐‑conflict  
reconstruction   and   statebuilding   can   best   be   served   by   elite   research  
universities   that   are   expensive   to  maintain.  While   expanding   access   is   an  
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  See	  sections	  3.3.2.2,	  3.4.1,	  6.4.1,	  and	  8.4.1	  for	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  private	  HE	  as	  a	  policy	  response	  
to	   post-­‐conflict	   HE	   recovery	   including	   the	   finding	   that	   many	   participants	   qualified	   their	   limited	  
support	   for	   private	   universities	   that	   any	   new	  private	   providers	   should	   operate	   on	   a	   not-­‐for-­‐profit	  
basis.	  
596	  See	  section	  8.4.1	  for	  analysis	  of	  the	  option	  of	  establishing	  a	  new	  elite	  university	  in	  Libya	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important   goal,   it   is   crucial   that   resources   are   not   spread   too   thinly   to  
produce  genuine  domestic  capacity  able  to  supply  high  levels  of  skills  and  
knowledge   for  recovery.  Concerns  with  elite  and  urban  bias  built   into   this  
option  are  dealt  with  below.  
  
v Solicit   Private   Sector   Funding.   Firms   and   enterprises   operating   in   post-­‐‑
conflict  countries  should  consider  investing  in  HEIs.  In  the  long-­‐‑term,  it  is  of  
mutual   benefit   to   firms   and  universities;   universities   gain   resources  while  
firms   gain   staff   with   advanced   skills   geared   to   their   human   resource  
requirements,   knowledge   of   local   conditions,   and   at   lower   cost   than  
international   staff.   This   model   is   applicable   in   particular   in   resource-­‐‑rich  
post-­‐‑conflict   states   including  Angola  or  Libya  where,   for   example,   oil   and  
gas   companies   should   be   expected   to   contribute   towards   engineering   and  
related  disciplines.    
  
v Incentivise   Returnees.   Diaspora   and   expatriate   nationals   are   a   major  
potential   resource   for   rebuilding   university   capacity   and   for   general  
reconstruction   in   post-­‐‑conflict   countries.597   Incentives   should   be   offered   to  
stimulate   returns   of   highly-­‐‑skilled   professionals  who   enjoy   a   comparative  
advantage   in   connecting   with   individuals   and   institutions   outside   of   the  
country.   However,   care   should   be   taken   to   avoid   the   creation   of  
antagonisms  between  existing   faculty  members  and  returnees,  particularly  
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   3.2.2	   for	   discussion	   of	   incentivising	   returnees	   as	   an	   aspect	   of	   re-­‐pooling	   human	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   for	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   and	   recovery,	   section	   6.4.4	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   ‘brain	   gain’	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   the	   context	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To  Donors  and  Agencies  
  
v Pooled   Funding   Mechanisms.   Developing   innovative   pooled   financing  
mechanisms   such   as   multi-­‐‑donor   trust   funds   to   support   HE   in   fragile  
conflict-­‐‑affected  contexts  would  be  a  major  advance.  HE  requires  significant  
financial   resources   that   are   difficult   to  mobilise   in   fragile   conflict-­‐‑affected  
contexts.   Pooled   funding  would   enable   long-­‐‑term   sustainable   financing   of  
HE  rebuilding,  enhance  domestic  ownership  of  HE  policy  in  contexts  where  
Ministries   are   highly   dependent   on   donor   financing,   and   ensure   that   the  
recovery  of  HE  is  integrated  with  the  recovery  of  other  sectors.    
  
v Innovate  with  other  financing  options.  Options  including  micro-­‐‑financing  
schemes  should  be  explored  particularly  in  contexts  where  state  capacity  is  
minimal  to  non-­‐‑existent,  such  as  Somalia.  Such  schemes  could  build  on  local  
energy   and   enthusiasm   for   HE.   Furthermore,   access   to   low-­‐‑interest   loans  
could  widen  access  and  improve  equity  in  fragile  contexts  where  private  HE  
emerges  in  response  to  state  weakness  and  where  capacity  to  address  equity  
concerns  raised  by  private  provision  is  low.    
  
v Support  in-­‐‑country  investment.  Donors  have  been  criticised  for  providing  
assistance   in-­‐‑kind   as   scholarships   for   study   in   the   donor   country   thus  
subsidising  domestic  institutions  rather  than  supporting  sustained  capacity  
development   in   recipient   societies.598   Donors   should   therefore   link  
assistance  to  recipient  needs  and  prioritise  in-­‐‑country  investment.    
  
v Integrate   capacity-­‐‑building   via   higher   education.   Donor   and   agency  
capacity-­‐‑building  initiatives  could  benefit  from  a  long-­‐‑term  perspective  that  
utilises  domestic  HE  capacity,  for  example,  supporting  the  establishment  of  
public  administration  and  public  policy  departments  or  investing  in  existing  
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  3.4.3	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capacity   in   these   areas   that   could  make   a   significant   contribution   to   state  
and   capacity   development.   One   recommendation   is   that   an   inter-­‐‑agency  
capacity  development  centre  with  certificate  awarding  powers  is  established  
in-­‐‑country  where  visiting   staff   can  deliver   lectures   and  advanced   facilities  
can  be  built.   If  such  a  collaborative  effort  were  to  succeed  it  could  offer  an  
innovative   means   of   improving   post-­‐‑conflict   capacity   and   reduce   out-­‐‑of-­‐‑
country   training   and   capacity   building   costs.   Moreover,   in   the   long-­‐‑term  
such  a  centre  would  provide  an  established  unit  that  could  either  transition  
to  ownership  by  a  national  university  as  a  policy  and  public  administration  
training  centre  or  become  a  public-­‐‑private  or  not-­‐‑for-­‐‑profit  private  degree-­‐‑
awarding  body  in  its  own  right.    
  
v Share   knowledge   and   best-­‐‑practice.   The   knowledge-­‐‑base   on  HE   in   post-­‐‑
conflict  contexts   is  very  weak.  While  an  increasing  number  of  projects  and  
programmes   have   been   funded   in   post-­‐‑conflict   HE   sectors   over   the   past  
decade  very  little  has  been  published  in  the  way  of  evaluation.  Evaluations  
and   assessments   of   programmes   should   be   undertaken   to   uncover   the  
effectiveness  of  current  practice  and   identify  common  obstacles.  Given   the  
emerging  status  of  this  field  such  knowledge  would  provide  a  very  valuable  
input.      
  
v Increase   interaction   with   higher   education.   In   chapter   three   it   was   seen  
that  ‘southern  universities’  in  conflict-­‐‑affected  and  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts  are  
generally  excluded  from  debates  over  fragility,  peacebuilding  and  recovery  
at   the   global   level.599   However,   they   are   well-­‐‑positioned   to   contribute.  
International   agencies   working   in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   should   therefore  
seek   to   integrate   domestic   academics   into   policy-­‐‑making,   reconstruction  
activities,   and   research   and   knowledge   production   activities   related   to  
statebuilding,  peacebuilding,  and  recovery.    
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  3.2.9	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To  Higher  Education  Institutions  
v Curricular   Review.   In   order   to   improve   the   quality   of   HE   and   make   a  
positive  contribution  recovery  it  is  recommended  that  HEIs  take  early  action  
to   review   curricula   in   light   of   the   altered   post-­‐‑conflict   environment.600   To  
harness   the   capacity   of   the   sector   towards   recovery   it   is   important   that  
educational  content  is  made  relevant  to  social,  economic,  developmental  and  
transitional  needs.    
  
v Faculty  development.   It   is   important   to   identify   training  needs  and  devise  
programmes   of   further   study   to   redress   any   major   human   resources  
shortages   caused   by   conflict.   Furthermore,   by   collating   this   information   at  
an  early  stage  any  offers  of   international  assistance  such  as  scholarships  or  
staff  training  can  be  better  coordinated  and  address  genuine  needs.    
  
v Support  Reconciliation.  Where  civil  conflict  is  highly  divisive,  campus-­‐‑level  
reconciliation  should  be  prioritised  at  an  early  stage.  This  can  be  achieved  by  
promoting   contact   between   adversaries   through   holding   meetings,  
conferences,  and  sporting  and  cultural  activities  which  create  bridging  social  
capital.601   Furthermore,   in   divided   societies  where   students  may  meet   ‘the  
other’   for   the   first   time  acclimatisation  and  cultural  awareness   training  can  
be   provided.602   Beyond   the   campus,   inter-­‐‑university   collaboration   and  
regional   university   networks   can   promote   wider   interactions   and  
reconciliation.    
  
v Conflict   Sensitivity.  A   cross-­‐‑cutting   finding   of   this   thesis   is   that   post-­‐‑war  
HE  policy  and  practice  should  be  conflict-­‐‑sensitive.  This  can  be  achieved  by  
protecting  minority   rights   through   the   study  of   languages,  history,   culture  
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  See	  sections	  8.2.2	  and	  8.2.4	  for	  findings	  relating	  to	  curricular	  review	  in	  post-­‐war	  Libyan	  HE	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  See	  section	  2.4	  
602	  See	  section	  3.2.7	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and  identities  of  local  and  national  communities.603  Furthermore,  inequalities  
can   be   identified   and   addressed   through   targeted   interventions   or  
affirmative   action   programmes.   For   instance,   it   is   recommended   that  
training   is  provided   for   staff   and   students   on   conflict   analysis   and  day-­‐‑to-­‐‑
day  skills  of  conflict  resolution.    
  
v Revitalisation.   In   the   wake   of   conflict   academic   communities   can   be  
fractured,   exhausted,   and   over-­‐‑whelmed   requiring   revitalisation   of  
community   ethos,   corporative   identity,   and   communication   channels.604   To  
address  this,  activities  and  programmes  may  be  held  including  workshops,  
reconciliation  work,  and  social  service  provision.  Furthermore,  for  this  end  it  
is   also   recommended   that   HEIs   communicate   their   mission   and   vision   to  
faculty   members,   staff,   students   and   the   wider   public   through   meetings,  
local  media,  and  public  consultation.    
  
v Psycho-­‐‑social   needs.   It   has   been   seen   in   the   cases   of   Iraq   and   Libya   that  
provision  of  psycho-­‐‑social  services   for   traumatised  students  was  poor  with  
negative   consequences.605   It   is   therefore   advised   that   HEIs   in   post-­‐‑conflict  
settings   place   emphasis   on   the   often   overlooked   psycho-­‐‑social   needs   of  
students,   faculty,   and   other   employees   that   arise   following   traumatic  
conflict-­‐‑induced  experience.    
  
  
On  University-­‐‑Society  Relations  
v Focus   on   public   outreach   and   communication.   It   is   important   to  
communicate   the  positive   impact  of  HE   through  public  outreach   including  
public   lectures,   activities,   and   media   strategies,   particularly   where   public  
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  See	  section	  3.2.7	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  See	  sections	  1.2,	  2.4.2,	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  6.3.2.2,	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  6.3.4	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  discussions	  relevant	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  See	  sections	  6.1.1	  and	  8.1.1	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perceptions  of  HE  are  low  and  an  obstacle  to  greater  state  investment  in  the  
sector.    
  
v Ensure   Relevance.   It   is   imperative   to   connect   teaching,   research,   and  
mission   to   social   and   developmental   needs   and   priorities   rather   than  
operating   as   an   ‘Ivory   Tower’.   Furthermore,   in   relation   to   the   above  
recommendation,  it  is  important  to  communicate  this  relevance  to  the  wider  
public  to  improve  university-­‐‑society  relations.    
  
v Economically   and   socially   benefit   local   communities.   By   providing  
employment,   public   facilities,   non-­‐‑university   training   and   skills  
development,   extension   projects,   and   local   community   development  
schemes  HE  can  make  a  positive  contribution  to  local  development.  This   is  
more   important   where   HEIs   operate   in   under-­‐‑served   and   marginalised  
regions  that  may  be  critical  to  stabilisation  and  conflict.    
  
v Spatially   integrate   with   local   communities.   Despite   the   challenging  
security   conditions   typical   of   post-­‐‑conflict   environments   there   is   a   need   to  
balance  security  with  openness  –  it  is  recommended  that  universities  do  not  
succumb  to  the  temptation  of  becoming  an  ‘academic  fortress’  (Yacobi  2008).  
Furthermore,   it   is  advised  not   to  spatially   locate  new  campuses  away  from  
residential  areas  where  opportunities  for  interaction  with  local  communities  
will  be  substantially  fewer.    
  
On  International  Cooperation  
v Get  branding  of  universities   right.   Internationalisation  was   found   to  offer  
many   opportunities   for   post-­‐‑conflict   HE   development.606   To   maximise  
opportunities   HEIs   are   recommended   to   ensure   self-­‐‑presentation   as  
attractive   partners.   This   can   be   aided   by   steps   such   as   maintaining  
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professional   websites   including   at   least   a   contacts   page   in   English,   and   a  
social   media   presence.   This   would   facilitate   cooperation   by   enabling  
information  sharing  and  easy  communications.  Moreover,  as  shown  by  the  
cases   of   Cote   D’Ivoire607   and   Iraq,608   HE   cooperation   can   create   positive  
international   legitimacy   for   post-­‐‑conflict   regimes   thus   promoting   further  
foreign  investment  in  other  sectors.    
  
v Be   strategically   selective.   Whilst   internationalisation   brings   many  
opportunities   there   are   also   challenges   and   dangers   involved.   For   this  
reason  it  is  recommended  that  HEIs  assess  all  offers  of  support  for  the  pros  
and   cons   rather   than   rushing   unquestioningly   into   the   first   offers   of  
cooperation  or   assistance   that   are   forthcoming.   It   is   important   to  prioritise  
cooperation   in   areas   of   key   strategic   concern   from   the   perspective   of  
reconstruction  and  development.    
  
v Consider   regional   and   South-­‐‑South   cooperation.   In   many   post-­‐‑conflict  
countries   a   strong   constituency   of   academics   have   a   preference   for  
cooperation   with   Western   institutions   due   to   their   prestige   and   the  
reputational   capital   gained   from   association   with   the   best   universities.  
However,   regional   partnerships   and   South-­‐‑South   cooperation   can   bring  
additional   benefits   including   cultural   familiarity,   spatial   proximity,   more  
equal   partnerships,   and   greater   probability   of   long-­‐‑term   sustainable  
cooperation.   It   should   be   qualified   that   these   forms   of   cooperation   are   to  
some   degree   also   subject   to   risks   of   dependency,   inequality,   and   self-­‐‑
interested  motivations.    
  
v Connect   to   global   civil   society.   It   is   recommended   that   the   potential  
opportunities   offered   by   the   emerging   global   network   of  NGOs,   charities,  
and  academic  organisations  are  recognised.  Efforts  should  be  made  to  learn  
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about  the  work  of  these  groups,  for  example,  the  Scholars  at  Risk  Network,  
the  NGO  SPARK,  and  the  Institute  of  International  Education.609  
  
  
To  Civil  Society    
There   is   a   strong   need   for   more   innovative   and   effective   ways   of   linking   civil-­‐‑
society  actors   to  peacebuilding  and  reconstruction   in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts   (Berdal  
2009,  p.141)  and  HE  arguably  offers  one  such  means.    
v Recognise   the   potential   of   universities   as   sites   of   civil   society  
development   and   ‘islands   of   tranquillity’.   Through   supporting   campus-­‐‑
based  student  unions,  organisations,  and   initiatives   that   function  as  crucial  
‘training   grounds’   for   organisational,   governance,   and   campaigning   skills  
civil  society  organisations  can  considerably  enhance  the  long-­‐‑term  prospects  
of  domestic  civil  society  development.610    
  
v Civil   Engagement   Centre.   By   promoting   volunteerism   and   recruiting  
members   from   the   student   body   for   civil   society   initiatives   beyond   the  
confines   of   the   campus   civil   society   actors   can   encourage   a   culture   of  
participation   and   civic   attitudes   while   developing   long-­‐‑term   human  
resources.   It   is   recommended   that   a   centre   for   civil   society   engagement   is  
established   that   could   provide   civic   education,   training,   and   opportunities  
for  participation  to  the  HE  community  and  also  the  wider  society.    
  
v For   international   civil   society,   base   assistance   on   needs   identified   in-­‐‑
country.   International   civil   society   actors   should   be   cognisant   of   potential  
unintended   consequences   of   their   actions   and   resistance   to   cooperation  
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being   perceived   as   driven   by   foreign   agendas.   Close   cooperation   and  
communication  with  domestic  civil  society  and  HE  communities  is  therefore  
recommended  to  ensure  that  assistance  coheres  with  national  priorities  and  
visions  for  HE  and  transition.    
  
  
To  the  Private  Sector  
v Communicate  human  resources  requirements.  While  much  onus   is  placed  
on  HEIs  in  aligning  with  economic  needs  the  private  sector  can  assist  in  the  
process  by  projecting   long-­‐‑term  requirements,   sharing  knowledge  with  HE  
and  planning  organisations,  and  cooperating  in  curricula  review  and  course  
development.    
  
v Cooperate   with   universities.   The   private   sector   should   recognise   that  
student   placements,   internships,   joint   supervision   and   other   forms   of  
cooperation   can   provide  mutual   benefit   by   providing   students   with   skills  
and   experience   relevant   to   the   needs   of   firms   and   enhancing   HE’s  
contribution  to  economic  recovery.    
  
v Support   student   entrepreneurship.   The   long-­‐‑term   prospects   of   private  
sectors   in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts  will   be   stronger   in   a   culture   of   innovation  
and  entrepreneurship.611  It  is  therefore  recommended  that  private  firms  and  
companies   recognise   that   students   and   young   people   represent   a   major  
resource  for  developing  entrepreneurial  skills  and  support  programmes  and  
initiatives   designed   to   encourage   student   initiative   and   entrepreneurial  
activity.    
  
v Seek   consultancy   and   advice   from   domestic   university   expertise.  Rather  
than   rely   exclusively   on   imported   consultants   domestic   firms   should  
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recognise   the  existing  capacity  and  expertise  offered   in-­‐‑country.  Large  and  
profitable   industries,   in   particular   extractive   industries,   have   a   social  
responsibility   to   invest   in   building   domestic   knowledge   and   research  
capacity   which   in   the   long-­‐‑term   is   in   the   self-­‐‑interest   of   firms   because   it  




Given   the   above   recommendations   it   is   impossible   to   do   all   at   once   and   it   is   not  
recommended   that   all   are   even   appropriate   in   any   given   context.   Furthermore,  
there  may  even  be   tensions  and  contradictions  between  various   recommendations  
and   the   major   conclusions   offered   in   this   thesis.   This   section   will   now   seek   to  
respond  in  broad  terms  to  some  of  the  main  counter-­‐‑arguments  anticipated  to  some  
of   the   assumptions   and   arguments   underlying   the   recommendations   and  
conclusions  offered  above.    
Increasing   investment   in   post-­‐‑conflict   HE   may   be   criticised   on   several   grounds  
including   that   it   perpetuates   an   urban   bias   that   is   inherent   in  much   international  
reconstruction  assistance   (on  urban  bias   see  Ozerdem  &  Roberts   2012).  While   this  
will  often  be  the  case  expansion  of  HE  beyond  urban  centres  and  capital  cities  into  
provincial   towns   and   under-­‐‑served   regions   can   in   fact   contribute   to   reducing  
uneven   educational   development   by   bringing  HE   to   rural   areas   and   furthermore  
support   rural   economic   development   through   agricultural   extension   in   areas  
including  animal  husbandry  and   farming   techniques,   for   example,   as  was   seen   in  
Omar  Mukhtar  University   in  Eastern  Libya.613  Moreover,   even   the  Rwandan  post-­‐‑
conflict   HE   strategy   that   was   criticised   for   favouring   an   urban   elite   constituency  
over  rural  pro-­‐‑poor  based  development  and  poverty  reduction  (Hayman  2007)  has  
in  fact  contributed  to  agriculture  through  research  and  university  outreach  (Butare  
2004).    
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This   leads   to   another   criticism,   that   post-­‐‑conflict   HE   has   an   elite   bias   that  
perpetuates   existing   class   divisions,   deepens   marginalisation,   and   in   particular  
where  ethnic,  religious,  or  regional  differences  overlap  with  elite/mass  distinctions  
can   constitute   a   major   grievance   with   potential   to   threaten   stability   in   fragile  
contexts.  It  should  be  qualified  that  in  all  countries  globally,  there  is  a  degree  of  elite  
stratification  in  HE.  Access  is  often  low  and  demand  far  outstrips  supply.  Further,  
private  HE  expansion  exacerbates  elite  bias  as  those  who  can  pay  gain  access.  With  
the  weakening  of  state  capacity  and  structural  adjustment  globally  private  service-­‐‑
delivery   expansion   has   reduced   post-­‐‑conflict   state   ability   to   redress   horizontal  
inequalities   (Langer,  Stewart  &  Venugopal  2011)  and   this  arguably  also  applies   to  
private  HE.  Where   state   capacity   is  greater   the   capacity   for  managing  elite  bias   is  
also  higher.  World  Bank  (2010b)  advice  to  post-­‐‑conflict  countries  including  Rwanda  
and   Burundi   to   introduce   user-­‐‑fees  with   loan   schemes   in  HE   can   be   expected   to  
reduce   state   capacity   to   redress   existing   inequalities   in   access   and   that   is   in   two  
cases  where  high   levels  of   inequality  have  been  persistent   throughout  episodes  of  
violent  conflict.    
From   another   perspective,   elite   theory   holds   that   social   and   political   power   is  
always   highly   concentrated   (Evans   2006).   This   is   frequently   more   so   in   poor  
countries   and   in   war   economies   where   a   small   number   of   actors   are   enriched.  
Recognising   the   unavoidable   centrality   of   elites   to   development,   Leftwich   (2009)  
and   others   have   stated   that   a   major   task   of   development   is   how   to   create  
developmental  elites.  As  Brannelly,  Lewis  &  Ndaruhutse  (2011)  argue  HE  can  play  
a   crucial   role   in   the   formation   of   developmental   elites   through   socialisation   and  
fostering  elite  networks  that  later  facilitate  the  solving  of  collective  action  problems  
that   hinder   development.   In   post-­‐‑conflict   societies   where   elites   are   divided   by  
conflict,   dissipated   by   displacement,   and   diminished   by   violence   the   elite  
reproduction   function   of  HE   can   arguably   be   viewed   as   a   positive   form   of   social  
renewal   and   elite   re-­‐‑pooling.   This   position   is   supported   by  Ghani,   Carnahan   and  
Lockhart   (2006)   who   argue   that   investment   in   tertiary   education   in   post-­‐‑conflict  
states  ‘enables  the  formation  of  elites  that  would  have  the  mental  models  and  skills  
to  become  stakeholders  and  shareholders  in  the  security  of  our  globalizing  world’.    
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Such   a   suggestion   may   be   criticised   by   those   favouring   popular   mass   social  
democracy   and  widespread   participation   as   an   alternative  model   to   elite-­‐‑led   top-­‐‑
down  liberal  peacebuilding.  However,   it   is   the  contention  here  that  HE  can  play  a  
role  in  elite  formation  as  part  of  the  wider  process  of  enabling  the  creation  of  post-­‐‑
conflict  developmental  states  able   to  catalyse  economic  and   industrial  growth  and  
job  creation  (Barbara  2008;  Briscoe  2008;  Reinert,  Amaizo  &  Kattel  2010).    
Another   argument   against   investment   in   HE   is   that   post-­‐‑conflict   countries   are  
typically  poor  whilst  facing  multiple  challenges  and  can  best  benefit  from  utilising  
the   existing  HE   capacity   of   neighbouring   countries,   regional   university   networks,  
and   further   afield   foreign   universities.   Certainly   in   the   short-­‐‑term,   in  most   cases,  
funding   scholarships   for   students   in   priority   fields   and   areas   not   provided  
domestically   is   a   sound   strategy.   However,   for   HE   and   research   to   have   a   truly  
developmental   role   a   domestic   and   public   HE   sector   is   vital   to   connecting  
knowledge  with  local  social  needs  and  problems.    
One  recommendation  of   the   thesis,   that   is   to  some  degree  concentrating  resources  
on  a  national  university  or  several  elite  universities,  and  several  key  disciplines  vital  
to   reconstruction,   in   fact   may   be   argued   to   intensify   rather   than   mitigate   the  
aforementioned   urban   and   elite   biases,   while   by   contrast   auguring   well   with  
Chauvet   and   Collier   (2007)   who   wish   to   see   domestic   public   HE   capacity  
dismantled  and  advanced  degrees  bought  from  overseas.  Regarding  elite  bias,  it  is  
highly  probable  that  elite  universities  will  be  concentrated  in  capital  cities  or  large  
commercial   cities.   Where   this   option   is   chosen   it   is   more   imperative   to   spread  
universities  into  rural  and  under-­‐‑served  areas  to  mitigate  this  bias.  For  elite  bias,  the  
concentration  strategy  privileges  elite   institutions  and  this   is  more   likely  to  favour  
the  social  and  political  elites  that  disproportionately  capture  the  higher  prestige  and  
prospects  within  the  system.  To  mitigate  this  problem  governments  and  donors  can  
make   additional   funding   of   strategically   favoured   programmes   contingent   upon  
open  and  meritocratic   selection  and  enrolment  processes.  This   recommendation   is  
not   suggesting   that   no   resources   be   allocated   to   other   universities.   Rather,   a  
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temporary   rebalancing   should   be  made   appropriate   to  meeting   the   twin   goals   of  
supplying  core  reconstruction  needs  and  equitable  access  to  HE.    
The   recommendation   that   HE   should   be   geared   towards   recovery   in   a   manner  
comparable  to  the  developmental  university  model  may  be  held  to  raise  a  point  of  
tension  with  the  suggestion  that  universities  should  be  afforded  greater  autonomy  
and   academic   freedom   should   be   protected.614   It   should   be   recalled   that   in   the  
context   of   the   developmental   university   in   Africa   the   protestations   of   some  
academics  that  academic  freedom  was  violated  in  the  drive  to  connect  universities  
to   the   task   of   development   were   rejected   by   proponents   of   developmentalism   as  
petty   bourgeoisie   defences   of   privilege   and   an   unwillingness   to   contribute   to  
national   development   (Ranger   1981;  Ake   1994).  A   similar   charge  may   be   levelled  
against   the   Recovery   University;   that   it   must   rely   on   coercive   state   power   that  
tramples   the   rights   of   academics   to   free   inquiry,   the   freedom   to   publish,   and   the  
autonomy  to  steer  the  direction  of  their  universities.    
However,   steps   can  be   taken   to  avoid   this  dilemma.  First,  national   recovery  goals  
that  frame  the  gearing  of  HE  to  recovery  should  be  generated  from  an  inclusive  and  
open   process   that   incorporates   major   stakeholders.   This   would   give   academics   a  
voice   and   build   confidence   around   the   goals   of   recovery   in   the   academic  
community.  Second,  in  the  implementation  of  recovery  priorities  persuasive  power  
and  incentives  should  be  utilised  rather  than  coercive  power.  For  example,  research  
priorities   should   be   linked   to   reconstruction,   recovery,   and   development   and   a  
nationally-­‐‑funded   grant   awarding   body   established   or   maintained   to   incentivise  
academics  to  connect  with  recovery  goals.    
However,  it  should  be  qualified  that  in  the  final  analysis  the  state’s  coercive  power  
may  be  necessary   to   enforce   compliance  with   recovery  priorities  which   should  be  
primary   to   maintaining   the   autonomy   of   units   of   HE   capacity   that   represent   a  
socially   sub-­‐‑optimal   utilisation   of   scarce   resources.   This   may   be   necessary   given  
that  HE   in   post-­‐‑conflict   contexts   addresses   the   critical   age   group   (17-­‐‑24)  which   is  
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highly   politicised   and   widely   considered   to   pose   the   greatest   conflict   risk  
(Goldstone  2002;  Rose  &  Greeley  2006;  Collier  2000;  Munive  2010).  State  action  may  
therefore  be  required  to  ensure  that  the  sector  maximises  its  potential  to  contribute  
to  stabilisation  and  recovery.    
This  argument  may  be  unpalatable  to  some,  or  even  held  to  be  contrary  to  universal  
human  rights  principles.  The  most  developed  and  effective  advocacy  networks  for  
HE   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   countries,   the   Scholars   at   Risk   Network,   SRF,   and   CARA  
adopt  a  rights-­‐‑based  framework  and  frame  the  issue  in  terms  of  academic  freedom  
(Quinn   2010;   Miller,   Riendeau   &   Rosen   2013;   Jarecki   &   Kaisth   2009).   It   may   be  
contended   that   this   is   an   argument   that   empowers   semi-­‐‑authoritarian   or  
authoritarian  regimes  to  discard  notions  of  academic  freedom  to  enforce  top-­‐‑down  
goals.    
It   can   be   stated   that   this   is   not   the   intention   behind   the   argument.   Rather,   the  
concept   of   ‘embedded   autonomy’   developed   in   Evans   (1995)   to   describe   state-­‐‑
business  relations  in  Brazil,  India,  and  South  Korea  can  be  fruitfully  applied  in  this  
context   to  elucidate   the   type  of  state-­‐‑university  relationship  envisaged.  Embedded  
autonomy   refers   to   cases  where   the   state   and   business   groups   embarked   on   joint  
projects  of  development  which  were  enabled  by  the  close  personal  and  professional  
relationships   between   bureaucrats   and   business   leaders.   The   ideal-­‐‑type   for   state-­‐‑
university   relations   in   post-­‐‑conflict   settings   would   be   where   universities   are  
embedded  in  a  national  project  of  recovery  yet  enjoy  relative  autonomy.  Crucial  to  
enabling   this   institutional   linkage   to   emerge   is   maintaining   communications  
between  the  state  and  HE  communities  and  generating  goodwill  which  could  itself  
be  achieved  through  strong  political  will  behind  a  guarantee  of  academic  freedom.  
Du   Toit   (2007)   argues   that   in   the   context   of   development,   university   autonomy  
should   be   conceived   as   part   of   a   social   compact;   it   is   the   argument   here   that  
academic   freedom   and   autonomy   in   post-­‐‑conflict   settings   should   be   conditional  
upon  a  broadly  held  recovery  compact  underpinned  by  an  inclusive  national  vision  




10.4. Future  Research  Agenda  
  
As  has  been  emphasised  throughout,  the  field  of  HE  in  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery  is   in  
its  infancy  and  this  thesis  is  the  first  to  offer  a  global  and  systematic  view.  However,  
a  single  study  cannot  redress  the  under-­‐‑development  of  the  field  and  for  this  reason  
an  expansion  of  research  in  the  area  would  be  a  welcome  development.  While  the  
literature   review  was   wide-­‐‑ranging   in   order   to   connect   the   diverse   contributions  
and   cognate   literatures   addressing   issues   of   relevance   to   the   study   a   number   of  
areas  of  future  research  were  touched  upon  but  not  explored  systematically  in  this  
thesis.  The   following   recommendations  aim   to  guide   research   into  useful   avenues  
for  the  emerging  field  of  knowledge  on  HE  and  post-­‐‑conflict  recovery.    
  
v Micro-­‐‑foundations:  While   this   thesis  has  addressed   the  macro-­‐‑relationship  
between  HE  and  reconstruction  strategy,  there  is  much  scope  for  work  that  
investigates   at   the   micro-­‐‑level   the   type   of   HE   practice,   reforms,   or  
interventions   that   can   contribute   effectively   to   recovery,   for   example,   by  
providing   classroom-­‐‑level   evidence   on   whether   participative   pedagogical  
approaches  have  any  impacts  on  student  attitudes  and  behaviour  that  could  
assist  in  stabilising  fragile  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts.    
  
v Regional  analysis:  The  scope  of  the  study  has  been  concerned  with  cases  of  
post-­‐‑conflict   reconstruction   defined   by   nation-­‐‑state   units   of   analysis.  
However,   as   Shahjahan   and   Kezar   (2013)   argue,   the   vast   majority   of   HE  
research   is   conducted   within   a   limiting   ‘methodological   nationalism’  
framework.   Considering   the   growing   inter-­‐‑connectedness   of   HE   systems  
with   the   plethora   of   new   trans-­‐‑national   and   regional   HE   networks   a  
potentially  rewarding  new  avenue  of  research  would  examine  HE  and  post-­‐‑
conflict  recovery  at  other  units  of  analysis,  for  example,  in  West  Africa  or  the  
Great  Lakes   region.  Moreover,   the   fast  growth  of   scholarship  on   the   ‘Arab  
Spring’  would   benefit   from  a  major   study   examining   the   role   of  HE   as   an  
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underlying  causative  factor  in  regional  uprisings  and  as  an  agent  in  driving  
post-­‐‑Arab  Spring  transitions.  
  
v Contexts   of   fragility:  While   the   dynamic   of   HE   in   fragile   states   has   been  
addressed  at  various  points  throughout  this  thesis,  there  remains  a  need  for  
systematic   research   that   investigates   the   problematic   of   HE   in   contexts   of  
fragility.  While   Tierney   (2011)   analyses   the   potential   role   of   HE   in   ‘fixing  
failed  states’   the  concept  of   fragility  better  captures   the  complex  and   inter-­‐‑
connected   drivers   of   conflict,   under-­‐‑development,   low   economic   growth,  
and  state  weakness  that  affect  many  countries  and  areas  globally  (Stewart  &  
Brown  2009).    
  
v Historical  analysis:  More  attention  should  be  paid  to  historical  case-­‐‑studies  
examining  HE’s  post-­‐‑war  role.  The  literature  review  in  chapter  three  briefly  
discussed   several   historical   cases   including   post-­‐‑WWII   Europe,   however,  
due   to   constraints   of   space   more   in-­‐‑depth   analysis   of   relevant   historical  
cases  was   not   possible.  While   this   thesis   has   examined   two   contemporary  
cases  new  historical  research  would  provide  a  much  richer  comparative  base  
of   knowledge   and   enable   more   robust   analysis   of   long-­‐‑term   trends,   for  
example,   the  differences   between   funding  modalities   and   rationales   of  HE  
assistance   to   post-­‐‑war   settings   in   the   early   Cold  War   and   post-­‐‑Cold  War  
periods.    
  
10.5. Concluding  Remarks  
  
The   above   discussion   addressed   some   implications   of   the   thesis,   consequences   of  
and   tensions   between   the   main   recommendations,   and   responses   to   counter-­‐‑
arguments.   It   is   intended   that   the   Agenda   for   Action   could   support   future   post-­‐‑
conflict   recovery  actors   in  harnessing   the  sector’s  potential   towards  reconstruction  
and   transition   goals.   A   main   conclusion   of   this   thesis   is   that   this   represents   a  
454	  
	  
potentially   beneficial   endeavour   and   a   realistic   prospect.   While   the   findings,  
conclusions,   and   recommendations   offer   support   to   this   position   it   is   recognised  
that  the  field  of  post-­‐‑war  recovery  and  HE  remains  significantly  under-­‐‑studied  and  
requires  further  research.  This  thesis  was  designed  to  redress  this  gap  and  further  it  
is  hoped  that  it  can  stimulate  greater  interest  in  the  area.    
It   can   finally   be   stated   that   this   thesis   concludes   that   higher   education   should   be  
conceptualised  as  an   important  pillar  of   recovery;   the   capacity  of  domestic  higher  
education  sectors  in  post-­‐‑conflict  contexts  is  an  often  under-­‐‑recognised  and  under-­‐‑
utilised  resource  of  considerable  potential  value  that  can  connect  to  a  wide  range  of  



















APPENDIX  A  –  A  BRIEF  HISTORY  OF  IRAQ  
Modern  Iraq’s  territories  were  formally  under  Ottoman  rule  until  1918  when  British  
rule  was  established.  British  colonial  policy  constructed  a  centralised  state  in  which  
the  minority   Sunnis  were   relied   upon   to   rule   (Stansfield   2007,   p.47).   On   14th   July  
1958   the   ruling  Hashemite  monarchy  was  overthrown  by  a  coup  d’etat   led  by   the  
Free  Officers  movement   (Tripp   2008,   p.144).   After   a   tumultuous   decade   of   coups  
and   counter-­‐‑coups   the   Ba’ath   party   gained   power   in   1968.   Iraq   under   the   Ba’ath  
party  developed  a  strong,  single  party,  highly-­‐‑centralised  state  under  an  ideology  of  
Arab   nationalism.   Under   Ahmad   Hasan   al-­‐‑Bakr’s   leadership   the   party   enjoyed  
some   popular   legitimacy   and   was   characterised   by   various   factions   with   al-­‐‑Bakr  
acting   as   mediator.   However,   in   1979   Saddam   Hussein   emerged   as   Ba’ath   Party  
leader   consolidating   power   around   himself   and   a   much   narrower   power-­‐‑base  
(Davis  2005b,  p.177).  Saddam  was  paranoid  about  internal  threats  to  his  regime  and  
power   resided   in   a   small   circle   of   close   confidants.   Over   time   this   circle   became  
more  familial  drawing  heavily  on  his  hometown  for  support  leading  to  the  label  the  
Tikriti  Ba’ath.    
  
Owen  (2007)  argues  that  Iraq’s  1950s  and  1960s  economic  path  was  typical  of  most  
developing   countries   in   its   transition   from  colonial  dependence   to   a   concern  with  
economic   development   and   independence.   While   oil   has   been   a   factor   in   Iraq’s  
economy   for   over   one   hundred   years,   in   the   1960s   oil   production   and   export  
accelerated   rapidly   (Zedalis   2009),   enabling   rapid   modernisation   and  
industrialisation   in   a   nationalised   and   highly-­‐‑centralised   interventionist  
development   path   (Mahdi   2007).   This   phase   of   ‘developmental   nationalism’  
(Bunton   2008)   driven   by   increased   oil   wealth   enabled   remarkable   progress   in  





Oil  revenues  account  for  over  90%  of  Iraq’s  wealth  and  the  country  is  held  to  be  a  
rentier   state   (Al  Khafaji   2004).   Iraq’s   economy  pre-­‐‑2003   is   often   characterised  as   a  
prime  example  of  a  top-­‐‑down  state-­‐‑controlled  Socialist  system.  Mahdi  (2007)  argues  
that   in   contrast   to   portrayals   of   the   Iraqi   economy   as   a   Soviet   monolith,   private  
enterprise  was  gradually  introduced  from  the  late  1970s  in  particular  after  the  Iran-­‐‑
Iraq  war.  Faced  with  many  problems  in  the  1990s,  Iraq  gradually  permitted  greater  
space  for  private  economic  activity.    
  
However,   strong   developmental   gains   were   reversed   by   wars   and   sanctions  
beginning   around   1980.   Social   problems   intensified   including   increased   illiteracy  
rates,   infant   mortality,   and   disease   due   to   deteriorated   health   and   education  
systems   (Ismael   2003;   Tripp   2008,   p.252).   The   Iran-­‐‑Iraq   war   marked   ‘one   of   the  
longest   and   costliest   conventional   wars   of   the   twentieth   century’   (Potter   &   Sick  
2004,   p.2),   and   initiated   many   economic   and   social   problems   as   resources   were  
allocated  to  military  rather  than  social  sectors  (Ismael  2003).  While  Alnasrawi  (2001)  
agrees   that   the   Iran-­‐‑Iraq  war,  militarisation,   and   the  Gulf  War  were  major   factors  
causing   reversal  he  argues   that  post-­‐‑Gulf  War   sanctions  played   the   largest   role   in  
devastating  social  and  economic  systems.    
  
Debates   over   Iraqi   identity   and   nationalism   are   important   to   this   study.   One  
argument   describes   Iraq   at   independence   as   a   British-­‐‑designed   highly   ‘artificial  
creation’  bringing  together  Sunni,  Shiite,  and  Kurds  in  a  state  that  empowered  the  
Sunni  minority  and  was  kept  together  through  the  monopoly  of  violence  (Stansfield  
2007,  p.47).  In  this  conception  communal  divisions  are  deeply  embedded  while  Iraqi  
nationalism  is  weak.  Visser  (2008)  holds  that  the  artificiality  position  is  ‘ahistorical’  
and  that   ‘the  concept  of   ‘Iraq’   is  enduring’.   It   is  held  that   Iraqi   ‘proto-­‐‑nationalism’  
emerged   prior   to   state   formation   (Lukitz   2009)   due   to   extensive   pre-­‐‑statehood  





Iraq   consists   of   diverse   ethnic   and   linguistic   groups   including   Arabs,   Kurds,  
Turkmen,   Christians,   Sabaeans,   and   Yezidis.   The   majority   (60-­‐‑70%)   follow   Shiite  
Islam  while  around  30-­‐‑40%  adheres  to  Sunni  Islam.  Diverse  communities  were  held  
together   under   a   relatively   cohesive   national   identity   under   the   Ba’ath   regime  
although   since   2003   ethnic,   sectarian,   and   communal   divisions   intensified   (Marr  
2007,  p.42).  Various  Iraqi  regimes  from  the  monarchy  onwards  ‘focused  on  fostering  
national  unity  and  in  the  process  denigrating  particularistic,  sub-­‐‑national  identities’  
(Dawisha   2008).   An   exception,   since   independence   latent   conflict   between   the  
central  state  and  Kurdish  separatism  erupted  into  outright  conflict  or  ‘civil  war’  in  
several   periods,   notably   the   1970s.   Bunton   (2008)   argues   that   ‘complex   and   fluid  




APPENDIX  B  –  A  BRIEF  HISTORY  OF  LIBYA  
Modern  Libya’s  territories  have  been  ruled  by  various  external  powers  throughout  
history  including  Phoenicians,  Greeks,  Romans,  and  Turks  (Wright  2010).  Ottoman  
control  ended  after  the  Italo-­‐‑Turkish  war  (1911-­‐‑12)  followed  by  Italian  colonial  rule  
from   1911.   Libya  was   the   staging   ground   for  WWII  North  Africa   campaigns   and  
was   lost  by   Italy   in  1943  with  a  French  and  British  UN  administration  controlling  
the  territory  until  independence  in  1951  (Vandewalle  2006,  pp.24-­‐‑40).    
Post-­‐‑independence  Libya,  a  federal  monarchy  under  King  Idris,  faced  the  challenge  
of  uniting  ‘three  very  different  regions’  (Owen  2004,  p.53);  Tripolitania,  Cyrenaica,  
and   Fezzan.   The   externally-­‐‑designed   state   structure   reflected   British,   French   and  
Western   interests   generally   (Wright   2010,   p.173).   The  monarchy’s   powerbase  was  
eastern   Cyrenaica   with   Tripolitania   the   most   populous   and   economically  
productive   region.   Pre-­‐‑independence,   most   Tripolitanians   favoured   a   central  
republican   system  while  Cyrenaicans   opted   for   a   federal   state.   This   once   divisive  
issue  passed  without  opposition  when  in  1963,  buoyed  by  growing  oil  revenues,  the  
King  abandoned  federalism  for  a  centralised  system  (Wright  2010,  p.180).    
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Libya   at   independence   had   one   of   the   lowest   per   capita   incomes   globally   ($25)  
facing   such   developmental   barriers   that   ‘if   Libya   can   be   brought   to   a   stage   of  
sustained  growth,  there  is  hope  for  every  country  in  the  world’  (Higgins  quoted  in  
Vandewalle  2006,  p.51).  Growth  prospects  improved  in  1959  with  oil’s  discovery.  In  
1961  the  first  crude  exports  were  traded  producing  the  first  significant  oil  revenues  
in  1963,  marking  a  watershed  in  development  (Mabro  1970).  Libya  possesses  ‘sweet  
and  light’  crude  oil  which  is  very  high  in  quality  and  demand.  Rapid  growth  in  oil  
exports   provided  vast  wealth   and   economic   transformation.  Oil   revenues   account  
for   a   very  high  percentage   of   national   income   and  Libya   is   a  prime   example   of   a  
rentier-­‐‑state.  
In   1969   a   coup   d’état   led   by   Colonel   Qaddafi   overthrew   the   monarchy.   Libya’s  
political  centre  of  gravity  decisively  shifted  from  Cyrenaica  to  Tripolitania.  Over  the  
next   four   decades   some   held   that   the   regime   neglected   Cyrenaica   to   weaken   the  
Sanusiyya  as  a  rival  power  centre.  Fezzan  remained  marginal  throughout;  its  most  
prosperous  period  was  when  trade  Saharan  routes  ran  through  its  oasis  towns  such  
as   Sabha   (Ahmida   2009).   Economically,   Qaddafi’s   coup   initiated   a   new   phase  
transforming   from   capitalist   to   socialist   state-­‐‑controlled   during   the   1970s   (St   John  
2011,   p.90).   Qaddafi   constructed   a   distributive   state   substantially   raising   living  
standards  (Martinez  2007,  p.18)  and  by  2010  Libyan  was  ranked  53rd  globally  in  the  
UN  Human  Development  Index.    
In  the  mid-­‐‑1970s  a  major  contest  within  Libya’s  state  emerged  over  future  direction  
(Vandewalle   2006,   p.100).  On  one   side,   technocrats   favoured   ‘an   orderly,   planned  
course   of   action   that   included   a   carefully   designed   economic   plan’   while  
revolutionaries  ‘wanted  to  pursue  a  more  activist  policy  that  sacrificed  some  of  the  
country’s   riches   for   the   sake   of   Arab   unity   and   other   ideological   pursuits’.  
Dissatisfied  with  his   revolution’s   impact,   in  1973  Qaddafi   and   the  RCC  embarked  
on  a  ‘popular  revolution’,  initiating  an  experimental  revolutionary  phase  (Anderson  
1986,   p.262).   By   1975   technocratic   rationalisation   lost   to   the   revolutionary  
Jamahiriya   experiment.   In   1977  Qaddafi   established   the   Jamahiriyya   based   on  his  
Third   Universal   Theory;   a   political   system   neither   communist   nor   capitalist   but  
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based  in  nationalism  and  religion  (St  John  2011,  p.56).  In  theory  a  ‘direct  democracy’  
existed   in   which   the   people   exercised   control   in   radically   decentralised   local  
committees.    
In   the  1980s  deep  economic  crisis  was  caused  primarily  by  declining  oil   revenues,  
sanctions,  and   ‘extravagant  and  ill-­‐‑judged  economic  policies’   (Martinez  2007,  p.16;  
St   John   2011,   p.90;   Pargeter   2012,   p.146).   Libya   was   forced   to   adopt   austerity  
measures  and   living   standards  declined  with   significantly   falling   income   levels   in  
the   mid-­‐‑1990s.   In   1988   state   monopoly   on   imports   and   exports   ended   allowing  
private  enterprises  to  re-­‐‑open  (Pargeter  2012,  p.150).    
Qaddafi  pursued  a  highly-­‐‑interventionist   foreign  policy,  unusual   for  a  small  state,  
supporting   national   liberation  movements   in  Africa   (Huliaras   2001)   and   the   PLO  
(Joffe   2008,   p.197).   Martinez   (2007,   p.59)   writes   that   ‘throughout   its   first   three  
decades,  the  Jamahiriya  was  in  a  constant  state  of  conflict’,  for  example,  with  Chad  
and  briefly  Egypt  (De  Waal  2006).  Libya’s  support  for  ‘terrorism’  including  alleged  
bombings  of  Pan  Am  and  Lockerbie   flights  brought  Libya   into  confrontation  with  
Western  powers   in  particular   the  US  and  UK.   In  April  1986   ‘Operation  El  Dorado  
Canyon’  was   launched  as  US  bomber  planes   from  British  bases   and  attack  planes  
from  US   aircraft   carriers   bombed   locations   in   Tripoli   and   Benghazi   (Kaldor   1986,  
p.1).   Libya   became   increasingly   isolated   from   Arab   neighbours   and   the  
‘international  community’  with  sanctions  imposed.  
The   1986   bombings   initiated   Libya’s   slow   transformation   from   ‘pariah   state’   to  
Western   partner   (Joffe   2008,   p.202).   In   the   early   2000s   Libya   dramatically   shifted  
foreign   policy   ceasing   its   WMD   programme,   re-­‐‑engaging   with   the   ‘international  
community’,  and  cooperating  in  the  ‘War  on  Terror’  (Martinez  2007).  Soon  after,  the  
regime   announced   far-­‐‑reaching   economic   reforms,   professed   commitment   to  
human   rights,   and  pursued  peaceful   reconciliation  with   internal   Islamist   enemies.  
Qaddafi’s   son,   Saif   Al-­‐‑Islam,   was   the   emblematic   figure   in   this   reform   process.  
Pargeter  (2010)  questions  whether  reform  was  ‘chimera  or  reality’,  concluding  that  
they  are  ‘a  means  of  preserving  the  status  quo  and  the  life  of  the  regime’.      
460	  
	  
It  should  be  noted  that  Libya  is  highly  religiously  homogenous  with  almost  100%  of  
its   population   following   Islam.   In   addition,   Arabs   are   the   majority   ethnic   group  
with   smaller   number   of   Amazigh   (Berber).   Compared   to   Iraq,   Libya   has   few  
significant   sectarian   cleavages   such   as   the   distinction   between   Sunni   and   Shiite.  





















APPENDIX  C  –  LIST  OF  INTERVIEWS  AND  FOCUS  GROUPS  
IRAQ  
1. Interview   with   Dr   Juliana   Dawood   Yusuf.   Lecturer   in   Linguistics   at   the  
University  of  Basra.  December  2010  in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
2. Interview  with   Ali   Baban.   Former  Minister   of   Planning   and  Development  
Cooperation,  Government  of  Iraq.  March  2013  in  Manchester,  UK.  
  
3. Interview  with  Dr  Akeel  T.  Al-­‐‑Kazwini.  Dean  of  School  of  Applied  Medical  
Sciences,  German  Jordanian  University.  
  
4. Interview  with   former   senior   Professor   and   President   of   the  University   of  
Basra  who  wishes  to  remain  anonymous.  December  2010  in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
5. Interview  with   a   former   lecturer   in   the   College   of   Political   Science   at   Al-­‐‑
Nahrain  University  in  Baghdad,  Iraq  and  IIE  Visiting  Professor  at  the  British  
Institute  in  Amman.  February  2011,  in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
6. Interview   with   Dr   Dhia   Shansal.   Ex-­‐‑Head   of   Metallurgy,   University   of  
Technology.  February  2011,  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
7. Interview  with   former   Professor   at   the   Faculty   of   Engineering   and   senior  
administrator  at  Al-­‐‑Nahrain  University.  January  2011,  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
8. Interview  with   former  Dean   of   Law   at   the  University   of   Basra.   December  
2010,  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
9. Interview   with   Dr   Kasim   M   Al-­‐‑Aubidy.   Dean   of   Faculty   of   Engineering,  




10. Interview   with   Professor   Khalid   Ismail.   Former   Dean   of   the   Faculty   of  
Linguistics  at  the  University  of  Baghdad.  December  2010  in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
11. Interview  with  Dr  Majid  Al-­‐‑Ani,  assistant  to  the  Cultural  Counsellor  to  the  
Iraqi   Embassy   in   Jordan.   Former   Assistant   to   the   President   of   Al-­‐‑Anbar  
University.  February  2011  in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
12. Interview   with   Professor   Mazin   Kadhim.   Ex-­‐‑Vice-­‐‑President   of   Saddam  
University   and   Dean   of   the   College   of   Engineering.   December   2010,   in  
Amman,  Jordan.  
  
13. Interview   with   former   lecturer   at   the   College   of   Dentistry,   Al-­‐‑Anbar  
University.  February  2011  in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
14. Interview  with  Dr  Munther  Al-­‐‑Tikriti.  Professor  at  Philadelphia  University  
in   Jordan.   Formerly   of   the   University   of   Baghdad,   the   University   of  
Technology,   Scientific   Research   Council,   and   Al-­‐‑Mustansiriya   University.  
February  2011  in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
15. Interview   with   Professor   of   Engineering   at   Philadelphia   University   and  
former   Professor   at   the   University   of   Basra.   February   2011   in   Amman,  
Jordan.  
  
16. Interview  with  former  Manager  of  the  Iraqi  Space  Centre  –  part  of  Military  
Industrial  Commission.  December  2010  in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
17. Interview   with   former   vice-­‐‑President   for   Academic   Affairs   at   al-­‐‑Nahrain  
University.  February  2011  in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
18. Interview  with  Dr  Sadiq  Nasrullah.  Cultural  Attaché  to  the  Embassy  of  the  




19. Interview   with   Dr   Sana   Al-­‐‑Omari,   former   Professor   of   Economics   at   the  
University  of  Baghdad.  February  2011  in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
20. Interview  with   a   former   President   of   Al-­‐‑Mustansiriya   University.   January  
2011  in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
21. Interview  with  Mr  Ahmed  Seraf.  Former  student  of  the  College  of  Chemical  
Engineering,  University  of  Technology.  January  2011  in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
22. Interview  with  Dr  Kahtan  K.  M.  Al-­‐‑Khazraji.  President  of  the  University  of  
Technology.  January  2011  in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
23. Joint   interview   with   two   Scholar   Rescue   Fund   Iraq   funded   Iraqi   scholars  
working  in  Syria.  January  2011  in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
24. Interview   with   Mr   Khaled   Ehsan.   Monitoring   and   Evaluation   Specialist,  
UNDP,  Iraq  Country  Office.  February  2011  in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
25. Interview   with   ex-­‐‑Mamoun   University   student   and   assistant   at   the   Iraqi  
Cultural  Office  in  Amman.  February  2011  in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
26. Interview  with  Professor  Dr  Dlawer  Ala’aldeen.  Former  Minister  of  Higher  
Education   in   the  Kurdistan  Regional  Government  and  Professor  of  Clinical  
Microbiology  at  Nottingham  University.  July  2013  in  Nottingham,  UK.  
  
27. Interview  with  Ms.  Sameerah  Saeed.  Assistant  to  the  Director  of  the  Quality  
Assurance   division,   Ministry   of   Higher   Education,   Kurdistan   Regional  




28. Interview  with  Professor  of  Economics,  University  of  Mosul.  December  2010  
in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
29. Interview   with   Semia   Saadaoui.   Higher   Education   Project   Manager,  
UNESCO  Office  for  Iraq.  January  2011  in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
30. Interview  with   a   SRF   Scholar   resident   in   Syria.   February   2011   in  Amman,  
Jordan.  
  
31. Interview  with  a  SRF  Scholar  at  Princess  Sumaya  University  for  Technology.  
February  2011  in  Amman,  Jordan.  
  
32. Email   interview   with   the   Dean   of   Dijla   University   College.   Response  
received  May  2012.  
  
33. Email   interview  with  President  of  Kufa  University.  Response  received  May  
2012.  
  
34. Email  interview  with  Dr  Mohamed  Al-­‐‑Rubeai.  Former  senior  advisor  to  the  
Ministry   of   Higher   Education   and   Coalition   Provisional   Authority,   and  
Chairman,   Network   of   Iraqi   Scientists   Abroad.   Response   received   August  
2012.  
  
35. Email   interview   with   Dr   Tahir   Al-­‐‑Bakaa.   Former   Minister   of   Higher  
Education   and   Scientific  Research,  Government   of   Iraq.  Response   received  
May  2012.  
  
36. Email   interview  with   Professor  Wayne   Bowen.   Professor   and  Chair   of   the  
Department   of   History,   Southeast   Missouri   State   University   and   former  





37. Email   interview   with   Dr   Arkan   Al   Taie.   Professor   of   Engineer   at   the  
University  of  Technology.  Response  received  August  2013.  
  
LIBYA  
UK-­‐‑Based  Interviews  and  Focus  Groups  
38. Interview   with   Abdulmaula   Hamza.   PhD   Candidate   in   Environmental  
Science,   University   of   Hull,   head   of   the   Hull   Libyan   Society   and   former  
employee  of   the  Ministry  of   the  Environment,  Government  of  Libya.  Hull,  
UK  in  February  2012.  
  
39. Interview  with   lecturer   in  Computing  at   the  University  of  Tripoli  and  PhD  
candidate  at  the  University  of  Salford.  Salford,  UK  in  May  2012.  
  
40. Interview  with  Libyan  PhD  candidate   in  Food  Science   at   the  University  of  
Salford.  Salford,  UK  in  May  2012.  
  
41. Interview  with  Giuma   Sasi.   PhD  Student   at  Department   of  Chemicals   and  
Materials,   Newcastle   University   and   President   of   the   Libyan   Society,  
Newcastle  University.  Newcastle,  UK  in  February  2012.  
  
42. Interview   with   Hamad   Warhed.   PhD   Candidate   in   Business   and  
Management,  University  of  Hull.  Hull,  UK  in  February  2012.  
  
43. Interview   with   Isaac   Larbah.   PhD   candidate   in   Control   Engineering,  
University  of  Hull.  Hull,  UK  in  February  2012.  
  
44. Interview  with   PhD  Candidate   in   Economics.  University   of  Hull,   Business  




45. Interview   with  Majda   Elferjani,   PhD   Candidate   at   the   School   of   the   Built  
Environment,  University  of  Salford.  Salford,  UK  in  May  2012.  
  
46. Interview   with   Mohamed   Eljarh,   PhD   Candidate,   University   of   Derby.  
Derby,  UK  in  March  2012.  
  
47. Interview   with   Mohamed   Gharssalla.   PhD   Candidate   in   Media   and  
Communications,   Department   of   Media   and   Communications,   Sheffield  
Hallam  University.  Sheffield,  UK  in  March  2012.  
  
48. Interview  with  Libyan  PhD  Candidate,  University  of  Leicester.  Leicester,  UK  
in  March  2012.  
  
49. Interview   with   Nabil   Eljaaidi.   PhD   Candidate   in   Management   at   the  
University  of  Hull.  Hull,  UK  in  February  2012.  
  
50. Interview  with  Salah  Ghana.  PhD  Student  in  Faculty  of  Biological  Sciences,  
University  of  Leeds.  Leeds,  UK  in  March  2012.  
  
51. Focus  group  with  six  Libyan  PhD  Candidates  at  the  University  of  Leicester.  
Leicester,  UK  in  March  2012.  
  
  
Field  Interviews  and  Focus  groups  
52. Interview   with   Ahmed   Jehani.   Former   Minister   of   Reconstruction,   former  
Chairman   of   the   Stabilization   Team   of   the   National   Transitional   Council,  
and   founder   of   the   Libya   Development   Policy   Centre.   November   2012   in  
Benghazi,  Libya.  
  
53. Interview   with   Dr   Adil   Al-­‐‑Wefaty.   Engineer   and   former   Professor   of  




54. Interview   with   Dr   Fathi   Al   Arabi,   Consultant   to   the   Ministry   of   Higher  
Education  and  Scientific  Research.  November  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.  
  
55. Interview  with  Dr  Izedin.  Head  of  Higher  College  for  Industrial  Technology.  
October  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
56. Joint   interview   with   two   senior   managers   at   the   Economic   Development  
Board.  November  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
57. Interview   with   Guma   El-­‐‑Gamaty.   Co-­‐‑founder   of   the   Taghyeer   Party.  
October  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.  
  
58. Interview  with  Manager  of  the  Department  of  Fine  Arts  at  the  Academy  for  
Graduate  Studies.  October  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.  
  
59. Interview   with   Obaidat.   Higher   education   consultant.   December   2012   in  
Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
60. Interview  with  Dr  Aboubaker.  Assistant  to  Dean  of  Economics  and  Political  
Science,  Azzaytuna  University.  October  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
61. Interview   with   Dr   Mohamed   Al   Asfar.   Media   Department,   Azzaytuna  
University.  October  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
62. Interview  with  Dr   Salh  Buzwaik.  Head   of   Planning  Council,  Gharyan   and  
Professor   at   the   University   of   the   Jabal   Al-­‐‑Gharb.   December   2012   in  
Gharyan,  Libya.    
  
63. Interview   with   Musbah   Almontasser.   Education   Department,   Planning  




64. Joint   interview   with   the   Deans   of   Science   and   Medicine   at   Misrata  
University.  November  2012  in  Misrata,  Libya.    
  
65. Interview   with   Head   of   Scientific   Affairs   in   the   Faculty   of   Medical  
Technology  in  Misrata.  November  2012  in  Misrata,  Libya.    
  
66. Interview  with  Manager  of  Reconstruction  at  Misrata  University.  November  
2012  in  Misrata,  Libya.    
  
67. Joint  interview  with  Heads  of  the  Departments  Mathematics  and  Pharmacy  
in   the   Faculty   of   Science,   Misrata   University.   November   2012   in   Misrata,  
Libya.    
  
68. Interview  with  the  Head  of  the  Department  of  Training,  Ministry  of  Higher  
Education.  December  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.  
  
69. Interview  with  assistant   to  Dr  Fathi  Akkari,  Ministry  of  Higher  Education.  
December  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
70. Interview  with   Dr   Ibrahim   Saleh.   Deputy  Minister   for   Scientific   Research,  
Ministry   of  Higher   Education   and   Scientific   Research   and   former  Dean   of  
the   Faculty   of   Engineering,   Tripoli   University.   November   2012   in   Tripoli,  
Libya.    
  
71. Interview  with  Dr  Milad  Taher.  Director  of   the  Planning  and  Development  
Department,   Ministry   of   Higher   Education   and   Scientific   Research.  
November  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
72. Interview   with   Dr   Ibrahim   El-­‐‑Ghariani.   President   of   Omar   Al-­‐‑Mukhtar  




73. Interview   with   former   Head   of   the   Student   Union   of   the   Faculty   of  
Engineering  at  Omar  Mukhtar  University.  November  2012  in  Baida,  Libya.    
  
74. Interview   with   Head   of   Computer   Science   Department,   Omar   Mukhtar  
University.  November  2012  in  Baida,  Libya.    
  
75. Interview   with   Mohamed   Yaseen.   Registrar   of   Medicine   Faculty   at   Omar  
Mukhtar  University.  November  2012  in  Baida,  Libya.    
  
76. Interview  with  Mustafa  Alfalani.  President  of  Refak  University.  November  
2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
77. Conversation   with   six   female   students   of   English   Language   at   Nasser  
University.  October  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
78. Focus   group   at   the   Faculty   of   Information   Technology,   Tripoli  University.  
Dr  Abdulsalam  Nuasri,  Former  Head  of  Software  Engineering  Department,  
and   new   Vice-­‐‑Dean   of   Faculty.   Dr   Halal   Dbuli,   Dean   of   the   Faculty   of  
Information   Technology.   Dr   Ibrahim   Merhag,   Head   of   Networking  
Department.  Dr  Abdulsalam  Sherif,  Head  of  Computer  Science.  November  
2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
79. Interview   with   Mrs   Aida   Abushagur.   Lecturer   in   Linguistics,   English  
Language   Department,   Faculty   of   Languages,   Tripoli   University.   October  
2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
80. Interview  with  Deputy  Dean  of  Faculty  of  Arts,  Former  Head  of  Department  




81. Interview   with   Dr   Abdulatif.   Director   of   the   International   Cooperation  
Office  at  Tripoli  University.  October  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
82. Interview  with  Dr  Abdulbasit  Abuazza.  Professor  of  Physics,  Department  of  
Physics,  Tripoli  University  -­‐‑  Head  of  Examination  and  Study  for  Faculty  of  
Science.  October  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
83. Interview   with   Dr   Abdullatif   Mohamed   Karmous.   Dean   of   Faculty   of  
Agriculture,  Tripoli  University.  November  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
84. Interview  with   Dr   Abdulmonim   Alaswad   –   former   Dean   of   IT   Faculty   at  
Tripoli  University.  November  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
85. Interview  with  Dr  Aboubaker  Al-­‐‑Aswad.  Department  of  English  Language,  
Faculty  of  Languages,  University  of  Tripoli.  October  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
86. Interview   with   Dr   Aboubaker   Swehli.   Department   of   Zoology,   Faculty   of  
Science,  University  of  Tripoli  and  International  Cooperation  Office.  October  
2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
87. Interview   with   Dr   Ahmed   Al-­‐‑Atrash.   Former   Dean   of   the   Faculty   of  
Economics   and   Political   Science,   University   of   Tripoli.   October   2012   in  
Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
88. Interview  with  Dr  Ahmed  Khalifa.  Department   of  Economics   and  Political  
Science.  University  of  Tripoli.  October  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
89. Interview   with   Dr   Ahmed   Murad   Ghanuni.   Coordinator   for   Faculty   of  





90. Interview   with   Dr   Atigh   Alhouni.   Professor   of   Zoology,   University   of  
Tripoli.  October  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
91. Interview   with   Dr   Hadi   Omran   Tumi.   Head   of   Civil   Engineering  
Department,   Faculty   of   Engineering,   Tripoli   University.   October   2012   in  
Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
92. Interview  with  Dr  Hussain  Zurganer.  Department   of   Economy,  University  
of  Tripoli.  October  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
93. Interview   with   lecturer   in   the   Department   of   Archaeology,   Nasser  
University.  October  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
94. Interview   with   Dr   Mohamed   Ajaili.   Former   Head   of   English   Language  
Department,   Faculty   of   Languages,   Tripoli   University.   October   2012   in  
Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
95. Interview   with   Dr   Mohamed   Amer.   Head   of   Chemical   Engineering  
Department,  Faculty  of  Sciences,  Tripoli  University.  October  2012  in  Tripoli,  
Libya.    
  
96. Interview  with  Dr  Mohamed  Bakaa.  Department  of  Zoology,  University  of  
Tripoli.  October  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
97. Two   interviews   with   Dr   Mohamed   Mashena,   Dean   of   the   Faculty   of  
Engineering,  and  temporary  President  of   the  University  of  Tripoli.  October  
and  November  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.  
  
98. Interview  with  Dr  Nasr  Salama.  Department  of  Zoology,  Tripoli  University.  




99. Two  interviews  with  Dr  Sami  Khashkusha.  Department  of  Political  Science,  
University  of  Tripoli.  October  and  November  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
100. Interview   with   Dr   Sobhi.   Vice-­‐‑Dean   of   the   Faculty   of   Languages,  
University  of  Tripoli.  November  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
101. Interview  with  Dr   Taher.   Professor   of   Physics   and   former  Head   of  
Department  of  Physics,  University  of  Tripoli.  October  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
102. Interview  with  Dr   Tarek   Basher   Jdeidi.  Head   of   the  Department   of  
Zoology,   Faculty   of   Science,   Tripoli   University.   October   2012   in   Tripoli,  
Libya.  
  
103. Interview   with   Dr   Usama   Al-­‐‑Hadi.   Head   of   the   Department   of  
Architecture   and   Urban   Planning,   Faculty   of   Engineering,   University   of  
Tripoli.  October  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
104. Interview  with  Dr  Zekia.  Head  of  Translation,  Faculty  of  Languages,  
University  of  Tripoli.  November  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
105. Interview  with  Fatima  and  Hanan.  Two  female  Masters  Students   in  
Department  of  Zoology,  University  of  Tripoli.  October  2012  in  Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
106. Interview  with  Ms.  Henan  Saadi.  Head  of  Studies  and  Examinations,  
Department   of   English   Language,   University   of   Tripoli.   October   2012   in  
Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
107. Interview   with   the   Head   of   Archaeology,   University   of   Tripoli.  




108. Group   interview   with   three   female   archaeology   students   at   the  
Department  of  Archaeology,  University  of  Tripoli.  October  2012   in  Tripoli,  
Libya.    
  
109. Interview   with   Thuraya   Al-­‐‑Wifati.   Lecturer   in   Translation  
Department,   Faculty   of   Languages,   University   of   Tripoli.   October   2012   in  
Tripoli,  Libya.    
  
110. Interview  with  Dr   Khalid   Karmaji.   Dean   of   Engineering   at   Zawiya  
University.  December  2012  in  Zawiya,  Libya.    
  
111. Interview  with  the  Dean  of  Science  at  Zawiya  University.  December  
2012  in  Zawiya,  Libya.    
  
112. Interview  with  Dr  Mustafa  Sahoub.  President  of  Zawiya  University.  













Appendix  D:  Photographs  
  
Photo  A:  Unfinished  campus  construction  at  Tripoli  University  Campus  B  
  









Photo  D:  Structural  damage  to  Misrata  University  
  




Photo  F:  Heavily  damaged  building  -­‐‑  Faculty  of  Medical  Technology  in  Misrata  
  




     
CARA        Council  for  Assisting  Refugee  Academics,  London  
CPA         Coalition  Provisional  Authority  
CSR         Council  for  Scientific  Research  
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